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Preface 
 
This book is a collection of all the papers and essays published in the 
Special Issue “Nihilism and the Meaning of Life: A Philosophical Dialogue 
with James Tartaglia,” Journal of Philosophy of Life, Vol.7, No.1, 2017, 
pp.1-315. Two years ago, in 2015, we published the book Reconsidering 
Meaning in Life: A Philosophical Dialogue with Thaddeus Metz, and after 
the publication, one of the contributors to the above book, James Tartaglia, 
published his own intriguing philosophical book on the meaning of life and 
its connection with nihilism, entitled Philosophy in a Meaningless Life: A 
System of Nihilism, Consciousness and Reality (Bloomsbury 2016). I 
thought it would be a good idea to have a symposium on his book in the 
Journal of Philosophy of Life. 
I invited ten philosophers who have a strong interest in this topic, and 
edited a special volume dedicated to Tartaglia’s book. After receiving their 
papers, I asked James to write a reply to each of them, and in July this year 
we published a special issue in the Journal. You can read all of them, along 
with the replies by Tartaglia, in this single book. 
Nihilism is an important topic in the field of philosophy of life. 
Currently, anti-natalism is hotly debated in the context of the meaning of/in 
life in analytic philosophy. The idea of anti-natalism goes back to ancient 
Greek literature and philosophy in Europe, and ancient Indian philosophy 
and religions in Asia. I believe that tackling the theme of nihilism will 
contribute a lot to contemporary philosophical discussions about the 
meaning of life and death in the contemporary world. 
 
 
 
Masahiro Morioka 
Professor, Waseda University 
Editor-in-chief, Journal of Philosophy of Life 
July 31, 2017. 
 
*Masahiro Morioka (ed.) Nihilism and the Meaning of Life: A Philosophical 
Dialogue with James Tartaglia. Journal of Philosophy of Life, (July 2017): i. 
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Nihilism and the Meaning of Life   
James Tartaglia   
Senior Lecturer in Philosophy, Keele University   
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In Philosophy in a Meaningless Life, I set out to reaffirm the question 
of the meaning of life in the face of outdated, positivistic instincts, the 
scientistic and anti-religious sentiment that pervades much of contemporary 
intellectual culture, and, in no small dose, I think, an existential discomfort 
that makes people reluctant to take up such questions. When I looked to 
recent discussions under the ‘meaning of life’ heading, I also felt the need 
to save the question from a group of contemporary value theorists who 
have tried to make it something it is not, and to show that the genuine 
article is just as interesting for non-believers as it is for those of faith. 
Prominent as this agenda became in the final product, however, it emerged 
from other aims.  
When I began to study philosophy, I wanted to know what it was – 
what made a discussion or topic specifically philosophical – and was 
amazed at the evasion, disinterest and even scorn which this natural 
question typically elicits within the profession. It has been neglected just as 
much as the meaning of life, and I came to think this was no coincidence; 
for as I argue in the book, when philosophy turned away from the meaning 
of life, it turned away from its own unifying theme. This pushed 
philosophy to the margins of culture. For outside the discipline (inside as 
well, for the most part), nobody has much of a clue what philosophy is 
supposed to be; and the one question you would have thought would be 
prime philosophical territory is officially not – I cannot think of a better 
recipe for getting people to lose interest. When people are exposed to 
philosophy, however, it can elicit a passion that is the envy of other 
disciplines. This suggested to me that a lack of self-consciousness was 
preventing philosophy from fulfilling its proper role. I trace this lack of 
self-consciousness principally to a lack of self-confidence in the face of 
science. 
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Traditional works of philosophy, of the kind that still enthuse people 
about the subject, are typically wide-ranging, interconnected, squarely 
implicated with matters of natural interest, and aimed at a certain kind of 
systematic completeness of understanding; they are philosophy-like. The 
philosophy that predominates in the contemporary analytic tradition is 
piece-meal and fragmented; it is science-like. If the results of this work 
were to be pulled together into something of general interest, then you feel 
that, just as with science, this would have to be done in a popular book that 
abstracts from the difficulties to distil the interesting, take-home messages. 
I do not see this happening; and I am not sure that there are enough 
take-home messages around these days that people would find interesting. I 
worry that the interest is too often solely professional; and worse, that it is 
sometimes essentially professional, as competing ‘researchers’ vie to carve 
out their own distinctive niches in debates. All academics engage in the 
latter to some extent, of course, but in science, burying your head in 
whatever research programme is within reach can make a certain kind of 
scientific, rather than just professional, sense; for the visible, real-world 
effects of science are the collective result of lots of people doing just that. 
However this model strikes me as much less appropriate to philosophy, 
where the only visible, real-world effect is human understanding. Science 
provides us with technological solutions, as well as understanding which 
may or may not be of general interest; but philosophy produces only 
understanding.  
This understanding should not be confined to the profession if, as I 
think, philosophy deals with issues of natural human interest. I am not 
saying that philosophers have a duty to reach out to the public; I would 
have a written a very different book if that had been my main concern. 
Neither am I saying that the piece-meal approach is without merit; it instils 
discipline and responsiveness to peers, and much great philosophy has been 
produced this way. I am saying that since philosophy deals with issues of 
natural human interest, it should provide answers that cater to those 
interests; such that if people make the effort to understand what 
philosophers are saying, and they succeed, then they do not feel cheated.  
If you believe that philosophy as a piece-meal, collective endeavour 
will ultimately provide better answers than the traditional approach did, and 
which can consequently be disseminated to satisfy natural philosophical 
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interests, then it may still seem good to you that the piece-meal approach 
has eclipsed the systematic one. But then you must have faith that the 
collation and dissemination will ultimately transpire, rather than be 
indefinitely deferred as debates inconclusively fizzle-out to be replaced by 
new ones. That is, you must have faith that ways of philosophically 
understanding the world, and thereby meeting the natural human interests 
which the discipline arose from – and is still sustained by – really are being 
produced in this way. Moreover, you must have faith that debates come to 
dominate journals because they represent the state-of-the-art culmination of 
a history of philosophical discussion; and that they do not leave behind, for 
forgotten reasons and happenstance, large swathes of thought which only 
historians of dead philosophers continue to write about, but which will 
almost inevitably resurface in tomorrow’s leading debates.  
Lacking this kind of faith, I set out to write a traditional philosophy 
book. In that way, I was able assure myself that I was doing my job; for I 
take a long-view of my job-description. The topic I wanted to build this 
book around was consciousness. Consciousness was the topic of my Ph.D., 
and of all the topics I have come across in contemporary debates, it is the 
one that has gripped me the most. Moreover, I knew that consciousness 
would lead me into the metaphysics of time, which sounded good for my 
traditional aspirations, and I had been persuaded by Richard Rorty’s 
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature that there was a deep connection 
between modern concerns about consciousness and the ancient problem of 
universals. So far so good; but I still needed an account of consciousness, 
and more importantly, I still wanted to know what philosophy was. 
For many years I struggled to formulate a physicalist account of 
consciousness that I could believe, for I was sure that physicalism must be 
true, even if, to echo Thomas Nagel, I found it incredibly difficult to see 
how it could be true. When my overarching concern about the nature of 
philosophical inquiry finally led me to ask why anyone would care, as I did 
so much, about how consciousness could be fitted into a physical world, I 
finally arrived at the question of the meaning of life. (For some days, a 
passage by Heidegger about science had been stuck in my head, like a 
song; then it just ‘clicked’.) From that point onwards, all the pieces began 
to fall into place. I soon rejected physicalism, and am now as thoroughly 
anti-physicalist as the proverbial ex-smoker is anti-cigarettes. This allowed 
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me to write my book; which panned out as follows.  
 
2. Synopsis 
 
In the introduction, I begin by tackling the popular notion that the 
question of the meaning of life is hopelessly obscure. It is in fact perfectly 
straightforward, but in an intellectual culture dominated by science, and 
displaying strong anti-philosophical tendencies, the ‘what does it even 
mean, anyway?’-idea has provided an easy way of dismissing what is 
perhaps the most potent philosophical question of all. Another popular 
avoidance strategy is to interpret the question, however tenuously, as a 
question about the social meaning which we build up within our lives. I 
argue that this conflation stems from 19th century overreactions to the 
prospect of nihilism which sprang from the false assumption that nihilism 
is bad. But only a meaning of life could be bad, not the lack of one.  
The introduction ends with an appendix, in which I launch into a 
polemic against the contemporary analytic approach to social meaning; an 
approach which either dismisses, or tries to pass itself off as, inquiry into 
the meaning of life. I regret the tone I took here, partly because it may 
overshadow what I think are some good arguments against the main 
theories in the field, but mainly because the philosophers I attack revived 
interest in this crucial area, for which they should be congratulated; I made 
the latter point in the book, but a little too reluctantly. The only excuse I 
can offer is the rather pathetic one that I had been reading a lot of this stuff 
at the time, and some it, especially the examples adversely comparing 
ordinary people with the great and the good, in terms of how meaningful 
their lives were deemed to be, had annoyed me. But I wrote with no malice, 
either here or in other pieces of the time, but rather with an excess of 
enthusiasm inspired by having seen my book to completion, or knowing 
that I soon would; anyone who knows me would have no doubt about the 
truth of this. My views have not changed or softened; in fact I have now 
seen even more fundamental problems with the social meaning agenda 
(Tartaglia 2016a). But in making my critique, I should have thought less 
about honesty and providing a good read, and more about courtesy and 
diplomacy. Since I targeted leading figures, I trust this was water off a 
duck’s back; I am sure it would have been, because great experience instils 
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wisdom of the kind I am still learning. But if I did offend anybody, then I 
sincerely and publicly apologise. 
In chapter one, which survived relatively unscathed from my first draft 
for over a decade, I claim that human life is meaningless, but does not 
normally seem like that because our social understanding of the world 
focuses our attention on goals; we normally have ‘something to do’. 
Nevertheless nihilism ticks away in the background and reveals itself 
through our susceptibility to boredom, which arises when our engagement 
with the social framework subsides; we find ourselves with ‘nothing to do’. 
After criticising Heidegger’s existentialist analyses of both boredom and 
anxiety, on the grounds that they are rooted in a misguided redemptive 
agenda (always a danger for creative philosophers, I think), I connect the 
question of the meaning of life to another of the great issues of natural 
philosophical curiosity: the cosmological question of why there is 
something rather than nothing. The connection is that life and the fact of 
existence are both things we naturally expect to be able to make a certain 
kind of sense of, but find that we cannot. In understanding that we cannot, I 
think we can satisfy the curiosity behind this question. The chapter 
concludes with a critique of Nietzsche’s conception of nihilism, which is 
much more loaded than mine is. 
In chapter two, I look at the various intellectual defence mechanisms 
which 20th century philosophers devised to deal with nihilism; the prospect 
of the truth of nihilism has evidently struck terror into many hearts. But 
there was no need for protection, consolation, or resignation, since nihilism 
is neither a threat nor a challenge; it only comes to seem that way because 
of inherited prejudice and intellectual error. Thus some have argued that 
nihilism renders life absurd; but such views only make sense within a 
religious perspective that the nihilist rejects. So nihilists should not be 
absurdists. Others try to avoid nihilism by defending the humanist view 
that people make their own meaning. Now people obviously do make their 
own meaning, but social meaning is a different issue: for there to be a 
meaning of life would require a transcendent context of meaning of the 
kind supplied by religions, and since humanists agree with me that there is 
no good reason to believe in one, they should accept the inevitable result, 
namely nihilism. A radical form of humanism is relativistic scepticism 
about objective truth, of the kind promoted by ‘postmodernists’ (an 
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entrenched and useful label, which most of the thinkers in question try in 
vain to disavow). But this can be discounted for obvious reasons; people 
can decide to uncover as many objective truths about the world as they like. 
I find the circumstances in which these radical, and radically implausible, 
views came to prominence, far more interesting than the views themselves. 
For they were yet another unnecessary response to nihilism: if nothing is 
true, so went the underlying thought, then nihilism cannot be either. 
In chapter three, I turned to my overriding concern: achieving 
philosophical self-consciousness by answering the question of what 
philosophy is. I have since produced a neater, more journal-friendly version 
of this chapter’s core theory about the unity of philosophy (Tartaglia 
2016b); but the position itself did not change. However, I am not 
particularly happy with how, within the book chapter, I subsequently went 
on to use this position to answer scepticism about philosophy. What I say is 
along the right lines, but the ideas had not been properly developed at the 
time. More importantly, I had not yet seen their importance; I was 
primarily thinking of philosophy-scepticism as a dumb and annoying meme 
which philosophers had taken too seriously. But I now see that it is much 
more than that. 
I begin the chapter by supporting my view that the question of the 
meaning of life is a natural philosophical concern by discussing the Epic of 
Gilgamesh, thereby taking us right back to the beginning of human 
literature. I was blown away, on first reading this work, when I discovered 
that its dominant theme is the meaning of life. Although I was nervous 
about treading into scholarly waters of which I know very little, I simply 
had to include it; for although some of my speculations about its intentions 
may be miles off, despite my best efforts, my central point – namely that 
the authors were thinking about the meaning of life – is something I would 
be very surprised to be dissuaded of. 
I go on to observe that although the question of the meaning of life is 
paradigmatically philosophical, the same can be said about the traditional 
questions of metaphysics, epistemology and ethics. To understand 
philosophy, as I see it, the connection between all of these areas of 
philosophical concern must be understood. The conclusion I came to is that 
the connection is the question of the meaning of life. More exactly, I claim 
that philosophy is rooted in attempts to discover the meaning of life 
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through a description of the world employing the concept of transcendence. 
Philosophy’s various and diverse problems have arisen in this attempt, I 
argue, but have now often become far removed from their natural sources 
of curiosity. Thus at the end of the chapter, I offer an account of 
constructive inquiry in philosophy, inspired by Meno’s Paradox, which is 
designed to counteract this problem; I have used it ever since.  
With my account of the nature of philosophy on the table, I put it to 
work in providing an answer to the rampant philosophy-scepticism that 
circulates in our day. This scepticism is based on philosophy’s apparent 
lack of a unified subject-matter, its a priori method, and its perceived lack 
of progress. The point I did not place nearly enough emphasis on in the 
book, however, is that these perceived problems arise through an invidious 
comparison with science. The basic thought, as I see it now, is that science 
is beyond reproach, philosophy has features that are different from science, 
and therefore philosophy is bad. A popular weapon against philosophy that 
science-worshippers use, is to disparage it as an ‘armchair’ pursuit; and 
defenders of philosophy have displayed dire political instincts by actually 
embracing this description. But seriously, do the action-men and -women 
of science really write their research papers on the go? Do they not sit at 
desks? When they get up, they sometimes conduct experiments, of course; 
because they are scientists. But when philosophers get up, they live and 
they think; the two often merge. Philosophers often think at their desks, but 
you would hope that scientists do too. If experimentation really is the 
be-all-and-end-all, I wonder what experiment I might have performed to 
see the connection between consciousness, the meaning of life, and the 
nature of philosophy, which inspired this book? And if thought is obsolete, 
how is scientific investigation to be rationally directed? In any case, the 
relation between philosophy and science is something I shall treat much 
more fully in the sequel to Meaningless, which I am currently preparing, 
and which is entitled Gods and Titans.  
When philosophers – predominantly in the English-speaking world – 
turned their backs on concerns like the meaning of life, I think that they lost 
their sense of identity and, looking around for a new one, became fixated 
on science; some of the results of this were scepticism about philosophy, 
aversion to self-reflection, and the piece-meal approach of analytic 
philosophy. But since this new model of inquiry was not universally 
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embraced, a split took root in 20th century philosophy. I think the situation 
is more complex with the continental side of the split, where interest in the 
meaning of life and in providing holistic understanding remained more 
prominent, and where it seems to have been art, literature and politics, 
rather than science and mathematics, that provided the new inspiration. I 
tentatively identify with the analytic side, because I favour argumentative 
analysis in clear prose, which that side better preserved from the 
philosophy that predominated before the split. However, I always 
remember one of my teachers telling me, with a knowing look, that, ‘you’re 
going to be a continental philosopher!’ 
In chapter four, I take up one of the hottest topics of debate within 
analytic philosophy since the 1950s: the problem of consciousness. 
Enthusiasm for this debate, which is essentially about whether science can 
tell us what consciousness is, shows no signs of abating. Philosophers who 
argue that consciousness cannot be incorporated into the scientific 
world-view of physicalism, or at least that it presents very serious problems 
for science which nobody yet knows how to overcome, continually 
infuriate philosophers who think that consciousness is obviously as natural 
as the birds and the bees, and hence that science can tell us everything there 
is to know about it. In turn, philosophers of the latter kind continually 
infuriate those of the former by implying, or even openly stating, that 
consciousness does not exist. What is primarily at stake in this debate, I 
have since argued, is philosophy’s voice: for physicalism is a metaphysical 
position which silences that voice (Tartaglia 2016c). Physicalism 
endeavours to be the final metaphysical position, which after its triumph, 
would quietly forget its own status as metaphysical. As I see it, then, the 
reason the two sides are so entrenched is that the struggle concerns 
philosophy’s future. If consciousness (or perhaps a related metaphysical 
concept that will replace it) continues to contextualise the scientific 
world-view for us, then philosophy will have a future. If not, then I doubt it 
very much; and so much the worse for us.    
After explaining the problem as vividly as I can, I begin by arguing that 
the distinction between indirect and direct awareness is a red herring in this 
area. For unless we deny that there are any conscious perceptual states, of 
the kind you and I are apparently in right now, then we have no choice but 
to think of experience as providing us with indirect awareness of the world 
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via a causally mediated process. I then argue that all the various attempts 
that have been made to incorporate consciousness into the physical world 
inevitably result in what I call ‘revisionism’; because they must revise our 
conceptions of either consciousness or the physical world, if they are to 
make physicalism work. But revisionism is untenable. The dominant kind, 
which seeks to revise our conception of consciousness, is untenable 
because our ordinary conception of consciousness will never go away – 
even from the minds of the revisionists themselves. No matter how well 
you internalise these theories, consciousness will not seem to be what they 
say it is. Not only will you go back to thinking of it in the ordinary way 
when you put the theory aside – that is, as some kind of inner presence, 
such as a visual image which only you can ‘see’ – but you will think of it 
that way even in the act of telling yourself you should not; no matter how 
often you repeat the physicalist mantra. This is hardly surprising, given that 
human beings have always thought essentially like this, as far as we know, 
and have constructed their entire world-view on this basis; a world-view 
that physicalists completely rely upon, thereby demonstrating their 
inattention to epistemology. How sensible would it be, I wonder, to insist 
that triangles have four sides, when every time you look at one, or think 
about triangles, they clearly seem to have three?  
Now my PC is currently displaying all the sentences I just wrote, and 
we could easily make it ‘say’ them too. It could say that, ‘I, the PC, seem to 
have inner experiences, and cannot shake this impression, despite my 
physicalist convictions.’ The revisionist thinks my situation is essentially 
the same as the PC’s would be; for as I argue in the chapter, this is the only 
stable version of physicalism about consciousness around, namely the one 
commonly known as ‘eliminativism’, but which now seems to be adopting 
the improved title of ‘illusionism’ (Tartaglia 2016c). However, I do not 
think the case for physicalism, such that it is, is remotely strong enough to 
get me to believe that the PC and I are in the same metaphysical boat; 
whereas I find the case for thinking that physicalism is a naïve metaphysic 
which philosophers embraced because of their reverence for science, to be 
very plausible indeed.  
Of course, physicalists will scream that they never said that I was just 
like my PC; and that is true enough. But the ones with a relatively stable 
position, the ‘illusionists’, do say that I only seem to be conscious because I 
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make false judgements. And though they will go on to say that my PC 
cannot make judgements as I can, this can only be through appeal to my 
greater physical complexity, integration with my environment, etc. That is, 
they will appeal to objective conditions that cannot possibly be relevant to 
understanding the objective / subjective gulf. A nice illustration of this 
point which I use in the chapter is that of the physical differences between 
colour- and black-and-white cameras (the old-fashioned kind). Told that 
the cameras are conscious, physical information will explain the difference 
between their visual experiences; but it will never tell you that they have 
visual experiences. Yet physicalism is a metaphysic which needs to be able 
to tell us when and why conscious experience arises from certain physical 
systems, but not others, as a condition of its own success. It does not avoid 
this requirement by substituting ‘false judgements that there are conscious 
experiences’ for ‘conscious experiences’; it just lengthens the terminology. 
If physicalists insist that the PC cannot make these false judgements, it is 
only because they think it is not conscious. But the task of explaining how 
consciousness (or: the right kind of false judgement) arises from the 
physical world is impossible. It arises because physicalism is a metaphysic 
that forgets its own starting point. 
For those wondering what this has to do with the meaning of life, the 
answer emerges in chapter five, which is the first of three chapters that 
provide the core of my metaphysic. In this crucial chapter, I present a new 
(I think) solution to the problem of consciousness, which is neither 
physicalist nor dualist nor idealist. According to the ‘Transcendent 
Hypothesis’, which like any philosophical hypothesis can only be tested by 
thinking through the implications, we have as much prospect of 
understanding how experiences could be brain states, as we would during a 
dream of understanding how dream experiences could be states of the brain 
within the dream. That is to say, no prospect at all: because dream 
experience does not ontologically belong to the dream-world. And 
likewise, if the hypothesis is correct, waking experience does not 
ontologically belong to the objective world: it is transcendent. Thus 
reflection on consciousness and the meaning of life bring us to the same 
place; and in a variety of ways, I think this has always been the direction of 
travel in philosophy. Moreover I think it has been the right direction, since 
reality is transcendent.  
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If reality is meaningless and transcendent, this immediately explains the 
distinctive dialectic we witness throughout the history of philosophy, in 
which repeated attempts, repeatedly resisted, have been made to close 
down the conceptual space of transcendence. The instinctive mistrust of 
transcendence which drives this process is mistaken, but it is a natural 
enough one for those who, like myself, do not think there is a meaning of 
life, and who accept that our objective, physical way of thinking about the 
world provides all the reason we need to dismiss this possibility. I still have 
the instinctive mistrust to the extent that I think most people have been 
attracted to transcendence because of the prospect of a meaning of life. But 
I overcome it by reflecting on the many rational lines of thought which 
have led philosophers to the same place, whatever their motivations; and 
also the mess which metaphysics gets into when it tries to deny 
transcendence. The equilibrium, I think, lies in a combination of nihilism 
and transcendence. I am fully aware that in defending this combination, I 
am likely to bifurcate my readers between those who like the nihilism but 
not the transcendence, and those who like the transcendence but not the 
nihilism; I am already beginning to witness this. But the consolation is that 
my account predicts this, which is a fact that some others may find 
persuasive. 
My guiding thought about consciousness is that it creates differential 
contexts of existence, and on this basis I explain that our positive 
conceptions of mental states are misrepresentations which allow us to 
articulate a world. As I follow through on this agenda into deeper 
theoretical waters than had hitherto been explored in the book, I try to show 
how the theory makes new sense of the distinctions between introspection 
and perception, appearance and reality, primary and secondary qualities, 
and realism and idealism. My hope is that those who follow me this far will 
no longer immediately associate ‘transcendence’ with mysticism, religious 
yearning or, indeed, general wackiness (I do not equate these, but many 
do). For in my view, the transcendent is everything. Name the most 
ordinary and well-understood thing you can think of; on my view, that 
thing ‘belongs’, in the loosest possible sense of the word, to transcendent 
reality. If it exists, then it must so ‘belong’; given that reality is 
transcendent. The transcendent, as I understand it, is not some ethereal 
realm that occasionally teases us with its elusive presence. It is all of this 
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stuff. My point is that our objective understanding simply cannot be 
capturing the nature of this stuff, given certain facts about the world, such 
as that we are conscious and exist in the present. But nevertheless, this 
objective understanding, which will only seem to be flawed if you make the 
mistake of interpreting it as a metaphysic, allows us to form the reasonable 
hypothesis that reality is transcendent, and thereby allows us to make 
metaphysical sense of it.  
In chapter six, I explore another philosophical route to transcendence, 
this time via time. Given the connection between transcendence and the 
question of the meaning of life which I set out before, this builds my case 
for the centrality of this question to philosophical inquiry, while allowing 
me to further develop the metaphysic of the Transcendent Hypothesis. I 
begin the chapter by bringing things down to earth for a while – by which I 
mean from the philosophical art of justification, to the matters of natural 
human interest which it ultimately serves – by revealing connections 
between common anxieties about time, and the philosophical claim that 
time is unreal. By this method, which I employ throughout the book, my 
metaphysic remains rooted and purposeful, with its value plain. I then 
move on to reject Heidegger’s revisionary conception of time – thereby 
completing the critique of Heidegger initiated in chapter one – before 
making the case that attempts to dissipate the counterintuitive 
consequences of the ‘block universe’ theory inspired by modern physics, 
are hampered by the consciousness revisionism which I diagnosed in 
chapter four.  
This sets the scene for my continued exploration of the consequences of 
the Transcendent Hypothesis, which, as I now argue, can show us how to 
accept the block conception, thereby paying due respect to objective 
thought, without being forced into an untenable denial of the fact that we 
experience the world from the privileged perspective of the present. The 
key to being able to make this move is realising that there is both an 
objective and transcendent sense of ‘now’, and that there is no more reason 
to think experience belongs to objective time than to objective space. I 
conclude that the characteristic perplexities of philosophical reflection on 
time result from attempting to superimpose the transcendent ‘now’ upon 
the objective world. I end the chapter by relating my position to ideas from 
the Chan / Zen Buddhist tradition. I think that Dōgen was driving at the 
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same point as me; but in any case, I find his example of firewood turning to 
ash, with which I open the chapter, fascinating and well-worth sharing. 
In chapter seven, I move onto the Western philosophical problem par 
excellence, namely the problem of universals. To illustrate: we experience 
many different particular red things, but what is redness itself? Whenever I 
teach this topic, I reflect that I could have been doing much the same thing 
at any time during the last two-and-a-half millennia; which is one reason 
why I like my job so much. Glorious as the problem is, however, it has 
become rather dusty and arcane, making it a challenge to get today’s 
students to empathise and fully engage; and when I read contemporary 
writings about the problem, although I am glad they continue to flow, I do 
sometimes wonder what the authors think they are up to. As such, I begin 
the chapter by trying to bring things down to earth again, showing that we 
actually do have natural concerns about universals, and that they dovetail 
with and motivate Plato’s monumental metaphysic of universals.  
After rejecting a strand of scepticism about the universal / particular 
distinction which originates with Nietzsche, I connect the ancient but still 
ongoing debate between nominalist and realist positions on this issue, with 
debates about consciousness and time. We witness exactly the same 
contours: efforts are made to either deny the existence of a phenomenon 
(real universals, consciousness, the temporal present), or else to squeeze it 
into the objective world. The motivation is always to close down the space 
of transcendence, within which a meaning of life might reside; but these 
efforts always fail because reality is transcendent. Thus the debates roll on 
and on. Once more I invoke the Transcendent Hypothesis to try to resolve 
the standoff. First I try to show how the problem of universals is just as 
intimately connected with consciousness as time is, by explaining how the 
roots of the modern conception of consciousness reside in Greek 
metaphysics. I do not think our conception of consciousness is ‘modern’ in 
any very substantive sense – I think it is natural, since people have always 
thought of their experience subjectively (Homer did; see Tartaglia 2017) – 
but I do think that philosophy came to thematise this conception more 
explicitly, as the appearance / reality distinction developed to fit a changing 
world. 
I then present a new argument to show that the instantiation of 
universals is required by our conception of experience as a self-sustaining 
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reality. However I do not conclude that this implies the existence of 
universals, and thereby vindicates realism, because, as I have by this point 
been arguing since chapter five, our only positive conception of experience 
is a misrepresentation derived from the objective world. I end the chapter 
with a discussion of representation, which is a notion I previously needed 
to simply rely upon in order to get this far. This allows me to explain the 
ontological status which my metaphysic provides to the objective, physical 
world; and that is as far as the metaphysic develops in this book.  
I now read the final, eighth chapter as thoroughly transitional, since it 
begins to take up a theme, namely that of philosophical and scientific 
understanding in the midst of ceaseless technological advance, which will 
be central to the sequel, Gods and Titans; the new book will also give me 
the opportunity to further develop the metaphysic so as to incorporate free 
will, personal identity and truth. Providing this transitional link was 
certainly not my intention at the time, but nevertheless, it was surprisingly 
soon after I finished Meaningless that the plot of the new one started 
coming together. 
In this chapter, in addition to some inevitable recapitulation and 
consolidation, my main concern is with showing how my position 
establishes the (relative) autonomy of philosophy. Science cannot solve 
philosophical problems because its role is to describe the objective world; 
while philosophy’s concern is with the status of the objective world within 
the context of transcendence. I anticipate that philosophy will continue to 
oscillate between affirmations and denials of transcendence, but 
nevertheless welcome this as a fulfilment of its social role: to maintain a 
rational discussion about transcendence. Against populist, 
science-worshiping atheism, I argue that religious believers have seen 
something important, regardless of how they got there: for there is a 
transcendent context, and they are only wrong to think that it is a context of 
meaning. And in a thoroughly transitional ending (with hindsight), I argue 
that the provision of a rational way of thinking about these matters, as our 
social framework advances in ways that make it harder to see, is something 
philosophy uniquely has to offer us. 
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3. Transition 
 
And that is the book. If you are reading this symposium in the right 
order, then the main event is about to commence. But before it does, I want 
to do two things. The first is to thank the ten philosophers who agreed to 
comment on Meaningless. They have very generously given me the 
opportunity to reflect on and develop my work in the company of thinkers I 
really respect; money can buy you a Bentley Continental, but not that. It is 
particularly gratifying that the line-up includes both my teacher (Valberg) 
and my student (Balmer). Above all, however, I would like to thank the 
editor, Masahiro Morioka, since this was all his idea. Setting up this journal 
showed great foresight, and I suspect that its significance to philosophy 
will steadily increase. 
The second thing I shall do is respond to the three reviews of the book 
that have been published to date. Usually when I read book reviews – and 
always when I write them – I want to know how the author would respond. 
And yet there is no institutional mechanism for this; which to my mind 
removes a great source of philosophical value which academic reviewing 
could have. In the absence of a Journal of Philosophical Replies, then, this 
symposium strikes me as an ideal forum in which to take the measure of an 
extra three critical responses to my work. 
 
4. Leach, Hawkins and Bennett-Hunter 
 
In the review by Stephen Leach (2016), an elegant summary of the 
book is followed by two interesting criticisms. The first is that we have no 
way of knowing whether or not life is meaningless, and hence I have no 
justification for dismissing the possibility of a meaning of life as ‘idle’, as I 
like to put it. He says that, ‘All agree, including Tartaglia, that the obvious 
place to look for the meaning of life is in death. But we know nothing 
about death. Therefore we have no justification for describing one 
possibility as idle and another more likely.’ He concludes that since we 
cannot know what will happen after we die, and hence whether life is 
meaningful or meaningless, it follows that life is absurd. This is because we 
fear disappointment at death, but it is a disappointment we will never 
experience. Leach thinks this phenomenon is at the root of a gulf that exists 
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between how we think life should be and how it actually is, such that we 
are continually surprised by disappointment, but rationally should not be. 
This gulf permeates our social lives and thereby renders them absurd.  
If we all fear being disappointed at death on discovering that life is 
meaningless, it seems to follow that nihilists like me are secretly hoping we 
are wrong. If there is any truth to this, however, it is surely not that we 
incoherently fear a disappointment we will never feel, but rather that we 
fear death; that is, our last moments actually being our last moments, rather 
than the final countdown to an after-life. You might perhaps make some 
headway in persuading me that I would be happy to be wrong about 
nihilism if that meant transitioning at death into something new and not 
altogether worse. But then, I do not see anything inherently absurd in that. I 
can quite reasonably hope for something which I nevertheless consider to 
be overwhelmingly unlikely. And generally, I see nothing absurd in 
maintaining a positive attitude to life, so long as it is grounded in a 
reasonable assessment of the facts. It might, after all, be perfectly rational 
to try to escape from a burning building, even if you think it is 
overwhelmingly likely that you will die in there; you never know, you 
might just make it. Leach thinks we are constantly disappointed but should 
not be because we should expect the worst. That sounds like pessimism to 
me, which can be just as absurd as optimism if not grounded in a 
reasonable assessment of the facts. Irrational optimism generates 
unnecessary disappointment, but irrational pessimism generates 
unnecessary miserableness; and disappointment, unlike miserableness, is a 
spur to try again. 
The reason Leach thinks my nihilism is unjustified, and that we do not 
know what will happen at death, is that he neglects a central aspect of my 
position, namely that without misrepresenting it, we cannot know anything 
about transcendent reality except that it exists. At a first glance, this might 
seem to reinforce Leach’s point, since it would be illegitimate to form any 
positive hypothesis about what happens to consciousness at death; whether 
it ends or continues. Surely, then, according to my own principles, we 
simply cannot know. However, to ask about ‘what will happen’ inserts the 
question into the time of the objective world; we can ask the question only 
by misrepresenting consciousness as something it is not, that is, as 
something objective. The question only makes sense within the 
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misrepresentation we live by, then. And within this misrepresentation of 
consciousness as temporally ordered states in causal communion with the 
objective world, the states are correlated with the objective states of living 
human beings, and we have absolutely no reason to think they are 
correlated with dead bodies, or that they can float free of the objective 
world altogether; if the latter even makes sense. Objective thought does, 
however, give us plenty of reason to think that our attachment to the idea of 
an after-life, and indeed a meaning of life, is the product of wishful 
thinking and intellectual justifications designed to serve it. So given that 
the question directs us to objective thought, we must believe what it tells 
us. Similarly, when assessing nihilism, we have nothing to go on except 
objective thought; even though the recognition of transcendence opens up 
the idle possibility that religious believers guessed right. 
Leach’s second criticism is that the connection I make between 
boredom and nihilism is unwarranted. The connection in question is that 
boredom occurs when our immersion in the social framework drops away, 
thereby leaving us exposed to nihilism, such that our susceptibility to 
boredom shows a latent sensitivity to this truth, of the kind which 
metaphysics can exploit. But Leach says that it is just as likely – although 
he seems to actually think it is more likely – that boredom is a product of 
our immersion in the framework which ‘incites’ thoughts about nihilism. 
Thus rather than boredom being a window onto nihilism, it may rather be 
that belief in nihilism is a product of boredom. This is clearly where he 
thinks I went astray, because earlier in the review, he surmised that I am 
someone who is highly susceptible to boredom. Maybe so, Dr. Freud, but 
idiosyncratic entry points to philosophy are either false starts or lucky 
breaks: the reasoning determines which. 
Boredom has its uses within the framework, to be sure. When it hits in, 
it can make you realise that your time would be better spent elsewhere. 
However it is not always like that, for tasks sometimes bore us when we 
have no doubt that pressing on is the best possible way to meet the 
framework commitments that matter most to us. Boredom is essentially 
disruptive of our framework engagement; evidently so when it is just a 
hindrance, but equally so when boredom will ultimately be useful to that 
engagement by providing the spur to re-evaluate our goals. However, in all 
cases the phenomenon is the same: we are not gripped by goals. 
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Suppose Leach is right that this is a kind of framework engagement; 
perhaps it developed because of its potentially useful consequences, or 
perhaps it is an aberrant engagement that arose through a kind of 
malfunction. Thus although it would seem to me in boredom that the goals 
do not grip me, they actually do: in a boring sort of way. The objection 
would then be that when my goals grip me in this special, boring way, I 
mistake this for them not gripping me at all, and thereby falsely come to a 
nihilist conclusion. However, it does not follow that the conclusion is false. 
For even if I can never shed my immersion in the framework, the nihilist 
thoughts this special kind of immersion incites in me will still reveal that 
my goals are a product of ordinary immersion, rather than the meaning of 
life; for the special immersion will never generate its own goals, even if it 
inspires more ordinary immersion which does. With the spell of ordinary 
immersion broken, then, I am better positioned to realise the truth of 
nihilism. I describe this as boredom providing us with an attunement to 
nihilism. So even if Leach were right, it would not affect my case. 
However, I still think my description is better, because I find it less natural 
to say that when bored, our attitude towards goals becomes one of 
boredom, than that certain outcomes cease to present themselves as goals.  
Stephen B. Hawkins (2017) begins his review by calling me ‘a 
disappointed physicalist’. He is thinking of the fact that I used to be a 
physicalist – but then, why would that make me a disappointed physicalist? 
Surely, the situation is just that I once held the belief that physicalism is 
true, and later found reasons to abandon it. To be disappointed, you must 
have wanted your belief to be true. But why would anyone want 
physicalism to be true? I can think of two reasons. The first would be that 
you want it to be the case that human beings can tell the final, definitive 
story about reality by means of physical science. The motivation here 
cannot be curiosity about what the story amounts to because physicalism is 
a metaphysical view about the story – it claims there is one to tell and that 
physics can in principle tell it – so it must rather be something to do with 
human dignity or the prestige of science. If there turned out to be a reason 
why the final metaphysical story can never be told by science, then that 
might be disappointing, if it revealed human, or scientific, limitations. A 
second reason you might want physicalism to be true stems from 
anti-philosophical sentiment. Thus you might think that describing the 
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nature of reality is obviously something only science can do, and be 
annoyed that anti-physicalist philosophers question the metaphysical status 
of the scientific description of the world. Physicalism promises to put an 
end to all of that nonsense. 
If you want physicalism to be true for either of these reasons, however, 
then I doubt you will ever meet with disappointment. For you will not be 
open to the truth or falsity of physicalism, but rather driven by pride in 
scientific achievement, disdain for philosophy, or both. No matter how 
good the argument against physicalism which such a person hears, they are 
unlikely to be persuaded unless it comes from science itself; and it is hard 
to see how it could. So the notion of a disappointed physicalist strikes me 
as rather fanciful. Personally, I am just an ex-physicalist; one who finds it 
difficult to imagine wanting a metaphysic to be true, unless it were of the 
religious kind that holds something positive in store for us. I would like to 
think that the majority of physicalists in academic philosophy today are like 
this. 
Hawkins’ image of me as a disappointed physicalist frames his whole 
reading of the book, I think. He sees my Transcendent Hypothesis as a case 
of settling for second-best. Since I could not have the physicalist 
metaphysic I wanted, I instead worked up ‘a variety of Kantian idealism, 
shaped by the scepticism of Hume, Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, and some 
strands of Chinese philosophy’, in accordance with my overriding concern 
to stay on the right side of both our scientific and everyday understandings 
of the world. The only kind of reason I could stomach for rejecting 
physicalism, pertains to limitations on human understanding which do not 
impugn or challenge the scientific picture in any way, but rather just place 
it within a wider, philosophical perspective. Taking this philosophical 
perspective must neither challenge science, nor remove us from our 
common-sense, everyday understanding of the world. In short, philosophy 
must be tangential to science and not at all wacky. Well, I do think a bit 
like that, so this is certainly an insightful review. Hawkins disapproves, 
however. He thinks the price I pay to ‘shield’ philosophy from science is 
that of ‘hiding it away in a corner where, at best, it transforms your attitude, 
and nothing more’; and that I offer only ‘the status quo and the freedom of 
indifference in a universe beyond our comprehension’. Hawkins, by 
contrast, thinks philosophy should ‘demand ever deeper understanding’ and 
xxi 
 
‘make a difference in a real world where real people govern themselves by 
what really matters.’ He seems to think my philosophy is conservative and 
apathetic. 
I find this reading both intriguing and disconcerting; but I am pretty 
sure it is not sustainable. In a world where scientism, and its philosophical 
extension, physicalism, is trying to discredit attempts to place the scientific 
description of the world within any context other than its own, thereby 
leaving it as the unassailable absolute truth, there is nothing timid or 
browbeaten about my view that objective thought must be placed within the 
context of a transcendent reality whose nature it can never capture; how is 
that hiding philosophy away in a corner? As to my affirming of the status 
quo, I do this in two ways, both of which I think are sound. Firstly, I do not 
see any credible way of disputing what science tells us about the world; or 
any good reason to try to do so. Secondly, I do not see any credible way of 
disputing what our everyday framework understanding tells us about what 
life basically amounts to. That picture certainly presents what life seems to 
be, and to argue that it should not seem that way, or that the seeming covers 
over an incompatible reality, would require exactly the kind of positive 
metaphysic of a meaningful reality which the book argues is untenable. 
There is, however, a more philosophically significant sense in which I am 
certainly not affirming the status quo; namely by arguing that reality is 
meaningless and transcendent, and building that argument upon 
philosophical considerations about consciousness. If that argument is 
correct, then Hawkins’ demand for ‘ever deeper understanding’ is not 
going to get us any further than the fact that reality is transcendent. 
Hawkins’ line of criticism, according to which I should have been 
trying to completely revolutionise our understanding of the world and 
thereby spur us into positive action by revealing what ‘really matters’, did 
make me wonder what he himself thinks. A reviewer need not reveal their 
own views, of course, but I did become curious about the nature of the 
higher stance from which my position was being criticised. A clue is 
provided, perhaps, when he says that, ‘it should not surprise us to find 
boredom elevated to a philosophy of life in a book that makes so much of 
the “everyday”. Philosophy can do more.’ Hegelian is my best guess; 
possibly Thomist.  
In any case, the most explicit criticism in the review is that I should not 
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have assumed that objective thought is our only substantive interpretation 
of reality. Hawkins seems to think that philosophy can provide a better, and 
at least equally substantive, interpretation of reality. Thus he sees a tension 
between my aim of preserving the everyday understanding of objective 
thought, and making maximum sense of the world with philosophical 
concepts. He thinks I am not entitled to assume that philosophy can never 
overturn objective thought, unless I can supply an argument to show that no 
explanatorily comparable alternative is possible. In short, my trust in 
objective thought is uncritical, dogmatic, and – once again – apathetic. I 
back it up with an appeal to everyday understanding, but in fact everyday 
understanding is silent on many issues that philosophical concepts can 
elucidate, such as the nature of matter.  
I think there are two main kinds of reason why someone would want to 
overturn objective thought. The first is to make sense of consciousness; or 
some other feature of reality which seems to resist incorporation into the 
objective world as a matter of principle. The second is to make room for a 
competing form of description which affirms a particular meaning of life; 
and possibly thereby provokes personal or social action of a kind designed 
to get us in touch with that meaning. Now in the book I argued that 
consciousness is transcendent. If that is right, then it is a mistake to think of 
objective thought’s inability to describe consciousness (or other related 
phenomena) as a shortfall. Hence the first kind of reason for wanting to 
overturn objective thought is explained away. I also argued that life is 
meaningless, and so the ultimate nature of human life does not provide any 
clues about what we should be doing with ourselves: these are matters we 
have to decide. That removes the second kind of reason. As I see it, then, 
the position I defended in the book removes any compelling reason for 
wanting to replace, or seriously question the legitimacy of, objective 
thought. Everyday objective thought tells us little about the nature of 
matter, I grant, but its extension – namely science – certainly does. If my 
account of consciousness is on the right track, then we have no reason to 
think there is anything wrong with a broadly objective account of what 
appears within the context of conscious experience. And in any case, 
common sense alone, it seems to me, dictates that we are never going to get 
an alternative of remotely comparable substance.   
The review by Guy Bennett-Hunter (2016) is a prime example of the 
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bifurcation of critical response I expected; he likes the transcendence but 
not the nihilism. The central criticism the review revolves around is that I 
fail to refute the best argument for the claim that there is a meaning of life 
– the one Bennett-Hunter agrees with – and hence fail to establish nihilism. 
He says that I do not explicitly address this argument, despite promising to 
do so in the introduction, but that my implicit response not only fails, but 
is, he strongly implies, outrageous. This is because it amounts to an 
invitation to stop thinking about the matter; philosophers ‘of all people’ 
should never do this, he says, thereby neatly using my own turn of phrase 
against me.   
The argument in question is that we would not be able to carry on if 
nihilism were true, and so given that most of us do carry on, there must be 
a meaning of life. Now a great many of us apparently think nihilism is true, 
of course; atheism is on the rise, and signs in cafes saying that life is all 
about ‘the journey, not the destination’ are very popular. Perhaps such 
people are psychologically spurred on by the humanist belief that we ‘make 
our own meaning’. I do not think so, however, because this kind of 
intellectual justification comes only after the event, and popular as this one 
has become, it is obviously not universally believed; not by me, and not by 
a great many people who would deny that there is a meaning of life, 
without having considered the philosophical question of what motivates 
goals in its absence. Bennett-Hunter, however, thinks motivation requires 
the psychological spur which belief in a meaning of life provides. But he 
fails to realise that this plays no part in his objection. For according to that 
objection, whether you believe there is a meaning of life or not, there can 
be no motivation without a meaning of life. If the meaning of life is there, 
we can feel motivated; but if it is not, we cannot.  
Bennett-Hunter gets close to realising this implication when he says, 
‘there is a logical [my emphasis] as well as a psychological need to 
suppose that life has meaning and nihilism is false.’ He believes in both 
needs, but only the logical one has any role in his objection. Whether or not 
we have a psychological need to believe in a meaning of life makes no 
difference. Presumably, he thinks that those of us who would deny that we 
have any such need nevertheless have it at some undetected psychological 
level. But even for those who fully recognise this need in themselves, and 
think it is being satisfied, the psychology would be completely ineffectual 
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if the meaning of life were not there. Should the meaning of life somehow 
recede, then they, like the rest of us, would slump to the ground.  
This view is unstable according to Bennett-Hunter’s own principles; as 
well as independently implausible. If he knows that nihilism is impossible, 
given that goals motivate us, then he must know some feature of 
transcendent reality which is required for motivation. We know square 
circles are impossible because we know about squares and circles. To know 
that nihilistic motivation is impossible, then, would require knowing 
something about both meaningless realities and motivation. But if the 
reality is the objective world, we already know that nihilism and motivation 
can coexist: motivation would be part of such a meaningless, objective 
world. If it is transcendent, however, then we cannot know anything about 
it that would rule out motivation. Bennett-Hunter’s main philosophical 
interest is in ineffability, and his interesting and original work argues that 
reality is both transcendent and ineffable (Bennett-Hunter 2014). As such 
he, of all people, should not be claiming that meaninglessness is impossible 
for transcendent reality: if we cannot say what it is, then we certainly 
cannot say what is or is not possible for it. So long as it is even possible for 
transcendent reality to co-exist with motivation, however, then we have no 
reason to look to a metaphysic of transcendence to explain motivation; for 
objective thought does the job perfectly well. Human beings naturally want 
things because this allows them to survive and find satisfaction. That seems 
to me a perfectly good explanation of why we find it so easy to be 
motivated.  
I am criticised for encouraging philosophers to stop thinking; but what I 
really said is this. Think about nihilism as long and hard as you like. 
Eventually, as a plain matter of fact, you will stop; and when you do, if you 
are psychologically healthy, you will probably find goals motivating you 
just as much as they always did, despite the fact that you were recently 
considering the intellectual position that they never terminate in a meaning 
of life. If your reflection went well, then you will have endorsed nihilism as 
a non-evaluative position, and hence will never have thought that you 
ought to resist the natural motivation kicking back in: for nihilism does not 
say that we ought not to be motivated by ordinary goals. If Bennett-Hunter 
wants the reflection to run on and on, then fine; but I suspect this is just 
because he does not like the natural terminus – and that is because he is still 
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thinking of nihilism as evaluative, and negatively so. Saying that the 
meaning of life is ineffable sounds to me suspiciously like what someone 
might be expected to say if they were determined to avoid nihilism, could 
not find the meaning of life, and were intrigued by the history of religious 
mysticism. 
When in the introduction to the book I mentioned the kind of argument 
which attracts Bennett-Hunter, in connection with David Cooper’s views, I 
took the worry behind it to be that without belief in a meaning of life, of the 
kind that is still widespread, people might find their commitment to goals 
drain away. That is why I said that the worry, ‘overestimates the 
importance of philosophy’; meaning that our commitment to goals can get 
along just fine with or without philosophical justification. I addressed this 
worry at length in chapter two; I was not thinking of Bennett-Hunter’s view 
that the meaning of life sustains our motivation directly, rather than 
indirectly via our belief in it. As to his complaint that my views on nihilism 
and transcendence do not connect up, I really do not know what more I 
could have done to make the connection plain and to place it squarely at the 
centre of the work. My account of the unity of philosophy depends on the 
connection, and I use it to explain the typical lines of opposition to be 
found in debates about consciousness, time and universals. I use the 
connection to explain opposition to nihilism, opposition to transcendence, 
and the distinctive value of philosophy. These explanations are backed up 
by detailed descriptions of the ways we misrepresent transcendent reality. 
Present me with an apparently ineffable experience, and I will do my best 
to describe and explain it: philosophy begins in wonder.  
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Abstract 
James Tartaglia makes original use of the idea of transcendence in order to answer various 
philosophical questions of contemporary and historical importance. I tackle the attempt to use his 
transcendent hypothesis to solve the problem of consciousness. Tartaglia describes the problem of 
consciousness as arising because we conceive of the objective world as composed of “centreless” 
objects and that any view that attempts to identify consciousness as a part of the world as presented 
to objective thought will fail since consciousness is inherently centred. His proposed solution is to 
suggest that a transcendent reality must be able to account for consciousness, but I argue that his 
characterisation of this reality entails that it too must be composed of centreless parts and thus the 
transcendent hypothesis fails to solve the consciousness problem. 
 
Positing that we can best describe reality as something about which our 
knowledge is unavoidably impaired has been a recurring theme in philosophy 
since its inception. Given that another of the paradigmatic issues defining the field 
of philosophy is what kind of meaning, if any, life is imbued with, it is also not 
historically uncommon for these two prima facie unconnected themes to find 
common ground in philosophical works. 
What is unique in Tartaglia’s book Philosophy in a Meaningless Life 
(hereafter referred to as “PML”) is how Tartaglia threads these concepts together. 
He posits that questions surrounding the meaning of life, although resolving 
themselves in our ultimate realisation that nihilism is true within the context of 
the physical universe, have enabled us to discover the concept of transcendence 
in attempting to figure out if there is some further context within which it makes 
sense to attribute meaning to our lives. We could only demonstrate nihilism to be 
false using the concept of transcendence, he then argues. This, Tartaglia argues, is 
only the tip of the iceberg when it comes to the benefits that can be gleaned from 
considering the possibility of transcendence, as it is also able to provide answers 
to major philosophical questions that have persisted over centuries of thought, 
namely those pertaining to issues of consciousness, universals and time. 
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Although Tartaglia’s approach to each of these issues needs to be addressed, I 
will be objecting in this essay specifically to his claim that positing a transcendent 
reality can be used to solve the problem of consciousness given how prevalent 
discussion of this issue is in contemporary metaphysical inquiry. In particular, I 
will be arguing that even if the idea of transcendence does present itself as an 
option when we consider difficulties in interpreting how consciousness fits into 
the world, accepting the existence of a transcendent reality does nothing to reduce 
these difficulties and in fact can only serve to increase them. As such, Tartaglia 
has failed to demonstrate that the concept of transcendence functions as a useful 
philosophical tool in finding a resolution to the problem of consciousness. 
 
Nihilism and Transcendence 
 
Tartaglia frames philosophical enquiry as stemming from two kinds of 
question about reality. These questions are about “ontology and enframement” or 
“what exists and why it exists” (Tartaglia 2016: 71). Philosophy as a discipline 
arose once these two kinds of question could be answered together using the 
concept of transcendence. 
Transcendence is a rare sort of concept that seems viable as a candidate for 
providing answers to both “what” and “why” questions by positing that the kinds 
of things we familiarly describe as making up the world around us exist within a 
wider context. This means that we are able to suggest that the things around us 
have the nature they do because of this wider context, and thus that we can better 
understand both what the world is and what sort of purpose the constituents of the 
world as we know it are capable of having. 
In asking what purpose life has, which is the initial major question addressed 
in PML, we are asking about the context of meaning within which life itself exists. 
This question is very different to asking what function something used within life 
serves. If I ask what the reason is for you moving a particular piece on a 
chessboard, what I wish to know is how making that move could get you closer 
to your overall goal of checkmating your opponent. Since I assume that your 
action of making that particular move exists within the wider context of your 
intention to checkmate your opponent, my question can be understood as 
addressing the purpose of the single move you just made within that wider 
context. Where the question of the meaning of life differs from the question of the 
meaning of a particular chess move is that humans often do things, such as move 
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chess pieces, because they want to achieve a certain result, whereas it is not clear 
that there is anything outside our various wishes and preferences that is able to 
provide a context within which life as a whole has meaning. The physical 
universe, which science informs us is responsible for our existence, does not seem 
to be the sort of thing capable of having a certain goal in mind. The answer to 
questions about the meaning of life also cannot be provided with essential 
reference to other living beings because we can simply ask the same question 
about them; if we suppose that the purpose of your life is to be useful to other 
people, then this presupposes that the lives of these other people already have 
meaning, which is precisely the question we are trying to answer. Thus, nihilism 
seems to be a logical conclusion to draw from our understanding of how our lives 
fit into the wider context of a physical universe. 
Positing that there may be a further transcendent context that is able to account 
for the physical universe and, ultimately, our lives “provides us with an idea of 
what would be required for nihilism to be false” (ibid.: 52-53). That is, although 
the physical universe is unable to account for life having meaning, the only way 
this could fail to demonstrate that life indeed does not have a meaning is if it were 
the case that the physical universe itself existed within some wider context and 
within that context life serves a particular purpose. While it is ultimately a 
mystery what this purpose would be, this follows from the fact that our 
understanding of transcendent reality necessarily lies outside of our understanding 
in the same way that within the context of a dream we often have no knowledge 
of the physical world (ibid.: 51). Questioning whether or not life has meaning, 
then, ultimately leads us to the concept of transcendence, although it is interesting 
to note that transcendence is equally compatible with either the truth or falsehood 
of nihilism (ibid.: 77). 
This provides a general understanding of how transcendence operates with 
regard to philosophical questions. By framing the physical universe and, more 
importantly, our lives within a wider context, it is possible for those lives to serve 
a purpose. What is important for a critical evaluation of Tartaglia’s position 
though is the manner in which transcendence provides such a context. 
There seems, on the face of it, to be an obvious objection to Tartaglia’s claim 
that transcendent reality could provide a context of meaning within which life 
exists, which is that, in the same sense that the physical universe alone cannot 
provide a context of meaning because the physical universe, if it is all that exists, 
does not itself exist for a purpose, surely it is the case that transcendent reality 
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will necessarily run into the same problem. It is, in fact, difficult to envision 
anything that would be able to provide a context of meaning whilst at the same 
time being immune to questions about the purpose of that. 
Tartaglia’s response to this is to state that this response “betrays a lack of 
imagination” (ibid.: 52). Since we have no awareness of a transcendent context, 
we have nothing to base our assumption that “an account of the purpose of things 
would not culminate in the brute fact of meaningless existence, but rather in the 
fact of purposeful existence” (ibid.: 52). He then states that, “although we cannot 
rule out the possibility, we have no good reason to believe in it either” (ibid.: 52). 
This is an important point when it comes to evaluating Tartaglia’s position 
because it demonstrates how the transcendent hypothesis works as a response to 
philosophical questions. It has the potential to be able to account for meaning in 
life precisely because we have no knowledge of this reality. Even if, as Tartaglia 
suggests may be the case, transcendent reality is also meaningless, the 
transcendent hypothesis still stands as being capable of explaining how life can 
have meaning because our limited conception of that reality prevents us from 
knowing whether it is meaningless or meaningful. The epistemic limitation of the 
transcendent hypothesis is thus precisely what lends its strength to the idea of 
transcendent reality; this reality may be capable of performing a wide variety of 
roles which we struggle to find another viable candidate for in our philosophical 
theories as a result of the fact that our ontology seems not to include the sort of 
things that can account in any clear way for certain phenomena, such as meaning 
and consciousness. 
The trade-off is that by accepting transcendence we open the door to the 
possibility that life has meaning but we also sacrifice any hope of being able to 
provide either a positive or negative answer to that question. We simply must 
accept that we cannot know. 
Accepting a limitation on the knowledge of reality it is possible for us to attain 
is not a problem in and of itself, but when it comes to arguing that the transcendent 
hypothesis constitutes a solution to specific metaphysical problems such as the 
problem of consciousness the issue is different. Because the truth of the 
transcendent hypothesis is equally compatible with nihilism being true or false, it 
does not matter whether or not transcendent reality really is capable of providing 
the metaphysical basis of meaning. There are two possible states of transcendent 
reality in this sense, as being meaningful or meaningless, and we are unable to tell 
which one it is. On the contrary, if the transcendent hypothesis is able to solve the 
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problem of consciousness as Tartaglia states (ibid.: 120), it must only be 
compatible with one possibility, which is that transcendent reality is capable of 
providing the metaphysical basis of experience. Thus the conditions for the truth 
of the transcendent hypothesis are more stringent when it comes to determining 
whether or not it can account for consciousness, and it seems to me clearly 
demonstrable that it does not meet these conditions. 
There are three key arguments that provide the foundation for Tartaglia’s 
transcendent hypothesis, which I will now outline in turn. 
 
1) Consciousness cannot be accounted for by objective thought 
  
Tartaglia defines “objective thought” as our “everyday way of thinking about 
the nature of the world” (ibid.: 83), such as thinking of a cinema room as being 
essentially composed of “objects in space made up of various different types of 
material” (ibid.: 83). This view “readily extends to take in the whole universe: the 
cinema is located on planet Earth, which is itself simply a very large object within 
a vast space containing astronomical objects composed of various materials” 
(ibid.: 83). The way we ordinarily conceive of consciousness as fitting into the 
world as described by objective thought is that a person sitting in a cinema and 
watching the screen has a particular perspective on the objective world that would 
differ from the perspective of any person sitting in a different part of the cinema. 
The trouble arises when we try to explain which aspect of the world as 
described by objective thought is supposed to be able to account for 
consciousness. 
 
there is nothing there to indicate that the organic objects should be centres 
of conscious experience; there is nothing in the scene to indicate that there 
should be any experiential centres at all (ibid.: 84). 
 
Although we “superimpose experiential centres onto the objective world” (ibid.: 
84), there is nothing within objective thought that is able to give us an account of 
why it is the case that any objects should be centres of experience. Objective 
thought seems to be able to readily provide an account of reality that is centreless 
where all objects simply exist in certain places and are made of certain materials, 
but for which there is no perspective. As such, we cannot account for 
consciousness by reference to the world as described by objective thought. This 
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also means that scientific understanding, which is a form of objective thought, 
will be unable to provide us with an explanation of how consciousness fits into 
the world. 
 
2) A transcendent hypothesis solves the problem of consciousness 
  
Tartaglia dismisses the possibility of describing consciousness as an illusion 
produced by brain activity (a view that Tartaglia calls “revisionism”), a view he 
attributes most closely to Dennett (ibid.: 90) since, as he argues, the idea of a 
perceptual illusion relies implicitly on the idea that the individual is having an 
experience that may mismatch reality or otherwise must simply be “nothing more 
than a dumb reflex, rather than a rational if ultimately misguided response to the 
evidence” (ibid.: 93). Using the example of an individual who judges that they are 
having the experience of feeling dizzy, Tartaglia argues that our inclination to 
make such judgements “necessarily lacks any rational explanation on the 
revisionist model, because that model denies that there are any dizzy experiences 
- or anything similar that might be mistaken for one - to provide the evidential 
basis of my false judgement” (ibid.: 93). 
He also dismisses consciousness as being identical to brain activity as he 
believes it to simply lead us back to revisionism. Tartaglia argues that those who 
try to argue that conscious states are simply brain states have not managed to 
properly deal with the basic criticism that conscious properties seem to be 
completely different to properties of the brain (ibid.: 95). Using the example of 
staring into a green light and then seeing an afterimage when you close your eyes, 
he argues that identity theorists such as Smart have attempted to avoid mentioning 
the properties of the afterimage at all by stating that when we perceive an 
afterimage there is simply something going on that is similar to that which 
happens when we are seeing a green light. This attempted evasion, however, 
under-describes the situation since the “something” that is going on when we are 
seeing an afterimage is experiential and thus still requires explanation (ibid.: 96). 
He also dismisses functionalism on the grounds that this attempts to avoid the 
problems of the identity theory by stating that conscious properties are realised by 
physical states rather than being identical to them but, Tartaglia argues, this does 
not avoid the difficulty because the problem is in imagining a physical state being 
sufficient to ‘realize’ an experiential state (ibid.: 96-97). 
Tartaglia also then argues against the position that conscious properties can be 
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identified with properties of the brain by stating that the properties of an 
afterimage would have to be a misconception of the properties of brain states. He 
uses the example of an experience of an after-image that is a green oblong with 
fuzzy edges and states, “If we are actually conceptualizing a brain state, then, we 
must have formed a radically false conception of it, given that it is not green and 
oblong with fuzzy edges” (ibid.: 97). The point being driven toward is that, if we 
have such a radically false conception of our experiences, we have simply ended 
up with revisionism once more. 
Finally, he dismisses dualism as an example of metaphysics finding itself 
“forced to tamper with objective thought’s conception of the world” (ibid.: 102) 
by positing that there is some special attribute of the brain that it is capable of 
interacting with the non-physical, which contradicts what we know from objective 
thought that “the brain is not radically unlike everything else in the world” (ibid.: 
101). 
In place of these problematic perspectives, Tartaglia refers to his 
metaphilosophical considerations earlier in the book and suggests that we are 
plausibly interested in the problem of consciousness because “it raises the 
possibility that reality transcends the objective world” (ibid.: 102). To give a feel 
for how this could explain the nature of consciousness, Tartaglia invites us to 
imagine that transcendent reality stands “to the objective world as the objective 
world stands to a dream” (ibid.: 103). 
 
In that case not only are the dream-trees I see transcended by the wider 
context in which I am asleep; my dream-thoughts must be as well. For any 
reality there is to the thoughts and feelings we have in a dream must be 
found in the real world, not the world of the dream. (ibid.: 103) 
 
The way this is supposed to account for consciousness is by positing that 
consciousness is not ontologically dependent upon the “centreless” constituents 
of the world as described by objective thought, but is rather ontologically 
dependent upon transcendent reality. There are difficulties inherent in 
understanding the nature of the ontological dependency of consciousness upon 
transcendent reality; since “The transcendent context of existence being 
hypothesized is one of which our knowledge is seriously curtailed” (ibid.: 106) 
we have no reason to suppose that we will awaken from our lives into transcendent 
reality. Indeed, this could not be so because if we did awaken into this context of 
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existence “it would not be the final context, since consciousness, according to the 
hypothesis, is always transcendent” (ibid.: 106). As such, although they must have 
some sort of ontological dependence upon transcendent reality in virtue of the fact 
that our entire conception of reality must be ontologically dependent upon the 
final context of existence, experiences cannot be identified with any aspects of 
transcendent reality, “since the transcendent reality of the final context – in which 
independent being is to be found – is not something we could consciously 
experience in such a way as to allow us to distinguish one part of it from another” 
(ibid.: 106). 
Although individual experiences are not aspects of transcendent reality, 
consciousness as a whole is. That is, although experiences are not identical with 
parts of transcendent reality, the awareness we have of those experiences simply 
in virtue of having them is a self-awareness of transcendent reality. Just as in a 
dream our awareness that we are having dream experiences can only be an 
awareness of a world transcending the dream (i.e. that we are lying in bed having 
certain experiences) even while the content of those experiences need not be of 
anything within the world transcending the dream, our awareness that we are 
having everyday experiences must be an awareness of a world transcending 
objective reality even while those experiences are not of transcendent reality 
(ibid.: 106). 
In short, Tartaglia states that the problem of consciousness can be solved by 
the transcendent hypothesis because it does not attempt to describe how a centre 
of experience can fit into the world as described through objective thought, which 
is centreless. Although this does not tell us what would constitute an accurate 
description of the ontological basis of experience, this gap in our understanding 
is attributable to the nature of transcendent reality being unknowable as it is in 
itself, rather than as arising from inconsistencies between our conceptions of the 
objective world and experience. 
 
3) We misconceive experience 
 
Where Tartaglia’s viewpoint distinguishes itself from any form of idealism is 
in its denial that we have a clear and accurate conception of experience. The 
transcendent hypothesis “denies that we have any legitimate conception of 
experience except that it is transcendent” (ibid.: 118). His argument for this 
position is that our conception of experience relies upon concepts borrowed from 
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objective thought; we conceive our experience of a tree as being of “an array of 
colour suitably arranged into the shape of a tree” (ibid.: 110), but this cannot be a 
correct conception of experience because spatial arrangement is something that 
belongs to the objective world and it does not make sense to say that ideas and 
physical objects can both share the same shape. Since when we attend to our 
experience of a tree all we find is “something shaped like a tree” and experience 
cannot have shape, this must be a misconception. This problem applies equally to 
secondary qualities; if our experiences cannot have shapes, then there is nothing 
for phenomenal colours to fill. 
The reason for the misconception is that we are attempting to interpret 
experiences “as if they were things in the objective world, when in actual fact – 
as we realize on further reflection – they have no place there” (ibid.: 111). As such 
it is objective thought that provides us with our dominant description of reality, 
with our conception of experience being parasitic upon this main picture. It is also 
an extremely useful part of our overall picture of the objective world because it 
allows us to explain how it is that somebody can misjudge some aspect of the 
world, such as thinking that a tree has darker leaves than it actually does. 
This leads us to believe that experiences are causally dependent upon the 
brain, which functions “to facilitate our interpretation of reality as an indirect 
awareness of an objective world” (ibid.: 112). Yet, this view must ultimately be 
false because it relies upon a misconception of experience and in actual fact 
“experience does not causally interact with the objective world, and neither is it a 
part of that world; since experience and the objective world are both parts of an 
interpretation of transcendent reality” (ibid.: 112). 
As such, the only thing our conception of experience gets right about the true 
nature of experience is that it exists (ibid.: 117). Furthermore, we should not 
expect to understand the nature of the independent reality underlying experience, 
“since as conscious beings we can only know reality as it appears within 
consciousness; and consciousness is always transcendent” (ibid.: 118). 
So, by virtue of having experience, we know that there exists some reality 
beyond the objective world but experience is unable to tell us any specific details 
about the nature of transcendent reality because of the fact that we misconceive 
experience. 
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How the problem of consciousness persists 
  
Tartaglia attributes the persistence of the problem of consciousness to 
competing schools of thought seeking either to argue that there exist things 
beyond the objective world or seeking to affirm objective thought by denying 
transcendence. By arguing for a hypothesis that puts our conception of objective 
reality before our conception of experience, while still maintaining that 
consciousness does transcend objective reality, the transcendent hypothesis 
“promises to resolve this impasse” (ibid.: 121). 
The supposed advantage of the transcendent hypothesis with relation to the 
problem of consciousness is that it does not try to place centres of experience in a 
world that is posited as being centreless. Even if we do believe it to be inexplicable 
that consciousness should be a part of objective reality, it could be stated that the 
transcendent hypothesis does not provide us with an answer to the problem of 
consciousness on the grounds that believing that consciousness relies on an 
unknowable transcendent reality necessarily leaves the ontological basis of 
consciousness just as far outside the realm of our understanding. Yet there is a 
significant difference between the problem of consciousness that arises in relation 
to objective thought and the problem that arises from considering the epistemic 
limits of the presented conception of a transcendent reality. The claim is that our 
conception of reality as presented by objective thought is of a world precisely in 
which there are no centred parts, such as centres of experience, and thus 
consciousness necessarily lies outside any coherent conception of objective 
reality, whereas we can only ever have a very limited conception of transcendent 
reality and this does not self-evidently demonstrate that consciousness cannot fit 
into transcendent reality. Indeed, the obscure nature of transcendent reality is 
arguably a strength when it comes to avoiding such a problem; it is seemingly 
because we cannot comprehend transcendent reality that we cannot conceive of 
some aspect of transcendent reality that is incapable of forming the ontological 
basis for consciousness. 
Such attributes can be conceived of, however, due to the fact that there are 
certain negative claims we can make about the nature of transcendent reality, 
given that we know that it cannot have the attributes we associate with objective 
reality or experience, since both of these conceptions are what apparently produce 
the problem of consciousness to begin with. To demonstrate, let us take the third 
claim outlined above, that we misconceive experience. Whatever transcendent 
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reality is, under Tartaglia’s account of consciousness, it must be able to account 
for us misconceiving experience. We cannot give an account of this misconception 
fully with reference to objective reality because this would entail revisionism, 
which Tartaglia rejects. However, giving an account of this misconception that 
makes essential reference to some aspect of transcendent reality does not seem 
like a particularly tall order; given that we know so little about transcendent reality 
it does not seem too problematic to state that it is in virtue of some aspect of this 
reality that we end up misconceiving experience even if we are unable to state 
which aspect we are talking about. All we know, then, is that when we 
misconceive experience, or any particular experience, we are actually 
misconceiving some aspect of transcendent reality.  
So, while we cannot know much about transcendent reality, we can know that 
it or some aspects of it are capable of giving rise to various misconceptions of 
experiences. There is a further inference we can make though and that is that, 
whatever it is that forms the ontological basis for our misconceived experiences, 
it cannot be experience itself. Since consciousness is always transcendent, the 
“final context” can never be within consciousness and as such the independent 
reality that forms the ontological basis of experience cannot be experience itself. 
What this means is that experience is ontologically dependent upon something 
non-experiential. If we misconceive experience as being a certain perspective 
within objective reality, given that experience equally cannot inhabit transcendent 
reality, we must ultimately be misconceiving consciousness as being a centre of 
experience. 
If this is so, the misconception of consciousness as a centre of experience must 
have as its ontological basis some feature of transcendent reality, which I will 
refer to as transcendent X. 
 
What is transcendent X? 
 
Perhaps the better way to phrase this question would be not to ask what 
transcendent X is, since we seem to be guaranteed not to have a clear answer to 
this due to the unknowable nature of transcendent reality, but it would be better to 
ask what transcendent X is not. We can know some things that transcendent X 
isn’t. 
For instance, transcendent X cannot be an object or a collection of objects 
because, if it were, it would be just as incapable of forming the ontological basis 
12 
 
for consciousness as the world as revealed through objective thought. There 
would be no use in positing a transcendent reality that suffered the exact same 
problems as that of objective reality since this would simply be to retain the same 
philosophical problems but to add a great deal of obscurity to our metaphysical 
picture of reality on top. We can conclude straight away then that transcendent X 
does not fit our conception of any aspect of the world as presented within 
objective thought. 
Transcendent X also cannot be experience because our conceptions of 
experience are misconceptions. Thus, in order for transcendent X to be 
experience, it would have to also be a misconception. 
There is no option here to bite the bullet and simply accept that transcendent 
X is a misconception. It may sound like a logical possibility; after all, we 
necessarily know so little about transcendent reality that stating that we 
misconceive it seems to be almost blatantly obvious. However, this bridge was 
already burned when revisionism was rejected. 
To recap, as Tartaglia stated, we cannot rationally make sense of the idea that 
experience is an illusion produced by objective reality because without experience 
we cannot make sense of the idea of an illusion at all. We need the concept of 
experience to make sense of the idea that you can be aware of something other 
than the way the world actually is. As such, there has to be some ontological basis 
for illusions that, Tartaglia argues, objective thought simply cannot provide. 
Similarly, transcendent X cannot be a misconception in and of itself because 
transcendent X is supposed to be the way the world actually is; transcendent 
reality is conceived as having independent existence. For something to be 
misconceived, it has to be mistakenly supposed to be something other than what 
actually exists and the one thing that has existence beyond how we conceive it, 
according to Tartaglia, is transcendent reality. You can have neither illusions nor 
misconceptions without there being a distinction between appearance and reality, 
whether that’s a difference between what we experience and what is actually 
present in the world or a difference between what we conceive of and what 
actually exists. 
The only available option, then, is for transcendent X to form the ontological 
basis for experience without being experience itself. The trouble here is that, as in 
the case of objective thought providing an explanation of consciousness, 
experience must be accounted for by something non-experiential, which could be 
problematic.  
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There is still plenty of room to muster up a defence of the transcendent 
hypothesis though. After all, the problem with our conception of consciousness 
and objective thought wasn’t that these two things combined cannot describe how 
experience can exist in a world of non-experience, but rather that they cannot 
describe how a centre can exist in a world of centreless parts. As such, in order 
for Tartaglia’s model to not run into the same problem, all that we need to be able 
to say about transcendent X is that it is centred. 
 
Is transcendent X centred? 
 
It is the nature of consciousness as a centre that supposedly forces us to be 
confronted with the problem of consciousness and inspires us to the view of 
transcendence. If consciousness is a centre of some sort, perhaps a centre of 
misconceived experiences, then our only two options are to accept that 
consciousness must either have transcendent X as its ontological basis or it must 
be transcendent X. Although Tartaglia chooses the latter option, neither is 
satisfactory as they both leave us with something remarkably similar to the 
problem of consciousness that they were posited in order to avoid. Let us regard 
these two possibilities in turn. 
If consciousness were dependent upon transcendent X, this would mean that 
a centre of experience were ontologically dependent upon something that was not 
itself a centre of experience. This does not immediately present itself as a problem 
since we have only said that a centre of experience needs to be ontologically 
dependent upon something that can account for centres, not that it necessarily has 
to be ontologically dependent upon a centre of experience in and of itself. Yet, if 
we know about transcendent reality that it is composed of things that are not 
centres of experience, then the situation seems to be remarkably similar to that of 
the original problem that was supposed to lead us to explore the possibility of 
transcendence in the first place. If all we can say about transcendent X is that it is 
not a centre of experience, then once again we are trying to fit centres of 
experience into a world made of things that, even if they are centres of some sort, 
are not centres of experience. 
The trouble is that we make sense of the idea of a centre purely in terms of its 
relation to experience. Consciousness exists as a centre for me because when some 
things happen in my visual field, certain kinds of vibrations in the air reach my 
ears, or my body is affected in particular ways, I experience these things from a 
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particular perspective. Yet, if experience is misconceived, then it cannot be the 
case that my perspective is anything other than a misconception. This would entail 
that our very idea of there being centres of perspective or experience is itself a 
misconception. 
This situation is not helped by simply disregarding the requirement to provide 
an ontological basis for experiences, given that they are misconceived and as such 
do not have an ontological basis. Even if they are misconceptions, these 
misconceptions must be accounted for in the same sense that an illusion must be 
accounted for in a revisionist model of consciousness. We still have to make sense 
of the idea that a centre of experience, whatever that actually is, has as its 
ontological basis something that is not itself a centre of experience. As such, we 
are still left with the conclusion that consciousness must be a misconception. 
If consciousness is a misconception, then this entails that transcendent X must 
be something that is not a centre of experience, which means that consciousness 
still exists in a world that consists of nothing that is so centred. This seems so 
similar to the problem of consciousness that it seems as though we have paid the 
price of assuming that we cannot understand the nature of independent reality in 
order to simply end up with the same problem we started out with. 
If, as Tartaglia concludes, consciousness is transcendent X this may seem to 
resolve the issue. In this case, consciousness has independent existence and does 
not have anything that is not centred as its ontological basis. This seems to evade 
the problem of consciousness neatly. 
The trouble is that consciousness cannot be a centre of experience as we 
ordinarily conceive it. If experience is a misconception, and our notion of 
consciousness is of something that is at the centre of our perceptions and 
perspective, then we must be misconceiving what consciousness is. Our notion of 
a “centre of experience” does not capture what consciousness is, because 
consciousness has independent existence whereas the notion of a centre of 
experience is a misconception. 
As such, even if consciousness is a centre in some sense, it is not a centre of 
experience, and as I have suggested it is not entirely clear what the notion of a 
centre even really means once we consider experience and perspective to be 
misconceived. This means that under the transcendent hypothesis, I still have to 
attempt to make sense of the idea of a centre of experience fitting into a world 
consisting of things that are not themselves centred. Once again, we seem to have 
arrived at something that seems like almost a trivial re-wording of the original 
15 
 
problem of consciousness and as such we seem to have travelled a great distance 
with no perceptible gain. 
Unfortunately, this seems to exhaust all of the available options. Either 
consciousness is a centre of experience that is ontologically dependent upon 
centreless parts, or our centre of experience is misconceived as being a part of 
consciousness. The first option leaves us with something closely resembling the 
problem of consciousness, since consciousness still must be accounted for in 
terms of centreless parts, and the second option also leaves us with something 
closely resembling the problem of consciousness, since centres of experience still 
must be accounted for in terms of centreless parts. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In summary, Tartaglia offers an original and ambitious alternative to the 
accepted model of consciousness fitting into an everyday conception of objective 
thought. It strives to avoid the problem of consciousness by taking away objective 
reality’s role in providing the ontological basis for consciousness and giving that 
role to the mysterious transcendent reality instead. 
The trouble is that even if we cannot understand transcendent reality, using 
the same arguments that Tartaglia uses to oppose other positions, such as what he 
calls “revisionism,” we are able to determine that transcendent reality cannot have 
any features that would be required to account for consciousness in any better way 
than objective reality. 
Given that the motivation here for accepting the transcendent hypothesis was 
supposed to be to avoid the problem of consciousness, winding up with more or 
less the same problem defuses this inclination to move to such a position entirely. 
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Reply to Adam Balmer  
James Tartaglia* 
 
‘Adam Balmer’ may well be a name to watch as this century’s philosophy 
unfolds, I am inclined to think, and this gem of a paper adds to my inclination. He 
does not take the approach of criticising a variety of my claims, but rather devotes 
his energy to providing one sophisticated argument against the transcendent 
hypothesis; which is of course absolutely central to the book. If you can do it, as 
Balmer can, then this is the way to go – if you want to progress a philosophical 
discussion. 
Before I get to that argument, however, there is a point in his exposition which 
I will comment on, since it sets the scene by revealing Balmer’s train of thought. 
What he says is that our epistemic limitations as regards transcendent reality – 
that we cannot say anything positive about it, except that it exists – are what allow 
me to gain so much metaphysical mileage. To put it more bluntly than he ever 
would, I am thinking, ‘the objective world cannot explain phenomenon X, so I’ll 
let transcendent reality do the job – since nobody can say anything about 
transcendent reality, they can’t prove me wrong’. If that were my tactic, then I 
would not really be explaining anything; I would be cheating, somewhat. As 
Balmer puts it, 
  
The epistemic limitation of the transcendent hypothesis is thus precisely 
what lends its strength to the idea of transcendent reality; this reality may 
be capable of performing a wide variety of roles for which we struggle in 
our philosophical theories to find another viable candidate as a result of the 
fact that our ontology seems not to include the sort of things that can 
account in any clear way for certain phenomena, such as meaning and 
consciousness. The trade-off is that by accepting transcendence we open 
the door to the possibility that life has meaning but we also sacrifice any 
hope of being able to provide either a positive or negative answer to that 
question. We simply must accept that we cannot know. (p. 4) 
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He then goes on to say that this might well work with the question of the meaning 
of life, where given that reality is transcendent, we cannot say whether it is 
meaningless or not. For in this case, it does not matter to my position whether or 
not that reality is capable of providing the metaphysical basis of meaningful lives. 
But the situation is different with consciousness, however, because if 
consciousness is transcendent, then I am committed to the view that transcendent 
reality can, and in fact does, provide its metaphysical basis.  
Now it cannot have escaped Balmer’s attention that the first sentence of the 
first chapter of Meaningless is: ‘There is no overall point to human life.’ And that 
thereafter, I frequently refer to the ‘truth of nihilism’. As such, it is not looking as 
if I actually did take the cautious, non-committal stance on the meaning of life 
which he attributes to me. What I think he is really saying, with characteristic 
drollness, is that I should have said that we cannot know whether or not reality is 
meaningful, given my commitment to the transcendence of reality. So let us 
explore why I did not say that. 
I think we can make claims to knowledge, and consequently state truths 
without excessive circumspection, in full awareness that we might be wrong. If it 
turns out that we are wrong, then we did not really know what we thought we 
knew; and what we took to be truths were not. But nevertheless, unless we think 
the prospects of our being wrong are worth taking seriously, we have no good 
reason to hold back on knowledge and committed truth claims; if we exercised a 
neurotic level of caution, these concepts would lose their role within our lives. I 
might be dreaming, in which case I do not know I have hands, and, as I said in the 
book, Heidegger might live on as the world’s oldest man. But I know I have hands 
and that Heidegger is dead; to deny this would be to redefine ‘knowledge’ as 
something very rarely attainable, leaving us in need of a new word to do the old 
job. As such, I do not exercise the caution Balmer recommends, and claim that 
nihilism is true, while also claiming that life might have a meaning. This is 
because I think it might have a meaning only in the idle sense that I think 
Heidegger might be alive. Objective thought persuades me that belief in a 
meaning of life is widespread, not because of its sensitivity to truth, but because 
of social and historical factors. And metaphysics persuades me that we have no 
reason to think our notion of meaningfulness has applicability to transcendent 
reality; and that incomplete as it is, objective thought provides our best guide to 
the nature of that reality. As such I recognise the possibility because, as Balmer 
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says, if reality is transcendent then we know nothing which could rule it out – but 
I dismiss it as idle. With this in mind, let us now turn to the argument. 
The argument is that although I deny that we can have positive knowledge of 
transcendent reality, my argument for its existence actually commits me to 
specific negative claims about it, which inadvertently rule out its ability to provide 
the metaphysical basis for conscious experience. So my manner of arguing for a 
transcendent reality ultimately leaves that reality just as lacking in resources for 
solving the problem of consciousness as the objective world is, thereby landing 
us back at square one; except with the distinct disadvantage of an ontologically 
extravagant transcendent reality on our hands. Arguments rarely come neater. 
The two key negative claims in question are firstly, that the transcendent 
world cannot be objective, and secondly, that it cannot be experiential. The first 
must be right if the transcendent world in question provides the final context. If 
experience, as we conceive it, cannot exist in this objective world, then it cannot 
exist in any objective world, and so its final ontological destination cannot be an 
objective transcendent world. No analogue of Trendelenburg’s Neglected 
Alternative exists for the transcendent hypothesis, then. 
On the second negative claim, Balmer says, 
 
Since consciousness is always transcendent, the “final context” can never 
be within consciousness and as such the independent reality that forms the 
ontological basis of experience cannot be experience itself. (p. 11) 
 
He is right that the final context cannot be within consciousness; if it were, then it 
would not be the final context. Consciousness creates a differential context of 
existence, according to which experience is found and misconceived at one level 
(that is how things are within consciousness), but independently exists at the 
higher one. As such, anything found and misconceived by a conscious being will 
not be the final context of existence. But it does not follow that experience does 
not exist in the final context. On the contrary, it must do, given that experience is 
real and reality is transcendent. Experiences are what we find within 
consciousness. We get the idea of what an experience is, along with the idea that 
experiences are centred at a particular temporal and spatial location, from 
objective thought. Since this idea is incoherent (subjective and objective), we 
cannot suppose that it characterises what experiences are in the final context; and 
if this context is transcendence, we have no reason to suppose that any of our ideas 
 19
are applicable to it anyway. But nevertheless, what we are calling ‘experiences’ 
must have transcendent existence, given that they exist, that they cannot exist in 
the objective world, and that consciousness ontologically defers whatever we find 
within it to a transcendent context.  
Balmer says that, 
 
under the transcendent hypothesis, I still have to attempt to make sense of 
the idea of a centre of experience fitting into a world consisting of things 
that are not themselves centred. Once again, we seem to have arrived at 
something that seems like almost a trivial re-wording of the original 
problem of consciousness and as such we seem to have travelled a great 
distance with no perceptible gain (pp. 14-5) 
 
But ‘centred’ is only what experiences would have to be if they existed in the 
objective world; they would have to be centred within a world which has no 
centres. When we leave behind the misrepresentation by which we think of them 
as centred, however, then there is no longer any problem of fitting centres into a 
centreless reality. We have no reason to think of the transcendent reality as 
containing centred experiences, or of that reality as being either centred or 
centreless. Think of the radical ignorance that someone who has only dreamed 
has of the waking world. They have no basis to assert that their experiences must 
be centred in the waking world, just as they are in the dream. But they know those 
experiences exist, and they have no other way of thinking of them, when they try 
to elevate them to what they take to be the ontological level of waking reality, 
except as ‘experiences’ taking place ‘now’. 
To return to our earlier discussion, it is now possible to see why Balmer is 
mistaken in thinking that the epistemic barrier provided by a commitment to 
transcendence counts against me in the case of consciousness, in a way which it 
does not with the meaning of life. He is thinking that I need a positive claim in 
the case of consciousness, but that I do not with the meaning of life; a positive 
explanation of the kind physicalists would love to provide, starting with the 
fundamental reality (physical, in their view) and leading inexorably to something 
which fits our natural conception of experience. Within their metaphysic, however, 
there simply cannot be any experience; despite the fact that experience is what 
their metaphysic is designed to explain, in terms of what it presents to us. I, on 
the other hand, need no such explanation, because I think our natural conception 
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of experience derives from objective thought, and hence will be inapplicable to 
transcendent reality. Similarly, I think our notion of a meaningful life is bound to 
be inapplicable to transcendent reality. Nevertheless, human life and conscious 
experience exists. So I claim that life is meaningless and that consciousness is 
transcendent. I am more reticent about calling the latter a ‘truth’, because I have 
to rely on dreams providing a model of how experience works in general; but I 
think it is true. 
In the final count, any explanation of a phenomenon will have to end with, 
‘that’s just what it is’. Dualism provides that kind of answer for consciousness by 
saying that minds have their own kind of reality; but people were not satisfied 
because they knew about another kind, the physical, and wondered how the two 
got on. Physicalism wants to provide a final ‘that’s what it is’ too; but whenever 
it tries, people keep saying, ‘that just can’t be what it is’. It should come as no 
surprise, then, that the transcendent hypothesis ultimately says: ‘consciousness is 
transcendent … that’s just what it is.’ If you were expecting an amazing, surprising 
answer, then that could only come from physicalists, since objective thought is 
where our detailed understanding resides. But I bet that if Balmer looks back on 
this passage on his eightieth birthday, he will have never encountered such an 
answer. Still, the transcendent hypothesis does offer a fairly surprising answer, as 
befits the question. And it provides new insight into consciousness, with its split-
level and misrepresentation theses. It explains where the debate came from; what 
drives it on; many traditional distinctions and lines of opposition; connects it up 
with the subject-matter of our discipline and natural sources of interest; ties it in 
with time and universals. What more did I need to do? At the end of his essay, 
Balmer refers to ‘the mysterious transcendent reality’. But it is our reality; the 
familiar one we know and love. I was just offering a metaphysical interpretation 
of it.   
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Is Consciousness Transcendent? 
Comments on James Tartaglia’s Philosophy in a Meaningless Life: A 
System of Nihilism, Consciousness and Reality 
Philip Goff* 
 
Abstract 
In this paper, I will discuss James Tartaglia’s view on consciousness, as laid out in chapters 4 and 5 
of Philosophy in a Meaningless life. Chapter 4 is an excellent critique of physicalist accounts of 
consciousness. In chapter 5, Tartaglia develops an original and intriguing alternative: the 
‘transcendent hypothesis’, the view that both consciousness and the physical world it puts us in 
touch with are elements of a reality whose nature is entirely unknown. I will raise small concerns 
about the critique of physicalism. More broadly, I worry that there is a tension between chapter 4 
and chapter 5: it seems to me that if the arguments of chapter 5 succeed in demonstrating that 
consciousness is unknowable, then this undermines the anti-physicalist arguments of chapter 4. 
Finally, I will respond to Tartaglia’s rejection of more standard alternatives to physicalism.    
 
In general, analytic philosophy has less to say about the meaning of life than 
other philosophical traditions. Many analytic philosophers doubt that questions 
concerning ‘life’s meaning’ are themselves meaningful questions. Certainly the 
vast majority of analytic philosophers (and I put myself in this category) will 
feel that they can get on with their own little branch of philosophy – ethics, 
epistemology, philosophy of mind, or whatever – without relating it to questions 
pertaining to the meaning of life. In so far as the problem of life’s meaning is 
taken seriously, it is seen as an isolable philosophical issue that a philosopher 
may or may not be interested in. 
In this context, it is wonderful to find, in James Tartaglia’s Philosophy in a 
Meaningless Life, a return to true systematic philosophy. Three central topics of 
philosophy – consciousness, time, and universals – are dealt with through a 
single approach, an approach focusing on the meaning of life. Each chapter is 
rich and thought provoking, but in this essay I will focus on the two chapters of 
the book (4 and 5) that deal with consciousness. 
Chapter 4 is an excellent critique of physicalist accounts of consciousness. 
In chapter 5, Tartaglia develops and original and intriguing alternative: the 
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‘transcendent hypothesis’, the view that both consciousness and the physical 
world it puts us in touch with are elements of a reality whose nature is entirely 
unknown. I am broadly in agreement with the rejection of physicalism, but I will 
raise some responses to the argument of chapter 5 in support of the transcendent 
hypothesis. More broadly, I worry that there is a tension between chapter 4 and 
chapter 5: it seems to me that if the arguments of chapter 5 succeed in 
demonstrating that consciousness is unknowable, then this undermines the 
anti-physicalist arguments of chapter 4. Finally, I will suggest that Tartaglia 
presents a less than conclusive case against more conventional alternatives to 
physicalism, such as dualism and panpsychism, and that these might be better 
options for the anti-physicalist.  
 
Can physical science account for consciousness? 
 
Physicalism is the view that fundamental reality is entirely physical. There 
are broadly speaking two approaches the physicalist can take to consciousness: 
reductionism and eliminativism. The reductionist tries to account for 
consciousness in terms of physical processes in the brain. The eliminativist 
denies that consciousness exists, and in this way dispenses with the need to 
account for it.  
The latter option is not very popular. For most phenomena, you’ll find some 
philosopher willing to deny its existence: free will, moral value, the material 
world. But the reality of consciousness seems so evident, that few philosophers 
are prepared to embrace out and out eliminativism about it. What could be more 
evident than your present experience of colours, sounds, emotions, etc.? Perhaps 
because it has few adherents, the case against eliminativism is not well explored. 
Most are happy to take the reality of consciousness as a non-negotiable starting 
point.   
Tartaglia offers an extremely interesting argument against eliminativism, 
going beyond just pointing out its basic implausibility. In the case of 
eliminativism about other phenomena – free will, moral value, God, or whatever 
– the eliminativist is able to make sense of the rational basis for belief in the 
entity in question. The eliminativist about, say, free will, ultimately thinks that 
belief in free will is false, but she will have something to say about why people 
believe in free will, something that makes sense of how rational women and men 
could come to believe in such a thing. Many eliminativists would say that people 
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believe in free will because it sure feels like we make free decisions.  
In the case of eliminativism about consciousness, however, it’s hard to see 
what could be said. One cannot say (as one would probably want to say in the 
case of free will) that it feels as though we’re conscious, because of course to 
accept the reality of feelings just is to accept the reality of consciousness. It 
seems that the consciousness eliminativist will have to say that we just have a 
basic, ungrounded, disposition to claim that we have experiences, contrary to the 
reality. As Tartaglia puts it: 
 
… the enduring inclination is to judge that I am having a certain kind of 
experience. But if I am not, and there is nothing in the objective world 
that I could mistake for an experience, then this inclination can have no 
rational basis, and must rather be an automatic and senseless reaction. 
This, however, is not how it strikes us at all: it is not as though I 
inexplicably find myself wanting to spout the word ‘I’m having an 
experience’ without knowing why; as if believing we have experiences 
were like suffering from Tourette’s syndrome.’ (p. 94) 
 
This seems to me a powerful and ingenious way of strengthening the case 
against eliminativism.  
What about reductionism, the more popular form of physicalism? Tartaglia 
argues, quite powerfully in my view, that reductionism collapses into 
eliminativism, and so ends up being just as implausible. The problem is that our 
concepts of consciousness richly characterise it, and that that characterization is 
inconsistent with the characterization physicalists give of it. Physicalist U. T. 
Place argued that our concept of a green experience amounts to nothing more 
than ‘the sort of thing we have when we see something green.’ Such a minimal 
characterization leaves the metaphysical nature of the green experience 
completely open, and hence leaves it open that the green experience could turn 
out to be a brain state (which is exactly Place’s view).  
The problem is, as Tartaglia puts it, ‘our conception of conscious experience 
is not remotely this anodyne’ (p. 96). He argues that, contra Place, our ordinary 
mental concepts characterise green experience as having a green quality 
(‘although not ‘green’ in the same sense we use to describe a patch of light’). 
And more broadly, we have a rich understanding of what an experience is: it is a 
certain kind of self-aware state. These kinds of essentially subjective properties 
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have no place in the objective picture of the world we get from physical science. 
The reductionist has managed to account for ‘consciousness’ by re-defining it. 
It’s a bit like claiming to have proved the existence of God, by redefining ‘God’ 
as the physical world, and then claiming that the existence of the physical world 
entails the existence of God. 
The currently dominant form of physicalism – the so-called ‘phenomenal 
concept strategy’ – tries to avoid this difficulty by claiming that we refer to our 
conscious states directly, rather than in virtue of any of their properties. We think 
about ‘water’ in terms of its superficial characteristics, such as its being 
colourless and odourless, and its being the stuff that falls from the sky and fills 
oceans and lakes. But, according to the phenomenal concept strategy, we don’t 
think about our conscious experiences in terms of any of their characteristics; we 
simply have a capacity to, as it were, blindly point at them through 
introspection: pain is ‘that thing’ *points at introspectively*. If this is our 
relationship to pain – a kind of blind pointing – then there seems no way of 
ruling out that the thing we blindly point at turns out to be a physical brain state.  
Tartaglia’s reply is that to point blindly isn’t really to have a concept at all: 
 
[the phenomenal concept strategy] forgets what it means to have a concept 
of something. My concept of a tree is what I believe the tree to be: it is 
how I think of it. It is true that I can have a false conception of a tree and 
yet still manage to refer to it; just as I can refer to a man at a party as the 
one drinking a martini even if he is drinking water. However, even a false 
conception presents my conception of what the things is; the Phenomenal 
Concept Strategy cannot exempt introspective concepts of this basic 
requirement … (p. 98) 
 
I’m not so sure. In Naming and Necessity, Kripke claims that proper names refer 
in virtue of a causal connection between the name and the referent, rather than in 
virtue of an associated description. A school child can refer to ‘Galileo’ without 
knowing anything about him (perhaps they mistakenly think he was a famous 
explorer), which shows that they can’t be picking him out in terms of any of his 
characteristics. The child manages to pick out Galileo because they use a term, 
i.e. ‘Galileo’, which is causally connected in the right kind of way with Galileo 
himself. This account of proper names seems to me fairly plausible, and it 
suggests that the concept expressed by a proper name is a kind of blind pointer. 
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I think it’s better to say, not that there are no blind-pointer-type concepts, but 
simply that it’s pretty implausible that experiential concepts are 
blind-pointer-type concepts. When I think about pain in terms of how it feels, I 
know something about its essential nature. That’s what prompts my concern 
when others feel pain; I know what pain is, and hence I know it’s a terrible thing 
to endure. We might bolster this claim with reference to Tartaglia’s claim that we 
characterise experiences as self-aware states: to characterise a state as self-aware 
is to have a positive conception of it, not just to point blindly at it. 
However, these are finer points of dialectical strategy. I agree with Tartaglia 
that the physicalist can accommodate consciousness only by revising our 
ordinary concept of experience, pretending that those concepts are more 
minimal than they in fact are. And this means that, in terms of consciousness as 
we ordinary conceive of it, the physicalist is an eliminativist. And as Galen 
Strawson remarks (reported by Tartaglia), eliminativism about consciousness is 
‘the silliest view ever put forward.’ 
 
The Transcendent Hypothesis 
 
Tartaglia rejects not only physicalism, but also the standard alternatives to 
physicalism, such as dualism, panpsychism and idealism. I will get to his 
concerns about these views presently. But first I want to explore the line of 
reasoning that gets Tartaglia to his favoured position: the transcendent 
hypothesis. According to the transcendent hypothesis, ultimate reality transcends 
our understanding of it. Ultimate reality, for Tartaglia, contains consciousness, 
but not in a form that corresponds to human understanding of it. The 
transcendent form of consciousness is entirely unknown.  
The move towards the transcendent hypothesis begins with some reasons for 
thinking that our ordinary conception of consciousness is hopelessly flawed. As 
Tartaglia notes, it is a traditional view in modern Western philosophy that the 
mind is better known that the body, indeed that we have a perfect grip on the 
nature of our experiential properties. He argues, however, that upon reflection, 
our experiential concepts turn out to be mere ‘shadows’ of our concepts of 
properties in the material world. We seem to find in our experience shape-like 
properties: my experience of the tree in front of me seems to be tree-shaped. 
And yet ‘our only notion of spatial arrangement and shape belongs to the 
objective world. We have no other notion, and besides, this is evidently the 
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notion we have in mind; the shape we discern in the experience is the shape the 
tree has, just as a photograph of a tree has the shape the tree has’ (p. 110).  
What about the greenish quality I find in my experience of the tree’s leaves? 
Colour, as Tartaglia notes, has often been taken by philosophers to reside 
primarily in the mind rather than the physical world. But he then rejects this 
traditional view, with an argument reminiscent of Berkeley’s attacks on Locke: 
‘if experiences do not have a size and shape, they can hardly have a colour 
which fills that size and shape … the greenness I had in my mind filled the 
contours of my experiences; but since experiences can have no contours to be 
filled, this cannot be a property that experiences possess’ (p. 111). What 
philosophers think of as the properties of experience – ‘phenomenal shape’ and 
‘phenomenal colour’ – are so described using concepts borrowed from our 
concepts of features of the external world. We dress experience up in the clothes 
of external reality in order to make sense of our idea of it as an internal 
mirroring of that external reality. 
I remain unpersuaded. Phenomenal colour and phenomenal shape represent 
their external analogues: when I see a tomato I have an experience which 
represents a red, round thing at a certain distance from me. But I see no reason 
to doubt that there is ‘mental paint’ doing the representing, mental paint with an 
intrinsic character known through introspection. We call a certain intrinsic 
property of experience ‘phenomenal colour’ because it represents phenomenal 
colour, and another intrinsic property of experience ‘phenomenal shape’ because 
it represents phenomenal shape. But this fact is not inconsistent with their 
having an intrinsic character of their own known through introspection. I do not 
take myself to have given an argument for this view; my only claim is that I 
can’t see what reason Tartaglia has given us to doubt it. 
Tartagalia presses the Berkeleyen argument: 
 
… as Berkeley has pointed out, resemblance between ideas and physical 
objects makes no sense; and we might express this point by saying that if 
experience does not belong to the objective world, then an experience 
cannot resemble something objective in virtue of shape. We might try to 
get around this by talking of an abstract isomorphism rather than a 
resemblance, such that something about the nature of experience 
systematically correlates with the shape of the tree. But to say this is to 
admit that the notion of shape is inapplicable to experience, despite the 
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fact that when I attend to my experience, all I find is something shaped 
like a tree; the experience of the leaves is above the experience of the 
trunk and so on. (p. 110) 
 
Certainly there is something we find in experience that we feel inclined to 
describe in such spatial terms. But I still don’t see why I cannot say that that 
thing is an intrinsic phenomenal character – known in terms of its essential 
nature – and that it is external shape which is unknown – or rather known only 
in terms of its structural commonalities with phenomenal shape. On this view, it 
is our conception of external shape that is a mere ‘shadow’ of our conception of 
phenomenal shape, rather than vice versa. Again, I have not given an argument 
for the epistemic priority of phenomenal properties over external properties, but 
I cannot see that Tartaglia has given an argument for his converse prioritising of 
external properties over phenomenal properties. 
But what is this ‘phenomenal character’ that we know through introspection? 
Tartaglia complains that we can’t say much about it: 
 
If I want to tell you what the experience of green is, for instance, I have 
but three very inadequate options: I can compare it to another colour 
experience; tell you how to get it so you can find out for yourself; or say 
some very general, philosophical things, such as that it is a subjective 
state that alerts people to the presence of green light. None of this 
remotely compares to the detailed knowledge than can be imparted about 
things in the objective world (p. 107). 
 
It is a familiar point that experiential qualities are in some sense ineffable. But 
this is plausibly due to the fact that the concepts we use to pick them out are 
primitive. Compare to other plausibly primitive concepts: existence, 
metaphysical possibility, causation, the notion of a reason. It is arguable that 
none of these notions can be explained in more basic terms. If someone asks you 
what it is to have a reason to perform a certain action ɸ, you might say ‘It’s for it 
to be the case that something counts in favour of ɸing.’ But this is really just to 
use different words to express the same concept. There is nothing mysterious 
about this, we have just reached the basic epistemic building blocks of our 
picture of the world. If, as seems plausible to me, experiential concepts are also 
epistemically basic, then we should likewise take it that we can’t say much very 
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informative about the nature of a given experience. The nature is known, but it is 
known only through actually having the experience itself. If you have to ask, 
you’ll never know. 
Tartaglia goes on to argue that our conception of experience is not only 
inadequate, but flawed. This further argument goes as follows (p. 112): 
 
1. In order to make sense of experiences representing the external world, 
it is necessary to conceive of experiences as being causally determined 
by the environment. 
2. However, given that experiences are not part of the objective world, 
they cannot be causally impacted by features of the objective world. 
3. Therefore, the notion that experiences represent the external world is 
incoherent. 
 
The second premise seems to me to depend on equivocation concerning the 
word ‘objective.’ Experiences are not ‘objective’ in the sense that they are 
subjective properties, i.e. properties which characterise the subjective experience 
of an individual. But they are perfectly ‘objective’ in the sense that the facts 
about experience are perfectly objective facts about reality. If I am having a pain 
with a certain phenomenal character, then it is a fully real fact about the world 
that I am having a pain with that particular phenomenal character. If someone 
thinks I am not having that pain, then they are wrong. And if experiential 
properties are in this sense perfectly objective features of reality, then why 
should they not causally impact on the physical world? In the last section we 
saw reason to doubt that experience properties are physical; but just because a 
property is not physical it does not follow that it cannot causally impact on 
properties that are physical. The belief that a non-physical God impacts through 
miracles in the physical world, whether or not it is true, does not seem to be 
incoherent. 
I am therefore not persuaded that I have reason to abandon the traditional 
view, which seems to me quite plausible, that the nature of experiential 
properties is (more or less) perfectly known through introspection. And for this 
reason, although I find the transcendent hypothesis intriguing and worth further 
consideration, I do not as yet take myself to have reason to accept it. 
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A tension between the two chapters 
 
In chapter 4 Tartaglia argues against physicalism on the grounds that we 
have a rich conception of consciousness and one at odds with the 
characterizations of consciousness offered by physicalists. In chapter 5, Tartaglia 
argues that we know absolutely nothing about the true nature of consciousness. 
This is most explicit at the point when his discussion touches on considerations 
pertaining to the famous ‘knowledge argument’ against physicalism. In the much 
discussed version formulated by Frank Jackson, the genius brain scientist Mary 
has spent all of her life in a black and white room, from where she has learnt 
everything there is to know about the physical processes involved in colour 
vision. One day she escapes her room and, for the first time, sees something red. 
For proponents of the knowledge argument, Mary at this point learns something 
new: what it’s like to see red. This is supposed to show that there is more to red 
experience than can be known from physical science. 
Tartaglia certainly wants to agree with the conclusion of the knowledge 
argument: red experiences are part of unknowable transcendent reality, and 
hence their nature cannot be known through physical science. But if red 
experiences are transcendent, then Mary’s experience of red cannot teach us 
anything about their nature either:  
 
… it is easy to be misled by the thought that in having experiences we 
learn something new, namely what it is like to have them. There is 
something important to this though, since there is no experience in the 
objective world … [h]owever … it is a mistake to infer ... that knowledge 
of ‘what it’s like’ is knowledge of a different part of reality than the 
objective world. These are mistakes because in having an experience, and 
making sense of it in the only way we can – namely with objective 
thought – we are forming a misconception. (p. 115-6) 
 
Why do I need to make sense of experience in terms of objective thought? Why 
can’t I form a perfectly adequate conception just by conceiving of my 
experience in terms of what it’s like to have it? It seems that I can entertain the 
possibility of solipsism – the hypothesis that all that exists is myself and my 
mental properties – and in doing so I think about my experience without 
bringing in the idea of anything from the external world. Why is this not a 
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perfectly adequate conception of my own experiences? I suspect there may 
again be an equivocation in talk of ‘objective’ thought and reality. The 
conception I form of myself and my experience when I entertain the epistemic 
possibility of solipsism is ‘subjective’ in the sense that it characterizes reality in 
terms of properties of subjective experience, but it is also perfectly ‘objective’ 
just in the sense that it is an objective fact about reality that I really am 
instantiating those subjective experiential properties. 
Moreover, if I have no adequate conception of my experiences, and hence 
know nothing about their nature, how can I know that their nature is not entirely 
physical? The anti-physicalist arguments of chapter 4 depended on my having 
rich knowledge of the nature of experience, which enabled me to rule out that 
my experiences are physical brain processes. But if I know absolutely nothing of 
the nature of my experiential properties, then these arguments seem to be 
undermined.  
Indeed, Tartaglia adopts a response to the knowledge argument popular 
among the phenomenal concept strategists, the very physicalists he argued 
against in chapter 5: 
 
… it is said that someone acquainted with objective thought’s final story 
about the nature of red, would upon seeing red for the first time learn what 
it is like to see red – which is not something they could have known 
before … [this is] best accounted for in terms of their acquisition of 
demonstrative concepts. Thus when they see red, they acquire a new 
demonstrative concept of it as ‘that’ property, the one they are indirectly 
aware of when they have a certain type of experience; as well as a shadow 
concept of ‘that’ as an experience of red. However although this will 
allow them to recognize red when they see it, and the experience of red 
when they have it, it will not teach them anything new about reality under 
either interpretation. (p. 116-7) 
 
According to many phenomenal concept strategists, the reason we can’t know a 
priori the conscious states are physical states is that our experiential concepts are 
demonstratives, and hence do not reveal to us the physical nature of their 
referents. It is an empirical fact that our experiential demonstratives pick out 
physical brain properties. Given that Tartaglia also thinks of experiential 
concepts as demonstratives that leave us in the dark about the nature of 
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experience, how can he be so confident that experience doesn’t have a purely 
physical nature? The arguments of the previous chapter depended upon our 
having a rich conception of experience, but the demonstrative account we find 
here seems to undermine that. 
 
What’s wrong with dualism and panpsychism? 
 
Tartaglia spends much more time rejecting physicalism than he does 
rejecting the traditional opponent of physicalism. There has been much 
discussion recently of Russellian monism, a view which has two components: 
 
1. Physics fails to reveal to us the intrinsic nature of matter, telling us only 
about its structural or dispositional properties 
2. The intrinsic nature of matter is made up of conscious, or 
proto-conscious, properties. 
 
Tartaglia’s quick rejection of this view is premised on understanding Russellian 
monism as in competition with physical science, a competition which the former 
looks certain to lose: 
 
… philosophers are in no position to pontificate on the inadequacy of our 
conception of matter; this is a concern which long ago passed into the 
hands of empirical science. And besides the inadvisability of philosophers 
stepping into core scientific territory as anything more than interested 
bystanders … the fact remains that in a contest between our ordinary 
conception of consciousness and objective thought, objective thought 
wins hands down. Objective thought provides the foundation for all of our 
understanding of the world, and cannot be put in doubt by a philosophical 
problem. (p. 99-100) 
 
However, Russellian monists do not see themselves as in competition with 
natural scientists, or trying to interfere with their work. The point is that, from 
Galileo onwards, natural scientists have been involved in a rather limited kind of 
project: mapping the causal structure of the universe. They have simply not been 
in the business of speculating about the intrinsic nature of matter. Philosophers 
should certainly leave it to physicists to tell us what the causal structure of 
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matter is. But they shouldn’t leave it to physicists to tell us its intrinsic nature, 
because this is simply not the job of a physicist.  
Russellian monists do not propose a competition between theorists of the 
objective physical world and theorists of consciousness; rather they propose a 
way of bringing both together in contributing towards a unified picture of reality. 
On this unified picture, consciousness is the intrinsic nature of the stuff physics 
describes extrinsically.   
Tartaglia is even quicker in his rejection of dualism. In order to make sense 
of the interaction between mind and the physical world ‘… the dualists must 
attribute to the brain a unique capacity to interact with the non-physical world’ 
(p. 102). But Tartaglia has already rejected any such ‘metaphysical specialness’ 
of the brain: ‘we know from objective thought the brain is not radically unlike 
everything else in the world; it is the most complex organ in the human body 
and the one science currently knows least about, but it is nevertheless still a 
physical object, metaphysically on a par with every other’ (p. 101-2).    
This is reminiscent of the standard anti-dualist argument from the alleged 
‘causal closure’ of the physical world. If the physical world is causally closed, 
then there is no space for the mind to do any causal work by making changes in 
the brain. However, although often stated, the causal closure of the physical is 
not often defended with empirical argument. It would be nice to hear a little bit 
more from Tartaglia of the case for causal closure.  
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I believe that the most important task for philosophers of the generation Philip 
Goff and I belong to is that of discrediting, once and for all, the metaphysic of 
physicalism. In a collection called The Waning of Materialism (aka physicalism), 
the editors provide an impressive list of major philosophers – from the period in 
which physicalism was supposed to have achieved hegemony, to the present in 
which it is supposed to possess it – all of whom reject, or have very serious doubts 
about, physicalism (Koons and Bealer 2010: ix). A little reflection upon that list 
makes it plain that the big players, in the main, have not in fact been physicalists. 
After looking at some of the problems with physicalism, the editors go on to say 
that, 
 
it is natural to predict that, among the major mature philosophers in the 
future, a significant portion (perhaps sometimes a majority) will reject 
materialism. Even among those who start out as materialists in their youth, 
a significant number are likely to end up doubting materialism’s ultimate 
viability or suspecting that the materialism / anti-materialism debate is 
moot, and in either case recognizing that some versions of anti-materialism 
have rational credentials at least as good as materialism’s. Thus, even 
though it is likely that in future the ranks of materialists will continue to see 
new recruits, especially among newcomers to philosophy, the character of 
the problems facing materialism will continue to inspire very serious doubt. 
If this is the case, materialism will in one respect continue to wax; in 
another it will continue to wane. (ibid.: xxi) 
 
Not good enough; this prediction needs to be falsified. We do not need more 
protracted waxing and waning, but rather a swift, clean and decisive break. It 
would do the discipline a world of good; both inside and out. If most of the big 
players never bought physicalism, and yet young philosophers continue to be so 
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swayed by our scientistic, anti-philosophical culture that they are prepared to 
accept the scant arguments in its favour to prop up their initial prejudices, then the 
big players have not been taking the problem seriously enough. 
Physicalism is not just a false view in metaphysics, but a corrosive force 
which affects how philosophers go about their business, keeping our discipline 
insular and culturally ambiguous; hence inconspicuous and uninfluential. 
(Philosophy’s rapid cultural decline in the UK is nicely captured by a recent piece 
in the New Statesman (Herman 2017)). And yet physicalism does seem pretty 
obviously true when you start thinking about it within the context provided by our 
scientistic culture: of course science tells us the nature of everything that exists, 
and so if philosophy (whatever that is) has anything to add, it can only be at the 
fringes. Physicalism achieved its supposed hegemony with intuitions of this kind. 
In one of its most influential breakthrough papers, Smart tells us that, ‘sensations, 
states of consciousness, do seem to be the one sort of thing left outside the 
physicalist picture, and for various reasons I just cannot believe that this can be 
so’ (Smart 1959: 142). Then after completing the paragraph with his reasons, he 
begins the next with, ‘The above is largely a confession of faith’ (ibid.: 143). Well 
exactly: faith in science, and a lack of faith in two-and-a-half thousand years of 
philosophy, during which physicalism, which has been around since Democritus, 
was rarely taken particularly seriously.  
What changed? What changed is that science became really impressive in the 
twentieth century and religious influence on intellectual life consequently 
declined. Little or nothing philosophically changed as regards the merits of 
physicalism. But physicalism was a scientific metaphysic, in the sense that it 
handed the central task of metaphysics to science. Religions embody a philosophy, 
so with their declining influence, philosophy was on the back foot. Not wanting 
to get caught on the declining side of the divide, it threw itself into the reluctant 
and ambivalent embrace of science; generally indifferent, sometimes encouraging, 
but more often hostile. Philosophers subsequently learned, like the rest of 
scientistic culture, to think of anything non-physical as ‘spooky’. ‘What sort of 
chemical process could lead to the springing into existence of something non-
physical?’ asked Smart. ‘No enzyme can catalyse the production of spook!’(Smart 
1963: 660). Do not get me wrong: I think Smart was probably the best philosopher 
that physicalism ever produced, for at least he was self-aware, and he did have a 
plausible theory; after Smart, physicalism ran out of those. But as soon as you 
start to reflect philosophically upon the status of the physical world, however – 
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which is what philosophy had always done prior to the advent of physicalism – 
then the notion of ‘non-physical’ takes on a whole new light. Although I would 
heavily qualify it, I am inclined to agree with Hegel that, ‘A philosophy which 
ascribed genuine, ultimate, absolute being to finite existence as such, would not 
deserve the name of philosophy’ (Hegel 1816: §316). 
These days the situation has become really extreme. In a symposium which 
Goff and I recently contributed to, Daniel Dennett says that, ‘most philosophical 
theories are just definitions defended, with no aspiration to make novel 
predictions but rather just to assign the phenomena covered by the “theory” to 
some category or other.’ (Dennett 2016: 67-8) In other words, unless you are 
looking to make ‘novel predictions’ – unless you are a scientist – then you are 
wasting your time. No more subterfuge then; the anti-philosophy that was always 
integral to physicalism is brought right into the open by this astonishing and no 
doubt heart-felt statement by Dennett. Trying to make a rational, well-argued case 
for a description of the world which satisfies human curiosity about natural 
questions such as how experience fits into the world we experience, whether we 
are free, or why the world exists – all of that is reduced to ‘definitions defended’ 
and assigning ‘the phenomena covered by the “theory” to some category or other’. 
Straight into the bin with the entire history of philosophical inquiry, says 
physicalism. It makes me proud to be writing about the meaning of life. 
Physicalism needs to perish and fast. As it gets bolder, its negligible 
philosophical foundations become more exposed; so the time is ripe. Physicalism 
may seem obvious within the context of scientistic culture, but the case against it 
can be made just as obvious with a little philosophical context. Thought 
‘experiments’, as they have come to be called, certainly have their uses; but as the 
name suggests, excessive reliance upon them is to the physicalist’s advantage. The 
instinctively physicalist philosopher can maintain their instincts in the face of 
them, so long as they are clever enough to spot a gap. Philosophical context is the 
real key, I think. Physicalism must reluctantly operate within that context, and 
when that is made clear, the arguments are stacked up against it. And with the 
metaphysic broken, as it will be, the culture that prompts it can also be broken; 
for people do remain open to philosophy, I think, on those rare occasions when 
they are still exposed to it. Philosophy could flourish during the next Roaring 
Twenties. Institutional security is no excuse for looking away from its wider 
cultural decline. 
I doubt Goff would disagree with much of what I have just said, if any of it, 
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but it does provide the essential context for my response to his paper. As I fully 
expected, his critical reading of my theory of consciousness is razor-sharp and 
always constructive. But although we have invested in different theories of 
consciousness, with consequently different ramifications for our metaphysical 
beliefs in general, we are both arguing against physicalism. I am inclined to think 
that the latter is the main thing we are doing. Of course, physicalists disagree with 
each other too – about how best to accommodate consciousness within the world-
view of physicalism – and everybody is just trying to determine the truth about 
consciousness, of course. But the situation across the physicalism / anti-
physicalism divide is highly asymmetrical.  
Physicalists have no reason to care about the particular truth their attention 
has alighted upon, namely that pertaining to consciousness. They talk about it 
because anti-physicalists do; and this because it presents an obvious problem for 
their metaphysic. I very rarely detect much, if any, metaphilosophical self-
consciousness among physicalists. When they disagree among themselves, it is 
simply a matter of disagreement over how best to bat off the latest annoying anti-
physicalist meme. The metaphysics is already settled in their minds; science 
determines that, at the end of the day. All that matters to them, within their internal 
disputes about whether or not to grant consciousness metaphysically supervenient 
or simply conceptual credit, is which tactic best silences the anti-physicalists. If 
they were to win, the only result would be an end to philosophical discussion 
about consciousness; science could take over at that point. Apart from the benefits 
to their careers of publishing on the matter, they really have nothing to win. Anti-
physicalists, on the other hand, have an extremely substantive and self-aware 
unity of purpose: that of bringing the metaphysics back to philosophy. Succeed, 
and they win the conceptual space to debate fascinating speculations about the 
ultimate nature of consciousness, such as Russellian Monism and the 
Transcendent Hypothesis, within a more self-confident, interesting and culturally 
attractive discipline. The fact that anti-physicalists have substantive metaphysical 
disagreements should not be mistaken for a disadvantage, on the grounds that they 
lack the unity of the physicalist side. It is in fact a major advantage; their 
disagreements presage the kind of fruitful debates which philosophy could be 
filled with were physicalism not holding it back, and their metaphilosophical unity 
of purpose in trying to take us to that place is far more compelling and inspiring 
than the physicalists’ metaphysical consensus. Consensus in science gets things 
done; but philosophy is not science, and excessive consensus in philosophy may 
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simply be a sign that the ideas have dried up.   
When I was reading Goff’s paper, reflections such as these kept reminding 
me of a sentence in my book which he does not mention, but which has played on 
my mind ever since I wrote it. After arguing that attempts to insert consciousness 
into the objective world inevitably result in ‘revisionism’, in that we end up trying 
to revise our conception of either experience or matter, I say that, 
 
If revisionism is necessary, then, it is Dennett who takes it in the more 
sensible direction, that is, towards experience rather than matter. (PML, p. 
100)  
 
I take this back. The reason I said it is that I do not think it is credible for 
philosophy to disagree with the characterisations of matter we receive from 
objective thought; whereas experience is prime philosophical territory. 
Philosophy must tell us about the metaphysical status of the world objective 
thought describes (to which physicalism has the simplest and most unreflective 
answer possible), but it is not within its remit to get involved in the first-order 
description itself; and any attempt to do so is liable to look ludicrous, given how 
advanced our science now is.  
I still think this, but I had not thought the matter through sufficiently, and 
hence wrote a false sentence. Given the choice between the Russellian Monist 
view that matter has an intrinsically experiential nature, and the eliminativist view 
of Dennett that we are not conscious, but rather falsely judge that we are, then the 
former is infinitely more sensible. This is because, on the eliminative view, you 
and I are simply not here to do any judging. In Meaningless, I reluctantly reached 
the conclusion that eliminative physicalism ‘could still be true’ (PML, p. 95), 
despite the incredible unlikelihood of its actually being true, given both the nature 
of the proposal and the thoroughly dubious motivations for it. Since then I have 
been circling around this idea (Tartaglia 2016 and 2017). I now see that it could 
not be true. For even if our conception of conscious experience is all wrong about 
its nature, it must at least be right that it has a nature, and that as such, people have 
what we naturally think of as a subjective outlook on the world. Within the 
exclusively objective metaphysic of physicalism, this could not be the case. Their 
conception of what it means for something to seem to be the case, which is that 
the objective conditions for representing it to be the case are met, can only be true 
of conscious beings, for whom a world is present, if at least one element of the 
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representation is correct: namely that there is something that conscious beings are 
representing as ‘the presence of the world’. This cannot be something objective, 
otherwise this element of the representation would not be correct. The equivalent 
representation had by a non-conscious being could indeed be all wrong. ‘They’ 
could ‘token’ this representation in the ‘face of’ nothing at all. 
My mistake was to overlook the metaphilosophical unity of anti-physicalism, 
and focus instead on the kind of metaphysical discussions that anti-physicalists 
can currently only presage. Within a metaphysic in which consciousness is 
assured, then I do indeed think it is considerably more sensible to distrust our 
conception of experience than our conception of matter. Revision is indeed 
required, to some extent, and I think physicalists have hit upon some sound 
insights in this area. But when revisionism is adopted simply in order to sure up 
the world-view of physicalism, which is the context in which I made my 
unfortunate statement, then there is no contest. Revise experience to make 
physicalism work, and consciousness disappears; so the result is the absurd 
spectacle of conscious people trying their damnedest to genuinely believe that 
they are not conscious. If in order to avoid this outcome you feel the need to revise 
our conception of the objective world – by inserting some objective subjectivity 
into the middle of it – then that is obviously the way to go. I do not agree with this 
way of doing it, I do not think you have to do it, and I am quite sure that it is a 
dire mistake to call the result a new and improved form of ‘materialism’ – as Galen 
Strawson does (2008), but Goff does not, despite the affinity of their positions – 
but nevertheless, the outcome is what matters. 
Now in a sense, I have already suggested my answer to the overarching 
concern of Goff’s paper, namely that there is a tension between my arguments 
against physicalist approaches to consciousness in Chapter 4 of Meaningless, and 
my positive account of consciousness in Chapter 5. When I am criticising 
physicalism, my point is that our conception of consciousness is much richer than 
physicalists can allow, since it conflicts with what they want to tell us 
consciousness really is. When I am subsequently presenting my own theory, I 
argue that this rich conception misrepresents the true reality of consciousness. 
What makes it coherent to argue in both of these ways is my view that the rich 
misrepresentation does not have it completely wrong: for it is a conception of 
something. For physicalists, however, it must be completely wrong: a conception 
of nothing at all. This is entirely in line with my general view that we cannot 
positively characterise transcendent reality, but nevertheless cannot deny its 
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reality. Compare, for instance, my argument in Chapter 6 that we have a 
transcendent notion of ‘now’, which inserts us into the flow of time, but which 
creates nothing but illusion when we try to make sense of it with the only 
substantive resources we have, namely those of objective thought. This was the 
direction of travel in the chapters on consciousness. 
Physicalists, before they reach the inevitable, eliminative terminus of their 
position – a terminus most remain unaware of – want our conception of 
consciousness to be anodyne, not rich, because then they have a chance of arguing 
that the anodyne features it ascribes latch onto something physical. I argued that 
as a matter of fact, our conception is not anodyne, but rather squarely incompatible 
with physicalism. But when physicalists do reach the eliminative terminus, it 
becomes irrelevant to them how rich our conception of consciousness is, because 
now they have seen the implication of their position that it is an entirely illusory 
conception. They are wrong, however, because it must at least refer to something, 
given that we are all here, thinking the matter over. Within my own account, I 
accept that the objective world is centreless, as the eliminativists recognise, 
together with the fact that our conception of consciousness is a conception of 
something, which the eliminativists try in vain to dispute – and this leaves me at 
liberty to reflect on the erroneous nature of the rich conception we possess. Rich 
and erroneous for the same reason: namely that it derives from objective thought, 
which is rich and centreless. 
Although I think concepts of conscious experiences are rich 
misrepresentations, the accurate representation at the heart of them can be thought 
of as ‘blind-pointer-type concepts’, as Goff puts it (p. 25). Goff thinks I reject all 
such concepts in Chapter 4 and then end up re-affirming them in Chapter 5. This 
is what he says, 
 
In Naming and Necessity, Kripke claims that proper names refer in virtue 
of a causal connection between the name and the referent, rather than in 
virtue of an associated description. A school child can refer to ‘Galileo’ 
without knowing anything about him (perhaps they mistakenly think he was 
a famous explorer), which shows that they can’t be picking him out in terms 
of any of his characteristics. The child manages to pick out Galileo because 
they use a term, i.e. ‘Galileo’, which is causally connected in the right kind 
of way with Galileo himself. This story seems to me fairly plausible, and it 
suggests that the concept expressed by a proper name is a kind of blind 
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pointer.  
I think it’s better to say, not that there are no blind-pointer-type concepts, 
but simply that it’s pretty implausible that experiential concepts are blind-
pointer-type concepts. When I think about pain in terms of how it feels, I 
know something about its essential nature. That’s what prompts my concern 
when others feel pain; I know what pain is, and hence I know it’s a terrible 
thing to endure. We might bolster this claim with reference to Tartaglia’s 
claim that we characterise experiences as self-aware states: to characterise 
a state as self-aware is to have a positive conception of it, not just to blindly 
point at it. (pp. 24-5) 
 
I have been deeply suspicious of Kripke’s causal theory of reference ever since I 
read Rorty’s critique of it (Rorty 1979: chapter 6; esp. pp. 284-95). To have a 
conception of something is to have a way of thinking about it. If a child thinks 
Galileo was a famous explorer, and nothing more, does the child have a way of 
thinking about that man? It seems to me that they know the name, but not what it 
stands for; and hence that they cannot have acquired a way of thinking about what 
it stands for. Since others know the name too, the child can use it to refer to 
Galileo; when the child says the name, others start thinking about Galileo 
according to their own conceptions of him. But the child has a conception of a 
famous explorer called ‘Galileo’, and there was no such person. Causal links 
within society may explain the child’s ability to use that name to refer to Galileo, 
but they cannot provide the child with a way of thinking about somebody they 
know nothing about. The causal links are epistemically nothing to the child; and 
the child’s ability to make a certain sound provides them with no cognitive grasp 
on the nature of the object that the sound conventionally stands for either.  
The reason I do not think this child has a blind-pointer-type-concept, is that 
they do have an idea of what they want to point to; and it is wrong. No doubt they 
also want to point to the standard bearer of the name (that is why it is wrong), but 
they lack the cognitive resources to do so. If they try on their own to think about 
Galileo, then they fail, by thinking about some explorer. (Perhaps ‘some man in 
the olden days called “Galileo”’ is good enough, but I am inclined to think that 
the more explicit content cancels this out; and in any case, you could easily adjust 
the example.) Thus it seems natural to me to say that they lack a concept of Galileo. 
The case of experiential concepts is different, however, because what we are 
trying to think about is right up against our faces, so to speak. We are trying to 
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think about that. In such cases, we cannot fail to have concepts of something 
which we are trying to make sense of with the concepts. These concepts are rich, 
so the pre-eliminative physicalist positions cannot be right. But they have blind-
pointer-type-concepts at their heart, surrounded by the rich misrepresentation that 
makes the concepts useful to us, so the eliminative physicalist position cannot be 
right either. 
The main point of contention between Goff and myself is over the question 
of whether our rich conceptions of conscious states get them right or not; he thinks 
they do and I do not. As he neatly puts it, the issue is over the ‘epistemic priority 
of phenomenal properties over external properties’ or vice versa (p. 27). For me, 
phenomenal concepts are shadows of concepts of external properties, but Goff 
thinks it can be the other way around. In response to my arguments that whenever 
we form a positive, phenomenal conception of our experiences, we end up relying 
upon features from the objective world which experiences cannot possess, he says 
that, 
 
Phenomenal colour and phenomenal shape represent their external 
analogues: when I see a tomato I have an experience which represents a red, 
round thing at a certain distance from me. But I see no reason to doubt that 
there is ‘mental paint’ doing the representing, mental paint with an intrinsic 
character known through introspection. We call a certain intrinsic property 
of experience ‘phenomenal colour’ because it represents phenomenal 
colour, and another intrinsic property of experience ‘phenomenal shape’ 
because it represents phenomenal shape. (p. 26) 
 
He supports this with the suggestion that my case draws support from an 
equivocation over the meaning of ‘objective’: ‘Experiences are not “objective” in 
the sense that they are subjective properties, i.e. properties which characterise the 
subjective experience of an individual. But they are perfectly “objective” in the 
sense that the facts about experience are perfectly objective facts about reality’ (p. 
28). 
I take the point that if there were subjective properties captured by 
phenomenal concepts, then they would be just as objective as everything else, in 
the sense that within any given time-slice of reality, subjective properties would 
number among the properties that exist. But that is not how I use ‘objective’, 
because I do not find the terminology useful in this context. Used in this way, 
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‘objective’ means something like ‘independently existing’; but then it cannot quite 
mean that because the existence of subjective properties depends on a subject 
experiencing them – unless you are the kind of panpsychist who denies this. And 
since you might reasonably think that no property exists independently, you may 
as well just say that subjective properties exist. So rather than unnecessarily 
muddy the waters, when I say ‘objective’, I mean having the properties 
characteristic of physical objects, such as size, shape, colour, density, and so on, 
plus the less obvious characteristics which science invokes to better explain them.  
Now I perfectly understand, I think, where Goff is coming from on this issue 
of epistemic priority. He thinks that conscious experience is our epistemic point 
of contact with the world, and that it was on the basis of the ‘mental paint’ of 
consciousness that we drew up our more abstract conceptions of size, shape and 
other external qualities. In a sense, then, I am bound to agree; I defend an indirect 
conception of perceptual experience. However, it seems to me that our original 
experience of the world was just that: of the world. We thought of our conscious 
experience as trees, animals, etc., and formed conceptions of those things. 
Developing such conceptions has ultimately led to the incredibly rich picture of 
an objective world which we now have. Reflection, however, taught us that this 
completely transparent conception of experience is philosophically naïve and 
unsustainable, and that to produce a coherent and complete picture of reality, 
which includes many ‘things’ we experience which are not things at all, we need 
to think of the things we conceive of objectively as external causes of the states 
of conscious experience which represent them. We needed an indirect conception 
of experience, to account for both the existence of experience and its causal 
integration with the world. But when we try to conceive the experiences 
themselves, and not just what they are experiences of, we have no new concepts 
to hand. We have to employ the concepts we developed for making sense of the 
external world; and when we look at the phenomenal concepts we actually have, 
it seems to me that this is exactly what we find. 
When we started saying that sounds were vibrations in the air, or that colours 
were light-reflectancies of surfaces, I do not think we were overlooking the mental 
paint, and trying to pretend it does not exist in the service of an impoverished, 
purely extrinsic conception of reality, as I think Goff does. There is definitely 
something to this, in the sense that we favoured anything that fitted our scientific 
theories, and looked away from the rest. But what I think was really happening is 
that we were refining our objective conceptions. We always thought, except in our 
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philosophical moments, that the sound, e.g., was ‘something out there’; and we 
found a better way of describing what it was. It was a description of the ‘mental 
paint’, except we were not thinking of it as mental, but rather external. When the 
philosophical need to describe what independently exists arose, we realised that 
the vibrations in the air could only be the causes of internal experience. But when 
we came to describe that internal experience, we had no new resources. All we 
could do was fall back on the less objectively accurate concepts we had before – 
‘the sound of a trumpet’, rather than ‘certain vibrations in the air’, for instance – 
and then assure ourselves that the former, and not the latter, captured the 
phenomenal nature of the experience. We knew experience could not be nothing 
at all and we felt we should be able to say something about it; so we enlisted the 
older objective concepts and starting talking about phenomenal ineffability. 
If we ‘call a certain intrinsic property of experience “phenomenal colour” 
because it represents phenomenal colour,’ then we end up with the mental paint 
representing itself; physicalists typically find themselves relying on this kind of 
idea too. It strikes me as untenable, since our notion of representation is of one 
thing representing another. More strongly, I think it is incoherent; and I have an 
analysis of where I think the deep-rooted incoherence lies (PML, chapter 7; esp. 
pp. 156-62). A much better plan, it seems to me, is to say that when we represent 
an experience as possessed of phenomenal colour, we represent it in accordance 
with the way we represent things in the objective world. The incoherence is still 
there, because we do also represent experiences as self-aware; but now that we 
are explaining a feature of misrepresentation, rather than a supposed feature of 
reality, it no longer matters.   
Further light is shed on our disagreement about epistemic priority, when Goff 
says, 
 
It is a familiar point that experiential qualities are in some sense ineffable. 
But this is plausibly due to the fact that the concepts we use to pick them 
out are primitive. Compare to other plausibly primitive concepts: existence, 
metaphysical possibility, causation, the notion of a reason. It is arguable 
that none of these notions can be explained in more basic terms. 
 
He goes on to say that,  
 
The nature is known, but it is known only through actually having the 
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experience itself. If you have to ask, you’ll never know. (pp. 27-8) 
 
‘What is swing?’ Fats Waller was once asked, and his reply was: ‘Lady, if you 
have to ask, don’t fool with it!’ (Terkel 2002: 72). Ned Block once attributed a 
similar line to Louis Armstrong, related it to the ineffability of phenomenal 
consciousness, and it subsequently went viral in philosophy; Goff was giving it a 
nod with his final sentence above. Well, if the lady in question did have to ask, 
then Fats was surely right that swinging was never going to be her thing. But 
although musicians who know how to swing are unlikely to know how they do it, 
that does not mean nothing can be said about it. I can swing; and although I do 
not know much about it (except in the ability sense), I do know a little. A lot of it 
comes down to adjusting the lengths of the quavers in accordance with the tempo; 
in jazz, contiguous pairs of these are, as a rule of thumb, divided two-thirds to 
one-third, but when the tempo goes up, this gradually gets closer to half and half. 
There is a lot more to it than that, of course, and you do not need to know even 
this to instinctively swing (thank God). But my point is that an awful lot could be 
said about it, and no doubt already has. In principle, you could take the styles of 
the greatest swingers apart, and show exactly what they are doing in 
excruciatingly dull detail.  
The situation with phenomenal consciousness is not remotely like this, so I 
do not think the analogy is a good one. Neither do I think it a tactically good idea 
for anti-physicalists to rely on ineffability intuitions; they are an obvious weak 
point, and quite unnecessary – not to mention misleading, to my mind. It is not 
that there is no need to get explicit about phenomenal consciousness and that it is 
better that we do not, as is the case with swing. The fact is that we simply cannot 
get explicit about it without talking in terms we have evidently borrowed from the 
objective world. The colour was really intense, says the introspecter; the light was 
really intense, says the scientist, etc. That we can get explicit right up until the 
point at which we feel the need to say something different about phenomenal 
colour to what we say about objective colour, strongly suggests to me that we are 
not dealing with one of Goff’s primitive concepts. Now you could think it is the 
other way around, in that our conceptions of the objective world come from our 
conceptions of experiences. And in terms of the metaphysics of what is actually 
going on, on both my account and Goff’s, it amounts to the same thing in at least 
the following sense: that we are conceptualising the same thing, whether we take 
ourselves to be conceptualising consciousness itself or the world which it makes 
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us aware of. However, it is not the same in the sense of what we take ourselves to 
be conceptualising; and outside of philosophy, it seems clear to me that we have 
taken ourselves to be conceptualising the world – which is why we have been so 
successful in developing the concepts of objective thought. In this sense, then, 
they are concepts of external properties, and hence this is where the epistemic 
priority lies. 
Various considerations convince me that this is the right order of priority, but 
the main one is the need to account for the ‘split-level’ nature of consciousness. 
The idea, which I learnt from J. J. Valberg’s ‘horizonal’ conception of 
consciousness (Valberg 2007), is that consciousness places us within a world from 
the perspective of which whatever reality there is to consciousness itself is to be 
found outside of that world. I do not think that Russellian monism, dualism, or 
any of the other alternatives to physicalism, outside of idealist and 
phenomenological traditions, account for that insight; an insight which I think is 
entirely sound. Once you accept it, it makes perfect sense that concepts of what 
appear within consciousness will have epistemic priority; Valberg himself does 
not even allow for specifically phenomenal concepts of that which appears within 
consciousness, but I do think we have them – as shadows (see my exchange with 
Valberg; this symposium). Once you look at things this way, then there is no 
longer see any reason to entertain doubts about the picture of the world-within-
consciousness which objective thought presents. Objective concepts are fine for 
objective purposes, and the fact that when you try to make a metaphysic out of 
this world you will find no room for conscious experience, is exactly what you 
would expect; the main problem for physicalist metaphysics is predicted and 
explained, without the need to criticise objective thought itself. And for all Goff 
says about Russellian Monism not being in competition with science (pp. 31-2) – 
which I accept – I still think that to say that science leaves out the intrinsic nature 
of the matter it describes, sounds like a criticism. On my view, describing matter 
is their business alone; metaphysically interpreting that description is ours. 
Now add in some metaphilosophical considerations about the connection 
between consciousness and transcendence, which I think explain why the issue 
has attracted so much philosophical attention, and which ties it in with a plausible 
account of philosophical inquiry in general. Add in the straightforward 
plausibility of the idea that the independent nature of reality outruns any 
description human beings can give of it, except when we retreat to some of the 
emptiest concepts we have, which lack the detail, and hence usefulness, of the 
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objective thought we developed because of its usefulness. Put all of that together, 
and I think we have an attractive package. Goff’s alternative has a powerful idea 
behind it which I cannot lay claim to, namely that objective thought is merely 
extrinsic and relational, thereby leaving an obvious gap when it comes to the 
intrinsic. But all things considered, I think that extrinsic characterisation is all we 
can do when we want to say something substantive – basically, relate things to 
each other; and Goff’s appeal to ineffability confirms me in this view. The 
intrinsicality gap is a natural enough place to insert the fact that we are conscious. 
But if you do it this way, you do not account for the distinctive structure of 
conscious experience, and end up placing consciousness in the objective world, 
rather than the objective world within consciousness; from the introspective 
perspective we must apply to think about consciousness, this is clearly the wrong 
way around. Consciousness ends up ineffable, but also extremely well-known to 
us, such that despite the fact that we know it spatially, for instance, we cannot 
employ this spatial knowledge to say the substantive things we normally would, 
e.g. that the experience is large with rounded edges. Better to leave objective 
thought alone, I think, while granting that it provides us with useful 
misrepresentations when we need to talk about individual experiences. 
Goff asks, 
  
Why do I need to make sense of experience in terms of objective thought? 
Why can’t I form a perfectly adequate conception just by conceiving of my 
experience in terms of what it’s like to have it? It seems that I can entertain 
the possibility of solipsism – the hypothesis that all that exists is myself and 
my mental properties – and in doing so I think about my experience without 
bringing in the idea of anything from the external world. Why is this not a 
perfectly adequate conception of my own experiences? (pp. 29-30) 
 
I agree that you could, but your conceptions of your own experiences will have to 
be rooted in the idea that it is as if they were caused by external conditions. 
Otherwise you will not be able to make sense of their succession. As such, you 
will be leaning on objective thought. You may disavow it, by saying that it is only 
as if your blue experience has rounded edges; as everyone does when they turn to 
the phenomenal conception. But since you will not be able to say anything 
positive about the blueness itself, and anything substantive you might want to say, 
such as about what seems to cause the blue experience, will be disavowed, then 
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everything that makes your conception adequate is being disavowed. Such a 
disavowal strikes me as hollow, unless made within a context which explains the 
status of objective thought within the context of consciousness, and thereby 
explains why we cannot say anything positive about the blueness itself.  
Goff goes on to point out an affinity between the Phenomenal Concept 
Strategy and my take on both Jackson’s Mary-in-the-room and the Farrell / Nagel 
bat. I very nearly passed over these examples, which have been unremittingly 
flogged for decades, on the grounds that they have clearly failed to do their job, 
and hence are very unlikely to ever do so now; but I am glad I did not, given that 
what I said caught Goff’s attention. He is right about the affinity; I spent so long 
trying to work out what was wrong with the Phenomenal Concept Strategy, that I 
eventually found the positive aspect within it that had maintained my attention. 
The Strategy appeals to physicalists, because it shows them a way to use Kripke’s 
causal theory to argue that phenomenal concepts are blind demonstratives; being 
blind, they could refer to anything whatsoever, which is just what the physicalist 
needs. I affirm this aspect of the view, like them, to explain why Mary learns 
something new when she leaves the black-and-white room, and why we do not 
know what it is like to be a bat. To this, Goff understandably asks, ‘Given that 
Tartaglia also thinks of experiential concepts as demonstratives which leave us in 
the dark about the nature of experience, how can he be so confident that 
experience doesn’t have a purely physical nature?’ (pp. 30-1). 
I have already answered this: the reason I can be so confident, is that if 
experience did have a purely physical nature, then it would be objective, and so 
no experiential field would open up from individual, subjective perspectives, such 
that our blind demonstratives have something to hit. No introspective 
demonstrative reference would be taking place; rather Mary, or the bat, would just 
be making noises – or computing in a manner appropriate to the emission of such 
noises. Consciousness would not present a world; rather an objective world would 
simply exist. And unless consciousness presents a world, our awareness of this 
fact cannot lead us to form the metaphysical intention to refer to the ultimate 
nature of that presentation, thereby making the demonstratives a little less blind.  
By leaning on objective thought, we form phenomenal concepts of distinct, 
individual experiences. Reflection on the transcendence of consciousness teaches 
us both that these concepts cannot be capturing their real natures, and that they 
must have a real nature. We point outside the horizon of consciousness, just as 
within a dream we might point outside of the dream to where the real existence 
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lies. We know that our conceptions formed within the context of consciousness 
cannot capture what we are pointing at, but we also know that these conceptions 
are of different experiences, because leaning on objective thought distinguishes 
them for us. Since objective thought cannot capture the demonstrate component, 
learning about what it has to say cannot provide us with these concepts; so when 
we gain one, we learn something new: what it is like. What we learn may be 
entirely illusory outside the context of consciousness – we have no reason to think 
that we are marking real distinctions, although I grant that it is very tempting to 
think this – but within the context, we learn something both practically 
informative, and philosophically, highly suggestive. 
Goff closes his paper by pointing out how very quick my rejection of dualism 
is, and how it presupposes the standard ‘causal closure’ line of physicalists. About 
this, he says, 
 
If the physical world is causally closed, then there is no space for the mind 
to do any causal work by making changes in the brain. However, although 
often stated the causal closure of the physical is not often defended with 
empirical argument. It would be nice to hear a little bit more from Tartaglia 
of the case for causal closure. (p. 32) 
 
He is quite right. The closure argument is far from water-tight, and I have nothing 
to say in response to the sophisticated objections that have been brought against 
it by Goff and others. My stance towards the causal closure argument is rather 
apathetic: I am prepared to give that one to the physicalists – although Goff may 
well be right that anti-physicalists should not. The reason for my apathy is that I 
am already convinced, from reflection on the structure of consciousness, that the 
right place to look for consciousness is not the objective world. As such, I have 
no reason to suspect that objective thought would not be capable of describing a 
perfectly closed system; except for general suspicion about the limitations of 
science, which seems less compelling with each passing decade.  
The closure argument would, if it were any good, reinforce my view that 
interactionist dualism makes a similar mistake to physicalism; inserting 
consciousness into the objective order, and thereby becoming forced to say that 
the brain is metaphysically special, rather than an ordinary object. But then, I 
would think that anyway. What really interests me is the fact that it is the main 
argument which physicalism relies upon. And yet it only has any force against 
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interactionist dualism. My tactic was to point out that since I am not an 
interactionist dualist – and the vast majority of anti-physicalists, past and present, 
have not been – then I simply do not care about that argument. They can have it; 
if it works, it can only reinforce what I am saying. If I keep saying things like this, 
and Goff continues to make the case that even this argument – the one which is 
supposed to provide the physicalist’s strongest ground – is actually a rather 
dubious article of faith, then we will have a classic pincer movement going on.  
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Meaningless Life 
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Abstract 
This appreciative inquiry of James Tartaglia’s Philosophy in a Meaningless Life examines the case 
Tartaglia makes for the meaninglessness of life itself (as opposed to particular purposeful activities 
within life), and asks whether it is still possible for modern persons to entertain a notion of meaning 
that does not stem from human purpose and decision alone. Does meaning only reside in the purposes 
humans choose and the activities they invent, or can human beings experience the enveloping universe 
as itself responsive to the human quest for meaning? Taking up the work of Victor Frankl, this essay 
explores the latter possibility, in sympathy with Tartaglia’s resistance to quick and easy impositions 
of all-too-human meaning on the transcendent context of life itself. 
 
 
I. Philosophical Pluralism and the Question of the Meaning of Life 
 
When the editors at the Journal of the Philosophy of Life invited me to 
contribute an essay to this special issue on James Tartaglia’s most recent book, I 
was both honoured and happy to accept. I had appreciated Tartaglia’s helpful and 
insightful commentary on Richard Rorty’s Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, 
and was curious to discover what sort of original philosophical contribution he 
would provide outside the format of a philosophical commentary.1 Then I opened 
the .pdf file that the editors at Bloomsbury sent me and was greeted by the 
ominous title, Philosophy in a Meaningless Life: A System of Nihilism, 
Consciousness, and Reality. Since I’m one of those increasingly rare intellectuals 
who naively yet somehow confidently assumes that life is meaningful, even if we 
humans cannot provide a general definition of such meaning or otherwise provide 
for it on our own terms, I prepared myself for the worst. Would I be treated to yet 
another tiresome version of ‘Ditchkinian’ physicalist reductionism, 
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paternalistically explaining to me that there is nothing but atoms and the void, and 
that any non-scientific discourse claiming to find meaning in human existence is 
nothing more than fanciful human projection? Or would I get the ‘accomplished’ 
Nietzschean version, in which we humans, mere floating specks in a vast universe 
that cares nothing for our existence, may connect to nothing more ultimate than 
our own will-to-power? 
Although Tartaglia’s version of nihilism more closely resembles the 
‘accomplished’ Nietzschean version, ultimately the book pursues neither of the 
aforementioned directions (while also appreciating and learning from them). 
Instead, he takes the reader on a whirlwind philosophical tour through which he 
lays out his own unique and highly interesting take on nihilism. Along the way, 
we are also treated to some first-rate and deeply rewarding philosophy of mind, 
including intriguing treatments of such themes as consciousness, time, universals, 
and transcendence. Through his exploration of these themes, Tartaglia seeks to 
convince his reader that the relative purposefulness we experience through the 
daily activities we pursue within the framework of ordinary life provides us with 
meaning enough, and the fact that we cannot specify an analogous purpose or 
meaning for life itself need not bother us very much.2 He even hints, toward the 
book’s end, that our inability to ascribe an overall meaning to life itself can in fact 
encourage an edifying form of spiritual comportment to the very fact of our 
existence, wherein our anxiety to impose meaning on life itself finally comes to 
be stilled (not answered), thereby providing a measure of existential comfort. 
But before jumping to the end of the book, I need to say more about the way 
in which Tartaglia argues for life’s meaninglessness. I will do so in the next 
section. After that, I will finally turn my attention to some of the spiritual concerns 
Tartaglia’s position raises for me, and indeed for himself (if the book’s conclusion 
is any indication). At this point, however, I would like to head off a potential 
misunderstanding: Simply because, as I described above, I consider myself to be 
an intellectual who somehow naively assumes life itself to have meaning, I would 
hate for anyone to conclude from this admission that my reaction to Tartaglia’s 
work must be fundamentally hostile, and that I therefore plan to engage in some 
form of more or less veiled polemics. To the contrary, I have struggled with 
Tartaglia’s position and have taken it seriously as a possible and defensible answer 
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to the big questions he asks. I have let his version of nihilism trouble my sleep. I 
have done so not simply to strengthen my position by exposing it to a strong 
contrast case, but also because, at the end of the day, I do not think that there exists 
any knock-down philosophical refutation of Tartaglia’s position, and I respect the 
intellectual honesty that has led him to it.3 
What I do spy in Tartaglia’s position concerning nihilism, however, is that he 
might not grant the same quarter to my spiritual position with respect to the 
question of life’s meaning (which I will reveal in due time), and would thus be 
less tolerant of a measure of philosophical pluralism when it comes to answering 
this question. Here I locate a productive tension between us that might help shed 
further light on the big questions that form the subject matter of this book. My 
hunch is that a greater tolerance of pluralism can open up dialogical space and a 
search for common understanding, if not common ground. Trying my level best 
to steer clear of polemic, then, I will take the opportunity this examination affords 
to consider ways in which the assumption of meaning to life itself could still look 
like a tenable position, even in modernity, in ways that perhaps Tartaglia has yet 
to consider fully or otherwise address. What I have found interesting and even 
surprising, given the difference between our positions, is the way that both of them 
eventuate in comparable (but of course not exactly similar) forms of attentive, if 
not receptive, spiritual comportment to human life in a world that transcends it. 
Of course, this spiritual resonance, however deep, still resides in the context of a 
difference that makes a difference. Nevertheless, I maintain that it presents real 
common ground upon which to continue a communal conversation. 
One final word of caution: In this brief examination, I will remain relatively 
silent on many of the book’s more fine-tuned arguments concerning the 
transcendence of human consciousness and self-aware experience from the 
objective or material world, the human consciousness of time, and the human 
ability to conceive the world in terms of universals. These are all fascinating 
discussions, and I’m still not sure that I have understood all the nuances of the 
arguments contained therein, and so I will leave it to others more capable than 
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myself to unpack them. Instead, I here take the risk of addressing my attention 
primarily to the beginning and end of the book, and so of neglecting somewhat 
the connecting parts in the middle. My justification for so doing, such as it is, is a 
felt need, as my discussion above already indicates, to take a high altitude view 
of Tartaglia’s project; for questions about what meaning itself is, and whether or 
not anything like it can be ascribed to life itself, are large ones, the biggest 
questions we can in fact ask. It is at this high-altitude level, then, that I begin to 
engage with Tartaglia’s project. 
 
II. Purposeless Life as the Framework for Relative Meaning 
 
As beings who ultimately pursue a meaningless life, humans are, to say the 
least, curious creatures. Together, over time and not without an enormous amount 
of violence and agonism, but also cooperation, we have developed cultures and 
civilizations that provide us with models for living together, roles to perform, and 
tasks to carry out. This feature of our existence provides us with goals and 
purposes, and these serve to provide relative meaning to the various and sundry 
activities we undertake to achieve them, as well as criteria by which to measure 
our success in so doing. In Tartaglia’s words, human culture and civilization thus 
provide everyday life with a “framework,” one that gives meaning to the activities 
that take place within it, and a sense of identity to those who perform them. 
“Within the framework … we can tread a more or less beaten path through our 
lives, and are thereby provided with rules and objectives for living. In this way, 
life takes on the character of a game: a highly flexible and complex game, of 
course, but nevertheless an activity we can join in with others, and perhaps at the 
end, look back to evaluate how well we did” (23).  
For humans, Tartaglia notes, this framework is not simply the framework of 
biological imperatives that we share with other animals. Our framework is more 
than simply biological because, unlike non-human animals, our lives are not 
constituted by biological imperatives alone. Whereas we would have good cause 
to ask what has gone wrong when an animal has stopped mating or eating for no 
discernible biological reason, we do not normally draw the same conclusion when 
a human being takes a vow of chastity or goes on a hunger strike (23). For 
Tartaglia, examples like this show us that human beings “have broken free of the 
biological framework in which their ancestors lived,” so much so that it is more 
accurate to describe the human framework as a “social framework” (23). Tartaglia 
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goes so far as to suggest that our biological imperatives have been socialized to 
the extent that even the imperative to satisfy our desire to eat, although not 
something we invented or gave to ourselves, “can only govern our behaviour if 
we choose to play along.” Following this line of thinking to its logical end, he 
concludes that our freedom “to put even biological imperatives aside serves as a 
reminder that for the modern human being, all purposes are socially constructed 
impositions upon life, rather than something constitutive of life” (23). 
The social framework we inhabit from day to day thus tells us some specific 
things about what is unique to the human form of life. For starters, when we 
consider the framework, we see that, unlike life itself, the activities and purposes 
that populate it are in some sense things that we ourselves have invented and 
chosen. While these activities and goals depend on the interpretation we give to 
them, life itself would continue to exist in the absence of such interpretation: 
“Once the interpretation is in place, activities have a purpose within life, just as 
chess moves have a purpose within the game, and the game has a purpose within 
life; but in all these cases the purpose is made up within a life that has no purpose 
of its own” (23). Life itself has no purpose because, as that which gives the 
framework in which we create all of our cultural inventions, it is something that 
we ourselves did not invent, and so it is something to which we could never 
ascribe, and upon which we could never impose, a purpose. 
For Tartaglia, all meaning is relative to the framework, and that which gives 
the framework, life, is meaningless itself. On this understanding, human meaning 
is intimately related to human making. This understanding of meaning allows 
Tartaglia to claim, as we saw above, that “all purposes are socially constructed 
impositions upon life, rather than something constitutive of life” (23). Whatever 
or whomever it is that constitutes life, it is not us. As alive, we find ourselves to 
be merely the recipients of life, albeit a unique form of life that has evolved the 
freedom to impose socially constructed purposes upon that which we did not 
ourselves constitute. These purposes, Tartaglia goes on to describe, “have been 
made up anonymously over the course of history, as people living together in 
communities, guided by evolving conceptions of what constitutes a good life and 
how best to achieve it, have established patterns of behaviour with criteria of 
success and failure” (23). We see the difference between life itself and the human 
form of life that is only able to impose relative meaning and purpose upon it, once 
we consider the fact that, even if we suspended all our culturally prescribed 
activities within the framework, life itself would not cease: “It would remain, its 
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pointlessness rendered more perspicuous” (23). 
One might wish to ask an epistemological question at this point, concerning 
how Tartaglia considers it possible for us to perform such a thought experiment 
in the first place. That is, how are we able to imagine the total suspension of 
everyday life practices, and thereby notice the way in which, in that situation, life 
itself would be seen to lack any point or purpose? In order for this thought 
experiment to succeed, would we not have to retain, rather than suspend, one last 
practice, i.e., the practice of judging the presence or absence of purposes? And 
wouldn’t the need to simultaneously retain and suspend that practice show the 
impossibility of ascribing either meaning or meaninglessness to life itself? My 
point is that, if any judgment concerning the meaning or meaninglessness of life 
itself can only come into view upon the suspension of all purposeful human 
practices, and yet the act of judging is part of the parcel of those practices to be 
suspended, then under such a requirement one would never be able to come to one 
conclusion or its opposite, because one would not be able to engage in the practice 
of judging. It seems rather facile to conclude that life itself refuses to answer a 
question that no one can ever ask (under the requirement of this thought 
experiment); in the absence of a prior question, or anyone who could ask it, how 
or why should life itself supply an answer? 
For now, however, we may put aside this epistemological quibble, for the 
inherent problems of Tartaglia’s counterfactual thought experiment do not really 
present insuperable obstacles to his overall program. That is, the weight of his 
thesis does not hang upon the thought experiment’s possibility, even if the way he 
poses it reveals some of his more important philosophical assumptions. The point 
he is really making is that we have no reason to believe that life itself would not 
continue if humans stopped being the free, socially constructive animals that we 
are. Counterfactually imagining a human witness to this situation, Tartaglia 
believes, renders the meaninglessness of life itself salient; by entertaining the 
absence or ceased existence of the activity of the meaning-giving creature—the 
socially-constituted human animal—one demonstrates the inaptness of searching 
for some ‘point to it all’, one akin to the relative purposefulness of everyday life. 
For, in this scenario, the purposefulness of ordinary life would no longer exist, 
and so could not be used to measure the meaning of life itself. 
Closer to the main thrust of his argument, Tartaglia thinks he can account 
positively, and not just negatively, for our ability to judge in favour of life’s overall 
meaninglessness, even in the midst of our purpose-filled, everyday lives. As it 
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turns out, humans are not just beings who exist within the everyday framework, 
but also beings who are able to transcend and thus suspend this framework in 
various ways. In moments of reflection, for example, we are able to look 
objectively at life as a whole. In thought, we are able to suspend our engagement 
with the framework, an ability, Tartaglia explains, we have evolved “to suspend 
engagement with one way of life in favour of another” (25). Unlike other animals, 
Tartaglia says, humans have evolved a degree of freedom with respect to their 
situation, through which they can choose which paths to follow in life, even 
changing them midcourse. As Bruce Springsteen reminds us, you can have a wife 
and kids in Baltimore, Jack, and then one day simply decide to go out for a ride 
and never go back. For Tartaglia, our freedom to make such shifts, to suspend 
engagement with one way of life in favour of another, demonstrates our ability to 
suspend framework engagement as such. 
This significant feature of human existence, our evolved freedom to transcend 
the framework and reflect upon it, naturally leads us to entertain questions 
concerning the meaning of life itself, the point or goal of the entire framework as 
such, and not just the meaning of the various activities we pursue together within 
it. Equally naturally, we are tempted to think that the meaning of life itself must 
be something analogous to the meaning of our goal-oriented activities within the 
framework it provides. Just as these latter have a point that gives them meaning, 
so must the former. Yet when we transcend the framework, he says, we neither 
discover nor discern any overall purpose to life itself, one that would give it 
meaning in the same way that, say, nourishing our bodies gives the activities of 
farming, hunting, and eating meaning: “[O]ur collective movements have created 
the context in which individual movements are understood as meaningful, but 
there is no wider context in which life itself can be understood as meaningful” 
(25). 
In order for us to attribute meaning to that which gives the framework, life 
itself, we must not only be able to transcend the framework, but also discern 
features of this new meta-context that would give it overall meaning. That is, this 
meta-context could not be any old context, but must rather be a context of 
meaning. “The idea of a further context of meaning beyond the framework, then, 
is the idea that life itself might be placed in a context of meaning; and if there 
were such a context, this might provide our various activities within life with a 
further significance” (48). Tartaglia argues, however, that any sort of meaning 
analogous to the kind we ascribe to activities within the framework is precisely 
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what this meta-context itself lacks (49), because we have no good reason to 
believe that it is itself a context of meaning. We know that the framework rests 
within the context of the physical universe, for example, but it is a leap beyond 
the available facts to presume that this context is a context of meaning, or that the 
physical universe itself is nestled within a further transcendent context of meaning 
(50). 
While Tartaglia admits that we have no grounds to rule out the existence of 
such a transcendent context of meaning—because, he says, “we have no grounds 
to suppose that only meaningless existence could provide the final context of 
existence”—he nevertheless argues that “we have no good reason to believe in it 
either” (52). While we cannot rule out the possibility of the existence of such a 
context, there is nothing we can do to establish that possibility either. “All this is 
possible, but possibility is cheap” (52). The real significance of the very notion of 
a transcendent hypothesis of meaning, Tartaglia says, is not the challenge it 
presents to nihilism, “but rather that it provides us with an idea of what would be 
required for nihilism to be false; an idea which is deeply rooted in our intellectual 
history, which is made tangible by our experience, and which people might 
understandably want to be true” (53). Wishful thinking, however, is no basis upon 
which to insist on as dubious a posit as the existence of a transcendent context of 
meaning. 
Yet even if we cannot in good intellectual conscience affirm the existence of 
such a context, we still need to come to terms with our ability to transcend the 
framework and view it as a whole (and thus entertain the question of the meaning 
of that whole). Precisely because of this ability, Tartaglia sees the emergence of 
two other features of everyday existence that bear witness to the meaninglessness 
of life itself. In particular, he points to what he describes, in Heideggerian fashion, 
as the “attunements” of anxiety and boredom. He describes these as attunements, 
rather than simply as moods, “because they are not responses to particular and 
changeable circumstances, but rather the human condition as a whole” (26). Pace 
Heidegger, Tartaglia maintains that both anxiety and boredom attest to the truth 
of nihilism, because they are attunements we naturally fall into once we transcend 
and thus suspend our ongoing activity within the framework. Both attunements 
are “appropriate responses to an existence which requires action because it is 
temporal, but does not require any particular action because it is meaningless” 
(26). Our freedom to transcend the framework and view all the moves within it as 
somehow optional is akin to our freedom to suspend the rules of a game like chess. 
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The moment we realize that nothing more ultimate than the conventionally 
interpreted rules of the game prevents us from moving the pieces in any direction 
or not at all, an infinite array of possibilities starts to loom. Our first response to 
such looming infinite possibility is anxiety—for, in the absence of any 
conventional rules, how shall we decide which to pursue? Finally this anxiety 
subsides into boredom, as the realization finally sinks in that it would be 
ultimately pointless to pursue any at all. Whether through reflection, anxiety, or 
boredom, then, our ability to transcend and suspend framework activity ultimately 
discloses the meaninglessness of life itself: “When we disengage in this way, 
either deliberately for the purposes of philosophy, or passively when we fall into 
anxiety or boredom, then previously unquestioned and all-consuming goals 
emerge in a new light: as optional and ultimately pointless” (27). 
I pause here to ask whether anxiety and boredom are the only human 
attunements with a significant bearing on the question of the meaning of life, or 
if Tartaglia emphasizes them to the exclusion of others because of the privileged 
relationship they have to the nihilistic answer to this question. Are there other 
attunements, maybe even competing or contrasting ones, that would render the 
question less decidable and more ambivalent? I wonder, to take a few examples, 
where Tartaglia would place joy, wonder, or gratitude? Like anxiety and boredom, 
these too would seem to qualify as attunements on his definition, insofar as “they 
are not responses to particular and changeable circumstances, but rather the 
human condition as a whole” (26). Since we are in Heideggerian territory here, I 
might point out that in section II of Being and Time, in his discussion of 
“anticipatory resoluteness,” Heidegger draws attention to joy as a “fundamental 
mood” that accompanies angst: “Together with the sober Angst that brings us 
before our individualized potentiality-of-being, goes the unshakable joy in this 
possibility. In it Da-sein becomes free of the entertaining ‘incidentals’ that busy 
curiosity provides for itself, primarily in terms of the events of the world.”4 I 
mention Heidegger here not because he is an unassailable authority on this 
subject, but because Tartaglia seems to agree with him that our attunements are 
more than just subjective projections, but instead reveal something about our 
ontological situation, our being in relation to the world that surrounds and solicits 
us (even if the solicitation is more obvious in Heidegger’s case than in Tartaglia’s). 
Unlike Heidegger, however, Tartaglia thinks these attunements reveal only 
                                                     
4 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time: A Translation of Sein und Zeit, trans. Joan Stambaugh (SUNY 
Press, 1996), 286. 
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ultimate meaninglessness, and he thus refrains from locating ultimate meaning in 
anything at all, let alone something akin to Dasein’s authentic seizing of 
possibility through its resolute being-towards-death. 5  The question remains, 
however, whether anxiety and boredom are the only possible “tunings” of our 
situation, or if there are other tunings just as legitimate that disclose different 
aspects of our ontological situation. 
Focusing on the attuning clues of anxiety and boredom exclusively, Tartaglia 
purports to discover meaninglessness as a kind of empirical fact. He thus frames 
his position as a kind of neutral discovery (one whose ramifications, moreover, 
are far from being as dire as philosophers and others have traditionally feared). In 
order to arrive here, he realizes that he can only follow Heidegger so far, and must 
eventually reject key features of the latter’s existential analytic of Dasein. The 
reason he must reject these features is because his position does not allow him to 
claim the same ontological significance for our everyday absorption in our 
projects as Heidegger does. Heidegger invests great significance in the fact that 
from the very first we find ourselves in a world where things matter for us or 
concern us. Although Heidegger argues that attunements like anxiety allow us to 
awaken from a sort of fallen absorption in the framework, from our routine 
adherence to the roles and assignments that have already been carved out and 
interpreted for us, so that we may eventually come to recognize and seize the 
possibility of choosing our own life projects, he still maintains that this awakening 
always (already) takes place within our careful and concernful being-in-the-
world. While we may work upon and alter our everyday absorption, we never 
really transcend or escape it. For Tartaglia, on the other hand, the break from our 
absorption in the framework he describes is more radical. He ultimately rejects 
Heidegger’s view that, although we can fall back from our engagements with the 
world, these engagements remain constitutive of our being. Instead, he insists that 
“falling back from our engagements—by viewing life as the ultimately pointless 
activity of bodies moving around and making noises—allows us to grasp 
something fundamental about our situation” (29). Tartaglia sees no reason to 
recognize anything more significant than temporal priority in the fact that 
existential absorption precedes philosophical reflection. What matters for him, 
rather, is the accomplishment that detached reflection represents. In thought, says 
Tartaglia, we have developed the ability to escape from the involved 
                                                     
5 For his treatment of Heidegger on these and other questions, see Tartaglia, Philosophy in a 
Meaningless Life: A System of Nihilism, Consciousness and Reality, 24–34. 
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understanding that Heidegger thinks we never truly escape, and this allows us to 
“look at our lives in detachment from the significance they normally have for us” 
(29). 
Of course, as Tartaglia himself recognizes, Heidegger would conclude that 
Tartaglia’s interpretation of our ability to fall back from our framework 
engagement smacks far too much of Cartesian detachment, and thus significantly 
misinterprets our being-in-the-world. Firmly grasping this horn of the dilemma, 
Tartaglia responds that the Heideggerian prioritization of existential absorption 
over reflective detachment fails to register the significance of the scientific 
worldview that modern humans have achieved: “[A]lthough we spend most of our 
waking lives in concerned engagement with the world, withdrawing from these 
engagements has produced a scientific worldview capable of explaining many of 
the features of them, as well as many other features of reality that have nothing to 
do with human engagement; and it is hard to see why temporal priority should be 
thought to take precedence over explanatory power” (30). Because “objective, 
scientific thinking provides a more comprehensive vocabulary for describing the 
world than the kind of understanding we have when engaged in the framework” 
(30), we have reason to take it seriously as indicating an answer to the question of 
the meaning of life itself, and thereby to question the derivative status to which 
Heidegger consigns it. By discovering and explaining “features of reality that 
have nothing to do with human engagement,” the scientific worldview “allows us 
to view our lives within a wider, physical context from which we are able to see 
that there is no overall point to our activities” (30). When it comes to determining 
criteria for what makes a context ultimate, the wider and more impersonal the 
better, Tartaglia thinks, even if interpreting ultimacy in this way forces us to 
relativize the only context we know that, according to Tartaglia, is capable of 
providing life with any meaning at all. 
With this all too brief summary of Tartaglia’s case for nihilism in hand, but 
with its rough contours in place, I now turn to some of the spiritual concerns it 
raises. In the next section, I will appeal to an extraordinarily influential modern 
treatment of the question of the meaning of life itself, Victor Frankl’s Man’s 
Search for Meaning.6 My intention in turning to this famous little book is not to 
produce some sort of philosophical trump card, but rather to see how Frankl’s 
alternative posture both compares to and resonates with Tartaglia’s nihilism. The 
                                                     
6 Victor E. Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning: An Introduction to Logotherapy, trans. Ilse Lasch 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1962). 
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comparison, it turns out, is highly illuminating, and even surprising in some ways. 
My destination will finally be Tartaglia’s own admission, near the book’s end, that 
embracing nihilism need not relegate us to a lonely and comfortless existence, 
devoid of any and all spiritual sense or answer to human spiritual longing. This 
admission comes as a sort of culmination to his struggle to come to terms with 
what he takes to be the legitimate and necessary question of the meaning of life, 
including the need to face the likelihood of a negative answer squarely, while 
refusing any wishful consolation from the various speculative traditions of 
religion and philosophy along the way. The manner in which Tartaglia articulates 
the residual spiritual sense of nihilism portrays far more than it explicitly says, 
and it is in the space of this ‘more’, finally, that I think Tartaglia’s position 
discloses a modicum of spiritual solidarity with certain positions, like Frankl’s, 
that offer the opposite answer to our shared question. 
 
III. Spiritual Attunement and the Scientific Worldview 
 
As he builds his case for the meaninglessness of life itself, Tartaglia never 
doubts the legitimacy of the question. His project is not to answer the question of 
the meaninglessness of life, but rather to answer the question of the meaning of 
life, and the answer he purports to discover is that it has none. Although his 
negative answer to this question, that life itself has no meaning, point, or purpose, 
might tempt one to think he takes the question lightly, his respect for the question 
itself is on every page of the book. Because our framework-transcendence makes 
the question unavoidable, he recognizes the significance of the longstanding 
traditions of religion and philosophy that have attempted to address it (55). We 
moderns have come a long way, however, and with the ascendance of the scientific 
worldview we have finally come to see that the context that transcends the 
framework, the physical universe, is not a context of meaning, not a context that 
can provide any point or purpose to life in general or as a whole. 
But do we really know that the context we enter when we transcend our 
framework is only a “physical” universe, one that does not give any meaning to 
life itself? Surely it is also physical, but why is it only physical? Tartaglia spends 
two chapters in the book explaining how it is that human beings are not only 
physical, and that our conscious awareness of our experience cannot be reduced 
to brain states or some other material level (see chapters 4 and 5). Yet, because 
“everything we know about on the basis of experience exists within the physical 
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universe,” and because the physical universe, as physical, fails to provide a 
context of meaning, the possibility of a wider context of meaning, he says, “might 
seem to be nothing more than an abstract possibility arrived at by a process of 
reasoning about what would be required if life were to have meaning” (50). And 
as it turns out, Tartaglia suggests, this is just how we have in fact arrived at the 
conviction that life is meaningful: because we thought it must be. Because we 
mistakenly considered such general meaning to be a necessary requirement of a 
tenable life, we assumed that such meaning must be there for us to discover. 
Speculative traditions of religion and philosophy have arisen and passed away, all 
to meet this demand. But the entire time prior to the rise of the scientific 
worldview, we had not yet developed the intellectual chops that now allow us to 
recognize that the physical universe is silent, especially where the question of the 
meaning of life is concerned. 
Hearing only silence in response to his question, Tartaglia interprets its answer 
to be a resounding “no.” He would likely not put the matter this way. For him, 
when we look for a meaning to life itself, we simply don’t find one, and that puts 
the question to rest. Life itself is meaningless. But I still think this conclusion is 
an interpretive gesture, and not simply the neutral registering of simple fact, and 
that is why I would insist that, even if it is true that the transcending universe or 
cosmos responds only silently to our question, no answer is not the same thing as 
the definitive answer “no.” To be sure, neither is it compatible with a definitive 
“yes.” Rather, I would construe the silence as a space we enter with our question, 
one in which we must tarry and listen, resisting any immediate and easy answers 
of either the “yes” or “no” variety. This space has perhaps what Heidegger calls a 
“resonance of silence” (Gelaut der Stille)7. I’m not sure if Tartaglia would be 
friendly to this suggestion, or if he would think affirming it leaves us in far too 
vague and mystical a place, so perhaps I can fill it in with greater definition, and 
for this I wish to turn to Frankl. 
Frankl is an important historical witness to the human search for meaning 
because his reflections are borne in the crucible of unspeakable human suffering, 
a crucible in which one has been stripped of all framework engagements, not 
though free choice but through the external imposition of violent force. Surely 
this particular form of framework suspension would, as much or more than any 
other, put one in a position to reflect on the whole, the framework as such, life 
                                                     
7 Martin Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought (New York: HarperCollins, 2001), 207. 
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itself. Anyone asking the question of the meaning of life, then, cannot afford to 
ignore Frankl’s witness; because, unless one has suffered this intensely (and 
thankfully not all of us have), one would, without such witness, be utterly unable 
to access the perspective, indeed the spiritual orientation, it affords.8 Now, I 
would not to be misunderstood: many of those who survived this crucible or others 
akin to it have come away with a different answer to our question than Frankl has. 
I do not wish to gainsay the interpretation they have taken from their experience, 
or even their inability to make any sense of it at all. Indeed, at the end of the day, 
there is a profoundly inescapable senselessness to this kind of suffering, and—
again—quick and easy attempts to stitch meaning from it are bound to fail. We 
must resist the temptation to do so. 
At the same time, none of these worries robs Frankl’s own reflections and 
perspective of their peculiar legitimacy either. Yet beyond merely pointing to his 
example as one that portrays the possibility of ascribing meaning to life itself in 
ways that Tartaglia might yet be moved to consider, Frankl’s attempt is 
particularly apt for this discussion because of its own refusal to provide a quick 
and easy answer to the question, of the variety that Tartaglia say will never be 
forthcoming: “Long ago,” Frankl tells his reader, “we had passed the stage of 
asking what was the meaning of life, a naive query which understands life as the 
attaining of some aim through the active creation of something of value.” 9 
Whatever meaning can be found here in this crucible of suffering, Frankl attests, 
must be different in kind than the sort of point and purpose that gives framework 
activities their meaning, and those who perform them their identity. 
Frankl ultimately bears witness to a meaning disclosed in suffering (and, 
importantly, not the meaning of suffering, i.e., a meaning that would somehow 
justify its cruelty and uselessness). But in order to entertain the possibility of such 
meaning, one needs to adopt a paradigmatically different philosophical 
anthropology than the one Tartaglia assumes, wherein human beings are not the 
only and final meaning makers, beings who, as such, are unable to receive 
meaning from that which they did not themselves make (from sources like the 
physical universe, or life itself). But Frankl bears witness to just this possibility: 
                                                     
8 I owe this insight to Joseph Kirby, a Ph.D. candidate at the Institute for Christian Studies now under 
my supervision. I expect his forthcoming dissertation, On the Origins of Nihilism and the Rhetoric of 
Moral Ontology, to make a signal contribution to the very discussion about life’s meaning that 
Tartaglia addresses in this book, and my own thoughts on this matter have benefitted greatly from his 
insights. 
9 Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning: An Introduction to Logotherapy, 78. 
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Selected by the Nazis to perform punishing forced labour under conditions of 
extreme malnourishment, he nonetheless found it in himself to reflect on his 
severely depleted condition, and wonder if any meaning could be found in it. His 
answer is rather stunning, especially to one who has not endured this level of 
suffering: “I was struggling to find the reason for my sufferings, my slow dying. 
In a last violent protest against the hopelessness of imminent death, I sensed my 
spirit piercing through the enveloping gloom. I felt it transcend that hopeless, 
meaningless world, and from somewhere I heard a victorious ‘Yes’ in answer to 
my question of the existence of an ultimate purpose.”10 
Now, perhaps I have here jumped too quickly to Frankl’s ‘yes’, but it is really 
the way in which he interprets that ‘yes’ that is important for the comparison I 
would here make between it and Tartaglia’s ‘no’. The quickest shorthand for me 
to use to get at this comparison is to highlight a difference between ‘what’ and 
‘that’ when it comes to how we think about the possibility of answering our 
question. That is, both Frankl and Tartaglia could likely agree that the ‘what’ 
question has no answer, at least not a general one applicable to everybody. But 
just because no everlasting or universally applicable answer to the question “what 
is the meaning of life” is forthcoming (such as The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the 
Galaxy’s famously hilarious “42”), does not preclude us from asserting that it has 
meaning or is meaningful itself in some way unrelated to our imposition of ends, 
points, purposes. “[F]rom somewhere I heard a victorious ‘yes’,” Frankl tells us, 
intimating that this answer is not something wishfully and willfully imposed on 
reality, but instead a message that came to him from beyond the darkness of his 
miserable situation. He proceeds to tell us that this missive came in several forms: 
a light comes on in a distant farmhouse, piercing the grey gloom; his wife from 
whom he had been long separated, and who has likely already died, becomes 
palpably present to him; and finally, at that very moment, he tells us, “a bird flew 
down silently and perched just in front of me, on the heap of soil which I had dug 
up from the ditch, and looked steadfastly at me.”11 Now, it could be that we 
moderns are no longer capable, or find it increasingly difficult, to be moved by 
this form of witness. Or, alternatively, this kind of witness could amount to little 
more than a highly sophisticated form of projection or wishful thinking. Even 
though I reject the latter conclusion, I cannot rule it out as demonstrably false. But 
                                                     
10 Ibid., 39. 
11 Ibid., 40. Again, I thank Joseph Kirby for impressing upon me the importance of the what/that 
distinction for this discussion. 
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at the very least Frankl’s witness portrays a different relationship with the 
surrounding physical universe than the one that the scientific worldview discloses. 
His surroundings speak to him in surprising and compassionate ways.12 
The difference I am trying to indicate here is the difference between thinking 
of the enveloping universe as something that somehow speaks to us, whether to 
issue a summons or to provide comfort and strength in the midst of suffering, or 
thinking of it as something that is mute and purposeless, because immune to our 
projections (however sympathetically one might interpret those). Tartaglia tells us 
that “some human desires—especially those for eternal life and universal 
justice—cannot be satisfied within our lives; whatever may happen in the future.” 
Because of this limitation, he says, we turn to “a transcendent hypothesis of 
meaning” which, in offering up the prospect of securing a meaning for life 
“satisfies these desires already.” Because these desires are eminently worthwhile 
in and of themselves, the transcendent hypothesis of meaning that would secure 
them, he tells us, “is an idea worthy of faith” (53). 
But for Tartaglia a transcendent hypothesis of meaning, such as the one Frankl 
claims to access, is not an idea worthy of reason, because when we follow our 
own rational lights beyond the everyday framework, we find nothing even closely 
resembling it. “Things make teleological sense only within life, and causal sense 
only within reality. Reality itself, however, makes neither teleological nor causal 
sense, for there is no purpose to it, and we cannot explain why it is here” (36). 
Tartaglia’s deeper spiritual position here seems to be, however, that there is no 
purpose to reality, or life itself, because we cannot explain why it is here. We 
cannot locate a purpose for it in the same way we can for our daily framework 
activities. If we could explain it in this way, if we free makers could impose a 
point or purpose upon something we ourselves have not made, then and only then 
would life itself yield an affirmative answer to our question. But then we need to 
ask, would such an answer really be one that comes from life itself? If we decide 
that the only meaning available to us is of this self-imposed variety, then we have 
already chosen to relate to the universe that surrounds and transcends us in a way 
that by definition precludes it from having any kind of voice or summons that 
could speak into our question. 
While Tartaglia marshals reasons to support an argument that would deny that 
                                                     
12 Here I have in mind something like Martin Buber’s distinction between relating to a given entity in 
the world as either an ‘it’ or as a ‘you’. See Martin Buber, I and Thou (Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1970), 
58, 173. 
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the enveloping context possesses such a voice, his decision to do so also bears 
trademarks of its own leaps of faith. For there is something about the scientific 
worldview he trumpets (as opposed to everyday interdisciplinary, institutional, 
and communal scientific practice) that requires the enveloping physical world to 
be silent and purposeless. In its more ideological and strident forms, this 
worldview requires the enveloping cosmos to be infinitely pliant and manipulable. 
Reality must not talk back to us or otherwise resist our instrumental interventions. 
Because this is the world the scientific worldview needs, it is the world that it 
finds. It is the world discovered by a being who has already decided that it is the 
only maker of meaning, and so it is free to impose any purpose upon life it chooses 
(even if not upon life itself, which I will get to later). This cluster of 
anthropological and cosmological assumptions, while of course not completely 
lacking in rational support, are far from being rationally demonstrated either. As 
such, the worldview composed from them is just as much an article of faith as is 
the religious assumption that the context that transcends the framework is one that 
speaks to us as a partner in dialogue. Both positions are rooted in faith, finally, 
because no one, per impossibile, is in the epistemological position to describe how 
the world is anyway, and science, in its multiplicity of forms, just as much as 
religion, in its multiplicity of forms, is an answer to a question that we ourselves 
have asked. Try as we might, we cannot erase ourselves from the equation.13 
Now, there can be no doubt that, to a great extent at least, we become who we 
say we are. But, should we decide to spiritually attune ourselves to the context 
that transcends our everyday framework, a possibility Tartaglia gestures toward 
at the end of the book, we may yet receive a message that might give moderns 
like us pause to consider if we should not in fact try to become something other 
than who we now find ourselves or think ourselves to be. Tartaglia’s insistence 
that life itself is not of our making, and so finally resistant to human-imposed 
meaning, carves out its own kind of spiritual space, one that he says promises to 
transform our willful relationship to our surrounding context. The pursuit of 
philosophy itself brings him to this space: 
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On occasion … the ideas come alive, and I find myself realizing once more 
that my life belongs to a transcendent reality which serves no overall 
purpose, and which I cannot and should not hope to make any more than 
minimal sense of. Many kinds of philosophical reflection can get you to 
this place, and when you arrive everything takes on a new significance; this 
is the most sense I can make of the idea of spirituality. (184) 
 
There is, indeed, something very spiritually edifying about Tartaglia’s stated 
refusal to impose human-made meanings on life itself; for there is something 
deeply terrifying about those who presume to have secured the meaning of life 
itself in precisely these self-imposed terms—those who think the search is over 
and they have it all figured out. Tartaglia’s position, that when we search for this 
kind of meaning to life itself we find none, has the spiritual benefit of encouraging 
us to cease imposing our finite human meanings on that which we have not made, 
on a world that transcends us. It encourages us to assume an attentive form of 
spiritual comportment that suspends this feverish activity, and instead puts us in a 
receptive posture. 
Would it be too far of a stretch to say that this attentiveness or wakefulness 
journeys awhile alongside the form of spiritual comportment that Frankl urged his 
fellow prisoners to adopt? According to Frankl, the only hope for those 
“despairing men” whose inner lights were in danger of becoming extinguished 
under the pressure of a world that no longer recognized the value of human life 
was to somehow retain their sense of being an individual, “a being with a mind, 
with inner freedom and personal value.”14 To prevent this slide into personal 
oblivion, which was always closely followed by physical oblivion, one had to stop 
asking about the meaning of life: 
 
We had to learn ourselves and, furthermore, we had to teach the despairing 
men, that it did not really matter what we expected from life, but rather 
what life expected from us. We needed to stop asking about the meaning of 
life, and instead to think of ourselves as those who were being questioned 
by life—daily and hourly. Our answer must consist, not in talk and 
meditation, but in right action and in right conduct. Life ultimately means 
taking the responsibility to find the right answer to its problems and to 
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fulfill the tasks which it constantly sets for each individual.15 
 
While Tartaglia might agree with Frankl that we need to stop asking about the 
meaning of life, stop looking for a kind of self-imposed purpose or point to it, I 
still doubt, given everything he has said, whether he would embrace Frankl’s 
further conviction that we must refrain from such hasty meaning imposition in 
order to put ourselves into the sort of receptive posture whereby we can once again 
become beings who are and can be questioned by life. 
So, in spite of some common ground we seem to have arrived at an impasse. 
For Frankl, it is imperative that we are not the only meaning makers in the 
universe: “If the meaning which is waiting to be fulfilled by man were really 
nothing but a mere expression of self, or no more than a projection of his wishful 
thinking, it would immediately lose its demanding and challenging character; it 
could no longer call man forth or summon him” (100). Perhaps Frankl’s spiritual 
posture in these and other passages ultimately amounts to just that, another form 
of wishful thinking, and life ultimately demands nothing from us. Perhaps we only 
want to think it does because such a summons would provide an underpinning for 
the kind of moral sense that Frankl suggests is so vital for us to maintain if we are 
to remain human. Perhaps that sense is finally only a sophisticated projection upon 
a physical universe that has no reason for existing and doesn’t care that we are 
here. I have no philosophical arguments at my disposal that could disprove any of 
these conclusions (which is not to say that I am unable to marshal any reasons to 
doubt them). Tartaglia leaves his reader enough space to wonder, however, 
whether or not his practice of philosophy as a kind of spiritual exercise has 
brought him right up to the threshold of the very space in which a human being 
might once again become open to receiving a meaning that he did not simply 
construct or impose. 
 
 
  
                                                     
15 Ibid., 77. 
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Reply to Ronald A. Kuipers 
James Tartaglia* 
 
Just as Ronald A. Kuipers knew of me from my book on Rorty, I knew of him 
from his; the best general book on Rorty’s philosophy there is, in my view (see 
Kuipers 2013). And just as he reports having felt some trepidation when first 
confronted by my title, Philosophy in a Meaningless Life, I felt some trepidation 
when I first opened his commentary; knowing that he works at the Institute for 
Christian Studies. It turns out that neither of us had much to worry about. Well, 
he does report having ‘let [my] version of nihilism trouble [his] sleep’ (p. 52); for 
which I apologise! But nevertheless, I was delighted to discover that he sees a 
substantive common ground between our positions, which ‘resides in the context 
of a difference that makes a difference,’ but which still provides plenty of scope 
for us to ‘continue a communal conversation’ (p. 52). I agree. That is what I want 
to happen and I think this symposium marks the beginning of our contribution to 
it. It was particularly refreshing and gratifying, when reading Kuipers recount my 
position, to discover that he has seen exactly where I am coming from. Refreshing, 
because this will allow me to hit the ground running in our conversation; and 
gratifying, because he takes the position seriously. 
Now maintaining both that we occupy a transcendent reality and that nihilism 
is true, places me in a tight critical spot within today’s philosophical culture: 
because those sympathetic to the former are very unlikely to be sympathetic to the 
latter, and vice versa. But that strikes me as a major bonus, rather than any kind 
of disadvantage, because it allows me to talk to both sides. If I had wanted a 
glowing, uncritical reception, then I could have knocked out one of those 
‘Ditchkinian’ books Kuipers mentions, using the very same title, and I reckon I 
might well have received it; along with a hostile and highly critical reception from 
the other side (if they could even be bothered). It is on the ground between these 
sides, however, that new thinking can occur, new alliances can be forged, and 
entrenched oppositions can start to degrade and transform; not good if you think 
one of the sides already has it all right, but I do not. I have not been so influenced 
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by Rorty’s pragmatism that such tactical considerations informed the 
development of my metaphysic, I hasten to add, for although it would make Rorty 
howl, the fact is that I was just trying to work out the right answers. But 
nevertheless, I am very pleased with where I have landed; for the aim is to develop 
philosophical thinking – and for helping out with that, it is a very useful place to 
be. 
My aims and resources are quite different in relation to the two sides, by 
which I mean, very roughly, physicalists and believers in a meaningful reality. My 
resources for dialogue with physicalists are plentiful, because I used to be one and 
I retain their main instinct: that we must give full, undiluted credence to objective 
thought. But physicalism embodies a false metaphilosophy, since science cannot 
determine a credible metaphysic of reality. My aim, like others of my generation 
who have not focused on the meaning of life, is to bring about the extinction of 
physicalism. In my case this is not just because I think it is false, but also because 
I think the unchecked conviction that science must determine our metaphysic, 
coupled with indifference to what that metaphysic actually amounts to – as 
embodied in the physicalist doctrine that reality is ‘whatever contemporary 
physics says it is’ – threatens to downgrade and diminish philosophical discourse. 
And as I hint at the end of Meaningless, and will argue at length in its sequel, this 
is an outcome no sane person could wish for; not if they had really thought it 
through. But rejecting the half-baked and insidious metaphysic of physicalism is 
no obstacle to giving full, undiluted credence to science, in my view, since it was 
never supposed to determine a metaphysic. Philosophy and science are different. 
It was a bad, but entirely dispensable philosophical idea to try to merge them. 
Liberated from this idea, the philosophers it has seduced can reconnect with the 
heart of their tradition and put stultifying scepticism about their own discipline 
behind them. 
It is exactly this aim with regards to physicalism which provides my main 
resource for dialogue with believers in a meaningful reality; even though 
‘transcendence’ obviously provides the headline attraction. For my book is 
essentially an affirmation of philosophy: an affirmation of our ability to say things 
about the world which science cannot say, which are rational, and which answer 
to legitimate matters of human curiosity (cf. Kuipers 2002). Since physicalism 
closes down the space in which believers in a meaningful reality can talk about 
the things they want to talk about, and is the main intellectual force in our world 
which pushes such talk to the boundaries, my energies in this regard should surely 
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be very welcome to this side. It is just a shame, I imagine them thinking, that upon 
reaching transcendence, I ruin the plot with nihilism. Despite this sticking point, 
however, my opposition to physicalism and affirmation of philosophy still must 
at least earn me a hearing. So what do I want to say? What are my aims with 
regard to this side of the debate? I must admit that I had thought considerably 
more about my aims for the other side, but Kuipers has inspired me to now answer 
this question. 
Do I want to persuade them of nihilism? Well, yes and no. The answer is ‘no’, 
to the extent that Meaningless does not set out to persuade people who think that 
God provides life with meaning that they are wrong. I am fully aware that there 
are many sophisticated arguments for the existence of God, and any reader of the 
book cannot fail to notice that I do not engage with any of them. There is an 
endnote in which I say that I think my transcendent hypothesis provides good 
reason to be suspicious of any kind of cosmological argument, and that I consider 
this the most promising line of argument in the area (PML, p. 191). I also say 
throughout the book that I think belief in a meaning of life is to be expected given 
natural human desires, the patterns of explanation within the framework, and the 
transcendence of reality. But nevertheless, if my aim had been to dissuade people 
of their belief in a transcendent context of meaning, then I clearly wrote the wrong 
book.  
Primarily, I was trying to increase metaphilosophical self-consciousness, 
vindicate the question of the meaning of life, undermine physicalism, solve 
problems which physicalists cannot solve, and thereby provide an affirmation of 
philosophy. One of my many subsidiary aims was to persuade people that the 
meaning of life is not provided by social meaning; but this critique was directed 
to the other side, since substituting social meaning for the relevant kind is just the 
kind of thing physicalism primes you for. Believers in a meaningful reality should 
welcome this critique, especially since advocates of the ‘meaning in life’ agenda 
typically contend that even if God did exist, it would be irrelevant to their issue; 
which strikes me as one of the more conspicuous absurdities within the debate – 
and a very telling one, as regards the real motivational drivers of physicalism. My 
concern with nihilism was predominantly expounding, rather than establishing it; 
within an intellectual culture where it has been marginalised as an ominous threat 
which nobody would or should pay much attention to, unless of course they were 
confused, depressed, destructive, or had a remedy to offer. And in the course of 
expounding it, I tried to show that it is legitimate, plausible and very 
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philosophically interesting. 
On the other hand, however, the answer must in a sense be ‘yes’, since I think 
nihilism is true. I think that once we get clear about nihilism, we see there is 
nothing wrong with it, and that a lack of clarity on this matter understandably 
skews people’s judgements. I think that metaphysically, at least, transcendence is 
all that the meaningful reality side was ever driving at – and that they were right. 
And I think that my metaphysic, taken as a whole, gives good reason to think that 
we cannot escape the rootedness of our cognition in objective thought, and hence 
that there can be no good reasons to make the kind of positive assertions about 
transcendent reality which this side does sometimes make. In philosophy, if you 
think your view is right, then you obviously want to persuade anyone who will 
listen. But aims come in different shapes and sizes. 
To see what I mean, consider the following example; selected in order to be 
so obviously far removed from the topic at hand that unintended connotations will 
not be invoked by the specific content. Suppose you think that your friend’s 
attachment to a certain brand of car is unjustified; you do not think they are 
particularly good. You are both car-enthusiasts, so you like to talk cars together; 
he knows what you think and vice versa. Given this point of contention between 
you, the topic of ‘that brand’ is bound to keep coming up; but there are many other, 
related things for you to talk about. You would like him to come around to your 
point of view, of course, even if you do not remotely expect this; but you certainly 
would not try to force the matter. For you only want him to come around if he 
wants to; rather as you would not want to be forced to grudgingly concede to him. 
This is because you are both convinced. This does not mean that you have closed 
your mind on the matter. For you are open to a revelation that takes you by surprise 
and makes you see the brand in a whole new light; just not tiresome, vaguely 
familiar considerations, which you might not know how to overcome at present, 
but which nevertheless leave you convinced that you doubtless could answer them, 
given the time and inclination. Only something genuinely new would change your 
mind about that brand. But there are many other things to talk about, in a world 
where people hold views on cars which you both find outrageous. So do you aim 
to persuade your friend that his brand is no good? Only half-heartedly and in good 
humour. 
That is pretty much how I feel in relation to the meaningful reality camp. I 
have no revelation to offer them, and I doubt they are going to find one for me. 
When I lay out my position, it is only in a half-hearted attempt to persuade them 
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on this matter; in stark contrast to my aims with regard to physicalists. Now this 
conciliatory, rather apathetic stance, might seem disingenuous on the grounds that 
the meaning of life is such an important topic; as my own book argues at length. 
But actually, what is primarily important to my aims in the book is the question, 
about which I see eye-to-eye with this camp. I think my answer to this question 
provides considerable philosophical insight, but I am not looking for converts 
from this side. I can see that I would care more if I thought reality was meaningful, 
but that is good, since if what I said inspires others to try to persuade me, we may 
both learn in the process. Moreover, if you think reality is meaningful in a good 
way, then you presumably think that this is the most important thing in the world; 
the meaning is where all the importance of the world resides. Even if I am right 
that nihilism is evaluatively neutral, then, from their starting point, the transition 
to nihilism is bound to be a serious downer in the short term. So why would I want 
to go out of my way to bring about such a transition? Who wants to be Richard 
Dawkins (qua philosopher)? 
It is the other side that I am really concerned to bring around to nihilism; to 
open them up to the question to which it provides an answer – an answer which, 
if they took the problem seriously, they would already be conducive to. The 
meaningful reality side is already open to the question, which has come to seem 
like their sole preserve. But I want to make it available to both sides, thereby 
widening the space for philosophical debate and speculation which physicalism is 
trying to close down. This would benefit everyone. Within this space, there is 
room for all kinds of positions on all kinds of topics; including positive views 
about the meaning of life. So on reflection, I think, my main aim with regards to 
the meaningful reality side is to bring them into dialogue with the mainstream of 
philosophy which physicalism has unfortunately seized; so that we can all talk 
about questions of natural philosophical interest from our differing perspectives. 
Were this to transpire, then I would be on the other side with regards to nihilism, 
and whenever the idea of a meaningful reality was brought to bear on other topics. 
But now the lines of opposition would have changed; they would have come 
together within a more unified discipline. 
With these aims in mind, I shall turn to the comment on spirituality I make on 
the last page of Meaningless, since it provides the focus of Kuiper’s paper (PML, 
p. 184). I suggested that there is something spiritual about reflecting 
philosophically upon our meaningless, transcendent reality. I was deliberately 
cautious in saying that this is the ‘most sense’ I can make of spirituality, because 
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the flat-footed will remind me that you can hardly be spiritual if you do not believe 
in spirit; at which I would immediately concede their flat-footed point. And yet 
the meanings of words move on, and I readily know what is meant when it is said 
of certain musicians that their music passed through a more ‘soulful’ period, or 
that they tapped into the ‘spirit of Africa’. Thoughts about immaterial substances 
and communal souls do not cross my mind; I think of a sound and where it came 
from, and if more than this is sometimes meant, that is tangential as far as I am 
concerned. Now when, in philosophy, we try to rationally think about reality 
beyond the objective thinking and social framework that dominant our lives, this 
does indeed strike me as the kind of thinking which might aptly be called ‘spiritual’ 
these days. It is the kind of thought which tries to get some kind of rational grip 
on the ‘something else’ which all kinds of people who think of themselves as 
spiritual are reaching for. That is why I said it; it is an underutilized and extremely 
attractive selling-point for a discipline with a very bad image-problem. When I 
said that ‘everything takes on a new significance’, I meant a philosophical 
significance; that is the kind of spirituality I favour, and the only one I really 
understand.  
I am very glad to see that Kuipers thinks I used the right word, for he says 
that, 
 
There is, indeed, something very spiritually edifying about Tartaglia’s 
stated refusal to impose human-made meanings on life itself [...] Tartaglia’s 
position, that when we search for this kind of meaning to life itself we find 
none, has the spiritual benefit of encouraging us to cease imposing our finite 
human meanings on that which we have not made, on a world that 
transcends us. It encourages us to assume an attentive form of spiritual 
comportment that suspends this feverish activity, and instead puts us in a 
receptive posture. (p. 67) 
 
The last sentence gives me pause, but up until that point, he captures my intentions 
almost exactly; I would qualify ‘cease imposing our finite meanings’ with ‘except 
when they are philosophical, and thus suitably sparse.’ The last sentence would 
be okay too, if the ‘attentive form of spiritual comportment’ and ‘receptive posture’ 
just meant openness to philosophical understanding. But Kuipers means more, as 
is made clear here: 
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If we decide that the only meaning available to us is of [the] self-imposed 
variety, then we have already chosen to relate to the universe that surrounds 
and transcends us in a way that by definition precludes it from having any 
kind of voice or summons that could speak into our question. (p. 65) 
 
And here we see the basis of Kuiper’s critique. He thinks I have made a similar 
mistake to the one which my qualified endorsement of spirituality offers a remedy 
to. For the reason I endorse nihilism, in Kuiper’s view, is that on achieving the 
important insight that we must stop looking for a self-imposed meaning to life, I 
subsequently draw on human-made meaning to steer me to nihilism. Instead, I 
should have stopped short at the point where I reached his ‘receptive posture’, on 
the grounds that, ‘even if it is true that the transcending universe or cosmos 
responds only silently to our question, no answer is not the same thing as the 
definitive answer “no”’ (p. 62). 
Kuipers thinks my commitment to nihilism is a step too far, then. He thinks I 
should have rested with an openness to other kinds of meaning, and wonders if I 
would consider retracing my steps in order to return to a point at which we ‘put 
ourselves into the sort of receptive posture whereby we can once again become 
beings who are and can be questioned by life’ (p. 68). Thus he closes his paper by 
saying, 
 
Tartaglia leaves his reader enough space to wonder, however, whether or 
not his practice of philosophy as a kind of spiritual exercise has brought 
him right up to the threshold of the very space in which a human being 
might once again become open to receiving a meaning that he did not 
simply construct or impose. (p. 68) 
 
Now Kuipers and I are both actively thinking into the same space; that much is 
clear. The question is whether I am still open to hearing something within that 
space; to passively receiving it. To this, my answer is ‘yes’; and yet I am not 
actively listening out for anything. I am not listening out for the doorbell at the 
moment, but if it rings, I will hear it. If reality is transcendent, I could in principle 
hear intimations of its meaning; this is possible on my metaphysic, unlike that of 
the physicalists. For reality might be meaningful, and it might be able to convey 
its meaning to us in a manner which the framework and objective thought makes 
it hard for us to hear. But I am not hearing anything. And if I did seem to, I would 
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endeavour to rationalise it away. Only if I failed in this, but found that I could 
rationalise what I heard in a new way, would I take it seriously.  
I do not hear anything in Frankl’s report of his ‘spirit piercing through the 
enveloping gloom’ and transcending the ‘hopeless, meaningless world’ within 
which he found himself imprisoned (p. 64), not because I am insensitive to the 
feeling expressed in this passage, but rather because I find these kinds of claim 
easy to rationalise away in terms of the framework and objective thought. To even 
begin to spell out this kind of rationalisation would be insensitive in this case; but 
Kuipers and I both know the kind of things that could be said – clearly the 
phenomenology of Frankl’s experience, and the sense that he gave to it, could 
have happened just the same way if nihilism were true. We were not always able 
to rationalize such voices away, however. It is perfectly understandable that 
people have thought, and still do think, that the meanings within our lives are the 
central focus of a reality in which something watches over us; or that they are part 
of a nature that has its own contiguous meanings which we should listen out for. 
It was natural, before Copernicus, to think that we were at the physical centre of 
reality; and it was natural, before Darwin, to think that we were at the centre of 
the phenomenon of life on earth. But it turned out, as a matter of fact, that we 
were wrong on both counts. These facts were exactly not things we primed 
ourselves for and hence made ourselves hear. They took us by surprise. 
Now I could hardly be more enthusiastically in agreement with Kuipers than 
when he says, as I would put it, that our desire for power led to us finding ways 
of manipulating reality, and hence that we came to conceive of it in accordance 
with how we could best manipulate it (pp. 66-7). That is a central topic in the 
sequel I am writing. But recognising this motivation does not devalue what we 
learnt in the process. It is not that the human desire for power deafened us to 
voices that are really there, but rather that as an offshoot of developing objective 
thought in this manner, we learnt that the voices are not there. Kuipers says that 
my trust in the deliverances of objective thought is just as much an ‘article of faith’ 
as the religious believer’s assumption that transcendent reality speaks to us (p. 66). 
But there is no faith involved in believing what you have firm inductive evidence 
for; as P.F. Strawson said, in effect, this is a major and inviolable component of 
what being ‘rational’ means (Strawson 1952). The voices are simply not there in 
the objective world. And we cannot discover anything new in this regard from the 
metaphysical insight that the objective world is transcended. Yet I grant Kuiper’s 
point that ‘no answer is not the same thing as the definitive answer “no”.’ 
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Consequently, I take my definitive ‘no’ from a combination of objective thought 
and metaphysical reflection. I find that we have no reason to think our notion of 
meaningfulness has application to transcendent reality; and that incomplete as it 
is, objective thought provides our best guide to the nature of that reality. That is 
definitive enough for me; idle possibilities do not need to be ruled out. 
This is the kind of reasoning I am relying upon, then, but perhaps it is 
deafening me to another ‘take’ on reality which is superior. To assert this, however, 
is to provide a reason to give up on the reason I am relying on; and I cannot see it 
as a good one. For if there is another kind of reasoning which would side-line both 
objective thought and the kind of bare metaphysical reflection on transcendence 
which I engaged in, thereby allowing me to hear what reality is saying, then the 
superiority of this new reasoning would have to explain and usurp the old; 
otherwise I could never rationally accept it as superior. Listening out might 
provide me with this new way of reasoning, thereby allowing me to hear what 
reality is saying. But my old reasoning provides me with no reason to actively 
listen out, because I am not expecting to hear anything. I could do it anyway, in 
the hope of receiving some kind of revelation. However, if there is something to 
be understood of the prerequisite enormity, which would explain the meaning of 
transcendent reality in such a way as to encapsulate and usurp both objective 
thought and metaphysical reflection of the kind which reveals to me only the bare 
fact of transcendent existence, then I would have thought the only place I am 
likely to hear it is in a philosophy book. And quite frankly, I would be amazed if 
there really were something of this magnitude in extant philosophy which has 
entirely evaded my notice.  
So I have no reason to give up on the reasoning I am relying on in order to 
make myself more receptive to something else. The reasoning I am relying on 
gives me no reason, and the new reasoning cannot provide that reason unless 
either somebody tells me what it is, or it somehow occurs to me. Actively listening 
out is not going to make the latter happen, however, because I have absolutely no 
idea what to listen for; without the new reasoning at my disposal, I am simply not 
going to hear anything. So I should do nothing more than remain open to a new 
discovery; which I always try to do anyway. Perhaps the injunction to actively 
listen out is rooted in emotion rather than reason. But I cannot help it if I do not 
feel it, and without the new reasoning at my disposal, I have no reason to think 
that it makes any difference to my job as a philosopher. 
Kuipers asks whether I would bracket ‘joy, wonder, or gratitude’ (p. 58) as 
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attunements akin to boredom and anxiety? I see what he is driving at – perhaps I 
have been taken in by existentialist gloom in privileging these two. But 
nevertheless, I do think they are special. Joy shows a natural propensity to engage 
with the framework. But does it creep over us when the framework recedes, 
thereby revealing something about our basic situation? Is there a joy in simply 
existing? I do not think so; it depends on the context in which you are existing. If 
you are frustratingly isolated from your framework goals while locked in a prison 
cell, boredom is inevitable, but not joy; a rush of joy when you realise your inner 
resolve not to let your present circumstances beat you, sounds like the call of the 
framework to me. Wonder also seems dependent on circumstances; you need 
something to inspire wonder. Simply existing may be enough in our more 
philosophical moments, but even then, this seems to be a product of the 
framework goal to understand. And gratitude, of the kind Kuipers has in mind, 
just strikes me as an imposition from the natural patterns of explanation we 
employ in the framework; something is good, so gratitude has to be expressed to 
somebody. Boredom and anxiety, on the other hand, however unpleasant they may 
often be, do strike me as philosophically illuminating responses to our basic 
situation; for the reason that they are a product of our projection into the 
framework losing its hold, and can thus reveal that projection to us. 
To return to the main thrust of Kuiper’s paper, then, I do not think I am going 
to hear anything. I am pretty sure that I do not think this because I have bought 
into unjustified assumptions that block my ears; I can hear just fine, but since I 
am not expecting to hear anything, I am not actively listening out. I would only 
have my ears to the ground, and recommend this attitude in my philosophy, if I 
thought there was good reason to expect to hear something; when in actual fact, I 
think there is very good reason not to expect to hear anything. Nevertheless, if I 
did hear something which I could not rationalise away, such that I was instead 
inspired to rationalise what I heard, then I fully grant that this could be amazing; 
I would love to read the book I would then write – so long as it was not the product 
of me losing my marbles. I am convinced this will never happen, but I am certainly 
open to a big surprise, especially if it is a good one. So I have an open attitude, 
just not the active one Kuipers recommends. This is a point of contention between 
us that we can continue to debate; and hopefully find things to say that others will 
find interesting. But to my mind, at least, this pales into insignificance against the 
fact that we are both thinking into a space which many other philosophers are 
missing out on – and because they are missing out, they are being inspired to say 
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things which are not only false, but detrimental to philosophy. Judging from his 
paper, I think Kuipers might just agree; if so, I put it down to our shared 
background in Rorty. 
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Abstract 
This article examines two concerns that accompany James Tartaglia’s claims about nihilism in 
Philosophy in a Meaningless Life. The first concern involves Tartaglia’s narrow conception of 
nihilism. His view is that nihilism is practically neutral. In response, I explore how practical 
consequences are integral to both the general understanding of the problem of nihilism and his own 
interpretation of the concept. The second concern involves a tension in Tartaglia’s distinction between 
practical consequences and the deep personal resonance of nihilism. As a reply, I explain how the 
notion of deep personal resonance could be interpreted as a practical consequence. The article 
concludes by questioning the motivation to justify the neutrality of nihilism. 
 
 
In Philosophy in a Meaningless Life, James Tartaglia claims that nihilism, or 
the idea that reality is meaningless, is a philosophical fact. To exist means nothing: 
for any living species, existence carries no fundamental or teleological value apart 
from the biological; for human beings in particular, existence holds no 
epistemological burden, moral weight or spiritual agenda. The questions ‘what is 
the meaning of life?’, ‘what am I here for?’ or ‘why do human beings exist?’ bear 
no fruit if we are looking for some sort of universally-binding, context-
transcending significance. The book suggests that our countless tries in religion 
and philosophy to respond positively, notably in terms of proposing a transcendent 
framework to accommodate the possibility of an overall meaning to life, have led 
to tricky and often unreliable paths. The simple fact that Tartaglia tries to convince 
his readers of is this: that we exist, just as easily as we could not exist. 
But denying a transcendent context of meaning does not mean forsaking the 
idea of transcendence itself. Tartaglia thinks that the importance of philosophy 
lies in being able to engage the concept of transcendence fruitfully in the face of 
nihilism. In his view, transcendence should be reconsidered as a conceptual tool 
that rightly belongs to the metaphysical concerns of philosophy, and herein lies 
the novelty of his work. The version of transcendence that Tartaglia offers is one 
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that operates without the pretension or hope of meaningfulness (unlike in the case 
of religion, and at times, science). This bold hypothesis has ramifications on both 
a philosophical dimension and a practical dimension. In terms of philosophy, 
Tartaglia impressively outlines how the transcendent hypothesis changes the 
terms of contemporary philosophical debates. A substantial part of his book aims 
at redefining our understanding of consciousness, time, and universals in view of 
the reality of nihilism. His redescription of these particular metaphysical concepts 
responds to the intellectual burden Tartaglia has set for himself in the introduction: 
to prove that ‘the question of the meaning of life, to which nihilism provides the 
answer, is the keystone of philosophy; it locks the rest of its traditional 
conceptions in place, and allows them to bear weight in an intellectual culture 
dominated by science’ (Tartaglia 2016: 7). Tartaglia’s notable conversation 
partners in recent review essays (see Bennett-Hunter 2016, Leach 2016) and in 
the special issue on ‘Nihilism and the Meaning of Life’ of The Journal of 
Philosophy of Life engage these implications in greater detail. 
His work also offers a reconsideration of our understanding of nihilism from 
a practical dimension. Tartaglia proposes that we ought to take nihilism as a 
neutral philosophical fact. He thinks that it has no moral quality and its truth 
makes no difference in the exercise of daily life and the availability of sources of 
meaning within our social context. It is this aspect of Tartaglia’s argument that I 
want to take issue with in this article. I claim that there are two concerns that 
accompany the understanding of the practical dimension of nihilism in Philosophy 
in a Meaningless Life. The first concern involves Tartaglia’s narrow conception 
of nihilism. His view is that nihilism is practically neutral. In response, I explore 
how practical consequences are integral to both the general understanding of the 
problem of nihilism and his own interpretation of the concept. The second concern 
involves a tension in Tartaglia’s distinction between practical consequences and 
the deep personal resonance of nihilism. As a reply, I explain how the notion of 
deep personal resonance could be interpreted as a practical consequence. The 
article concludes by questioning the motivation to justify the neutrality of nihilism 
on Tartaglia’s part. 
 
1. Nihilism: narrow and neutral 
 
In this section, I problematize Tartaglia’s narrow conception of nihilism – a 
nihilism that is devoid of or disconnected from practical consequences. The 
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common view in the Western tradition is that the significance of nihilism is 
directly related to the nature of its effects. Nihilism is usually understood to have 
practical consequences for human beings that are bad, though in some cases they 
are taken to be good (or a mixture of both). The idea that nihilism is bad can be 
found in the writings of Heidegger, and in the writings of contemporary figures 
such as Taylor, Dreyfus, and Kelly. These thinkers all propose ways of 
‘overcoming’ nihilism and thus of avoiding those bad consequences that come 
with the realization that life has no meaning. To achieve redemption from 
meaninglessness – one indicated by our attunement to the moods of anxiety and 
boredom – Heidegger argues that we should embark on the quest of revealing 
life’s authentic meaning (see 1927, 1936-37, 1939-46, 1954). In the face of 
nihilism, Taylor thinks that there are many rich and powerful sources of moral and 
spiritual significance in modernity. He also suggests that our culture should 
cultivate the possibility of a renewed theism in a secular age (see 1991, 1992, 
2007, 2011). Dreyfus and Kelly propose that a modern Homeric polytheism can 
ward off the threat of meaninglessness. This polytheism involves becoming 
attuned to the plural manifestations of the sacred in modernity (2011a, 2011b). In 
contrast, the likes of Nietzsche and Camus recognize the good behind the 
phenomenon of nihilism apart from the bad. The realization of life’s essential 
meaninglessness can liberate human beings from the debilitating framework of 
Western religion. It can also lead to their acceptance of life’s natural constraints 
and finitude. In place of the misguided values of the Christian tradition, Nietzsche 
thinks that the truth of nihilism encourages the creation of new and more 
worthwhile goals for human beings (see 1882, 1883, 1888a, 1888b). Meanwhile, 
Camus argues that meaninglessness paves the way for the heroic, Sisyphean 
acceptance of life’s absurdity (see 1942). For Nietzsche and Camus, the ability to 
transcend the life-negating horrors of nihilism serves as a testament to human 
potential and resilience.  
In comparison to these familiar evaluations, Tartaglia’s thinner conception and 
his morally neutral assessment of nihilism take on a wholly different tone. For 
him, the total answer to the question ‘what is the meaning of life?’ is that reality 
exists for no reason and that there is no compelling basis to make a moral 
assessment of this fact. Hence, to claim that nihilism is good or bad, whether in 
terms of its inherent nature or its practical consequences, are mistaken strategies: 
 
For nihilism does not and could not hurt anybody. The realization of 
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nihilism might cause pain, but then, any fact about the world might be 
counted as bad on that criterion; a man might react to the realization that he 
is short by becoming a military despot, for instance. Nihilism is quite unlike 
a fact such as that nuclear weapons have been invented, where it is the 
possible consequences of this fact, rather than the mere grasping of it, that 
are bad. So I do not think the possible bad consequences of realizing a fact 
provides a good criterion for capturing what we mean in saying that the fact 
itself could be bad; for on that criterion, all facts could be good or bad, even 
those of mathematics. So given that I can also see no potential in moral 
accounts other than consequentialism for classifying nihilism as a fact that 
could be bad, I think we should conclude that although the existence of life 
might be, its existence for no reason could not (Tartaglia 2016: 7). 
 
For Tartaglia, life having no meaning is a fact that one ‘grasps’ in the process of 
self-realization. It is not a kind of knowledge that is inherently bad and neither is 
it one that inevitably leads to consequences that could be judged as objectively 
bad (or good). Tartaglia is only interested in nihilism defined as a fact that has no 
bearing on a moral or existential plane. In short, he offers us a narrow conception 
of nihilism. But is nihilism recognizable if the criterion of practical consequences 
is taken out of the picture? In my view, Tartaglia’s restricted version of nihilism 
requires further questioning.  
The inherently practical significance that nihilism has in the Western Tradition 
can be seen from Karen Carr’s account of nihilism in The Banalization of 
Nihilism: Twentieth-Century Responses to Meaninglessness (1992), which 
provides a nice contrast with Tartaglia’s. According to Carr, there are many 
possible definitions of nihilism and these definitions heavily overlap. In particular, 
she suggests five elements that inform the historical concept of nihilism: (1) 
epistemological, or the denial of the possibility of knowledge; (2) alethiological, 
or the denial of the reality of truth; (3) metaphysical or ontological, or the denial 
of an (independently existing) world; ethical or moral, or the denial of moral 
values; and (5) existential, or the feeling of emptiness and pointlessness of life, 
due to existence having no meaning. While it is wise to make these distinctions 
for the purposes of argument, she also contends that they are fundamentally 
interrelated. The positions of Heidegger, Taylor, Dreyfus, Kelly, Nietzsche and 
Camus given briefly in the beginning of this section heed this sense of 
interrelation between the different elements of nihilism. In their writings, realizing 
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the truth of nihilism (of the epistemological, alethiological, metaphysical, or 
moral kind) can be disorienting and its practical consequences (of the existential 
kind) are explosive by nature. If we follow Carr’s reading, consequentialism then 
matters in nihilism since its existential element is fundamentally energized by the 
other components of nihilism. As Carr remarks: ‘It is because we believe there is 
no truth that we conclude the world is pointless; it is because we think that 
knowledge is mere illusion that we describe life as meaningless; it is because we 
see no moral fabric in the universe that we see our existence as without value. The 
despair of existential nihilism is parasitic on one of the other logically prior forms’ 
(1992: 20). In this interpretation, nihilism’s possible ontological impact 
participates in propelling urgent reflection on the part of philosophers. Its practical 
repercussions are responsible for making the fact of meaninglessness worth 
talking about. 
In response, Tartaglia may raise the distinction between the meaning of life 
and the meaning in life as he does in the book, a distinction that has been reviewed 
as amounting to ‘a very persuasive case that recent discussions have equivocated 
between these two different concepts’ (Leach 2016: 283). He may argue that these 
thinkers have been construed by their readers as speaking about the former, when 
they are really speaking about the latter. He may even suggest that these 
philosophers have irresponsibly conflated this distinction in their own writings. 
For Tartaglia, the meaning of life is a primordial issue that raises the question of 
what universally constitutes and justifies human life’s worth and purpose. Since 
it intends to make an appraisal of reality and the fundamental human condition, it 
should be treated as a properly philosophical question. Meanwhile, the issue about 
the meaning in life is about social meaning. It is essentially concerned about how 
lives can be made meaningful in their own particular, finite, and culture-bound 
way. In convenient terms, the meaning of life question is apt if we are interested 
in the truth of nihilism, and the meaning in life issue is important if we are 
interested in the experience of the phenomenon of meaninglessness. While they 
concern related issues, they are also separable. Tartaglia makes it clear that he is 
not interested in social meaning; furthermore, he thinks that the practical concern 
to ‘maximise social meaningfulness’ is an agenda that does not strike him as 
‘terribly philosophical’ (Tartaglia 2016: 4). He notes that the intellectual legacy 
of Nietzsche and Marx is to blame for sedimenting the question of social meaning 
as a legitimate concern for theorists. Their legacy is responsible for obfuscating 
the distinction between the original philosophical question about the meaning of 
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life and the more ‘recent cultural product’ of maximizing the experience of human 
meaning (Tartaglia 2016: 192, 4). For example, he characterizes All Things 
Shining, a book by Dreyfus and Kelly that is largely beholden to the concept of 
Nietzschean nihilism and Heideggerian phenomenology, as having moralistic 
intent (Tartaglia 2016: 192). Since All Things Shining suggests how one can live 
a spiritually flourishing life in the modern world, it thereby belongs to the quest 
for finding meaning in life.  
Yet interestingly, Tartaglia uses some of these thinkers as resources for 
speaking about the meaning of life. He employs their writings to develop and 
confirm his suspicion that life is fundamentally meaningless. Heidegger, 
Nietzsche, Camus and Schopenhauer are engaged in the first two chapters of his 
book in a manner that helps ground and legitimize his position about philosophy 
and nihilism. When Tartaglia talks about Heidegger’s fundamental moods of 
boredom and anxiety or about Camus’s notion of the absurd, their work is 
construed as having something integral to say about the human condition. When 
he discusses Nietzsche’s critique of authoritarianism and the crucial role of 
nihilistic despair in cultural progress and Schopenhauer’s asceticism as responses 
to striving and boredom, their claims are assessed not in terms of enhancing or 
adding to the experience of human meaning, but in terms of their relationship with 
the ‘deep, natural and ancient’ question of the meaning of life. These discussions 
reveal that Tartaglia’s narrow conception of nihilism is indebted to its broader 
notion – a notion that may not have been formulated by these philosophers without 
their attunement to the ‘universal’ practical consequences of nihilism for human 
beings. If this is indeed the case, then it would be inaccurate to treat the work of 
these theorists as pertinent only to the ‘less philosophical’ aim of maximizing 
meaning, which the dichotomy between the meaning in and of life invites readers 
to do. It is reasonable to posit that their concerns loom larger and deeper than the 
modern and pluralistic goal of ‘determining the best ways for people to make their 
own meaning’ (Tartaglia 2016: 4). It is also sensible to suppose that the conflation 
of the meaning of life question and the goal of social meaning cannot be cleanly 
separated when it comes to the writings of these modern philosophers. In short, 
while the distinction could be useful in assessing contemporary discourses, it 
would be inappropriate to apply it on Tartaglia’s own analysis (Tartaglia 2016: 
appendix).  
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2. The tension between the practical and the personal 
 
In this section, I explore how the response of deep personal resonance to 
nihilism could be construed as a practical consequence. To reiterate, Tartaglia’s 
position is that nihilism should not be assessed in terms of its practical 
repercussions. He analogizes human life and the recognition of its fundamental 
nihilism to playing a game of chess: ‘But although reflection on nihilism may 
provide the spur to practical reflection, nihilism itself is lacking in practical 
consequences. After all, even if realizing that chess is just an activity of moving 
pieces around a board may have a bearing on life outside of chess, it is of no 
relevance within chess; and so it seems that realizing the truth of nihilism should 
likewise be of no relevance within life’ (Tartaglia 2016: 42). For Tartaglia, while 
the activity may cause a player to philosophize about chess, how the game itself 
is played will remain unaffected by this reflective act. Applied to human 
existence, grasping that life has no fundamental meaning will not modify or shape 
our access and relationship to the many sources of social meaning for human 
flourishing. However, Tartaglia also says something in his reflection that is 
particularly puzzling: 
 
But nihilism is not just any old fact: it entails that everybody’s life is 
meaningless, and hence that your life is too. This must strike you as more 
significant for the way you think about the world than the vast majority of 
philosophical ideas you have come across, if not all of them; if it is not like 
that for you as it is for me, then perhaps I should start taking solipsism 
seriously. It is a thought which resonates throughout the understanding 
whenever you genuinely think about it, transfiguring everything while 
changing nothing.’ (Tartaglia 2016: 7).  
 
He also says something similar in Chapter 4, which I now quote at length: 
 
As regards lack of progress, once it is recognized that questions of 
enframement are integral to the subject-matter of philosophy – which along 
with religion is one of only two areas of culture which asks such questions 
– then philosophy-scepticism is immediately answered by the fact that the 
discipline of philosophy discovered the truth of nihilism. Thus philosophy 
answered the most important enframement question of all, the question 
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which provided its raison d’être. This discovery has produced – or at least 
has the potential to produce – a significant change in our self-
understanding, since it overthrows the presumption of a meaning of life that 
has dominated most of human history, a presumption continually reinforced 
by both our way of life within the framework, and our usual patterns of 
explanation. With the discovery of nihilism, then, human beings – who have 
always been in the unique position of knowing they will die – have learnt 
in addition that their existence serves no overall purpose. Knowledge of this 
kind lacks any particular practical consequences, but it does have the 
potential to achieve a deep personal resonance with every individual who 
reflects on it, thereby making other more impressive human discoveries 
seem like mere curiosities in comparison (Tartaglia 2016: 74-75). 
 
In these two quotations, Tartaglia denies the practical ramifications of nihilism 
but also asserts that the grasping of this truth can achieve an intimate, powerful, 
and transformative effect. This paradoxical hypothesis is worth problematizing 
since Tartaglia’s characterization of deep personal resonance communicates the 
possibility of a dramatic transfiguration of an individual’s life-orientation, which 
in my mind includes both thought and action. Will nihilism’s reflective potential 
in making ‘other more impressive human discoveries seem like mere curiosities’ 
spur the re-framing of human life? Will contemplation on the conclusion that 
‘everybody’s life is meaningless, and hence that your life is too’ cause a different 
way of thinking and behaving? In short, does the idea of a deep personal resonance 
indicate a connection to what might be understood as a practical consequence? 
We thus find a tension in Tartaglia’s text when we inquire about the link between 
these two reactions.  
The motivation for reasoning in this manner is related to the earlier discussion 
of how practical consequences are integral in conceptualizing nihilism. Nietzsche, 
Camus, Heidegger and Schopenhauer are philosophers who were attuned to 
nihilism in the way Tartaglia characterizes its impact in reflective thought. They 
were aware of its various and transformational practical consequences both to 
individuals suffering from nihilism and to the nature of modern culture at large.  
If we take nihilism as something that propels the direction and development of 
their philosophy, then their reaction to nihilism would be exemplary candidates 
for what deep personal resonance as a response might be like. Furthermore, the 
claim that the realization of meaninglessness can be held as relevant only for 
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reflection – that it can be responsible for ‘transfiguring everything while changing 
nothing’ – is not convincing when we consult its impact on the cultural history of 
the West. After all, the phenomenon of nihilism has arguably inspired a paradigm 
shift toward existentialism, religious critique, and anti-authoritarianism in 
philosophy, politics and the arts in the twentieth century, with the publication of 
works ranging from Jean-Paul Sartre’s Being and Nothingness (1943) to the works 
of Fyodor Dostoevsky (1886, 1880) and to the political mobilization of the 
Russian nihilists. These writings and movements are ready examples of reactions 
to the meaninglessness of life that are socially metamorphic in real life.  
  
3. Conclusion 
 
By way of conclusion, I now question why the urge to reflect about the effect 
of nihilism as deep personal resonance even exists in Tartaglia’s text. Recall the 
classic formula for existential nihilism: when we give up on religion and Plato as 
paths for legitimating our metaphysical and moral hopes, then nihilism, or some 
sort of epistemological or emotional or spiritual crisis, is expected as the result. 
The loss of authority can lead to an atmosphere of uncertainty and even 
melancholy, as existentialist thinkers like Dostoyevsky, Camus, and Kierkegaard 
have imagined, or thinkers like Taylor, Dreyfus, and Kelly have hypothesized. 
However, Rorty thinks that the grand anxiety about nihilism is not an automated 
response. He suggests that ‘we can, for example, tell Zarathustra that the news 
that God is dead is not all that big a deal. We can tell Heidegger that one can be a 
perfectly good example of Dasein without even having been what he calls 
“authentic”’ (Rorty 2010: 507). Concerns about the practical consequences of 
nihilism, in short, can disappear in a world that does not care about the threat of 
meaninglessness. In this context, there would be no reason to contemplate or 
placate any metaphysical worry or anxiety. The urge to appease meaninglessness 
would simply not exist. Nihilism, in a truly secular age, would be taken for 
granted; only social meaning becomes worth talking about in an age liberated 
from these contemplative urges. Tartaglia seems to expect this level of practical 
neutrality from those who have become aware of life’s essential nihilism. 
However, Tartaglia’s approach – his lengthy and intense discussion of nihilism 
and his suggestion of deep personal resonance as a response toward 
meaninglessness – seems to contradict the position of practical neutrality that he 
endorses. 
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Tartaglia could avoid these criticisms if he did not go as far as raising claims 
about the neutrality of nihilism. Doing so would avoid the problems regarding his 
narrow and neutral conception of nihilism as well as the tension between the 
practical consequences and the deep personal resonance of nihilism. The threat of 
nihilism would be a non-issue if the metaphysical urge to explore the question of 
the meaning of life did not exist. This is as far as I wish to go by way of conclusion, 
unlike others who have suggested that his account of transcendence, universals, 
and time could stand without positing nihilism at all (See Bennett-Hunter 2016). 
After all, there is still much more to talk about nothing. 
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Reply to Tracy Llanera 
James Tartaglia* 
 
In her superb paper, Tracy Llanera highlights the apparent tension between 
two claims about nihilism that I make in my book: that it has the potential to 
achieve deep personal resonance, and that it is a neutral, non-evaluative fact which 
lacks practical consequences. This leads her to ‘question why the urge to reflect 
about the effect of nihilism as deep personal resonance even exists in Tartaglia’s 
text’ (p. 89). It is an excellent question. 
It certainly does seem puzzling. On the one hand, this is the meaning of life 
we are talking about – yours and mine – so of course there is potential for deep 
personal resonance. Nihilism tells us that all the projects we put our hearts and 
souls into, despairing when things go wrong and rejoicing when things go right 
… all of that is not really going anywhere. There is no reason for humans to exist, 
so there is no reason for us to do that stuff; except that we want to. Meaning is not 
a pre-existing backdrop to our lives, but a web we spin. If things go well as we 
move around within in, then we can make a great life for ourselves and others. 
But still, there is nothing to be achieved except what we want to achieve. The 
hermit who never tries to do anything much is not making the metaphysical 
mistake of failing to grasp what life actually amounts; only, perhaps, a practical 
mistake. John Gray tells us that, ‘The pygmies of the African rainforests – now 
nearly extinct – work only to meet the needs of the day, and spend most of their 
lives idling’ (Gray 2002: 195). They are not making a mistake either. And neither 
is the high-flying businessman who works a 16-hour day. Not that kind of mistake, 
in any case. 
I cannot see how recognising this – or at least considering it as a serious 
candidate for truth – could fail to achieve deep personal resonance; hence my 
comment about solipsism, which Llanera quotes (p. 87). I fully recognise that 
interest in philosophy varies between people, so I am not expecting everyone to 
be immediately dumbstruck and thereafter obsessed. But nevertheless, so long as 
you have not so thoroughly closed your mind to philosophy that you refuse to 
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reflect on it – and to do so is to take an active stance, for which the typical 
scientistic motivations are highly dubious – then it seems to me that while you are 
reflecting on it, if only in passing, then the resonance will be there. Even if you 
have never believed that there is a meaning of life, you have still lived, so it will 
be there. 
So I seem to be saying that nihilism is a big deal. And yet, on the other hand, 
I seem to be saying that it is not: hence Llanera’s puzzle. For my central claim 
about nihilism is that it is a non-evaluative, neutral fact. When you grasp and 
embrace it, the sky will not fall down, and neither will you be elevated to a blissful 
state above the ‘tyranny’ of the framework. I am amused by the thought of an 
overly busy, stressed office worker using my book as a self-help guide: ‘At last, 
I’ve shed the burden of all that troublesome meaning!’ However, the joke trades 
on both the traditional presupposition that nihilism is a negative evaluation, and 
the meaning of / in life conflation. Leave those behind you and it is hard to see 
what practical consequences nihilism could have. Suppose it is a metaphysical 
fact about reality. Evidently, it will have no effect on the people who do not accept 
it. And as for those who do, what exactly are they supposed to do? Imagine you 
thought nihilism was true; would you not continue going about your business 
exactly as before? Since your life has not been evaluated in any way through your 
acceptance of this fact, and it changes nothing of your empirical assessment of 
your situation (there are no new objects or events for you to contend with), I fail 
to see what practical bearing this could have. Of course, accepting nihilism might 
mean losing your belief in a meaning of life, if you have one, and that would have 
practical consequences. But this is because belief in a meaning of life is evaluative, 
and hence has practical consequences: both when you have it and when you lose 
it.  
So why do I apparently say that nihilism both is and is not a big deal? Being 
the incredibly astute critic that she clearly is, Llanera instinctively hones in on a 
passage which comes close to unlocking the answer (pp. 87-8). In it, I am 
discussing philosophy-scepticism, of the kind which is rampant in our scientistic 
culture. If we had been playing the ‘warmer – cooler’ game, then at this point I 
would have said ‘scorching hot’. Another clue is provided by my discussion, in 
Chapter 8, of the different roles of philosophy and science, the current divergence 
in the cultural status they enjoy, and the most philosophically significant 
difference between them, namely that science produces technology. Put all this 
together, and with the help of Sherlock Holmes, she might perhaps have been able 
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to ‘deduce’ the answer; on the other hand, she might have needed to enlist the aid 
of a psychic, rather than Holmes.      
Meaningless covers a lot of ground; within today’s philosophical climate, a 
very unusually large amount for a non-introductory monograph. I used the word 
‘system’ in the subtitle. I did not plan on having a subtitle, but Bloomsbury 
understandably wanted something on the cover to provide more information about 
the topics being addressed, and I warmed to the idea primarily because it allowed 
me to use this word. It was meant as a statement, harking back to an earlier time 
when philosophy was more respected and philosophers did not pretend to be 
scientists. The book is not really a system on its own, but at best the beginning of 
one; for I do intend to continue addressing the traditional problems of philosophy 
in a systematically related fashion. The sequel to Meaningless, which I am 
working on at the moment, is called Gods and Titans; this time, if I get my way 
at least, the subtitle will be ‘Philosophy amid Ceaseless Technological Advance’. 
It is in this book that the solution to Llanera’s puzzle will be fully addressed, as 
the wider point of the positions I defended in the first book come into better focus. 
In Meaningless, my focus was on rehabilitating the question of the meaning of 
life, showing its connection to the mainstream of philosophy, and doing something 
concrete with these higher-order reflections by bringing them to bear on some 
central problems of philosophy, such as consciousness. That was already a lot to 
do, so it was practically inevitable that elements pertaining to my future direction 
of travel would appear as tensions. However, since Llanera has spotted this one, I 
shall address it now.   
Now as Llanera says, for philosophers from Nietzsche to the French 
Existentialists, as well as for the likes of Dreyfus, Kelly and Taylor in the present 
day, ‘Nihilism is usually understood to have practical consequences for human 
beings that are bad’ (p. 83). She thinks that this contrasts with my ‘narrow 
conception of nihilism’ according to which it is ‘practically neutral’ (p. 82). 
Actually, I think this practical neutrality is where the worry has always lain, and 
that my nihilism, somewhat paradoxically on the surface, inherits the activity of 
the need to overcome nihilism which these thinkers felt and still feel; and yet it is 
better directed, both metaphysically and given our current circumstances. 
Thinkers such as Nietzsche and Heidegger saw their world changing; faster than 
ever before. The driver of this was technology, which changes how people live 
and has evident, and hence alarming, destructive powers. They saw the old, 
traditional order, in which religion governed people’s lives to maintain 
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conservative ways of life, being swept away. They thought of this as nihilism: a 
literal void in the place of the old values. They perceived the practical neutrality 
of nihilism as a threat; the old values, which maintained a way of life by telling 
us how to live, were being replaced by nothing at all: nihilism was an absence of 
all practical guidance. The result of its onset, they thought, would be the chaos of 
‘anything goes’; and through some spurious reasoning, to my mind, this was 
sometimes thought to apply so generally as to render even truth a dubious notion. 
As I see it, then, it was the neutral passivity of nihilism that spurred these 
thinkers to action. The enduring influence of religion, according to which nihilism 
is a negative evaluation, portrayed it as obviously bad for them, but it was its 
inability to provide positive evaluative guidance – because, in my view, it is not 
evaluative at all – which was the real worry. So nihilism needed to be overcome; 
or at least, we needed to learn how to live with it. Perhaps, as Nietzsche thought, 
with his strong antipathy to the religious values that nihilism was replacing with 
nothing at all, this presented an opportunity to create new and better values. Or 
perhaps, as Heidegger thought, philosophical reflection could get us back in touch 
with our Being, and thereby reaffirm the traditional ways of life which nihilism 
was threatening; we needed to take decisive action and not allow ourselves to be 
lulled into a false sense of security by the unthinking crowd – and we needed to 
do this in a manner historically attuned to our heritage and our integral belonging 
to the natural world. I find some combination of making our own new values, or 
getting back in touch with the old ones without the need for support from religious 
institutions, in all of these thinkers. It continues to this day with the likes of 
Dreyfus and Kelly, who want to put us back in touch with the compelling ‘flow’ 
of the old ways. In all such cases, the passivity of nihilism is the problem, whether 
recognised or not, and the new authority we are supposed to need is found in our 
individual and collective resolute will, our oneness with nature, our cultural 
heritage, or some combination thereof. In these ways, we recapture the 
significance of the world which was lost with nihilism. 
It seems to me, however, that in light of the violent history of our species, we 
have weathered the decline in institutionalised religious authority remarkably well. 
Nations of atheists have lived perfectly ordinary lives. In fact, we have now 
reached the point where we are just as likely to hear the ills of this world being 
blamed upon the influence, rather than lack of influence, of organised religion. I 
do not think the cataclysmic breakdown of order which these thinkers feared 
either happened, or is ever likely to happen; the idea was in large part a prediction, 
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for which a remedy was urgently sought, but its main effect seems to have been 
to provide inspiration to the arts – sometimes good, sometimes not so. Perhaps 
some of the philosophical remedies, such as relying upon our heritage, did 
transpire in a way; but overwhelmingly through muddling along, not because the 
philosophers thought of it. For philosophy, along with religion, was also in decline 
in this period. True, nihilism was not widely embraced. Atheism was, however, 
and they are only a short step from each other; but I think philosophy is harder to 
give up on than religion, given that religion always embodies a philosophy of one 
kind or another. Nevertheless, the fact that people typically continued to think 
they were living meaningful lives – by learning to think that you could make your 
life meaningful in any way you liked, or else to disparage the notion of the 
meaning of life, and thereby avoid thinking about it – strikes me as an intellectual 
epiphenomenon to what was really going on. Essentially, large numbers of people 
started living with nihilism, and in the moral sphere, which is what most 
concerned the likes of Nietzsche, nothing much changed. Decent nihilists wanted 
the same kind of things as decent religious believers; and the restraint which belief 
in the meaning of life was supposed to exercise on non-decent types was no longer 
terribly effective anyway, to the extent that it ever had been. 
In light of what transpired, I think it is reasonable to conclude, with hindsight, 
that nihilism itself was never really the problem. The problem was rather the 
symbiotic rise of technology and fall of philosophy. Technology started becoming 
really impressive, religious belief declined as living standards improved, 
scientistic culture arose to fill the void, and philosophy, struggling to find its place 
in this new world, turned in on itself and fell into decline. The philosophers who 
worried about nihilism should really have been worrying about the fact that the 
touchpaper of technology had finally been ignited after centuries of preparatory 
work, thereby precipitating rapid decline in the philosophical context required to 
make it safe. It all came in the same package, and although their moral concerns 
with nihilism were hardly irrelevant, and fully understandable at the time, what 
they failed to see was that by targeting nihilism – at a time when the meaning of 
life issue had no other credible place to go – they were actually targeting 
philosophy, and thereby contributing to the problem. For to think about, and 
embrace, nihilism, is to adopt a philosophical attitude to the world. The passionate 
activity of their opposition to nihilism should really have been directed to the 
preservation of philosophy, in the face of technological advances bringing 
awesome forces into the world on the basis of little more than blind curiosity, luck, 
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and market forces – and thereby practically every dream humans have ever dreamt, 
regardless of the wisdom of fulfilling them. For without philosophical guidance, 
when we see a way to do it, we do it. Research ethics committees, increasingly 
populated by scientists, cannot hold back the tide for long; for we simply do not 
live in a philosophical enough world for that anymore.  
That is why the deep personal resonance of nihilism is something to be 
cultivated. This resonance will not inspire any particular kind of action, because 
nihilism is not evaluative. However it can help to draw people into philosophy; so 
strongly that scientistic culture will have an uphill battle trying to combat it. And 
once they are drawn in, and start thinking about our world within a wider context 
which scientistic culture tries to discredit – about what to do with this life we have 
found ourselves with, and how much technological power we can realistically 
handle – then plenty of action should be inspired. These practical consequences 
will not spring from nihilism per se, but rather from an incompatibility between 
feeling its resonance and remaining blind to philosophy. What Llanera calls the 
‘intimate, powerful, and transformative effect’ of nihilism (p. 88) is nothing other 
than openness to a philosophical thought of immediate and universal interest. And 
we have never been in more need of such openness, with the ‘Doomsday Clock’ 
posted by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists currently giving us three minutes 
until oblivion, and scientists around the world diligently working away to spring 
a massive portfolio of new, life-transforming technologies upon us, of the kind 
which regularly make the news these days. So this is how Llanera’s puzzle is 
resolved; and I think I have already said enough to reveal how I would answer her 
more specific objections and queries, since they are all firmly rooted in this puzzle. 
I did not provide her with the resources to resolve the puzzle herself (Holmes 
might disagree), but the fact that it was the principle focus of her reading of my 
book is enough to leave me keenly anticipating the publication of her own positive 
views on these matters. 
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Living in the Frame 
Meaning on Loan from Nihilism  
Alan Malachowski* 
Abstract 
This article suggests that James Tartaglia’s otherwise interesting and insightful handling of the 
relationship between nihilism and philosophical questions concerning the meaning of life may have 
underestimated the former. Invoking a mini-tradition based on a Heideggarian reading of 
Nietzsche’s ‘European Nihilism’ as mainly expressed in The Will to Power, it outlines four possible 
perspectives from which Tartaglia’s conception of nihilism is liable to seem too complacent 
regarding its power to undermine the meaning we are inclined to attach to social life. 
 
In Philosophy in a Meaningless Life, 1  James Tartaglia cuts through 
misconceptions about the nature and consequences of nihilism that have dogged 
philosophical discussions over the years. And, he does this in a crisp, insightful, 
and often entertaining, way – one that should help refresh interest in issues 
concerning the meaning of life, while helping overcome the long prevailing 
tendency of analytic philosophers in particular to ignore such issues, or just 
shuffle them around in a pedestrian manner. The upshot is a timely, insightful 
book, the main thrust of which I am disposed, and even feel I ought to be so 
disposed, to largely agree with.  
If we accept, as the book argues, that human beings have autonomy 
regarding the requirements for a meaningful life within the social realm, and that 
they are able to endow their own lives and the lives of others with meaning 
therein, we ought to set aside otiose questions, as commonly inspired by 
nihilism, concerning whether meaning in some other, overarching, sense exists 
or is even possible. We should rather spend the time identifying useful ways to 
exercise some quality control over meaning’s dispensation and growth in social 
life, so as to avoid the trap of accepting just any old thing as meaningful. For 
this can only cheapen a cluster of very useful, closely associated, evaluations: 
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“purposeful”, “valuable”, “authentic”, and so on. Thinking along these lines, it 
strikes me James is quite right to contend that the threat nihilism poses to the 
meanings we are inclined to attribute to our lives is bogus, something 
philosophical reflection can as easily dispense with. 
When we are involved in projects and relationships we find worthwhile, and 
which others are liable to endorse, then we can generally have confidence that 
the life we are living is meaningful. And, philosophical deliberations along the 
lines James expounds should only enhance that confidence by drawing any sting 
nihilism might otherwise be perceived to have. For, it is highly unlikely that any 
external criterion of meaning, one that would have to override well established 
criteria which already mesh with the experiences of people who also engage in 
such projects and relationships, is going to possess the authority, natural or 
otherwise, to undermine this confidence.  
Moreover there is something fishy in the very thought that such a criterion 
could serve such a purpose. Although, as James rightly accepts, sincere 
questions concerning whether life has meaning ought not to be denied a hearing 
on narrow semantic grounds (e.g. because such questions supposedly lack sense), 
obedience to a nihilistic external criterion, one that excludes or undermines 
social meaning should raise serious semantic concerns. The idea of such a 
criterion involves semantic incoherence: under the weight of an alien notion of 
exclusion, the language within which we talk about social meaning would begin 
to lose its sense. And, this would have a knock on effect. How can we then 
accept such a criterion, since the language in which it has to be expressed no 
longer makes sense to us?  
What is doing the work here is an intriguing assumption about the 
connection between what we believe and semantic meaning: it is not possible for 
such meaning to retain its significance if too many of our beliefs turn out to be 
false.2 Hence if, per impossible, we are completely mistaken about meaning in 
the non-semantic senses just alluded to – so our many, and various, judgments 
about what is valuable, worthwhile, authentic, and so on are all radically 
mistaken – then there is no way we can understand that they are. The language 
in which this state of affairs has to be expressed will be opaque. Linguistic 
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meanings are holistically interwoven: they feed each other. If very large chunks 
of our beliefs are false then the words and phrases involved turn out to be 
meaningless, and language usage as a whole is irreparably damaged, leaving 
meaning in general destroyed. A totally meaningless life would, it appears, be 
one we could not contemplate, still less talk about. Having said that, I am, 
nevertheless, going to think against James’ treatment of nihilism which should, 
of course, also involve some thinking against my own views. 
The question I am going to focus on is simply this: “Does nihilism have 
more teeth than James allows it to have?” On the face of it, there is something of 
a paradox lurking here anyway. If nihilism has no teeth, if it is harmless, 
“morally neutral”, and “simply a fact”, with “no practical consequences” as 
James contends (e.g. 171 &172), it is pretty uninteresting. For then, its 
domestication is cheap – more or less self-financing, while James’ key claims:   
 
 (1) Nihilism is true: life is meaningless. 
 (2) Despite (1), our lives can, and presumably should, be carried on in 
the normal way because the things we do are worthwhile and 
serviceably meaningful in a social sense. 
 
become trivial. But, if nihilism has teeth, it is not clear how both of these can 
still stand. James fully acknowledges that, historically, nihilism appears to have 
had teeth, but contends that this is a highly deceptive appearance, caused, in the 
main, by (1) falsely believing that meaning needs to be undergirded by religion, 
and (2) conflating ‘meaninglessness’ of a certain lofty kind with ‘lack of social 
value.’ Here again, though, a chimerical nihilism that is so easily de-fanged 
seems hardly worth much serious consideration. 
The problem, if there is one, is perhaps structurally reminiscent of the once 
much discussed difficulties many philosophers had with swallowing John 
Mackie’s view that the second-order characterization of moral values as 
‘non-objective’ (“There are no objective values”3) need have no negative 
influence on genuine commitments to the first-order judgments involved in 
moral practices. But, I am not going to dwell on such considerations.  
Instead, I want to look more closely at why, contrary to James’ fairly relaxed 
dismissal of nihilism as an innocuous philosophical phantom, there emerged a 
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tradition that considered it unnervingly real, and monumentally threatening. My 
hunch here is that perhaps the ‘tradition’ was on to something which James 
overlooks despite the close, and at times perspicuous, attention he has paid to a 
number of the main works of its proponents. 
In exploring this tradition, it should become clear that James’ reasons 
(interesting and useful though they otherwise may be) for claiming nihilism 
probably has to be true, and harmlessly so,4 fail to allow for the devastation that 
a genuinely threatening nihilism, one such as Nietzsche dubbed “the eeriest of 
all guests”,5 is liable to have wreaked, and is likely to continue to wreak, on 
everything we can regard as meaningful. Having outlined the nihilism involved, 
we will discuss how it squares up to James’ notion of a meaningful life in what 
he calls “the framework” or “the frame”. This is a social context which bestows 
meaning not on everything as such (which is impossible), but on everything in 
that context: “if we want to understand the meaning of a particular practice, we 
do so by framing it within the wider context of social life” (70).6 
 
A nihilist tradition: Nietzsche and Heidegger 
    
With regard to the essence of nihilism, there is no  
prospect of, and no meaningful claim to, a cure. 
                                               Heidegger 
 
In talking about a “tradition” here, I should make it clear that I am setting 
aside the rich history of nihilism which includes, for example, its socio-political 
role in 19th Century Russia and numerous related literary sources such as 
Turgenev’s Fathers and Sons, as well as most of Dostoyevsky’s novels including 
Notes From Underground, Crime and Punishment, and The Brothers Karamazov. 
Instead, I want to deal with a very narrow philosophical tradition, a sort of 
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‘sub-tradition’ of the tradition I have so far been alluding to that, for the most 
part, reduces to virtually only two key thinkers: Nietzsche and Heidegger. 
Indeed, as far as the points that are intended to tell against James’ conception of 
nihilism go, this tradition shrinks even further, down to a mini-Heideggerian 
tradition of reading Nietzsche.7 
Nietzsche’s version of nihilism, though complex, is frequently interpreted as 
a hyperbolical depiction-cum-prediction of the socio-psychological 
consequences of the death of God, as announced by the ‘madman’ in Section 
125 of The Gay Science. 8  James, himself, seems content to buy this 
interpretation, as when he suggests Nietzsche’s “mistake was to believe that a 
wave of nihilistic psychology was about to engulf the world” (171-172). But, 
Nietzsche’s concerns, one ought to hesitate to say “fears”, about the advent of 
nihilism are more complicated. The extremely dark picture he paints of its 
putative fallout serves as a dramatic device designed to draw attention to the 
importance of his underlying claim that historically speaking, and regardless of 
surface social outcomes and our felt responses, nihilism has us by the throat. By 
“us” he means the people of “Western History” – and, his nihilism is therefore 
what he calls ‘European’.9 
Nietzsche can speak for himself, and speak well. But, he shouts far too 
often,10 and in my view the resulting ‘megaphonic’ effect tends to obscure the 
subtlety and importance of this underlying claim, even to the extent of 
encouraging confusion over the import of a phrase like “historically speaking”. 
                                                     
7 There is a much wider tradition in recent European thought, involving thinkers such as Gianni 
Vattimo and Vittorio Possenti, (not to mention Gilles Deleuze and Jacques Derrida) that is strongly 
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to be reckoned with largely on account of the writings of both Nietzsche and Heidegger. It is beyond 
the scope of the present article to consider how James’ approach to nihilism compares with that of this 
wider tradition. That he does not engage with this tradition by explaining why its members are wrong 
to take nihilism so seriously is perhaps an unfortunate lacuna given that he refers to both Heidegger 
and Nietzsche - and not always in passing. 
8 The Gay Science, Friedrich Nietzsche, (Bernard Williams, ed.), Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge, 2001. 
9 “By ‘us’ and ‘we’, Nietzsche means the man of Western History”, (NIV43). Along with Heidegger, 
my use of the present day “we” assumes the current inhabitants of the West are “the contemporary 
representatives of Nietzsche’s era” (NIV44). 
10 A quick survey of other commentators on this point reveals an interesting contrast. R. J. Hollindale, 
one of Nietzsche’s main early translators disagrees with me. After remarking on “the excess of 
manner” of Thus Spake Zarathustra, Hollingdale claims that “excess is the one fault no one could 
impute to Nietzsche’s subsequent works”, Thus Spake Zarathustra, Friedrich Nietzsche, (R. J. 
Hollingdale (trans.)), Penguin: London, 1969, p.11. Simon Blackburn, however, asserts that Nietzsche 
“had no volume control”; Truth, Simon Blackburn, Penguin: London, 2006, p.77. 
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Fortunately, we can turn for illumination to an inveterate reader of Nietzsche 
who knows how to speak softly, even though he is also prone to overdo the 
philosophical dramatics. 
Heidegger seems to have first broached the question as to what lies behind, 
what “grounds”, the nihilism which he says was “exposed” by Nietzsche “in the 
first book of The Will to Power”11 during a lecture given in 1935.12 But there, 
his brief remarks are tied up in some obscure thoughts about “nothing/the 
nothing” (das nichts). And, his stark definition  
 
“Merely to chase after beings in the midst of the oblivion of Being13 – 
that is nihilism.”14 
 
merely reiterates his habitual insistence that just about everything that can go 
seriously wrong for human beings is the result of their ignorance of ‘how things 
stand with Being’. Later, however, at length and in a variety of other works,15 
he uncoils a complex and nuanced account of Nietzsche’s approach to nihilism 
                                                     
11 The Will to Power, Friedrich Nietzsche, Walter Kaufmann (trans.), Random House: New York, 
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is no scholarly consensus on this issue. I have some sympathy with Richard Rorty’s view that “Being 
is a good example of something we have no criteria for answering questions about”, ‘Heidegger, 
Contingency, and Pragmatism’, p.36; in Essays on Heidegger and others, Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge, 1991, pp.27-49. At the same time, I am not yet convinced that Peter van Inwagen is 
completely wrong when he claims Heidegger’s philosophy of being is “transparently confused”, 
‘Being, Existence, and Ontological Commitment’, p.475, n.4; in Metametaphysics: New Essays on the 
Foundations of Ontology, David J. Chalmers, David Manley, Ryan Wasserman (eds.), Oxford 
University Press: Oxford, 2009, pp.472-506. Matters have been made even more complicated by 
Thomas Sheehan’s intervention with what he claims to be a ‘paradigm shift in Heideggerian 
interpretation’. There he argues forcefully that Heidegger’s talk of ‘Being’ can be cashed out in terms 
of ‘meaning.’ See: ‘A paradigm shift in Heidegger research’, Thomas Sheehan, Continental 
Philosophy Review, 34, 2001, pp.183-2002. Obviously if Sheehan is right, then the content of ‘Being’ 
would impact the present article. It need not, however, necessitate any large changes in the basic 
claims regarding James’ approach to nihilism. I am skeptical that Sheehan is right, if only because of 
the puzzle it causes for Heidegger’s use of the phrase “the meaning of ‘Being’” throughout Being and 
Time.  
14 IM, p.217 
15 Heidegger’s engagement with Nietzsche’s nihilism is distributed over a large number of other 
works, but the views I discuss are not, to my knowledge, substantially contradicted or made 
obsolescent in any of those. Aspects of his similarly deep and wide-ranging engagement with the poet 
Hӧlderlin resonate with Heidegger’s treatment of Nietzsche’s nihilism, but touch on matters again 
beyond the scope of the present discussion. The same can be said of Ernst Junger. 
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that sparkles with creative insights, while, at the same, adding a measure of 
deeper coherence which vividly highlights fault lines in less imaginatively 
penetrating interpretations.  
We will take our bearings from just two of these works: ‘Nietzsche’s Word: 
“God is Dead”’ (hereafter ‘NW’)16 and Nietzsche Vols. I-IV: (hereafter ‘NI’, 
‘NII’, etc.),17 using the second mainly for backup, and elaboration. The aim here 
is to show how nihilism, as elucidated by Heidegger, still bears out the 
once-threatening connotations of its name tag, and cannot easily be made 
compatible with James’ view that life in the frame remains, and deserves to 
remain, untouched and hence unperturbed by it. As an enemy of the grounding 
that enables and sustains worthwhile social meaning, this nihilism should be 
recognized for what it is, and not be given shelter by way of philosophical 
appeasement. 
One of Heidegger’s first interpretational moves in NW is to stress that 
Nietzsche’s understanding of nihilism is historical: “His thinking sees itself 
under the sign of nihilism. That is the name for an historical movement” 
(NW160) … “Nietzsche comprehends nihilism as a historical process” (NW166) 
… “The essence of nihilism is rooted in history” (NW 197). Moreover, this 
‘thinking’ “gives the destiny of two millennia of Western history” for “after 
dominating the previous century” nihilism “ has determined the current one” 
(NW160) . Such claims already invite obvious objections of historical 
inaccuracy (e.g. the ‘mistake’ that James refers to). But, Heidegger is using the 
term “history” in a special sense. He equates it with metaphysics, so ordinary 
criteria for empirical accuracy do not apply.  
This means we should not treat the so-called madman’s announcement 
literally.18 Again, it is rhetorically devised, this time to capture the attention of 
                                                     
16 Reprinted in Off the Beaten Track, Martin Heidegger, (Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes, trans.), 
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2002, pp.157-199 (hereafter ‘OTB’). 
17 Nietzsche: Volumes One and Two, Martin Heidegger, (David Farrell Krell, trans.), HarperCollins: 
New York, 1991, and Nietzsche: Volumes Three and Four, Martin Heidegger, (David Farrell Krell, 
trans.), HarperCollins: New York, 1991. 
18 This has not gone unnoticed by other commentators. Megill, for example, tells us that “Nietzsche’s 
announcement of the death of God, should not be mistaken for an empirical observation concerning 
the decline of Christian belief in the nineteenth century … In announcing the death of God, Nietzsche 
is declaring his conviction that the present is in a state of dereliction.” Prophets of Extremity, Alan 
Megill, University of California Press: California, Berkeley, 1987, p.33. But, Heidegger’s reading is 
exceptionally insightful as to why a purely ‘empirical’ interpretation is wrong, and shows why the 
‘dereliction’ Megill refers to cannot be adequately discussed in just empirical terms either. In his 
introduction to The Gay Science, Bernard Williams also briefly notes that Nietzsche was not just 
concerned with the fallout from the God’s death but from the lapse of any “reassuring metaphysical 
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those who have no inkling when the ground shifting beneath their feet is 
symptomatic of a metaphysical earthquake. Heidegger is as firm as he is clear 
about this. Nietzsche is not just describing the consequences of the collapse of 
Christianity or even Christian faith: “Nietzsche uses the names “God” and 
“Christian God” to indicate the supersensory world in general … the 
metaphysical world” (NW162, italics added). In NIV, Heidegger emphasizes the 
same point, but unpacks it in more direct detail:19  
 
‘Christian God’ also stands for the ‘transcendent’ in general in its various 
meanings – for ‘ideals’ and ‘norms’. ‘principles’ and ‘rules’, ‘ends’ and 
‘values’ which are set above the being in order to give being as a whole a 
purpose, an order, and – as it is succinctly expressed – ‘meaning’ ((NIV4) 
italics added). 
 
And in NW, the outcome of God’s death, construed in these broader terms, is 
spelled out:  
 
If God – as the supersensory ground and as the goal of everything that is 
real – is dead, if the supersensory world of ideas is bereft of its binding 
and above all its inspiring and constructive power, then there is nothing 
left which man can rely on and by which he can orientate himself 
(NW163). 
 
However, Heidegger stresses that neither belief nor disbelief in religious or 
secular transcendent sources of ‘orientation’ is sufficient to indicate how 
someone, or, more to the point, a culture, ‘stands’ with regard to nihilism. To 
find that out, we must dig deeper. 
Nihilism “is not just any view or doctrine held by just anyone” (NW163). It 
operates, as ‘a historical movement’ below the threshold of ordinary beliefs. At 
first sight, Heidegger makes this sound mysterious: 
 
Nihilism moves history in the way of a scarcely recognized fundamental 
process in the destiny of the Western peoples. Hence nihilism is not just 
                                                                                                                                                                     
structure of the world”, op.cit. p.xiii. 
19 There is a good deal of overlap and repetition as between NW and NI-IV. In each case, I use the 
source that is felicitous for the purposes in hand. 
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one historical phenomenon among others …. Nihilism thought in its 
essence, is on the contrary the fundamental movement of the history of the 
West. Its roots are so deep that its development can entail only world 
catastrophes. Nihilism is the world-historical movement of the peoples of 
the earth who have been drawn in to modernity’s arena of power 
(NW163-164) …. Nihilism, as the fundamental process of Western history, 
is also and above all the intrinsic law of this history … its inner logic” 
(NW167). 
 
But, even as it stands, this passage provides important clues as to why the 
consequences of nihilism are liable to be misconstrued, especially by someone 
who, unaware of its metaphysical depth, believes it to be patently inoffensive. 
Nihilism is not easy to spot at work. Its roots are deeply submerged, and it 
operates undercover as an “intrinsic law” or “inner logic”. These characteristics 
help explain why, as Heidegger more than once claims, the effects of nihilism 
are often mistaken for its cause, and why its most important feature, its ‘essence’ 
(das Wesen)20 in his elevated terms, is invariably ignored (even Nietzsche 
himself slips up here, but a bit more about that shortly). 
On the Heideggerian reading of Nietzsche put forward so far, we have the 
bare bones of an explanation as to why those who are unable to detect visible 
signs of ‘world catastrophes’ not clearly caused by quotidian events might be 
mistaken in considering this sufficient evidence that Nietzsche was wrong about 
the ominous nature and dire repercussions of nihilism. But, to cast even a 
shadow over James’ view that, beneath the fierce face commonly projected onto 
it, nihilism is benign, we need more. We need to see how nihilism can threaten 
meaning and that it does. And, we need to give some substance to the idea that 
what might seem to be no more than an imaginary form of metaphysical 
terrorism has a real impact. 
The Heideggerian story we are unfolding, convoluted as it is, eventually 
leads us to four different vantage points, or outposts, from which James’ take on 
nihilism looks complacent. For reasons of space, we will need some shortcuts to 
get to these.21  
                                                     
20 ‘Essence’ is a Heideggerian term of art that he does not, as far as I am aware, define (even when he 
asks himself directly what it means – e.g. NIV206). Here, I take “the essence of X” just to mean 
something like “what is most important about X” – though Heidegger’s uses “essence” so often that he 
tends to undermine even the kind of ‘importance’ alluded to in this particular interpretation. 
21 For example, we circumvent the doctrine of ‘Eternal recurrence’ which Heidegger, probably rightly, 
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Viewed from the first vantage point, that of the Heideggerian Nietzsche, our 
world has no value: “Existence has no goal or end; any comprehensive unity in 
the plurality of events is lacking … the categories ‘aim,’ ‘unity,’ ‘being’ which 
we used to project some value into the world – we pull out again; so the world 
looks valueless” (WP12, 13). In such a world, life in the frame can only embody 
superficial meanings, the equivalent of moral flotsam. The second vantage point 
reveals how things look through Nietzsche’s own eyes: again value disappears, 
and although the possibility of revival through a new form of valuation is 
broached, this turns out to be a Trojan Horse according to Heidegger. The third 
vantage point is occupied Heidegger himself. From there, the human situation 
looks worse than Nietzsche envisaged: nihilism has engulfed our lives, draining 
them of not just meaning, but also the resources for escaping from, or 
overcoming, the value vacuum. And, by way of conclusion, the view from the 
last outpost shows briefly how Heidegger’s verdict on the plight of “those drawn 
into the arena of modernity’s power”, and hence into nihilism on his terms, 
might be extrapolated from his reflections on Nietzsche without deploying either 
bespoke Heideggerian philosophical apparatus/terminology or tendentious 
assumptions about the priority of issues concerning ‘Being’. This way of 
reaching the verdict invokes what, following Richard Rorty,22 we might call 
“Heideggerian common sense”.  
 
Heideggerian Nietzsche 
 
Nietzsche’s concept of nihilism is itself nihilistic. 
Heidegger 
   
For Heideggerian Nietzsche, metaphysics is the motor of human history, the 
only kind of history in which meaning can reside (because it is metaphysical not, 
as James would presumably prefer, because it is human). This is tantamount to 
saying that metaphysics creates the human appreciation of order and unity 
within and amongst entities and events on the world stage, as well as the 
subsequent basis for evaluations of them. How can it do this? Well recall, history 
                                                                                                                                                                     
says is Nietzsche’s fundamental metaphysical position. Adequate treatment of this would take far too 
long, and also take us too far away from James’ text. 
22 ‘Heideggerianism and Leftist Politics’, Richard Rorty; in Weakening Philosophy: Essays in Honour 
of Gianni Vattimo, Santiago Zabala (ed.), McGill-Queen’s University Press: Canada, 2007, pp.149-58. 
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is metaphysically infused. Metaphysics is not just something behind it: “We are 
not thinking of a doctrine or only of a specialized discipline of philosophy but of 
the fundamental structure of beings in their entirety” (NW165). Even so, there is 
a sticky surface incongruity: metaphysics belongs to the supersensory world and 
manages to exert a ‘determinative and supporting’ effect on what happens in the 
sensory world. This latter claim about the world-historical potency of 
metaphysics, one Heidegger is determined to make on Nietzsche’s behalf, 
apparently introduces an anomaly akin to that of Cartesian dualism: how can the 
‘supersensory’ influence the ‘sensory’?  
In discussing the view from our fourth outpost, we will suggest a way of 
re-describing metaphysics’ relationship to the sensory world that allows for 
straightforward causal influences. But, Heidegger does not see a problem here 
either, though for different reasons. Humans who lead meaningful lives always 
lean on and are guided in their actions, consciously or otherwise, by a 
metaphysics that provides them with a general sense of “the fundamental 
structure of beings in their entirety”. This is not just something they are inclined 
to fall back on whenever they are, as Dostoyevsky puts it, “striving to unite the 
details of existence and to discover at least some kind of general meaning in the 
universal muddle”.23 For on that conception, metaphysics seeps into, and gives 
motivational shape to, everything they do. It is not operating from the 
supersensory realm, but within the history that it shapes. The dualistic dilemma 
is simply an illusion that vanishes when this becomes clear and the idea of a 
supersensory realm is redundant, and can no longer play a credible role. 
Nietzsche’s great, and terrible, discovery, Heidegger tells us, is that the 
metaphysics which has been driving history since the time of Plato is 
unremittingly self-destructive. For the values it gave birth to, are fated to issue 
challenges to the legitimacy of both themselves and any would-be replacements. 
These are challenges that cannot be met.  
Taking the high estimation of truth as a test case, as Nietzsche himself does, 
we can quickly see how Christian doctrines would succumb to self-destruction 
given their weak evidential basis (the high estimation of truth bringing in tow 
urgent demands for strong evidence): “The sense of truthfulness, developed 
highly by Christianity, is nauseated by the falseness and mendaciousness of all 
Christian interpretations of the world and of history (WP 2, 7) …. If on a Sunday 
                                                     
23 The Brothers Karamazov, Fyodor Dostoyevsky, (David McDuff, trans.) Penguin: London, 2003, 
p.9. 
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morning we hear the old church bells chiming, we ask ourselves: is it really 
possible! This is on account of a Jew crucified two thousand years ago who said 
that he was the son of God. There is no proof for such an assertion”24. And, 
Nietzsche suggests that this kind of scenario, where disbelief is the inevitable 
result of rudimentary questioning, plays out for morality in general: 
 
Morality was the great antidote against practical and theoretical nihilism. 
But among the forces cultivated by morality was truthfulness: this 
eventually turned against morality, discovered its genealogy, its partial 
perspective. (WP 4, 5 (10)) 
 
Heidegger speaks, as we said, of ‘destiny’, ‘intrinsic law of history’, ‘inner 
logic’, and so forth, thus depicting metaphysical activity as something shielded 
from ordinary scrutiny, as we also indicated. But, we do not need a clearer view 
of the details of that activity to see why Heidegger wanted to say that when 
Nietzsche moved beyond the generality of morality in toto, and identified the 
operative metaphysics of the Western world in the even wider terms of values, 
this metaphysics should be regarded as nihilistic. For values were also 
self-undermining. They could not withstand the force of the insight, already part 
of their inbuilt logic as it were, that the idealized world they represented, or 
promised, would never be actualized: “The highest values have already devalued 
themselves now by coming to understand that the ideal world is not, and not 
ever, going to be realized within the real world” (NW167) – and not only that, 
but the value of the highest values, the obligatory basis of sincere commitments 
to them, runs up against the discovery that the “ true world (the “transcendent”, 
the beyond) has been fabricated solely out of ‘psychological needs’” (NIV34) .  
 At the conclusion of the process of the highest values undermining 
themselves lies a valueless world, a world in which nihilism therefore reigns. Of 
course, two key assumptions need to dominate here: (1) a world without value is 
a world without meaning: “‘Meaning’ signifies the same thing as value, since in 
place of ‘meaninglessness’, Nietzsche also says ‘valuelessness’” (NIV30), and 
(2) values are homogeneous, so all worthwhile values lose their currency absent 
the creditworthiness of the higher values: “If these uppermost values, which 
grant all beings their value, are devalued, then all beings grounded in them 
                                                     
24 Human All Too Human, Friedrich Nietzsche, (Gary Hanwerk (trans.)), Stanford University Press: 
Stanford, California, 113, p.93 (hereafter: HAH). 
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become valueless” (NIV30). The end of the devaluation process is not however 
the end of Nietzsche’s own story, but it is the place where Heidegger parts 
company from him. Before we discuss the significance of these points, we need 
to touch base with James’ handling of Nietzsche in his approach to nihilism. 
James gestures towards the richness of Nietzsche’s nihilism (36), but targets 
his discussion on a thinner version that is no threat to meaning as he conceives it, 
cannot be overcome by us, and need not be overcome because “we have no 
reason to want to” do so (28). He thinks this is a good idea because Nietzsche’s 
nihilism is inextricably tied to at least two bad ideas: (1) that European culture 
had been embroiled in a long term crisis caused by nihilism, and was heading 
towards a climacteric phase which we now occupy (“What I relate is the history 
of the next two centuries. I describe what is coming, what can no longer come 
differently: the advent of nihilism” (WP3)), and (2) that meaning is intimately 
connected to a religious outlook on life. 25  James is skeptical about (1), 
apparently regarding it as more or less bogus history and unverifiable prophecy. 
But here, he misses something we have just discussed: the real catastrophe, the 
one Heideggerian Nietzsche is concerned about, is metaphysical for which 
ordinary talk about cultural calamity and disaster is rhetorical window dressing, 
serving as a contingent indicator of the more severe underlying problem. This is 
one of the reasons, as Heidegger often points out, Nietzsche does not dwell on 
ordinary historical details: “Nowhere does Nietzsche identify any historically 
recognized and demonstrable forms of the positing of the uppermost values, nor 
the historically representable contexts of such positings (NIV35) … for a 
comprehension of the essence of nihilism there is little to be gained by 
recounting the history of nihilism in different centuries and depicting its 
different forms” (NIV53). As for (2), James’ swift suggestion that we can show 
how ineffectual nihilism is by simply severing the connection between meaning 
and religion (for this will leave meaning unscathed) fails to acknowledge that 
such a move cannot thwart Nietzsche’s ‘richer nihilism’, which depends not on 
tight links between meaning and religion, but between meaning and ‘the 
transcendent in general’. Nihilism begins to bite when a metaphysics that caters 
for ‘the fundamental structure of beings in their entirety’ has no operational 
                                                     
25 A third reason would presumably be that Nietzsche’s nihilism is tied to the doctrine of ‘Eternal 
Recurrence’ that James regards as absurd. For reasons of brevity, as we said, we do not discuss this 
doctrine here, but simply assume what we say about Nietzsche’s nihilism independently of it still holds 
up. 
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existence within culture. Life in the frame is always lacking in that regard. For, 
it is invariably dominated by the antics of the ‘herd’ (Nietzsche) or the ‘They’ 
(Heidegger), the mobile vulgus, the people who are manipulated by popular 
culture, banal politics, and prejudices masquerading as opinions – and it is 
therefore bound to forfeit stability: 
 
The real disadvantage that the cessation of metaphysical views brings 
with it lies in the fact that the individual keeps his eye too strictly upon his 
short lifespan and receives no stronger impulses to build durable 
institutions designed to last for centuries; he wants to pick the fruit 
himself from the tree he plants, and he therefore no longer cares to plant 
those trees that require centuries of constant cultivation and are intended 
to shade a long series of generations … our agitated and ephemeral 
existence still contrasts too strongly with the deeply breathing repose of 
metaphysical ages. (HAH 22, p.32). 
 
Through Nietzsche’s own eyes 
 
What does Nihilism mean? – That the highest values are losing their value. 
Nietzsche 
   
A world without value is still a world, so Nietzsche’s account of nihilism 
does not come to a halt when the ‘higher values’ self destruct: “The 
earth-shattering change behind the devaluation of the highest values hitherto is 
revealed in the fact that a new principle of valuation becomes necessary” 
(NIV49). Humans can no longer rely on their judgments as to what is, and what 
is not, worthwhile, but Nietzsche believes this only signals the completion, not 
the triumph, of nihilism. He identifies something that he believes counters 
nihilism, something he calls ‘the will to power’. This cannot be thwarted or 
undermined by nihilism because it does not depend on anything that can be 
undermined. And, it does not depend on anything of that kind because it does 
not depend on anything (even itself). Nor is it professed to occupy the 
supersensory realms, such as ‘the true world’, that nihilism ‘exposes’ as 
fraudulent.  
Unlike morality and the higher values in general, the will to power is not 
destined for self-destruction in virtue of its own nature. If anything, its trajectory 
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is self-reinforcing. It strives to overcome itself, but in doing so only becomes 
stronger (because a greater force is required to do this). Nick Land graphically 
captures how the will to power elusively offers nothing for nihilism to bite into: 
 
The will to power is not driven by the tendency to realize and sustain a 
potential, its sole impetus is that of overcoming itself. It has no motivating 
end, but only a propulsive source. It is in this sense that will to power is 
creative desire, without a pre-figured destination or anticipatory perfection. 
It is an arrow shot into the unconceived.26 
 
Nihilism is defeated because values are so radically transformed in the process 
of willing, they become indestructible. The value of values then lies in the 
willing itself, and not in anything outside the domain of the will that is doomed 
to self-destruction or can be undermined. 
James’ treatment of nihilism has to seem complacent from this perspective, 
that of the special kind of person, der Übermensch, who has taken what Philippa 
Foot calls the “highly daring mental voyage”,27 and come to recognize that 
traditional values are bankrupt, that the will is the only unimpeachable source of 
what can replace them.28 By comparison, life in the frame, lacking “deeply 
breathing repose”, then has to look “agitated and ephemeral”: a mundane, 
self-deceptive life; one that surfs routinely, without any overall sense of 
direction, on an ocean of disparate values, which are now no more than the 
detritus from the insidious eruption of a metaphysical volcano. 
 
Heidegger 
 
Insight into nihilism remains something terrifying. 
      Heidegger 
 
For Heidegger, Nietzsche’s nihilism has some promising features up to the 
                                                     
26 The Thirst for Annihilation: George Bataille and Virulent Nihilism, Nick Land, Routledge: London, 
2002, p.73. 
27 ‘Nietzsche: The Revaluation of Values’, Philippa Foot, p.210; in Nietzsche, John Richardson and 
Brian Leiter (eds.), Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2001, pp.210-220. 
28 Compare Richardson: ‘The human becomes overman by grasping himself as will to power, and 
putting this insight into effect by making new values”, Heidegger, John Richardson, Routledge: 
London, 2012, p.246. 
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point where the will to power is introduced as a countermeasure. Then, in 
Heidegger’s terms and to his great dismay, Being is utterly reduced to mere 
matters of value: “For Heidegger, Being is annihilated insofar as it is 
transformed completely into value”. 29  
Heidegger ruminates extensively on the nature of value and valuing (e.g. 
NIV 15-16), questioning, for instance, what makes a value ‘valid’. In doing this 
he invites further questions as to whether Nietzsche’s model of valuing as sheer 
willing in a social vacuum without an extrinsic aim or object is at all cogent. But, 
he passes up on these, preferring to concentrate on the consequences of 
assuming the model is viable, or certainly not incoherent. Heidegger has two 
main problems with these consequences, and believes that they feed into a much 
larger problem. 
The first difficulty is that, far from countering nihilism, the notion of ‘a will 
to power’ remains caught up in its underlying metaphysics: “the revaluation of 
all values, as a grounding of the principle for a new valuation, is itself 
metaphysics” (NIV6). And, this metaphysics “is not an overcoming of nihilism. 
It is the ultimate entanglement in nihilism” (NIV203). The supposed 
countermeasure to nihilism counter-productively, and ironically, empowers it – 
“ironically”, because Nietzsche’s ‘completion of metaphysics’ turns out to be 
nihilism’s last stand. 
The second problem is that a world transformed by the metaphysics of the 
will to power is one given over to “unconditional subjectivity” (NW191) and 
rampant self-assertion (“pure powerfulness without restraint” (NIV28)) through 
which all beings are objectified: “World becomes object”, and “earth can show 
itself now only as the attack arranged in the willing of man … nature appears 
everywhere as the object of technology” (NIV191). When awareness, conscious 
or otherwise, of the world’s ungroundedness outside the will proliferates, it 
descends into darkness: “The time of the world’s night is a desolate time 
because the desolation grows continually greater … The age for which the 
ground fails to appear hangs in the abyss”.30 
Both problems feed into a larger problem, a problem which for Heidegger is 
paramount and therefore never absent throughout even his most protracted 
discussions of Nietzsche’s nihilism: “Being, as a matter of principle is not 
admitted as Being” (NIV203). Crudely: Being is not given its due. This is the 
                                                     
29 The End of Modernity: Nihilism and Hermeneutics’. Gianni Vatimo, p.21.  
30 ‘Why Poets?’ Martin Heidegger, p.200; in OTB, pp.200-241. 
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very reason why entanglement in metaphysics is a problem in the first instance. 
In Heidegger’s view, all Western metaphysics short changes Being (“In its 
essence, however, metaphysics is nihilism” (NW198)).  
The second problem, unbridled objectification, which is the practical 
concomitant of Nietzsche’s nihilism, fuels the larger problem because it creates 
a mechanically distracting world that blatantly “leaves Being unthought” 
(NIV212). Before we discuss whether these considerations might be problematic 
for James’ notion of a toothless nihilism, we need to say a bit more about what is 
supposed to be going on here. 
Heidegger credits Nietzsche with recognizing that the metaphysical 
underpinnings of successive societies in the West have contained the seeds of 
their own destruction, and hence have always been nihilistic.31 But, he believes 
Nietzsche’s attempt to thwart this inherent nihilism fails miserably because in its 
totalizing capacity (everything comes down to value and ultimately the ‘willing’ 
thereof), the attempt is itself metaphysical. At the same time, and Heidegger 
claims this all along, Nietzsche fails to engage the essence of nihilism.32 This is 
a disastrous deficit.  
For Heidegger, the rhetoric about nihilism’s psychological and social upshot 
that Nietzsche both voices and encourages covers up the real threat that nihilism 
poses: the threat to Being. The path from the supersensory world to the will to 
power bypasses Being, creating a culture in which Being is reduced to nothing. 
Or, more accurately, the essence of nihilism is that it eclipses Being. “Eclipses” 
is apt because it is not that Being is destroyed as such – on my reading at least, 
Heidegger operates with a quasi conservation of Being principle (it can neither 
be created nor destroyed by human hand), but rather that is unable to reveal 
itself or be revealed: “The value-thinking of the metaphysics of the will to 
power is deadly in an extreme sense because it does not permit Being itself to 
come into the dawning” (NW196). It should perhaps be noted, however, that 
Heidegger’s immense concern with ‘how things stand with Being’ leads him to 
darken his portrait of Nietzsche’s nihilism. In his comprehensive study of 
Nietzsche’s thought, Richard Schacht sketches a more optimistic portrait in 
which its transitional status is emphasized. This leads Nietzsche to regard 
nihilism as ultimately beneficial because it opens up possibilities for fresh 
                                                     
31 “Credits’ is too weak. It is clear that Heidegger was often in awe of Nietzsche’s insights. 
32 However, in NI, Heidegger praises Nietzsche’s insights into the essence of Nihilism. 
 115
values and a new kind of human being, der Übermensch.33 
How do things now ‘stand’ with regard to James’ view that, deceptive 
appearances aside, nihilism is ineffectual and can be profitably ignored? 
Historically, at least on Heidegger’s understanding, those who are, even now, 
creating meaning within ‘the frame’ are doing so during, or at least under the 
influence of, the Nietzschean epoch and hence in the dark, so to speak, because 
they are not witnessing the light of Being’s presence. But, why should James 
feel any need to respond to this? Or even take it seriously? 
Heidegger believes that metaphysics grounds the intelligibility of the world, 
typically over long periods of time. In doing this, it both creates regions of 
intelligibility and conceals other such regions. Yet, it is destined to be exposed as 
nihilistic because it never does justice to ‘Being’. By contrast, James’ position 
seems to be that metaphysics cannot ground intelligibility on the grand scale 
Heidegger believes metaphysics aims for, but this is of little consequence 
because meaning within specific social contexts does not require such grounding. 
Metaphysics cannot underwrite the meaning of the world as a whole or, in 
Heidegger’s terms, “of the fundamental structure of beings in their entirety”. It 
cannot do this because ‘the whole’ or ‘the fundamental structure’ has no 
meaning. Meaning is, so to speak, local, and floats free of concerns about 
globalized ‘grounding’. Being then drops out of the picture, with no appreciable 
loss. 
Richard Rorty has voiced some trenchant criticisms of what he regards as 
Heidegger’s gross over-assessment of the power of philosophy in this 
connection, finding it preposterous that there should be any substantial 
connection between our current socio-political difficulties and metaphysics: 
“that our present troubles are somehow due to the Plato-Nietzsche tradition …, 
that our fate is somehow linked to that tradition”.34 As an accomplished Rorty 
                                                     
33 Nietzsche, Richard Schacht, Routledge: London, 1983, see especially pp.344-348. 
34 ‘Overcoming the Tradition: Heidegger and Dewey’, Richard Rorty, p.53; in Consequences of 
Pragmatism, University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis, 1982, pp.37-59. In an interesting discussion 
of the criticisms Rorty voiced both in this paper and in ‘Heidegger Against the Pragmatists’ 
(unpublished), David Krell concedes that major world events such as the First World War seem to be 
the upshot of “more a nexus of ineluctable and incomprehensible stupidities than anything one could 
define as “subjecticity”, “will-to-will”, “calculative thought”, or “Ge-stell”,” but wonders “might not 
trade warfare, mobilization, Realpolitik, and all the rest, even the unbelievable bungling, conceal 
‘some essential relation’ to the way Europeans think and have thought; and would it be utterly 
ingenuous to believe that the history of metaphysics has had at least ‘some essential relation’ to such 
thought?” Intimations of Mortality: Time, Truth, and Finitude in Heidegger’s Thinking, David Farrell 
Krell, Penn State University Press: Pennsylvania, 1990, p.167. Heidegger may be vulnerable to a 
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scholar,35 James is no doubt aware of these, and may well feel that they simply 
buttress his own preference for keeping some distance from the narrow 
‘tradition’ we have been discussing. But, this kind of criticism relegates 
metaphysics to philosophy, as if it is to be identified with particular doctrines, 
lines of argument and so forth, whereas, Heidegger claims, these are usually the 
products of metaphysics. Collapsing Heidegger’s distinction between 
metaphysics and particular philosophical doctrines blurs the bigger causal 
picture, making it look as if he was trying to say that specific philosophical 
views were the sole determinant of certain socio- historical outcomes. There are 
also other factors that Rorty’s, otherwise catchy and characteristically acute, 
objections ignore.  
For, as Iain Thomson percipiently suggests, when Heidegger talks about the 
longer term influence of metaphysics, he can be usefully interpreted as 
subscribing to a thesis of ontological holism. This “leads him to the view that 
metaphysics does not just concern philosophers isolated in their ivory towers; on 
the contrary [it] grounds an age”.36 Here, metaphysics involves underlying 
synoptic conceptions of the world which dictate what it is for things to be what 
they are, and in doing so play “a foundational role in establishing and 
maintaining our very sense of the intelligibility of all things, ourselves 
included ... metaphysics molds our very sense of what it means for something – 
anything – to be”.37  Thomson makes Rorty’s objections less immediately 
compelling by clarifying Heidegger’s notion of ontotheology38 so that it is 
easier to see (a) how metaphysics plays a grounding/foundational role for ein 
Zeitalter (“an age of time”), and then (b) why Heidegger insists that “Western 
humanity in all its comportment towards beings, and even towards itself, is in 
every respect sustained and guided by metaphysics” (NIV205). ‘Ontology’ 
identifies what there is, what counts as ‘a being’, and these identifications are 
                                                                                                                                                                     
related line of criticism that Bernard Williams opens up regarding Nietzsche when he suggests that the 
latter’s “conception of social relations owes more to his understanding of the ancient world than a 
grasp of modernity”. Interestingly Williams qualifies this by saying that “the idea of nihilism is 
undeniably relevant to modern conditions”, but unfortunately does not explain why. The Gay Science, 
op.cit.p.xii. 
35 See, for example, Rorty and the Mirror of Nature, James Tartaglia, Routledge: London, 2007. 
36 Heidegger, Art, and Postmodernity, Iain Thomson, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2007, 
p.12. 
37 Thomson, op.cit. p. 124. 
38 Here, and elsewhere, we do not distinguish between the views of the ‘early’ and ‘’late’ Heidegger, 
on the assumption that the core of his later beliefs is prefigured in the Nietzsche volumes – this, in my 
view, is largely what makes those books so interesting. 
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intellectually justified by an accompanying ‘theology’. The combination 
(Ontotheology) thereby creates what Thomson calls “constellations of 
intelligibility”. He also points out that ontological holism presupposes two 
additional theses which lend further credence to Heidegger’s account of 
metaphysics: ontological historicity and epochality. The first holds that our 
elemental ideas about what there is, and hence our basic understanding of reality, 
change over time. While the second, recognizing the way in which ontotheology 
stabilizes these ideas and this understanding, “specifies that Western humanity’s 
changing sense of reality congeals into a series of relatively distinct and unified 
historical epochs”.39 
Heidegger’s history of metaphysics provides a narrative in which 
Nietzsche’s attempt to ‘counter’ nihilism only conjures it up in a stronger and 
more virulent form. What matters most here, for Heidegger, is that Being has 
been neglected, with little prospect of life progressing in ways which will alter 
this.40 The picture he paints – empirically, as it were, for he is now expecting us 
to take his discussion seriously on its surface and not as ‘window dressing’ or 
some rhetorical ploy, is one which the whole earth is dominated by the 
unrestrained willfulness of humans, and all beings, including themselves, are 
treated as technological resources that have no inherent meaning, but are ‘on 
standby’ (Bestand), readily available for projects motivated and guided only by 
the bleakest calculative notions of ‘optimization’, ‘efficiency’, 
‘cost-effectiveness’, and the like. The great danger, the danger (die Gefahr), in 
Heidegger’s eyes, is that the Nietzschean nihilistic ontotheology of our time will 
buck the age-old trend of gradually giving way to some other version, and 
become, instead, a permanent fixture. If that happens, and Heidegger often 
speaks to us as if it already has, then we will inhabit “a technologically 
homogenized world civilization”. 41  Contemplating this, Thomson draws a 
plausibly dire conclusion: “It is, in fact, not so difficult to imagine that, in our 
endless quest for self-optimization, we might go so far as to unintentionally 
reengineer our meaning-bestowing capacity for creative world-disclosure right 
out of our genetic make-up, thereby eliminating the very source of any 
                                                     
39 Thomson, op.cit.p.142. Thomson goes into some detail in explaining how this works out for a 
number of different epochs: pre-Socratic, Platonic, medieval, modern, and late-modern. 
40 We are now alluding to the late Heidegger, although, as already suggested, the rudiments of this 
picture are already there in the Nietzsche books. 
41 Quoted by Thomson. The original source is Gesamtausgabe Vol.11: Aus der Erfahrung des 
Denkens, 1910-1976, H. Heidegger (ed.), Klostermann: Germany, 1983, p.243. 
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meaningful future.”42 Set against such prospects, James’ claim that meaning is 
both safe and sufficient within the frame again seems complacent.43 
 
Heideggerian common sense  
 
The kingdom of nihilism is powerful. 
    Gilles Deleuze 
                        
This concluding section could well have been entitled “Heideggerian 
common sense and the fragility of social meaning”. For the view from our final 
vantage point, reveals that the meaning typically generated in the frame is not 
robust enough to withstand a form of nihilism that can be derived from a 
common sense interpretation of Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche. Here, 
Heidegger’s claim that Nietzsche identified the necessary fragmentation of 
meaning which characterizes our societies is accepted, but the explanation for 
this ‘necessity’ (which is historical) can be couched in plainer terms that need 
not refer to the neglect of Being or involve use of any of the terminology 
associated with metaphysics as Heidegger views it (“essence”, “destiny”, 
“intrinsic law”, “inner logic”, and so forth). What is missing – and its absence 
constitutes a cause of ‘fragmentation’, is the equivalent of a thoroughly 
naturalized metaphysics: a guiding conception of how life makes sense 
considered in the round. This needs to involve, or at least inspire, a set of 
interwoven beliefs and congruent practices that provide practical guidance as to 
how to make sense of life as a whole, and within the whole so that social 
purposes can be aligned with it. James contends that while “nihilism tells us that 
life has no overall goal … we can still act as if it did” (172). But, generally 
speaking, we do not. When we do, any serious reflection is liable to undermine 
our motivation – and even a modicum of historically aware philosophical 
reflection is liable to destroy it. Common sense nihilism distilled from the late 
Heidegger’s diagnosis of our world shows: “There is no longer any goal in and 
                                                     
42 Thomson, op.cit.157. 
43 Interestingly, Julian Young claims that Heidegger, in his later work, is the only significant 
‘post-death-of-God’ philosopher who contends “there is a meaning to life as such”. This ‘meaning’ is 
revealed when the role of ‘guardianship of the world’ is fulfilled; The Death of God and the Meaning 
of Life, 2nd Edition, Julian Young, Routledge: London, 2014, p.248. Again for reasons of space, we do 
not explore the possibility that this claim could be worked up into a sustained objection to James’ view 
that life is meaningless. 
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through which all the forces of the historical existence of peoples can cohere, 
and in the direction of which they can develop” (NI157).44 The absence of such 
goals is a symptom of an unsettling, Western world-historical, nihilistic social 
malaise, the evidence for which seems ubiquitous. A cure, an ersatz metaphysics, 
will not be found within conventional thinking sanctioned by the frame, but 
rather within perdurable consideration of the limitations of such thinking.45 
 
                                                     
44 In his introduction to NI, the translator David Krell points out that in context this remark also bears 
an ominous interpretation, one that implies the absence of such goals is “a matter of the Volk, a matter 
that calls for bold deeds and interminable struggle” (NI xiii). 
45 I have resisted throughout any play on Heidegger’s great fear of ‘enframing’ (Gestell) and James’ 
philosophical satisfaction with his own version of it and with the meaning that life in the frame 
achieves (plus the escape hatch of ‘transcendence’). The way out of nihilism that the later Heidegger 
advocates involves an approach to life that is the antithesis of ‘the will to power’. It involves an 
abdication of what he calls ‘calculative thinking’ and ‘willfulness’ in order to take up a meditative 
stance (Gelassenheit) in which things in the world are left to reveal their nature. This approach 
involves a version of truth (unconcealment) that possibly insulates it from the Davidsonian objections 
about meaning mentioned at the start of this paper. 
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Reply to Alan Malachowski  
James Tartaglia* 
 
Alan Malachowski went back to Nietzsche and Heidegger, and thereby the 
very heart of the issues pertaining to my stance on nihilism; because he did so, I 
could feel this reply rapidly gestate in response to practically every line I read. So 
let me get straight to the heart of the matter myself, by amending one of 
Malachowski’s quotations from Heidegger: 
 
Merely to chase after beings in the midst of the oblivion of Being – that is 
nihilism. (p. 103) 
  
I would say: 
 
Merely to chase after beings in the midst of the oblivion of Being – that is 
the scientistic culture which insufficient and inadequate reflection upon 
nihilism has unfortunately contributed to. 
 
I very much doubt that this culture is the result of an inevitable unfolding of 
historical forces. But nevertheless, that is where we have ended up. And although 
I remain deeply sceptical about the kind of ‘redemptive agenda’, as I called it in 
Meaningless, which pervades the works of philosophers such as Nietzsche and 
Heidegger, nevertheless where we have ended up creates an obvious, practical 
problem for us all. People can live however they like, to the extent that they are 
able to, so long as the problem is fixed. Nihilism is not the problem, but rather 
part of the solution; so nihilism is not toothless. But nihilism is benign. We are 
not renting our meaning from it; we own the freehold.  
Before I start to explain this combination of views, it should be emphasised 
that Malachowski could not have been expected to anticipate my reply; not from 
the resources of Meaningless, which is all he had to go on. In this respect, and 
others, his essay is a natural companion to the one by Tracy Llanera in this 
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symposium. As I say in response to Llanera, I had an awful lot on my plate when 
writing Meaningless, making it practically inevitable that the future direction of 
travel for some of my positions would appear as mere hints; Malachowski and 
Llanera both honed in on blank spaces. In the sequel to Meaningless, entitled Gods 
and Titans, all should become clear. But since I am lucky enough to have such 
astute critics, I will use this forum to add enough additional material into the mix 
to hopefully explain to them why, when they look back at the text of Meaningless 
with hindsight, it is not so puzzling that I insisted on the ‘deep personal resonance’ 
of nihilism (Llanera); and that I never meant to suggest that ‘nihilism is ineffectual 
and can be profitably ignored’ (Malachowski, p. 115). As Malachowski points out, 
I could have said a lot more about nihilism than I did in my early chapters: my 
discussion of the framework would have benefited if I had related it to Searle’s 
work (p. 101), and I could have profitably discussed reflections on nihilism from 
recent European philosophy (p. 102). But I needed to press on to the 
metaphilosophy, and the accounts of consciousness, time and universals. Nihilism 
was the connecting theme of the book, not the subject; the format itself had a point, 
namely that the meaning of life is not just an isolated topic in philosophy. And if 
I had lingered to discuss the matters I will now enter into – which, in any case, I 
was not ready to do at the time – then I would have never reached my destination.  
Near the beginning of his essay, Malachowski argues that,  
 
obedience to a nihilistic external criterion, one that excludes or undermines 
social meaning should raise serious semantic concerns. The idea of such a 
criterion involves semantic incoherence: under the weight of an alien notion 
of exclusion, the language within which we talk about social meaning 
would begin to lose its sense. And, this would have a knock on effect. How 
can we then accept such a criterion, since the language in which it has to be 
expressed no longer makes sense to us? (p. 99) 
 
He concludes this argument by saying that, ‘A totally meaningless life would, it 
appears, be one we could not contemplate, still less talk about’ (p. 100); where by 
a ‘totally meaningless life’, he means one in which nihilism holds true and there 
is no social meaning – the latter because nihilism holds true. It seems to me that 
the reason nihilism could not eradicate social meaning is rather simpler than that. 
For if reality is meaningless, then it does not have a meaning which could conflict 
with, and thereby cancel out, social meaning. Perhaps a meaning of life could, but 
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I have my doubts. It might explain to us, in some irrefutable fashion, that we are 
valuing all the wrong things. I think we could understand that alright. If we then 
proceeded to value the right things (those in accordance with the meaning of life), 
then social meaning would radically change, but not disappear. If we found we 
could not value the right things (because they were too esoteric for us to really 
care about, too disconnected from our lives, or too naturally repulsive to human 
beings, for instance), then the revelation we had just received might lead social 
meaning to collapse, I suppose; in which case we would not last long. But without 
the benefit of the revelation to go on, it seems to me considerably more likely that 
we would just carry on roughly as before; the phrase, ‘I shouldn’t really care about 
these things’, even if we believed it, would soon become hollow.  
Malachowski’s main concern is captured in the following: ‘If nihilism has no 
teeth, if it is harmless, “morally neutral”, and “simply a fact”, with “no practical 
consequences” as James contends (e.g. [PML] 171&172), it is pretty uninteresting. 
For then, its domestication is cheap – more or less self-financing, while James’ 
key claims [nihilism is true; life continues as normal, since all we need for that is 
social meaning] appear to be trivial’ (p. 100). But the fact that nihilism has no 
potential to directly affect our daily routines – by persuading us to change our 
holiday plans, close our Facebook accounts, follow Tracy Emin’s lead by 
committing ‘emotional suicide’, find a guru, become at one with nature, leave 
your family to embark on a nomadic life, stop taking your family for granted, get 
rich quick, bend the rules, become involved in political anarchism, become more 
integrated with your local community, live ‘the good life’ of simplicity and self-
sufficiency, put yourself first, put others first, put animals and the natural 
environment first – the fact that nihilism has no potential to rationally steer you 
in any of those directions, does not mean that it is trivial. For it is not 
philosophically trivial, which is one of the most crucial things my book was trying 
to show. It connects up squarely with a variety of traditional philosophical 
concerns. Reflection upon it allows us to become more self-conscious about 
philosophy. Reflection upon it resonates with our lives and draws us into 
philosophy. None of that is trivial, especially not in the midst of a scientistic 
culture which is doing all it can to end such reflection.  
Malachowski says that ‘a chimerical nihilism that is so easily de-fanged 
seems hardly worth much serious consideration’ (p. 100), and goes on to contrast 
it with the conceptions of nihilism to be found in Nietzsche and Heidegger. But 
the nihilism I deal with is the only one there ever has been or ever will be in this 
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area of metaphysics; the contrast appears only because these thinkers and others 
built some of the consequences they saw arising from nihilism into the thesis itself. 
The consequences they saw made them think it needed to be ‘de-fanged’. But 
realising that it never did does not make it less interesting; it makes it much more 
interesting and currently valuable. For it seems to me that these thinkers, for 
reasons that are perfectly understandable given the time in which they were 
thinking, alighted upon the wrong target. Nihilism arose just as religious influence 
declined and the scientifically-driven ability to produce life-changing 
technologies first reached maturity; ever since then, this ability has grown 
exponentially. All three of these events were integrally connected, of course, for 
when life got better, and man-made utopias started to seem within our reach, then 
the increasingly tenuous promise of an otherworldly utopia rapidly lost its 
relevance. Since religions embody a philosophy, philosophical influence fell into 
rapid decline and scientistic culture arose. Philosophers blamed nihilism. But it 
was scientistic culture and the decline of philosophy they should have worried 
about. Nihilism is as philosophical as you can get, and offers just the kind of 
credible secular position needed to keep thoughts about the meaning of life alive. 
So Nietzsche and Heidegger chose the wrong target, and painted it with the same 
dark colours that had been allocated to it by the religious philosophy which they 
should have been replacing. 
Malachowski says that Nietzsche’s predictions of an impending disaster 
which nihilism would precipitate, were incidental to his main insight; and that 
Heidegger is ‘as firm as he is clear about this’ (p. 105). I am happy to accept this. 
I wanted to emphasise the point that faltering assurance in metaphysically firm 
foundations underpinning our social and moral institutions has not led to chaos. 
Nietzsche thought it would, and that superhuman acts of will would be required 
on behalf of a newly emerging, better class of people, in order to keep a normal 
framework of life running in full knowledge that there are no such foundations. I 
think that is the standard worry; no foundations, no values, chaos. I also think 
Nietzsche was evidently wrong about this. Billions of people have since lived 
perfectly ordinary lives without believing in such foundations, and if the power 
of such belief continues to decline, it will be in the manner we have already 
witnessed, namely through readings of ancient religious texts becoming gradually 
more liberal, such that they fit better with current conditions of life. In this sense, 
then, nihilism has not remotely had the practical consequences it was feared it 
would have; and I think this was a point well worth making. In fact, I do not think 
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nihilism has had very much effect at all, outside of art and certain kinds of 
philosophy, because philosophy was also so much in decline in the twentieth 
century that nobody much thought about it. To the extent that people continued to 
think about the meaning of life, they assumed that their lives were meaningful, 
even when they no longer believed in the metaphysical foundations required for 
there to be a meaning of life; intellectual epicycles like the social meaning debate 
are attempts to make some sense of this. 
It seems to me that there is nothing superhuman about the ability to carry on 
ordinary life without belief in metaphysical foundations. All you need in order for 
ordinary purposes to govern your behaviour is a compelling social framework; of 
the kind we have always had. Will, if you like, is all that has ever kept that going; 
although why it would have to be will to power, I have no idea, despite the fact 
that power is obviously one of the big motivators. So when Malachowski explains 
Nietzsche’s proposal by saying that, ‘The value of values then lies in the willing 
itself, and not in anything outside the domain of the will that is doomed to self-
destruction or can be undermined’ (p. 112), my natural reaction is: that is how it 
has always been. Now obviously the ‘will’ in question has received – and still 
does receive – support from beliefs about metaphysical foundations; although how 
frequently and how explicitly are questionable matters. But we evidently do not 
need this support; this may not have been obvious in Nietzsche’s time, but it is 
now. I see the Übermensch every time I visit the supermarket. The fact that this 
kind of worry has been taken so seriously is the reason that I emphasised the lack 
of practical consequences of nihilism, and why I focused on Nietzsche’s 
predictions when discussing him. If you want to rehabilitate nihilism, as I do, then 
this is important.  
Nevertheless, Nietzsche was indeed driving at a metaphysically deeper point. 
This is clear from the fact that he says nihilism will lead the notion of truth itself 
to collapse; which strikes me as hyperbolic, radically unsupported in Nietzsche, 
and badly supported thereafter – despite the influence the idea has had on more 
radical forms of twentieth-century philosophy. I think a large part of the appeal of 
the idea, as I say in Chapter 2, was to distance us further from nihilism: since if 
nothing is true, nihilism could not be either. In any case, Heidegger makes 
Nietzsche’s deeper point quite explicit, in a sentence Malachowski quotes, when 
he says that ‘Nietzsche uses the names “God” and “Christian God” to indicate the 
supersensory world in general … the metaphysical world’ (p. 105). That seems to 
me largely right; the concern about the collapse of Christian philosophy was part 
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of a wider concern about the collapse of metaphysics. And if we connect this with 
the Heidegger quote I opened with, namely ‘Merely to chase after beings in the 
midst of the oblivion of Being – that is nihilism’, then we start to get into a position 
where we can see both what is right and wrong with Nietzsche and Heidegger.  
Nietzsche was right, in a sense, that we only need will to keep the framework 
going; but the active connotations of ‘will’ are misleading in this regard. Since 
will is backed by desire, and our will to achieve some purpose or another is 
presupposed in framework engagement, this is not the heroic feat he imagined. 
He was also right, in a sense, that nihilism would sweep away the philosophical 
beliefs maintained by religious institutions (it was a factor), and that a void of 
philosophy from our world would result. However, there was no historical 
necessity to such a void appearing. Philosophy might have seamlessly transitioned, 
and if technological advance had not so dramatically changed gear at exactly the 
same time as the idea of nihilism was starting to be taken seriously, then such a 
transition is not excessively hard to imagine. Suppose a benevolent alien race had 
visited us while our scientific and technological abilities remained primitive, and 
bestowed upon us the means to make our lives considerably longer, easier and 
more pleasant; essentially, they gave us modern life, but without the means to 
understand, and thereby reproduce, that which makes it possible. Suppose also, if 
you like, that they banned us from trying to scientifically advance. In such a 
situation, the influence of religious institutions might have collapsed and nihilism 
might have arisen; but it is far from obvious that a void of philosophy would 
thereby have ensued. 
But the void happened and it is dangerous; so in an important sense Nietzsche 
was right. He was also part of the problem, however, because he thought that 
nihilism and the nullification of the philosophical tradition were inextricable. This 
is one major reason why he welcomed nihilism; as a destructive, but ultimately 
cleansing force. There are strong elements of both anti-philosophy and scientism 
in Nietzsche. He wanted to be the prophet of a new age which would abandon the 
philosophical tradition he so vehemently criticised throughout his career, in 
favour of beliefs such as eternal recurrence, which he considered thoroughly 
scientific.  
For Heidegger, as Malachowski says, ‘the human situation looks worse than 
Nietzsche envisaged: nihilism has engulfed our lives, draining them of not just 
meaning, but also the resources for escaping from, or overcoming, the value 
vacuum’ (p. 107). But nihilism has not drained our lives of social meaning, which 
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is the only meaning they ever had; and the only relevant ‘value vacuum’ is a 
philosophy vacuum, primarily caused by technology and the scientism it inspired, 
and which proper attention to nihilism might have mitigated; and still can. As 
Malachowski goes on to say, ‘Nietzsche’s great, and terrible, discovery, 
Heidegger tells us, is that the metaphysics which has been driving history since 
the time of Plato is unremittingly self-destructive. For the values it gave birth to, 
are fated to issue challenges to the legitimacy of both themselves and any would-
be replacements. These are challenges that cannot be met’ (p. 108). He 
subsequently explains Heidegger’s charge that Nietzsche made three fundamental 
errors which led him to think the challenges could indeed be met, if only we could 
re-value the world with a hitherto unknown strength of will (pp. 113-4). The first 
is that although Nietzsche thought he was leaving metaphysics behind, his 
solution is itself metaphysical, and hence part of the problem. The second is that 
Nietzsche’s ‘unconditional subjectivity’ of willing, which needs no help from 
metaphysical foundations, leads to everything being interpreted as an object 
designed to satisfy our wills; as Heidegger puts it, ‘earth can show itself now only 
as the attack arranged in the willing of man … nature appears everywhere as the 
object of technology’ (p. 113). And thirdly, that Being is no longer accepted as 
what it is; we actively force it into our own subjective mould, rather than listen to 
what it tells us about itself. 
Within the Heideggarian landscape, these three criticisms of Nietzsche are all 
practically the same. Essentially, he thinks that the history of metaphysics is the 
history of actively objectifying our reality through subjective acts of will, 
technology is the inevitable result of this tendency, whereby we have learnt to 
mould the reality we have objectified to suit our own subjective purposes, and 
Nietzsche’s solution of trying to will the value back is not a solution at all, but 
rather the culmination of the metaphysical tradition. We were landed with the 
problem by all of that objectifying willing, and Nietzsche planned to solve it with 
more of the same. I am put in mind of a discussion I had fairly recently with a 
philosopher (I shall not name names) who was arguing that motivational 
enhancement drugs are a good thing. Using them can help athletes to train harder, 
to give the example he lingered over; if sprinters took enough of them, perhaps 
they could run 100 metres in 9 seconds, rather than just 9.5 seconds, for instance 
(the more specific example is mine). I suggested that boredom can be a good thing, 
since it can lead us to re-evaluate our commitments, and thereby sometimes 
radically improve our lives; but these drugs could leave us locked into our initial 
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decisions. He took my point and suggested a solution: we make de-motivational 
drugs too. This struck me as a clear case of trying to fix a problem (one which we 
do not remotely need to have, but no doubt soon will) with the cause of the 
problem; and I think this is exactly how Nietzsche’s solution struck Heidegger. 
I agree with Heidegger about a lot of this; wholeheartedly, in fact. I do think 
we have ended up with a scientistic culture which increasingly sees nothing to the 
world except what can be done with it. And taken in a certain way, I also agree 
with his criticism of Nietzsche. If the problem Nietzsche was addressing was how 
to maintain, without metaphysical support, the everyday values that allow us to 
live together, then I do not think there is any problem; I can accept his view that 
our values are held up by will, but only with the crucial caveat that our wilful 
commitment to projects is predominately a matter of going along with the 
imperatives of the framework, which comes naturally to us, and hence is no 
Herculean task. But if the problem is the relentless rise of life-changing 
technologies within the philosophical void of scientism, which I think is what 
really worried Heidegger, then Nietzsche’s proposal is a clear case of trying to fix 
a problem with more of the same. A concrete example of this Nietzschean 
approach is to be found in the proposal to ‘morally enhance’ us all, so that we can 
safely manage the technologies blindly thrust upon us with ever-increasing 
frequency; often in the name of legitimate scientific curiosity, but financed by 
political agendas and market forces. 
Unfortunately, however, Heidegger identifies the root of the problem as 
metaphysics, which is as clear a case as there could be of throwing the baby out 
with the bathwater. One particular strain of metaphysics, physicalism, has 
contributed to the problem, for sure; it gave scientism a philosophy to cling onto 
during the transition it envisages to no philosophy at all. But metaphysics itself is 
not the problem; it is the core of our philosophical heritage which might still allow 
us to break the back of scientistic culture, and start thinking about technology 
within the wider context of what we are, what we want, and what we ought to 
want. This may yet allow us to exercise some rational control over the ability we 
have acquired to rapidly harness more and more powers for ourselves through the 
medium of objective thought.  
Our current predicament with technology was not inevitable from the moment 
people started thinking about the world metaphysically; or at least if it was, then 
I do not see how anyone could possibly know this. Heidegger says that 
‘metaphysics is nihilism’ (p. 114) – which does not make an awful lot of sense – 
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but given that he attributes our predicament with technology to nihilism, and buys 
into Nietzsche’s story about nihilism being built into metaphysics from the outset, 
we can certainly see why he thought it was inevitable from the outset. The only 
plausibility to this idea, however, comes from the sound Nietzschean observation 
that the epistemology of metaphysical views which place the foundations of our 
values in another world is so ropey that it is unsurprising that people ultimately 
gave up on their belief in a meaning of life and discovered nihilism. But it in no 
way follows that Plato’s transcendent metaphysics was itself nihilistic. It was a 
strong rejection of nihilism, which took considerable unpicking before we could 
see the truth it covered over. If you whitewash a blue wall, and it eventually flakes 
off, the whitewash was not blue. You would only think this if you thought Plato 
persuaded us that the meaning of life could only be found in a transcendent context, 
when in actual fact it is really to be found in ordinary life; thus we forgot about 
the real meaning of life, invested our hopes for one in the transcendent context, 
and when those hopes did not pan out, we were landed with nihilism. I think that 
is basically what Nietzsche and Heidegger did think, but it is all wrong; it 
incorporates both a sophisticated conflation with social meaning and a hidden 
strain of anti-philosophy; or in Heidegger’s case, anti-everybody-else’s-
philosophy. Plato was right that the meaning of life could only be found within a 
transcendent context, because without one, there is no way of explaining why we 
are here. His thought was not nihilistic: it was philosophical. It addressed a 
philosophical question, and nihilism addresses that same question. 
In this light, a highly conspicuous feature of my book needs to be considered; 
one which Malachowski passes over. The book combines nihilism with 
transcendence. (For some years I planned to call it Nihilism and Transcendence – 
but nobody would have read a book with that title.) Consider the following: 
 
James’ swift suggestion that we can show how ineffectual nihilism is by 
simply severing the connection between meaning and religion (for this will 
leave meaning unscathed) fails to acknowledge that such a move cannot 
thwart Nietzsche’s ‘richer nihilism’, which depends not on tight links 
between meaning and religion, but between meaning and ‘the transcendent 
in general’. (p. 110) 
 
However the link between nihilism and a denial of ‘the transcendent in general’ 
is exactly what I set out to break. Nihilism is trivially incompatible with belief in 
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a transcendent context of meaning, but it does not remotely follow that it is 
incompatible with any transcendent context. The assumption that once you 
abandon a transcendent context of meaning, you must thereby jettison the whole 
concept of transcendence, promotes philosophy-scepticism, scientism and the 
philosophical void. I argue, however, that the history of philosophy has provided 
us with a number of routes through which we can come to see that reality is indeed 
transcendent. Desire for a meaning of life may have initially inspired interest in 
transcendence, but philosophy thereafter found many rational routes to the same 
place.  
As regards nihilism, far from me being someone who, ‘unaware of its 
metaphysical depth, believes it to be patently inoffensive’ (p. 106), I set out to 
explain its metaphysical depth. I believe it to be ‘patently inoffensive’ because 
explaining that depth required severing the link between nihilism as a rejection of 
a transcendent context of meaning – which in a religious context is offensive – 
and the spurious idea that nihilism requires the rejection of transcendence per se. 
I placed nihilism within the context of philosophical reflection upon the 
transcendence of reality.  
Malachowski says that, 
 
Nihilism begins to bite when a metaphysics that caters for ‘the fundamental 
structure of beings in their entirety’ has no operational existence within 
culture. Life in the frame is always lacking in that regard. For, it is 
invariably dominated by the antics of the ‘herd’ (Nietzsche) or the ‘They’ 
(Heidegger), the mobile vulgus, the people who are manipulated by popular 
culture, banal politics, and prejudices masquerading as opinions – and it is 
therefore bound to forfeit stability. (pp. 110-1) 
 
He is explaining Nietzsche and Heidegger’s perspective, which is infected with 
snobbery. Just because they did not like to see us prosper and inevitably become 
rather more conspicuous, it does not remotely follow that our framework could 
not be infused with considerably more philosophy than at present, or that if it 
became so infused, our lives would substantively change. They might have 
wanted our lives to substantively change, such that the masses went back to the 
‘old ways’ in which they knew their place, but that is entirely tangential to the real 
problem they failed to isolate. The real problem is that when philosophy culturally 
collapsed, technology was left unconstrained by philosophical reflection. Few of 
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us can have any real effect on this problem, and the only extent to which it reflects 
on culture as a whole is that if philosophy were to acquire renewed cultural respect 
– such that anti-philosophy collapsed and awareness of, and interest in, 
philosophical ideas grew to at least the current level of awareness of, and interest 
in, scientific ideas – then the few who could have a real effect would act very 
differently to how they do at present, I think. This would not be a radical cultural 
upheaval; who apart from religious fundamentalists, political radicals, or cultural 
snobs wants that? I am not aware of even professional philosophers living in 
radically different ways to the contemporary norm. Some are a little odd; but when 
they sit at their desks to write, I cannot see that this makes an awful lot of 
difference – unless they are writing about ethics, perhaps, in which case it is does 
not strike me as an obvious advantage. 
Malachowski goes on to quote Nietzsche: 
 
The real disadvantage that the cessation of metaphysical views brings with 
it lies in the fact that the individual keeps his eye too strictly upon his short 
lifespan and receives no stronger impulses to build durable institutions 
designed to last for centuries; he wants to pick the fruit himself from the 
tree he plants, and he therefore no longer cares to plant those trees that 
require centuries of constant cultivation and are intended to shade a long 
series of generations … our agitated and ephemeral existence still contrasts 
too strongly with the deeply breathing repose of metaphysical ages. (p. 111) 
 
He is right to the extent that this is the attitude taken to the development of new 
technologies. An advantage can be achieved, or a long-standing human dream 
realised, or a current problem solved; so we race to produce the technology as 
quickly as possible (with personal rewards for the scientists involved if they get 
there first, of course), despite the fact that the new ability we will acquire will 
never go away, and may well change our lives forever. So in light of what 
Nietzsche says above, why on earth would he target metaphysics? Because, as 
becomes clear in the bit Malachowski misses out (‘a long series of generations … 
our agitated and ephemeral existence’), Nietzsche wants to replace metaphysics 
with science. But this scientistic agenda, and the success it has achieved, is the 
source of the problem. Nietzsche does go on to consider the possibility that 
philosophy might be useful for smoothing over this transition to pure science; but 
ultimately decides that, ‘It is preferable to use art for this transition’ (Nietzsche 
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1878: 32). For the job requires catering to our feelings, which philosophy can only 
appease (with false metaphysics) or eliminate (with science); elimination is what 
is ultimately required, but since this is too harsh for now, art’s relative isolation 
from the scientific truth makes it ideal. Nietzsche’s antipathy to the metaphysical 
thought of nihilism flowed straight from his scientism. 
Heidegger also targeted metaphysics. This is because he thought that 
metaphysics was nihilistic, and hence the problem. He did not always say 
‘metaphysics’, either; in Meaningless I quoted him saying, ‘the development of 
philosophy into the independent sciences … is the legitimate completion of 
philosophy’ (PML, p. 67). That is why he despaired of any prospect for a return 
of metaphysics / philosophy of the old kind, which had ordered our lives through 
the medium of religion: he thought it had run its course. But the objectifying 
metaphysics which he critiqued in Being and Time is only one strain of the 
discipline. Put aside the terminology he adopted to suit his own agenda – and his 
self-image as the unique ‘thinker of Being’ – and it is clear that Heidegger was 
doing metaphysics too; he was certainly not doing science. Metaphysics – of 
Heidegger’s kind, and innumerable others – remains perfectly viable. And it is the 
only route to undermining scientism, since scientism is forced to embrace its own 
metaphysic: physicalism. That makes it vulnerable. Nihilism is a metaphysical 
position with the power to draw us back into this area and see things such as this. 
Given Heidegger’s concerns about us ‘peoples of the earth who have been drawn 
in to modernity’s arena of power’ (p. 106), then, his choice of target was extremely 
poor. 
Malachowski says that, 
 
James’ position seems to be that metaphysics cannot ground intelligibility 
on the grand scale Heidegger believes metaphysics aims for, but this is of 
little consequence because meaning within specific social contexts does not 
require such grounding. Metaphysics cannot underwrite the meaning of the 
world as a whole or, in Heidegger’s terms, “of the fundamental structure of 
beings in their entirety”. It cannot do this because ‘the whole’ or ‘the 
fundamental structure’ has no meaning. Meaning is, so to speak, local, and 
floats free of concerns about globalized ‘grounding’. Being then drops out 
of the picture, with no appreciable loss. (p. 115) 
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Well, yes and no. There is no meaning of life, so metaphysics cannot ‘ground 
intelligibility’ in that sense. But we can aim to produce metaphysically complete 
descriptions of reality; and that is a way of grounding intelligibility. Just because 
we cannot do it one way, it does not mean we cannot do it another. We can of 
course theorise about ‘the fundamental structure of beings in their entirety’; as I 
did at length in my book. Why should that structure need to be supported by a 
meaning of life? It is not Being that ‘drops out of the picture, with no appreciable 
loss’, only overall meaning. Being is transcendent, in my view, and we make sense 
of it with the framework, objective thought, and metaphysical reflection; the task 
I undertook was to line these up coherently in such a way as to shed light on 
matters of natural philosophical interest. As with all metaphysics, the aim was to 
place our lives in a wider, illuminating perspective; the widest possible, at times. 
Heidegger thought Nietzsche’s metaphysics was ‘deadly in an extreme sense 
because it does not permit Being itself to come into the dawning’ (p. 114). The 
only remedy for that is better metaphysics. 
Now I was hoping Malachowski would bring up Rorty at some point in his 
paper, and he did not disappoint. As he says (p. 115), Rorty thought it was crazy 
of Heidegger to think that current socio-political problems are a direct product of 
the history of metaphysics. Malachowski disagrees, on the grounds that this 
history has produced our general conception of reality; it has made things 
intelligible to us in a manner which is now causing socio-political problems. I 
would qualify this. One strain of metaphysics has contributed to this problem, 
physicalism, which Francis Bacon launched an influential manifesto for on the 
back of the scientific revolution, and which later came into its own when 
technology had come into its own. As such, I also disagree with Rorty, although 
not as strongly as with the further implication of what he says, namely that 
metaphysics will have no part in the solution. Rorty had a point: the rise of 
technology was far more influential in promoting scientistic culture than 
physicalist philosophy. But contra Rorty, however, metaphysics will have a 
crucial part to play in the solution, because so long as scientism goes unchecked 
– and only metaphysics can intellectually check it – then the inevitability of our 
discovering more and more objective truths about the world, and thereby 
acquiring more and more technological power for ourselves, will simply not be 
questioned. The only questioning involved, as is the case in our present situation, 
will concern how best to deal with the consequences of whatever we have just 
discovered, or expect to discover soon; when those consequences become clear, 
 133
that is, and to the extent that they can be anticipated before the irreversible event. 
Rorty’s promotion of physicalism, and his paradoxical combination of anti-
philosophy and pragmatism (‘all philosophy is confused’ / ‘let’s put it to useful 
purposes’), was not helpful in this regard. He had a habit, it seems to me, of 
homing in on all the important and interesting issues, making them as clear as day, 
but then too often saying the wrong things about them. 
I shall end by quoting the ending of Malachowski’s essay, because I agree 
with much of it, when construed in the right way, and yet strongly disagree with 
one word: 
 
What is missing – and its absence constitutes a cause of ‘fragmentation’, is 
the equivalent of a thoroughly naturalized metaphysics: a guiding 
conception of how life makes sense considered in the round. This needs to 
involve, or at least inspire, a set of interwoven beliefs and congruent 
practices that provide practical guidance as to how to make sense of life as 
a whole, and within the whole so that social purposes can be aligned with 
it. James contends that while “nihilism tells us that life has no overall goal 
… we can still act as if it did” (172). But, generally speaking, we do not. 
When we do, any serious reflection is liable to undermine our motivation – 
and even a modicum of historically aware philosophical reflection is liable 
to destroy it. Common sense nihilism distilled from the late Heidegger’s 
diagnosis of our world shows: “There is no longer any goal in and through 
which all the forces of the historical existence of peoples can cohere, and 
in the direction of which they can develop” [Heidegger, Nietzsche, vol. 1, 
p. 157].  The absence of such goals is a symptom of an unsettling, Western 
world-historical, nihilistic social malaise, the evidence for which seems 
ubiquitous. A cure, an ersatz metaphysics, will not be found within 
conventional thinking sanctioned by the frame, but rather within perdurable 
consideration of the limitations of such thinking. (pp. 118-9) 
 
The word, as the reader will no doubt have guessed, is ‘naturalized’. Naturalized 
metaphysics, namely physicalism, is exactly what we do not need. We need 
metaphysics; and we need the idea of a naturalized metaphysics to become a 
distant and thoroughly discredited memory, born of an age in which amazement 
at our suddenly spectacular achievements in science led us to forget about 
philosophy, and assume that if there could still be such a thing, it would have to 
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emulate science. Of course, metaphysics must take account of what science tells 
us about the world – when it is relevant – and it must never conflict with it; we 
should not make that kind of mistake again. But the scientific description of reality 
is not the widest perspective we can take. And without wider perspectives, science 
becomes dangerously autonomous. 
Malachowski says that generally speaking, we do not act as if life has an 
overall goal, and that ‘any serious reflection is liable to undermine our motivation 
– and even a modicum of historically aware philosophical reflection is liable to 
destroy it’. I disagree. While writing this paper, my goals have been presupposed 
as I effortlessly engaged with the task at hand (the engagement, not the task, was 
effortless). I imagine it was the same for Malachowski when writing his paper. I 
think we both showed a ‘modicum of historically aware philosophical reflection’, 
but neither of us gave up. That is all I ever meant. I think he means that humanity 
as a whole needs to act as if it had an overall goal. I do not think this has ever 
happened before; but maybe one day, and maybe it would be good. Nevertheless, 
I do not think it necessary, because I do not think there is any problem of 
widespread ‘nihilistic social malaise’; I think the only worry in this area which 
remains of contemporary relevance relates squarely and exclusively to a particular 
problem with technology, which arose due to the badly-timed decline of 
philosophy’s cultural influence.  
Malachowski says that, ‘a cure, an ersatz metaphysics, will not be found 
within conventional thinking sanctioned by the frame, but rather within 
perdurable consideration of the limitations of such thinking.’ But we do not need 
an ersatz metaphysics, we need the real thing. And although there is not enough 
philosophy in our current framework to deal with the problem, this situation could 
be rapidly turned around. The problem is big alright, but it is not a wholesale 
problem with contemporary life; malcontents have continually been detecting 
such wholesale problems with the culture of their era ever since Ancient Greece. 
Assuming we will not succumb to misanthropy, then, they cannot all have been 
right. I do not think that this is where the problem lies; many problems do, of 
course, but not the one at issue. The problem is that our scientific knowledge now 
far exceeds our philosophical wisdom; and the philosophical wisdom we do have 
has been maligned and quarantined. So we have too much power and not enough 
control. The balance needs to be redressed and I maintain that reflection on 
nihilism and transcendence can help. 
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In Search of Perspective 
Notes on Freedom, Transcendence, and Finitude in Tartaglia’s 
Philosophy in a Meaningless Life  
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Abstract 
This paper suggests that a main concern of James Tartaglia’s Philosophy in a Meaningless Life is 
human freedom, and the ways in which it may be served (and hampered) by philosophy. Initial 
remarks about freedom and nihilism are followed (in Section II) by brief methodological 
considerations. Section III offers a reading of the idea of transcendence as Tartaglia deploys it, while 
Section IV makes use of a comparison with Richard Rorty’s understanding of the relation between 
philosophy and freedom in order to locate what is distinctive about Tartaglia’s approach. Finally, in 
Section V, it is suggested that freedom, in Tartaglia’s system of nihilism, is essentially a feature of 
finitude.  
 
But she had known from the moment I appeared, and now, risking 
tensions with her workmates, and fines, she was explaining to me 
that I had won nothing, that in the world there is nothing to win, 
that her life was full of varied and foolish adventures as much as 
mine, and that time simply slipped away without any meaning, 
and it was good just to see each other every so often to hear the 
mad sound of the brain of one echo in the mad sound of the brain 
of the other.  
                                         Elena Greco1 
 
I. It cannot be helped; human beings are free. We enjoy freedom of action in the 
moment, and we enjoy deliberative freedom—freedom in deciding whether to 
pursue this goal or that end. Moreover, we enjoy that peculiar freedom, of central 
importance to James Tartaglia in his challenging, inspiring, and courageous 
monograph,2 to stand back from our life altogether, to disengage from it and to 
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1 Elena Ferrante, The Story of a New Name (New York: Europa Editions), 2013, Ch. 124. (Kindle 
edition) 
2 Tartaglia, James, 2016. Philosophy in a Meaningless Life: A System of Nihilism, Consciousness and 
Reality. London: Bloomsbury. Henceforth cited as Meaningless. All bare page-references are to this 
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contemplate it—to question the value, the significance, of all the projects and 
plans and habits that make it up, and ask; are they worthwhile? Do I want to be 
doing the things I am doing, living the life I am living? Is this life of mine of 
value? We enjoy this peculiar, encompassing reflective freedom as—I am sure 
Tartaglia is right about this (cf., 24) —a consequence of those more constrained, 
more narrowly targeted exercises of choice the capacity for which have been 
bestowed on us by evolution, indeed, by the very same evolutionary processes 
that produced consciousness. For I think we can take it that freedom and 
consciousness go together. Not analytically, perhaps; but for embodied, temporal, 
self-moving organisms like us, they are inseparable. To be conscious of our 
surroundings is to be aware of the possibilities they afford us. Even if, in the 
limiting case, they should afford us none, the salience that fact would then have 
in our awareness serves to confirm the connection of awareness to freedom of 
action. And to be conscious of our life as such is to be aware of the contingency 
of its particular features and engagements; not just of the fact that they might have 
been other than what they are, but, importantly, of the fact that our attitude to them, 
our engagement, might have been—and indeed might at any moment come to 
be—different from what it is. So: No freedom without subjectivity. Let that be a 
first slogan. 
Now, it may look as if, by describing our reflective freedom as an ability to 
disengage from life’s projects and question their significance, I am about to take 
these preliminary remarks on freedom in a direction that would violate right at the 
outset a critical distinction that Tartaglia is at pains to make. This is the distinction 
between the value of my life and yours, of the various life-contents that make up 
those lives, on the one hand, and, on the other, the question of the meaning of life 
as such. Because Tartaglia, in Meaningless, is not concerned to argue that 
disengagement from the framework, as he calls what I have labelled the exercise 
of reflective freedom, will reveal that your life and mine has no value.3 Quite to 
the contrary; Tartaglia emphatically makes the point that however we answer the 
complicated questions we raise in assessing the value of the life we each happen 
to live, there is no traction to be had by contemplating the meaning of life as 
such—for, as he says, life, as such, simply has none. This follows from the basic 
                                                     
book.   
3 I will continue to call this standing-back-from-life reflective freedom, while recognizing a point that 
Tartaglia stresses, namely that most of our reflection is actually instrumental and engaged in character. 
Reflection of this commonplace sort directed to alternative means, ends, plans, and priorities I will call 
the exercise of deliberative freedom.  
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claim of nihilism: reality is meaningless. Reality is meaningless, and so is life, as 
a part of that reality. Note well, however, says Tartaglia, that that is not at all to 
deny that any particular existence can be meaningful in all sorts of ways—it 
typically will be, in so far as it is enmeshed in a web of purposes and intentions. 
So, for instance, all manner of desires, values and purposes may be at stake when 
a child is brought into the world. And whether or not I was begotten with the aim 
of securing an heir or a donor or a well-rounded family, or all or none of these, 
may matter significantly for the web of meanings that constitute the context of my 
life—that great latticework of meaning into which I find myself geworfen—but 
all this is neither here nor there when it comes to the question of whether there is 
a meaning to life as such.  
Actually, there is a double disconnect here. Individual human beings may, like 
tables, chairs, chickens and banana flies, be brought into existence in a deliberate, 
purposive manner with an eye to certain specific ends that this existence should 
serve, but unlike artefacts, farm animals, and laboratory organisms, human beings, 
once up and running, may come to stand at a reflective distance to such initiating 
purposes, and may or may not come to think of them as sources of significance 
for their life. That much is so obvious to most modern human beings that it seems 
hardly worth noting. The further disconnect, though, the one at issue in the context 
of Meaningless, is that however we as individuals comport ourselves with respect 
to sources of value, we must recognize that there is no general purpose for us as 
human beings to serve. We are not here for anything, for any reason, at all—
notwithstanding the multifarious purposes that may be fuelling the coming into 
existence of concrete individuals or motivating each in the pursuit of the projects, 
pleasures, ends and plans that make up the particular action horizon of a particular 
life. It just happened that homo sapiens evolved and eventually—or perhaps rather 
quickly, in evolutionary terms—became the sole surviving species of the genus 
homo. Thus, whatever meaning I may find in the life-stuff that makes up my 
particular life, this cannot be due to a relation between the purposes that may have 
been involved in my conception, nor the goals and values that I commit to and 
navigate by, and the very point of life itself, since life in itself has no point. So, if 
my goals really are worthwhile goals, and my values really valuable, this must 
have some explanation other than my species membership. If my life is in some 
way meaningful, this cannot be due to the meaning of life. In slogan form: Homo 
has no purpose. 
This seems to me to be a correct diagnosis. Reality is meaningless. 
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Accordingly, life, as such, has no meaning. I suppose this is common ground for 
a lot of people. There is nothing very startling, so far, philosophically. Where 
things may begin to get interesting, is in the assessment of the significance of what 
we may call bare philosophical nihilism. What is the importance of the nihilist 
observation—of this fact, to use Tartaglia’s idiom—for life, and for philosophy? 
The standard direction from here, for those who take philosophical nihilism as 
common ground and not a reductio ad absurdum, has been to ask; how then are 
we to account for the meaning that human lives may indeed have? What is it? 
How does one get it? Tartaglia has a fair bit to say about such efforts, and, in 
general about the presupposition that the meaninglessness of life is a problem 
(surmountable or not) for the meanings of lives. However, one very refreshing 
aspect of Tartaglia’s Meaningless is that he thinks of this entire discussion—which 
is to say most philosophical examinations of nihilism so far—as a philosophical 
dead-end. We must all make sense of our lives as we can, narrate them as we go 
to suit our various needs and ends. Let this be granted. Tartaglia has a grab-bag 
for all that stuff—social meaning—and once something has been tossed into that 
bag it is not likely to make any further appearance in Meaningless. His treatment 
of that issue is a mere prolegomenon; a diagnosis of a mistaken assumption and 
its consequences. Tartaglia’s positive concern is to show us what philosophy looks 
like once we take bare philosophical nihilism to be its main discovery, the answer 
to its central question. What must a discipline be like that is devoted to a question 
to which bare philosophical nihilism is the answer? That is the question 
Meaningless addresses. And the answer is that such a discipline would be an 
autonomous and potentially progressive endeavour, quite distinct from scientific 
inquiry into the objective world. Moreover, it would be rather a robust discipline, 
one that has a special—even central—significance for inquiring minds, and thus 
would tend to spring up in one recognizable form or other no matter what the 
conditions of thought or the particular cultural context of human existence might 
be—beyond, perhaps, conditions of bare subsistence. And it would be, finally, an 
endeavour with a kind of unity in all its diversity that is much stronger than 
whatever continuity might be wrung from a historical narrative of influence and 
textual interconnection. It is substantive.  
This is an assertive stance on behalf of philosophy, and a very attractive one, 
not least because it is assumed in full awareness of all the reasons that have been 
amassed for philosophy scepticism over the course of the most recent centuries 
(cf., 74-78). In what follows quite soon below, I would like to consider this 
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particular feat a little further. Specifically, I want to try to get clearer on the 
innovative move that makes this stance possible; the separation of the question of 
the meaning of life and the possibility of transcendence. Then there are two further 
aspects of Meaningless I should like to touch on. I would like, first, to venture the 
hypothesis that a deep concern of Meaningless is with human freedom, in 
particular that a significant feature of the nihilist hypothesis, in Tartaglia’s hands, 
is that it serves human freedom in a particularly philosophical way. In aid of this 
exegetical-hermeneutical endeavour, I will bring in some themes from Richard 
Rorty, who, as I take him, is committed above all to the idea of philosophy as an 
engagement for human freedom. These themes will then lead us to my final 
topic—finitude. Here, in the brief concluding section, I will be reaching back to 
transcendence, once again, and simply wonder whether finitude and 
transcendence are a package deal, so that emphasizing one may be a way to 
illuminate the other. If Tartaglia were to agree, that, yes, indeed, expanding in this 
general direction on finitude may be one way of approaching the point that the 
transcendence hypothesis makes, then that would be an encouragement. If not, I 
will learn something from the explanation.  
 
II. A brief interjection on philosophical aim and method may, however, be 
useful at this point, before further talk of transcendence, if only to ensure that 
expectations are appropriately tweaked. Tartaglia is (in Meaningless at least) a 
systematic philosopher. He marks his ground, sets up his claim, and then drives 
the transcendent hypothesis through three central problems of metaphysics 
(consciousness, time, universals). Thereby, he both recasts these problems and 
also constructs a multifaceted argument for their interconnection as concerns that 
spring naturally from a philosophical engagement (pro et con) with the 
transcendent hypothesis, an intellectual product—a deliverable, we might say, in 
the parlance of current grant application lingo—which, in turn, receives 
substantiation and clarification in the process of the systematic elaboration and 
development of the three metaphysical themes. Now, a natural form of response 
to this sort of systematic philosophy is dissection; extracting the arguments on 
offer, locally and globally, assessing them for soundness, seeking out qualification 
and amendment as necessary, or even providing, perhaps, the occasional 
refutation (if, unlike Nietzsche, one has something to do with refutation). From 
my point of view, there are two difficulties with this approach. The first is a matter 
of personal limitation; argumentative analysis is something I do at most tolerably 
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well and then only in cases where I am not particularly taken with the process of 
thought under scrutiny, something which, given the constraints we generally 
operate under, seems a misplaced use of intellectual effort. The second reason—
quite likely a rationalization of the first seeking to make virtue of necessity—is 
this: good systematic thought produces synergy; the whole is more than the sum 
of the parts, there is systemic enrichment. My interest in systematic philosophy is 
in this enrichment—less in how it is achieved, more in what it illuminates. 
Dissection and disassembly threaten to drive away exactly what it is I want to get 
a hold of. So it is incumbent on me to address interesting systematic philosophy 
in a different, non-dissecting way. I think of it as a form of active reception, or 
listening. Listening is not a contribution to systematic thinking, but for us non-
systematic philosophers it is a way, possibly, of getting something out of 
systematic philosophy, by ferreting out instances of it that seem fuelled by the 
right sorts of sensibilities, and then trying carefully to speak along with it, 
alongside it, and then seeing how it responds.  
But, it is entirely fair to ask, what might such metaphors really come to? What 
might “listening” mean here that could not be just as fairly put by saying “trying 
to understand,” “seeking to interpret” or even “offering an analysis of”?  
Well, let’s see. “Please listen to me!” I might occasionally find myself saying 
(or wishing). What might I thereby be asking for? “Please,” I would probably be 
intending, “try to be guided, as you construe me, by what is my central concern. 
And please don’t impose on my words your semantic ready-mades, your fast-
thoughts, your blocking responses. Wait, please—hold your inferences. Don’t be 
modus-tollensing me. Give me space to find my descriptive way. Give me some 
conceptual latitude. Yield a little—be generous, be flexible. Walk along with me 
for a bit, and let me language-lead, as I try to find a new way.” Of course, 
systematic philosophers rarely plead. But even so, one has the option of trying to 
listen, and of allowing oneself to be moved.  
Slightly more philosophically, we might say that listening is a hermeneutic 
notion, embodying the idea central to the thinking of Hans-Georg Gadamer, that 
trying to understand is to stand prepared to be told something new (cf., Gadamer, 
271). 4  And this, in turn, is to be guided by what Gadamer calls “the fore-
conception of completeness” (Gadamer, 294). That means, as I read Gadamer, to 
be willing to undergo a change through an intellectual experience of encountering 
                                                     
4 Gadamer, Hans-Georg, 1991. Truth and Method, 2nd revised edition, trans. J. Weinsheimer and 
D.G. Marshall, New York: Continuum. 
 142
new truths, of seeing what is the case in a new light. Now, experience is a central 
hermeneutical notion. The main point is that it always essentially involves a 
negative element. In genuine experience, some part of you is risked and lost, and 
that very process is enriching; you come to see the limitedness of a horizon that 
was yours. That is why it makes sense to think of experience as something that 
requires a certain openness. One need not be open to experience, of course—one 
can simply have things happen to one, and refuse to allow one’s horizon of 
understanding to be challenged by them. In slogan form: Nothing ventured, 
nothing lost—nothing lost, nothing (re)generated. Listening, then, is the effort to 
be ready to be changed and enriched by venturing something in the encounter with 
an intellectual presentation. Its contrastive force derives from the kind of 
philosophical polemic that is a struggle for conceptual turf—for the right to decide 
the terms in which an issue is put and an investigation is framed. Listening aims 
not at a psychological understanding, but is rather an effort to comport oneself in 
a dialogue such that one’s perspective may be changed through another’s 
presentation of a common concern. That, more or less, is my agenda here, and 
with this in mind, I turn to the transcendent hypothesis.5  
 
III. Transcendence is the central concept of Meaningless, and to make a case for 
“the transcendent hypothesis” is its explicit aim. What does this hypothesis 
amount to?  
  
This is the transcendent hypothesis—that the objective, physical world is 
transcended—and it provides the basis for a metaphysical description of the 
                                                     
5 Gadamer elaborates by way of a discussion of Heidegger’s “disclosure of the forestructure of the 
understanding” (Gadamer, 268):  
The process that Heidegger describes is that every revision of the fore-projection is capable of 
projecting before itself a new projection of meaning; rival projects can emerge side by side until 
it becomes clearer what the unity of meaning is; interpretation begins with fore-conceptions that 
are replaced by more suitable ones.” [Gadamer, 269] 
What is risked are the very expectations by which we are able to perceive something as meaningful at 
all. In one sense, this goes on in all linguistic interaction, as we accommodate mutually to secure fluency 
of communication. Listening is simply being deliberate about it, and halting, as best one can, the process 
of solidification of one’s anticipatory prejudices of truth and meaning.  Put crudely; instead of 
determining meaning and then assessing for validity, it is a matter of assuming validity and then 
determining for meaning. And, not least, of allowing the determination of one’s own beliefs and 
semantics to be placed in motion by that process. This is the point that Gadamer makes in the reference 
to Heidegger just quoted. Perhaps surprisingly, then, to really listen to someone “means, primarily, to 
understand the content of what is said, and only secondarily to isolate and understand another’s meaning 
as such.” (Gadamer, 269) 
 143
world which leaves objective thought and thus the brain alone; while 
relating to transcendence and incorporating the existence of experience. 
[105] 
 
Objective thought, being centreless (84) has no room for exactly what is 
distinctive about experience, namely that in being aware of experience we are 
conscious of ourselves as beings with a perspective on the world and thus as 
centres of experience. To accommodate—that is to locate—experience within 
objective thought (science), entails an act of conceptual destruction because, “if 
experiences are brain states, our conception of either experiences or brain states 
must be more or less completely wrong.” (100) 
Tartaglia’s discussion of Daniel Dennett makes the point. Dennett famously 
attempts to dissolve the problem of consciousness by revealing the reification of 
phenomenology that our talk of experience seems to commit us to as an illusion. 
But when we are dealing with phenomenology, with appearance, the difficulty of 
capturing the illusion without undermining the claim that it is illusory seems 
insurmountable. Tartaglia observes: 
 
And this gets to the heart of the difficulty with the revisionist position, 
which is that no matter how well-supported its rejection of consciousness 
as ordinarily conceived might be, such rejections will inevitably be made 
in the apparent presence of consciousness. Our most sincere denials that 
‘that’ exists will not make ‘that’ go away. [92] 
 
The direction of Tartaglia’s argument here is not to mount a challenge to scientific 
understanding. Science—objective thought—is the best guide to the nature of 
things that we have got. We must stand by science in its fundamentals, including 
its scope; to fully illuminate the objective world without remainder. And from 
Tartaglia’s point of view, Dennett is correct to be sceptical of the efforts in 
naturalist philosophy of mind to reify appearance; to reify phenomenology, to 
locate it in the spatio-temporal order, is, as Dennett rightly argues, to impute 
magical properties to material stuff, or, alternatively, simply to lose sight of 
appearance altogether. Moreover, Tartaglia agrees with Dennett (and any 
naturalist) that to try to save the objective reality of consciousness by imagining 
an objective order beyond the physical, in the manner of ontological dualism, is 
just to push back the problem. And yet, to deny the subjective aspect of experience, 
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awareness, seems impossible; the very protest against it seems to bring it back 
around. That is the critical juncture where Tartaglia and Dennett part ways; 
Dennett, presumably, sees no alternative but those just adumbrated. Tartaglia 
does; it is the transcendent hypothesis. 
We have a model for the relation that Tartaglia wants; that between the 
experiences we undergo when dreaming and the reality that is our dreaming brain. 
He writes: 
 
The equivalent conclusion would be that conscious experience must be 
identified with something within a wider context of existence than the 
world it presents: it must be identified with something transcendent to the 
objective world. If this is right, it would explain why consciousness 
apparently has no place within the objective world. The reason would be 
that it does not exist there, any more than dream experiences exist in the 
world of the dream. It could also explain why experiences exist in a context 
transcendent to the objective world in which brain states belong, making 
such an identity out of the question; just as an identity between a dream 
experience and a state of a dream-brain would be out of the question. [105] 
  
I quote at length, because this is a highly significant passage. The line of thought 
may remind us of arguments intended to show that the world of objective science 
is not all there is—that the cold, meaningless, atoms-and-the-void reality revealed 
by science cannot be the ultimate ontological story, and that therefore the 
conclusion that existence is meaningless—as per the picture of the cold, 
meaningless, etc.—is unwarranted. That we are so reminded, supports one of the 
main contentions of Meaningless, namely that the ontological question of 
transcendence has been obscured by the presupposition that it concerns at its core 
the question of the meaning of life. And the question has indeed very naturally 
been raised and pursued largely in this context; it is another contention of 
Meaningless that a meaning of life, as opposed to social meaning, indeed requires 
a transcendental context. But, argues Tartaglia, that consciousness does require us 
to entertain the transcendent hypothesis has no tendency to show that bare 
philosophical nihilism is false. Nor, as I read Meaningless, is the point here simply 
that to establish transcendence is not yet to show that life as such has a meaning.  
Rather, it seems to me, the very nature of the transcendent hypothesis tends to 
undercut philosophical and religious efforts to establish the meaningfulness of life. 
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The transcendent hypothesis, as I understand it, entails that as soon as we try to 
say something of specific substance about a context transcending the context of 
objective knowledge, a context indicated by the fact of conscious awareness, we 
are, at best, out of warrant, and at worst incoherent. As conscious beings, we come, 
through experience, to know the world objectively. That we do, points beyond 
what we objectively know. Our attempt as conscious beings to thematise—or 
locate—that which the fact of our awareness points toward, has no independent 
base, no experiential fund, no autonomous presence for us. Our grasp of it is 
parasitic on objective knowledge—amounting to what Tartaglia calls “a shadow 
of objective thought.” (108)  
If this is so, then only what amounts to religious faith could ever provide a 
view of life as such as meaningful. And neither objective knowledge—nor an 
elaboration of subjectivity—could ever be invoked in support of such faith in an 
ultimate context of meaning; it would be mere faith. A concomitant lesson, made 
explicit by Tartaglia, is that denying transcendence by insisting that objective 
thought describes—in principle at least—an ontologically ultimate context, and 
so committing to the naturalist effort to reduce the subjective to the objective, is 
not required, neither in order to respect the claims of science nor to defend a 
humanistic view of the world.   
If I have got things more or less right so far, then not only bare philosophical 
nihilism, but also the transcendent hypothesis, serve principally to dispel illusions 
and undercut a certain kind of futile intellectual ambition. As Tartaglia observes: 
“Nihilism’s consequences outside of philosophy are all negative; in that it only 
has practical potential because of its ability to relieve us of false beliefs:” (172) 
Within philosophy, though, these negatives may have positive consequences—in 
particular, there is the possibility of the kind of affirmative view of philosophy as 
an autonomous and substantive intellectual practice.   
Consider the philosophical ambition of closure. This is the idea that there may 
be—perhaps only ideally and in principle, but nevertheless conceivably—a way 
to conceptualize explicitly a definitive metaphysical context, one that assigns to 
all that there is and all the ways of being there are their proper ontological place. 
Now one way to take bare philosophical nihilism is to say that there is no 
teleological closure—no ultimate point to what is. And one way to take the 
transcendent hypothesis is to say that there is no descriptive closure, either—no 
ultimate conceptualization of what there is. Well, how might these negative 
thoughts support a robust conception of philosophy? They might do that, it seems 
 146
to me, if we think of philosophy as a concern exactly with the openness that 
closure struggles against; articulating our experience of it and responding to those 
articulations. This is what I take Tartaglia to be suggesting. He argues for nihilism 
and transcendence, and he shows us what philosophy looks like if we think of it 
as a concern with a response to these facts.  
What I would like to do now, however, is to try to make something out of the 
qualification that I have so far respected, the one that Tartaglia relies on as he 
constrains the significance of nihilism. It has only negative consequences, we are 
told, “outside philosophy.” However, perhaps what we do in philosophy may 
permeate conscious life in such a way that more practical applications of intellect 
are also shaped by it, and not just in an entirely contingent manner.  
There are intellectual ambitions that are both philosophical and practical—
closure is one such. And in undercutting the ambition of metaphysical closure, 
philosophy also pertains to human freedom. Admittedly, the connection is 
ambiguous, as we shall see. Moreover, freedom is not a topic that receives a great 
deal of explicit attention in Meaningless. Still the connection between philosophy 
and freedom is nevertheless strongly present in the book. It contributes to its force, 
it is of practical significance, and it isn’t captured simply in terms of correcting 
false beliefs or dispelling illusions. I will now try to indicate why I think this is 
so.  
 
IV. Articulating freedom, elaborating its conditions and limitations 
metaphysically and politically, has been one preoccupation of philosophy from its 
inception. Though the connection between philosophy and freedom isn’t simply, 
from the perspective I should like to take, a matter of some philosophers’ concern 
with the nature and conditions of various forms of freedom. Rather, for sematic 
historicists—that is, people who think that meaning emerges in time and that 
conceptual resources are developed through intellectual communicative 
interaction; concepts are made, not discovered, in slightly misleading slogan 
form—philosophy has a more direct connection with the freedom characteristic 
of reflective human agency. That is because philosophy—as the invention, 
modification and elaboration of concepts—contributes resources serving the 
intellect’s ability to articulate, in more refined and fine-grained terms, such 
possibilities of deliberate agency as may be available to us. Philosophy, we might 
say, thereby potentiates reflective agency. We might note that this connection 
between philosophy and freedom is one reason why philosophy is different from 
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straightforwardly cumulative disciplines of knowledge. For this potentiation 
cannot be passed on the way information can be passed on. To be sure, we benefit 
from the philosophical struggles of past generations, but only, at least as far as the 
potentiation of reflective agency is concerned, by making their struggles our own, 
and then, perhaps, taking them further. Certain moves come easier to us, no doubt, 
because others have made them—in a manner akin to Hebbian long-term 
potentiation of synaptic networks—but even so, the firing needs to happen. As 
Tartaglia says, making what I take to be just this point, “every new generation 
needs to make philosophical ideas their own.” (181) They need to do that, because 
the particular connection between philosophy and agential power that I am 
homing in on here is available only as philosophy is performed, and not as its 
results are noted and filed.  
This agential potentiation, though, is a contribution to freedom only at a highly 
abstract level. Agential potentiation through conceptual innovation may just as 
easily equip human beings to act against freedom more concretely conceived, as 
happens when sophisticated theoretical endeavours of human intellect call forth 
systems of political oppression. There is no intrinsic connection between 
philosophical thought and concrete political freedom of the sort that democracies 
are designed to protect. However, a philosopher may commit to democratic 
freedom, and deploy philosophy in the service of that end. This is the explicit 
agenda of Richard Rorty.6 For Rorty, placing himself in the tradition of John 
Dewey, the point of philosophy should be to serve the human good, and that means, 
for a Deweyan pragmatist, contributing to our conception of and prospects for 
attaining a society of justice, equality and individual freedom.  
This is a broad and sweeping agenda, and I shall confine myself to one point 
in connection with it that I think is pertinent to Meaningless. We might give it this 
heading: Philosophy of freedom as anti-authoritarianism. Both Rorty and 
Tartaglia are anti-authoritarians, in a manner that comes to expression in how they 
philosophize. For that reason, it is instructive to consider some of the differences 
between them.  
For Rorty, a particular responsibility of philosophers in the struggle for 
democracy is to combat intellectual authoritarianism. Rorty’s denial of the idea of 
human nature, his scepticism toward the idea of truth as representation, toward 
                                                     
6 See, for instance, Richard Rorty, 1990. “The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy,” in Objectivity, 
Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Volume 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 175-
196.  
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foundationalist epistemological aspirations, and toward the rhetoric of objectivity, 
his hostility toward metaphysics, his Darwinian-constructivist view of linguistic 
meaning, his instrumentalist philosophy of science, as well as his anti-essentialist 
view of philosophy—these are, I think, all best understood as results of Rorty’s 
efforts to follow through on the commitment to anti-authoritarian pragmatism, 
which is essentially a political interpretation of the ancient view of philosophy as 
ameliorative.  
For Rorty, intellectual authoritarianism is the impulse to short-circuit the effort 
to seek a communicative resolution of differences of views and interests, by 
invoking a justification to act on, or against, or in spite of, others, without 
conversing with them. His counter-position is to advance a view of democracy 
centred on the idea that our most important obligation is to ensure the widest 
possible effective access to deliberative political conversation. One important 
aspect of that effort was to counteract theoretical impulses that threaten to reduce 
our willingness or ability to listen to others, to listen in that hermeneutical sense 
of which I attempted to give a flavour a few paragraphs ago.  
Now, this anti-authoritarian commitment in Rorty, which I interpret as an 
effort to philosophically strengthen our capacity and willingness to listen to those 
who think and speak differently from ourselves, led Rorty to be critical of some 
of the characteristically modernist, humanist commitments deeply embedded in 
the discourse of mainstream 20th century analytic philosophy. He noted the 
historical transformations of originally liberating notions like reason, truth, 
method, representation, and objectivity into scaffoldings for hierarchies and 
authority structures, and called them out. The result, when interpreted as 
philosophical doctrine, seemed to fit right into the interconnected set of 
constructivist ideas that make up what we call post-modernism. And this is where 
it may be useful to contrast Rorty with the form of anti-authoritarianism that 
shapes Meaningless. For Tartaglia is in several places quite critical of Rorty, and 
he is throughout the book clear on his dim view of what he takes to be the excesses 
of postmodernism.7 At the same time, I contend, Meaningless shares the anti-
                                                     
7 For instance, Tartaglia describes a “natural next step” upon the loss of God as a transcendent source 
of meaning:  
This was to deny that there is any objective truth whatsoever, such that nothing holds true 
independently of human opinion, and everything is endlessly open to interpretation and 
reinterpretation. This extreme relativism, which is sometimes called postmodernism, is the 
most recent stage in the intellectual flight from nihilism. [59] 
Rorty is taken to task for failing to acknowledge the difference between evaluations and facts, and for 
thinking that nihilism requires an ironic stance toward life (176). I think much could be said on Rorty’s 
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authoritarian thrust that was the explicit guiding thought in much of Rorty’s 
philosophy.  
The point here is not to defend Rorty against Tartaglia’s criticisms—rather it 
is to consider whether the differences between Rorty and Tartaglia may tell us 
something about the connection between philosophy and anti-authoritarianism.  
For Rorty, anti-authoritarianism is an end to which philosophical reflection 
may be put. Its special pertinence lies in the fact that philosophy itself may so 
easily be brought in to bolster an authoritarian impulse, to serve it and disguise it 
at the same time. Thus, for Rorty, it is a moral imperative, not a philosophical one, 
to engage in anti-authoritarian metaphilosophical criticism, and to provide ways 
of describing human practice that foster democratic attitudes, the art of listening. 
The challenge that this pragmatic stance faces, however, is that once we are 
persuaded that philosophy is only a tool, that it has no constraining project of its 
own, no purpose or unity intrinsic to it, we discover that we are already losing our 
grip on that tool, and we find that it becomes almost impossible to do anything 
with it. I think of this predicament as the pragmatic collapse of philosophy.  
Now, what about Meaningless? In a section of the book entitled, “Living with 
nihilism,” Tartaglia points out us that, “[ …]the truth of nihilism provides no 
platform for bossiness.” (172) “Bossiness” in this context is exactly the sort of 
intellectual authoritarianism that also is Rorty’s target. 8  But what is the 
significance of Tartaglia’s remark? Is it a by-the-way observation? Is it an aside, 
meant to assure those who may be concerned about the potential of philosophical 
theory to support bossiness that in this case they need not worry, that their concern 
should not keep them from considering nihilism more closely?  
The significance, I think, lies in the fact that anti-authoritarianism is not a 
contingent, optional add-on to the Meaningless system. The reason is that a 
philosophical truth that provides no platform for bossiness in fact undermines it. 
For without a philosophical platform, intellectual bossiness collapses. Intellectual 
bossiness, in the requisite sense, just is to provide justification for authoritarian, 
non-listening attitudes. And as a philosophical truth nihilism occupies exactly the 
place where such justification would be located. Its negative force has the positive 
                                                     
behalf on both these points, but that is not an important matter in the present context. 
8 As I alluded to earlier, philosophical accounts of human nature have served horrific instances of 
bossiness, both intellectual and practical. But the tendency is quite ubiquitous. To take but one example; 
physicalist metaphysics (not neuroscience) provides intellectual support for bossy dismissiveness of 
various forms of non-biological strategies for coping with mental health issues.  
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consequence that authoritarians will find it harder to use philosophy to disguise 
the fact that they really are bullies and thugs.  
The transcendent hypothesis provides not just a way of reading the various 
dialectical struggles of philosophy, but it tilts the reading toward finding an 
essential philosophical concern with openness. Where Rorty’s anti-
authoritarianism is a chosen stance, the transcendent hypothesis expresses a 
different relation between philosophy and human freedom. For a pragmatist like 
Rorty, the power of philosophy to serve the moral ends of the philosopher is 
weakened by the fact that philosophy is not acknowledged as a substantive 
project—reducing philosophy to a toolbox handed down to us as a rag-tag product 
of contingent cultural evolution is also pretty much to empty out the box. On the 
transcendent hypothesis, by contrast, the concern with openness goes beyond the 
instrumental and the political, it is an inherently philosophical concern. There is 
no guarantee that philosophy will serve openness. But when it does, it does so on 
terms that are genuinely its own. And that serves, not entirely paradoxically, to 
increase its potential for instrumental and political effect. 
I’d like, in conclusion, to venture some bald, brief, and sketchy assertions 
about this openness to which the transcendent hypothesis points, as a dynamic and 
ineliminable incompleteness.  
 
V. Finitude is a characteristic of human life in a number of ways, and Tartaglia 
recognizes it as a proper entry point into philosophy: 
 
Let us say, then, that questions concerning human finitude and the meaning 
of life are paradigmatically philosophical questions, to which religions have 
provided the best-known and most widely-believed answers. These 
questions have persisted since the dawn of civilization, and are renewed 
within each new generation by those that feel the need to answer them. [63] 
 
Typically, in these contexts, our finitude is construed in terms of limitation; how 
little we know, how limited our powers are, how woefully temporary are our lives. 
However this may be, though, I think that things we cherish and deeply identify 
with—freedom, agency, and thought—even consciousness, these are all aspects 
and attributes of human finitude. All these are features of beings that are centres 
of experience, beings that embody and enjoy perspective. Articulation, action, 
awareness—these are all matters of navigating limits, of detecting or determining 
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form in contexts where many forms are possible. Such determinations invariably 
point beyond themselves. Revealing, by selecting, is also always concealing, as 
we know, but it is equally a matter of bringing forth new possibilities for 
revelation.  
It is a hermeneutic insight that no interpretation is ever final, that there is 
always more to be said. But when Gadamer makes this essentially Heideggerian 
point, he is not simply drawing attention in a defeatist way to the fact that we, 
limited creatures, cannot ever hope to enumerate all the true descriptions there 
may be of even some insignificant little point of joint concern, some small piece 
of common reality. Rather the point is that every saying, every articulation, brings 
with it—brings into being—new possibilities for response and reaction. Finitude, 
in the form of perspective, of awareness, of conceptualization, is always in the 
process of going beyond what it brings forth. Human finitude is essentially 
creative, because to be human is to be essentially unfinished.  
Have I veered away from Meaningless? Tartaglia, towards the end of the book, 
contemplates the possible fate of the transcendent hypothesis in a world where 
philosophical nihilism had been accepted: “Before long, the hypothesis might 
become barely recognizable, with new forms of opposition springing up to replace 
the old stand-off between denying and affirming transcendence.” (181-182) The 
“system of nihilism, consciousness and reality” is not, then, built to last. It sets up 
a perspective that immediately raises the prospect of its own transformation. As 
far as I can tell, this is part of the central message of Meaningless about what it is 
to be a perspective—to always point beyond that which can be articulated and 
illuminated by virtue of it, toward what it is—from some other perspective. Ah—
if only I could clearly see what it is I am trying to think now… 
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Bjørn Ramberg asks his readers to, ‘try to be guided, as you construe me, by 
what is my central concern. And please don’t impose on my words your semantic 
ready-mades, your fast-thoughts, your blocking responses’ (p. 141). An excellent 
piece of advice, and one which I had no trouble following, given that I could 
readily see his central concern, and completely agreed (no qualifications) with his 
interpretation of my book. Had the latter not been the case, the advice would have 
been harder to follow; but more valuable. For when reading something in 
philosophy with which you are instinctively inclined to disagree, especially when 
your own views are being targeted, there is little point responding unless you try 
to see where the other is coming from; their central concern, motivating them to 
look for gaps and weaknesses. There is little point, because if you just throw out 
your ‘blocking responses’, you will neither learn from the encounter, nor have 
much chance of persuading your interlocutor; or others with the same kind of 
central concern. We all have our philosophical instincts, but unless we make the 
effort to empathise with others, our own will become inflexible, making it harder 
to reassure ourselves they are rational. Philosophy of mind provides my favourite 
example, where some philosophers today think their opponents are mad – well, 
perhaps they do not really think that, but they do like to suggest that it is the only 
reasonable conclusion to draw. This is frustration, and hampers the prospects for 
constructive engagement. They are probably right that the ‘mad’ philosophers will 
not be persuaded; neither will they. But others less entrenched in the debate might 
have been, if they had looked for the kind of central concern which might lead 
someone to write mad-sounding things, thinking them sensible.    
Ramberg’s central concern in his paper, I think, is to discover the central 
concern of my book. He sees all of these interlocking themes, concerning nihilism, 
transcendence, consciousness, and the autonomy of philosophy, and he wonders 
what is driving them. More specifically, he wonders if it is a central concern which 
he himself is on-board with; one concerning intellectual freedom. Basically, he 
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wonders if we have the same kind of central concern. I think we do.  
To give Ramberg’s advice a twist, however, I will start trying to illuminate 
this matter by throwing out just one of my ‘semantic ready-mades’ – the only one 
that even tempted me when I read his paper. I do not equate science with objective 
thought. When I instinctively make sense of the room around me in terms of 
physical objects in spatial relationships to each other, I am employing objective 
thought; but there is nothing remotely scientific about it. It is a natural way of 
thinking. Science is a development of that natural way of thinking; the best we 
have or are ever liable to get. Quine liked to say that science is a development of 
common sense, and to this extent, he was right. But we have another way of 
thinking, which arises equally naturally, albeit only explicitly within a more 
limited set of circumstances, and which has been a principle focus of all the great 
philosophical traditions. This is subjective thought. When we cannot readily think 
of what we are aware of as something in the physical world, as when we feel a 
sudden rush of enthusiasm, or see a blind spot of shimmering mercury while 
suffering from a migraine, then we think of it as experience. Just as science is our 
most sophisticated extension of objective thought, philosophy is our most 
sophisticated extension of subjective thought; for it is only with the latter, in 
conjunction with the former, that we can try to make sense of distinctively human 
concerns such as freedom. 
Now in Meaningless, I argued that subjective thought is parasitic upon 
objective thought. Many philosophers within what I think of as the broadly idealist 
tradition, past and present, have instead seen subjective thought as a kind of rival 
to objective thought, or else as something which shows an inadequacy in it; as if 
objective thinking needed to either catch up or fail. I share what I think is their 
central concern, these days at least, namely with the imperialistic ambitions of the 
scientific extension of objective thought, represented within academic philosophy 
under the heading ‘physicalism’ – or ‘naturalism’, when the emphasis is on 
epistemology rather than metaphysics. But I think an overly trusting attitude to 
subjective thought provides a weak basis for trying to do something positive about 
that concern. For as soon as you try to say something on its basis, the substance 
slips away, leaving you with only threadbare appeals to ineffability and a desire 
to say inarticulate things like, ‘you know what I mean … that particular feeling 
of pain, or the particular blueness, not of the sky, but of your experience.’  
The substance returns when you realise that whenever you try to think about 
things both substantively and subjectively, you must lean on objective thought; 
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but that where objective thought really does leave you short is over the fact that 
there is anything to think about at all. For we each think from an experiential, 
subjective perspective; reality appears to us from such perspectives and we think 
about it, even if what we think casts doubt on the notion of ‘subjective 
perspective’, exactly because it leans on objective thought. In metaphysics, 
subjective thinking points you in the right direction, then leaves you cold. But 
once you arrive, there is plenty to think about; in the company of all those who 
have been there before and are there now. For it was from this kind of subjective 
perspective that people formed the idea that they were free; that action was 
required of them, and so it was their responsibility to decide and act. It was from 
this perspective that people wondered if their lives had meaning. And it is from 
this perspective that, when we try to make sense of matters like these, we exercise 
our intellectual freedom to think philosophically. 
Thus the great significance of subjective thought, it seems to me, is that it 
brings us to the inside of human life, where philosophical questions arise. We have 
no choice but to think that way when circumstances make subjective thinking the 
only natural kind; but philosophers have chosen to develop it, realising that a 
distinctive set of the questions that we naturally ask depends on it. Physicalism, 
however, wants to close this kind of thinking off, with a metaphysical 
interpretation of the scientific extension of objective thinking. If we had only ever 
thought objectively, somehow oblivious to our subjective perspectives, then it is 
hard to see how we would have ever thought of the traditional problems of 
philosophy. If I thought of myself and others equally objectively, then why would 
I – how could I, even – come to think of these objects as free? Because they do 
unpredictable things, perhaps? (It would be hard to think this in your own case.) 
But then the weather would seem just as ‘free’ as people do. The problem would 
never have arisen.  
And that is very much the point of physicalism, just as it was the point of its 
predecessors in the analytic philosophy movement, namely ideal language 
philosophy, ordinary language philosophy and logical positivism; in each case, it 
was the appearance of genuine philosophical problems that was to be removed 
through analysis. For if we look at the world entirely objectively, as physicalists 
suggest, then there are no philosophical problems; or, if you prefer, the intellectual 
relics we call ‘philosophical problems’ are revealed to be the products of natural 
illusion; relics such as thinking you are free, conscious, and currently at a certain 
stage of your life. You could call the problem of reconciling quantum mechanics 
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with relativity theory a philosophical problem, if you like, but it looks for all the 
world like a scientific problem, and so unless you are prepared to bring in 
illusionary intuitions based on our apparently subjective perspectives – ordinary 
conceptions of time, for instance – then your choice of label is going to look pretty 
dubious. The irony is that physicalism itself, as a metaphysical thesis about the 
fundamental nature of reality, only makes sense in light of subjective perspectives; 
for if the ‘fundamentality’ of the physical particles is not to be contrasted with the 
non-fundamental status of minds, as in the traditional opposition between realism 
and idealism, then it no longer means anything. But again this is very much the 
point of physicalism – not that I think many of its advocates realise – namely to 
take us beyond the urge to philosophically scrutinise the scientific picture, to a 
place where we just trust it. Physicalism aims to lose its own metaphysical status 
and hence itself; it is a bridging device. 
Develop the natural objective and subjective ways we have of thinking about 
the world, then, and the former gets you science while the latter gets you 
philosophy; or at least, that is how it turned out in our world. Subjective thought 
does not negate objective thought, but rather contextualises it. But try to make a 
philosophy out of science, and philosophy is negated. For if we resolve to think 
only like a scientist at work, subjective thought must be intellectually disavowed; 
we must now think only of what the objective picture tells us, and refuse to 
contextualise it within our own individual perspectives. The contextualisation 
provided by subjective thought is vitally important, however; it is not something 
we want to lose, and so physicalism must be resisted with maximum effort. For it 
is within our individual perspectives that the fundamental reality – the only one 
there is – is there to be reflected upon by everyone; disavow those perspectives 
and it becomes an esoteric topic that only scientists can contemplate by means of 
their allegedly beautiful mathematical theories. But natural human questions 
about the meaning of life, or why there is something rather than nothing, are as 
real as they seem to be. Our lives themselves, as we live them from our insider 
perspectives, are as real as they seem to be; not just an illusionary take on 
something radically unfamiliar. Philosophy interprets and elucidates; it should not 
seek to obliterate. When it does, in the shape of physicalism, then its days are 
numbered; one way or the other. 
The contextualisation subjective thought provided me with is that the 
scientific development of objective thought provides a model of how things 
appear within human consciousness, not the final story about how reality is, or 
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even a marker on the road to that final story. To think otherwise, is to try to make 
consciousness disappear, rather than to try to impose some human order upon it 
with objective thought. The recognition of the transcendence of reality is the most 
final story we can have, for when we recognise the limits of both subjective and 
objective thinking – for the former, bare pointing, and for the latter, endlessly 
detailed modelling of the kind of things which could cause what we point to, when 
what we point to is conceived along the original lines of the model – then we are 
able to rationally assure ourselves we should not try to go further. But it does not 
provide closure, only an invitation to think through our place within a reality 
which always outstrips our best descriptive efforts, as part of an ongoing historical 
conversation. Ramberg asks whether, ‘finitude and transcendence are a package 
deal, so that emphasizing one may be a way to illuminate the other’ (p. 140). Yes, 
exactly. 
Now Ramberg pays special attention to my claim that nihilism’s 
consequences ‘outside of philosophy’ are all negative (p. 145). So did two other 
contributors to this symposium, Llanera and Malachowski, and it was the focus 
of one of the reviews of my book, by Hawkins, which I discuss in the Introduction. 
Only Ramberg, however, considers the possibility that the consequences inside 
philosophy might be both positive and practical; this is where his paper gets 
particularly interesting and perceptive, I think. If you think of philosophy as just 
an academic speciality, then the notion of it having practical consequences might 
make you think of its practitioners directly applying themselves to practical 
problems in the world today; this is the ideal of pragmatist philosophy. But my 
emphasis on the naturalness of philosophical questions, and the fact that I led with 
one of the most natural philosophical of all, that of the meaning of life, ought to 
have indicated that I do not.  
Ramberg wonders if, ‘perhaps what we do in philosophy may permeate 
conscious life in such a way that more practical applications of intellect are also 
shaped by it, and not just in an entirely contingent manner’ (p. 146). That is how 
I think philosophy exerts a practical influence; the ‘practical applications of 
intellect’ are not made by professional philosophers, but by people with more 
practical intellects, who have absorbed the prevailing philosophical atmosphere. 
That atmosphere at the moment, at least in the rich, secular world which drives 
social change, is physicalist. We see the effect as people, now used to casually 
relating what their brains make them do, live with only occasional, absent-minded 
curiosity about how the next technological breakthrough will radically transform 
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their lives; hopefully in a manner which will not put them out of a job. The 
philosophy which drives this is invisible, just as it wants to be: it wants us to see 
only science. Natural philosophical questions are thereby discouraged. But if they 
were rather developed, through a change of atmosphere, then we might start to 
see very different practical applications of intellect.   
As Ramberg very neatly puts it, nihilism tells us we cannot have teleological 
closure, and transcendence tells us we cannot have descriptive closure (p. 145). 
And yet religions offer us teleological closure and physicalist philosophy offers 
us descriptive closure; both hoping very much to close each other down through 
our acceptance of their respective offers. If we turn them both down, however, 
and reside somewhere in the middle, with nihilism and transcendence, then we 
may start thinking a little more. For teleological closure is not something we need 
to think through; only accept and live. And neither is descriptive closure; to get 
this, we just need to let the scientists do the thinking for us. Those offering closure 
have no ambition to invigorate public intellectual life by promoting intellectual 
freedom. But philosophy always should. Its traditional ambition is not closure, 
but openness. 
Ramberg finds an anti-authoritarian strand to my thinking which he also finds 
in Rorty. That may well be what attracted me to Rorty in the first place, since I 
liked the fact that he focused on questions concerning the nature of philosophy: 
metaphilosophy. This is certainly an anti-authoritarian preoccupation, liable to 
hold special appeal only to those who are not satisfied to just get on with what 
everyone else is doing at the moment, because they want to question whether 
everyone else is doing the right kind of thing, and to do something different if 
they are not. Rorty certainly wanted to do something different; the figures he felt 
most enthusiasm for within the analytic philosophy happening around him, most 
notably Quine, Sellars and Davidson, were those he was able to read, however 
forcibly, as undermining analytic philosophy. What he really wanted to do, as 
Ramberg says, was to place philosophy in the service of democratic freedom. To 
this effect, he ‘noted the historical transformations of originally liberating notions 
like reason, truth, method, representation, and objectivity into scaffoldings for 
hierarchies and authority structures, and called them out’ (p. 148).  
The problem with his efforts, according to the analysis I share with Ramberg, 
is that once he had divested from philosophy any source of distinctiveness, he had 
no leg to stand on. People listened alright, and they still do; because he became a 
famous intellectual off the back of philosophy. But given his overall message, his 
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support of democratic freedom would have had more intellectual credibility if he 
had not been a philosopher; Chomsky does better because he has scientific 
credentials. Ramberg memorably dubs this predicament, ‘the pragmatic collapse 
of philosophy’ (p. 149). It is an honest predicament if you are a philosophy 
professor who buys all that anti-philosophy stuff but who still wants to make a 
positive difference in the world; and Rorty was nothing if not honest. It is just a 
shame he did buy it. Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature had a formative 
influence on me. It seems to take us on a journey to a new and rosier future for 
philosophy, which is what I instinctively wanted. But this is not the destination, 
as you discover in the final chapter. He had a good title, ‘Philosophy without 
Mirrors’, but nothing to back it up; it turns out not to be philosophy at all, but 
rather ‘kibitzing’ between other academic disciplines, the legitimate ones, to keep 
them free of philosophy (Rorty 1979: 393). And to add insult to injury, Rorty tells 
us to embrace physicalism as a kind of Kantian moral choice in that chapter (ibid.: 
382-389); as if to turn away from philosophy and towards science were to do the 
right thing. 
Despite himself, Rorty did have very strong philosophical views: he held that 
there is no objective truth and that everything can be endlessly redescribed. These 
are the philosophical expressions of anti-authoritarianism which he weaved his 
messages about democratic freedom around. The problem is that they are radically 
implausible, and the main reason for this, within our current intellectual climate, 
is the authority science enjoys; which Rorty supported by endorsing physicalism. 
Of course, his own, idiosyncratic brand of physicalism was supposed to be a non-
metaphysical one, compatible with the endless redescription thesis – but note well 
his instincts: if the scientific description has potential to serve authoritarian aims, 
then it must be philosophy’s fault. Not that he was altogether wrong, because 
metaphysical (normal) physicalism is indeed a philosophy. But it is only one kind 
of philosophy. And the big picture Rorty missed is that if philosophy fades from 
our horizons, as he wanted, then the scientific description will not be viewed as 
simply one description among others, but rather as the one which offers closure, 
thereby providing authority to those who yield it. You cannot redescribe scientific 
theories; when postmodernists try, telling us that E=Mc2 is a ‘sexed equation’, to 
take one memorable example, the scientists just have a laugh (see Sokal and 
Bricmont 1999). But philosophy can credibly contextualise the scientific 
description as a whole, by placing it within the context of the experiential 
perspectives from which we live our lives; with our lives on its side, nothing could 
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be more credible. It cannot do this, however, while it is so wracked with self-doubt 
that it turns on its traditional resources in an effort to discredit the natural 
philosophical questions which people instinctively raise; questions those 
resources were built up to service.   
Have I now revealed my central concern in Meaningless? The emphasis I have 
been placing on physicalism more squarely relates to what started to become my 
central concern immediately after I finished that book; my central concern now. 
At the time, I was more concerned to present the metaphysic which had resulted 
from the process of freeing myself from physicalism; and to show the positive 
light in which it places philosophy, against a deafening background of anti-
philosophy. You might say that I was then more concerned with exercising my 
own intellectual freedom, and have since looked outwards, seeing the physicalism 
which once had an irrational hold over me, as the contemporary foundation of 
anti-philosophy; and anti-philosophy not as a challenge to my personal loyalties, 
but rather as a concrete problem for the world within our present circumstances. 
Still, the connection is plain enough, so when I look back over Ramberg’s essay, 
especially in light of his final sentence, I wonder if he has been better able to see 
my central concern than I was at the time.  
When we think of reality as meaningless and transcendent, thereby 
interrupting our more familiar interpretations of it, we are invited to think; if only 
to kick back against the initial thought. When critics of philosophy tell you it never 
makes progress, they reveal their desire for closure. Sure, we do close off some 
problems by solving them, or by realising they were confused. But the real 
progress occurs with the ones worth sticking with; both personally and inter-
generationally. Think of philosophy on the model of science and it looks terrible. 
Think of science on the model of philosophy and it looks terrible too. 
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Abstract 
The question “What is the meaning of life?” is longstanding and important, but has been shunned by 
philosophers for decades. Instead, contemporary philosophers have focused on other questions, such 
as “What gives meaning to the life of a person?” According to James Tartaglia, this research on 
“meaning in life” is shallow and pointless. He urges philosophers to redirect their attention back to 
the fundamental question about “meaning of life.” Tartaglia argues that humanity was not created for 
a purpose and, therefore, is meaningless. He assumes that humanity could not be meaningful unless 
we were created for a purpose. I will outline a different way that humanity could become meaningful. 
In addition, I will explain how the research on “meaning in life” is important for understanding how 
humanity could become meaningful.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
We live our lives, expending great effort to remain alive and achieve our goals, 
without knowing whether human life is meaningful. Laypeople often assume that 
philosophers seek to answer the question “What is the meaning of life?”1 Actually, 
only a small number of philosophers give attention to questions about the meaning 
of life.2 And when they reflect on these questions, they typically do so from a 
theistic perspective – a view that many people no longer find credible. I will 
examine these questions from a naturalistic perspective.  
In recent years, there has been a growing interest among philosophers in the 
topic of meaningfulness. However, instead of focusing on the traditional questions 
about meaning of life that preoccupied existentialists, contemporary philosophers 
strive to explain what gives meaning to the life of a person. They refer to this 
latter topic as “meaning in life” to distinguish it from questions about the 
“meaning of human life” in general. Susan Wolf and Thaddeus Metz – leading 
                                                     
* Independent scholar. Email: triselba[a]cs.com. 
** I would like to thank Editor-in-chief Masahiro Morioka for inviting me to contribute to this issue. 
1 Laypeople often also assume that philosophy is “all about” the meaning of life. Tartaglia (2016b) 
argues for this view.   
2 See, for example, Cottingham (2003), Cooper (2005), and Seachris (2009).  
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figures in this research – have each proposed a theory of meaning in life.3 These 
theories support objective naturalism – the view that one accrues meaning in one’s 
life by engaging with inherently valuable and natural, mind-independent goods.  
James Tartaglia is harshly critical of this work by these philosophers. He 
contends that this research is shallow,4 pointless,5 and can be misleading.6 He 
argues that there is nothing philosophical about identifying what makes a person’s 
life more meaningful.7 He seems to think that one can find this in a self-help book.  
Regarding the topic of meaningfulness, Tartaglia claims that there is only one 
truly important question: “[W]hat are we here for?”8 This focus on “meaning in 
life” has diverted our attention from this question, he argues. Tartaglia 
acknowledges that there is meaning in life – what he refers to as “social meaning.” 
However, he argues that human life was not created for a purpose and, therefore, 
is meaningless. 
 “Life” can refer to a human being or all of humanity, which can lead to 
confusion in this debate about meaningfulness. Take, for example, the title of 
Tartaglia’s book: Philosophy in a Meaningless Life. With this title, some potential 
readers might assume that the book is about the life of a person. However, in 
reading the book, it quickly becomes clear that Tartaglia is referring to human life, 
as a whole.   
As with “life,” “humanity” can be thought of in multiple ways. Humanity can 
be conceived as a whole or as the many individuals that make up the whole.9 
These two different metaphysical conceptions of humanity give rise to two 
different ways of thinking about how humanity could be meaningful. With the 
traditional, holistic account of meaning of life, a meaning of life is conceived as 
a meaning that is possessed by humanity, as a whole. There is, however, an 
alternative, individualistic conception of meaning of life that I will outline. By 
engaging with inherently valuable and natural goods, it adds meaning to our 
individual lives, which in turn adds meaning to humanity from the “bottom-up,” 
as I will hypothesize.10  
                                                     
3 See Wolf (2010) and Metz (2013). 
4 Tartaglia (2016a), p. 4. 
5 Ibid., p. 16.  
6 Tartaglia (2015), p. 98 and (2016a), p. 1.  
7 Tartaglia (2015), pp. 95, 102 and (2016a), pp. 4, 16. See Metz (2016a) for his response to the 
criticisms by Tartaglia and others.  
8 Tartaglia (2016a), p. 2. 
9 I will use the terms “humanity” and “human life” interchangeably.  
10 I initially discussed this view in Trisel (2016). I further develop this view in this paper.  
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In the next section, I will provide an overview of Tartaglia’s nihilism. Many 
people, including Tartaglia, assume that humanity could not be meaningful unless 
we were created for a purpose. In section three, I will seek to demonstrate that this 
assumption is false. Then, in section four, I will compare the holistic and 
individualistic accounts of how humanity could be meaningful and will point out 
some problems with Tartaglia’s holistic account. In section five, I will advocate 
for the individualistic account. In addition, I will explain how the research on 
“meaning in life” is important for understanding how humanity could become 
meaningful.  
 
2. An Overview of Tartaglia’s Nihilism 
 
In the social framework in which we live our lives, there are pre-existing 
traditions, organizations, and fields of endeavor that one can join, as Tartaglia 
indicates.11 Our individual activities can be meaningful because they are situated 
within the context of meaning provided by the social framework. Likewise, for 
human life, as a whole, to be meaningful, it must exist within a wider context of 
meaning, Tartaglia argues. Tartaglia claims that the physical universe does not 
provide life with a context of meaning. Therefore, he contends that a 
“transcendent context of meaning” is necessary for life to be meaningful.12  
Tartaglia hypothesizes that consciousness transcends the objective world. If 
true, this opens up a possibility that reality transcends the physical universe, he 
argues.13  
Tartaglia indicates that if humanity were created for a purpose by a 
transcendent context of meaning, “We might be here to do something, and so 
discovering the reason might persuade us to change our lives.”14 Alternatively, 
“the meaning of our lives might consist in being valuable, rather than having the 
capacity for doing something valuable.”15 However, he later concludes, “even if 
the physical universe does exist within a transcendent context, there is no reason 
this should be a context of meaning, or one in which human life has an overall 
purpose. All this is possible, but possibility is cheap.”16  
                                                     
11 Tartaglia (2016a), pp. 22-23. 
12 Ibid., p. 48. 
13 Ibid., pp. 10-11, 85-86.  
14 Ibid., p. 2. 
15 Ibid., p. 2. 
16 Ibid., p. 52 (emphasis in original). 
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Despite its negative connotations, Tartaglia adopts “nihilism” as the name for 
his view that human life is meaningless.17 Contrary to some nihilists, Tartaglia 
does not deny that there are values or objective truths. In fact, he claims that 
existential nihilism is an objective truth.18  
Within the social framework, people pursue various goals such as to graduate 
from college, get married, and have children, but these goals are nothing more 
than “socially constructed impositions upon life . . . ,” Tartaglia argues. 19 
Although our goals can seem like absolute imperatives, when we step outside of 
the social framework, we see that every human goal is “optional and ultimately 
pointless,” according to Tartaglia.20    
Tartaglia expresses admiration for the religious-based way in which John 
Cottingham and Joshua Seachris have analyzed questions about life’s meaning.21 
In contrast, Tartaglia does not discuss the characteristics of his envisioned 
“transcendent context of meaning” or use the words “God” or “transcendent 
being.” Rather, he tries to distance his view from theistic accounts of 
transcendence. For example, he argues, “there is no need to associate 
transcendence with religious meaning . . . .”22  
The transcendent context of meaning, as imagined by Tartaglia, has the ability 
to create the universe and human life for a purpose. To have this ability, it would 
be necessary for the “transcendent context of meaning” to think, plan, and have a 
goal(s). Thus, although Tartaglia does not mention “God” or a “transcendent 
being,” I will sometimes refer to his envisioned “transcendent context of meaning” 
as a “transcendent being.”  
Tartaglia’s argument that life is meaningless, in the absence of a transcendent 
context of meaning, is similar to the argument made by some theists, such as 
William Lane Craig, who contend that life without God would be meaningless.23 
However, unlike Craig, Tartaglia does not think that nihilism is “bad.”24 He 
thinks it is just a “neutral fact.”25 Tartaglia is adamant that nihilism will not lead 
                                                     
17 Ibid., pp. 6-7.  
18 Ibid., pp. 57-60.  
19 Ibid., p. 23.  
20 Ibid., p. 27.  
21 Ibid., on p. 19, Tartaglia discusses Cottingham (2003) and Seachris (2013a). 
22 Ibid., p. 170. 
23 See Craig (2000). 
24 Tartaglia (2016a), pp. 5-6. Another difference between the views of Tartaglia and Craig is that Craig 
maintains that God and personal immortality are both necessary for life to be meaningful. Tartaglia 
does not discuss personal immortality.  
25 Ibid., p. ix.  
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us to give up on, or care less about, our projects, activities, and relationships 
because when we realize there is no purpose of life, we will then step back into 
the social framework and reengage with our goals.26  
   
3. Why Transcendence is Unnecessary for Humanity to be Meaningful 
 
Tartaglia argues that the famous question, “What is the meaning of life?” boils 
down to the question “[W]hat are we here for?”27 I disagree. This latter question 
is too narrowly focused to serve as a guide in our search for a meaning of life. As 
philosophers have long recognized, there is an amalgam of questions about 
meaning of life, including the question “What makes life valuable?”28 This latter 
question holds out the possibility that human life could be meaningful and 
valuable regardless of whether it was created for a purpose.   
The universe does not exist for a purpose and, therefore, human life does not 
exist within a wider, context of meaning, Tartaglia contends. Tartaglia uses the 
phrase “context of meaning,” in an overly narrow way, to mean a context that has 
a purpose. As I will argue, the universe provides human life with a context of 
meaning despite whether the universe was created for a purpose or is inherently 
purposeful.  
By comparing the universe to other contexts that would be unsupportive of 
leading meaningful lives, as I will do, it becomes clear that the universe provides 
human life with a context of meaning. There are different ways that a context 
could be unsupportive of human flourishing. First, there might be a zero 
probability that intelligent life would originate in the context. Second, the context 
might be habitable to intelligent life, but the nature of that context might prevent 
one from engaging in meaning-conferring activities. For example, the species 
might have to spend all of its time searching for food and shelter and have no time 
left for meaningful activities. Alternatively, the species might have time to create 
things of value, such as artwork, but these things might disintegrate as soon as 
they are created.   
We naturally emerged in this universe and it unknowingly nourishes and 
sustains us. Although the things we create do not last forever, they generally last 
                                                     
26 Ibid., pp. 43, 175. In contrast, Kahane (2016) argues that belief in nihilism would have detrimental 
consequences.      
27 Ibid., pp. 1-2. 
28 See, for example, Hepburn (2000), pp. 261-276. For more discussion about the “amalgam thesis,” 
see Seachris (2013b), pp. 9-10.  
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long enough for them to enrich our lives. The universe has given rise to some 
intrinsically valuable goods. Goods often mentioned by objectivists include 
knowledge, autonomy, loving relationships, achievements, and excellence. By 
pursuing and promoting these and other goods, it adds meaning to our lives, and 
does so regardless of whether there is a transcendent context of meaning.   
Early in his book, Tartaglia argues that a transcendent context of meaning is 
necessary for life to be meaningful. Later, he adds a new requirement - that this 
transcendent context of meaning be a “final context,” which is a context that “does 
not depend for its existence upon another, wider context.”29 He contends that this 
is not an overly strong requirement. Unless the context is final, we could 
disengage from a purpose for which life was created, which would make it merely 
an optional pursuit within life instead of something that is constitutive of life, 
according to Tartaglia. He indicates that the purpose “would have to be something 
that determines the significance of our behaviour whether we like it or not . . . it 
would be like a game we could not stop playing.”30  
Under these conditions, it becomes difficult to see how we could have free 
will. Even if the purpose was not worth our efforts or evil, we could not stop 
implementing it.  
If the purpose would have to “determine the significance” of our behavior, as 
Tartaglia indicates, does this mean that we could not make any decisions on our 
own? Alternatively, does it mean that we could make some decisions, but that 
these decisions could be overridden? For example, if you want to spend time with 
a loved one, could the purpose or transcendent being override your decision and 
force you to do something else instead? As Robert Nozick indicated, “Without 
free will we seem diminished, merely the playthings of external causes. Our value 
seems undercut.”31  
Kurt Baier, in a well-known lecture, argued that having a purpose imposed 
upon us by a superior being would be degrading. He writes, “If . . . I ask a man . . . 
‘What is your purpose?’ I am insulting him. I might as well have asked, ‘What are 
you for?’ Such questions reduce him to the level of a gadget, a domestic animal, 
or perhaps a slave.”32 In response, Metz has argued that it would not necessarily 
be disrespectful for God to have assigned human life a purpose.33 If God assigned 
                                                     
29 Tartaglia (2016a), p. 49. 
30 Ibid., p. 49. 
31 Nozick (1981), p. 2. See also discussion by Fischer (2005). 
32 Baier (2000), p. 120. 
33 Metz (2000), pp. 297-300 and (2013), pp. 102-103.  
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the purpose as a request rather than a command, then this need not be degrading. 
I believe this is correct. However, having a purpose imposed upon us in the 
controlling way that Tartaglia envisions would be degrading.  
Tartaglia compares a meaning of life to the possibility of achieving checkmate 
in chess. He seems disappointed that human life does not have a purpose, as does 
a game of chess. Under the conditions that Tartaglia claims are necessary for life 
to be meaningful, human beings would be like the pawns in the game of chess. 
Even if we achieved the purpose for which we were created, because our actions 
were predetermined, or at least heavily influenced, this achievement would not be 
our own. Rather, it would be an achievement by the transcendent being.  
Some people feel threatened by the thought that life arose through chance. For 
example, Craig argues that, if the universe and humanity arose through chance, 
“Man is just a lump of slime that evolved into rationality.”34 If life originated by 
chance, this suggests that life was unintended and that it was contingent, meaning 
that there was a possibility it might never have come into existence. Craig and 
Tartaglia falsely assume that being created for a purpose by a transcendent being 
is the only way that humanity could be meaningful. There is, however, another 
pathway by which humanity could be meaningful. By engaging with the 
intrinsically valuable goods in the universe, it adds meaning to our individual lives, 
which in turn adds meaning to humanity.  
Tartaglia acknowledges that our individual lives are “contingently valuable.” 
He writes, “For although our nature is not intrinsically valuable, we value many 
things, including ourselves. We might not have done so, so this value is not 
essential to what we are, or to the other things we value.”35 He laments that value 
“does not flow inevitably from our nature . . . .”36 Tartaglia assumes that if there 
were a transcendent context of meaning, and if this context explained why we 
exist, that this would somehow make human life inevitably valuable. However, 
this is a false assumption because even if human life were created for a worthy 
purpose by a transcendent being, human life would still be contingently valuable 
because the transcendent being could have decided not to create us.37   
Why do some people want human life to have been inevitable? They think 
that being inevitable would make life valuable, but this is not necessarily true. 
                                                     
34 Craig (2000), p. 45. Tartaglia (2016a) discusses contingency on p. 50.  
35 Tartaglia (2016a), p. 6. 
36 Ibid., p. 6. 
37 For earlier discussion about contingency, see Trisel (2012b) and Metz (2013), pp. 83-84. Seachris 
(2013a, p. 609) acknowledges that humanity is contingent from the perspective of Christianity.  
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Consider, for example, bedbugs – an insect that feeds on blood. Even if the 
universe was non-contingent, such as being infinitely old, and it was inevitable 
that bedbugs would arise in this universe, bedbugs would still not be valuable.  
Early in his book, Tartaglia asserts that the hypothesis of a transcendent 
meaning is “worthy of faith,”38 but later he discards this hypothesis because it is 
too remote of a possibility to be taken seriously.39 There is an additional reason 
to reject the hypothesis that humanity was created by a transcendent being to “do 
something.” If humanity had been created to carry out a purpose, our role would 
have been revealed to us long ago. It would be self-defeating for a transcendent 
being to give humanity a role in carrying out a purpose, but then not reveal our 
role to us.40 This would be like a person creating a business and hiring workers, 
but then failing to tell them the mission of the business and their role. It is the stuff 
of comedy to imagine these workers being bored to tears, while the business 
owner sobs loudly after learning that the business is losing money. Of course, no 
competent owner of a business would fail to tell the workers what they were hired 
“to do” because failing to provide this essential information would be self-
defeating.  
To sum up this section, the universe provides human life with a context of 
meaning by having given rise to intelligent life, by unknowingly sustaining us, 
and by containing intrinsically valuable goods. By engaging with these goods, it 
adds meaning to our individual lives and to humanity. This outcome occurs 
regardless of whether the universe and humanity were created for a purpose by a 
transcendent context of meaning. Not only is a transcendent purpose unnecessary 
for our lives to be meaningful, the one envisioned by Tartaglia would be degrading.  
In response, Tartaglia will likely argue that I have not addressed the questions 
about “meaning of life,” but have only shown that our individual lives can be 
meaningful - something he does not dispute. Tartaglia wants us to focus on the 
question “What is the meaning of life?” where “life” refers to “humanity.” But to 
know whether humanity is, or can be, meaningful, we must first answer the 
fundamental question of “What is humanity?” The answer to this question might 
seem obvious, which likely explains why the question has not been explored. 
However, as I hope to show in the next section, the answer to this question is not 
obvious, and is one of the keys for unlocking the mystery of whether human life 
                                                     
38 Tartaglia (2016a), p. 53. 
39 Ibid., pp. 169-184. 
40 I provide a more detailed version of this argument in Trisel (2012a).  
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is, or can be, meaningful.    
 
4. What is Humanity? – Holism versus Individualism 
 
Bertrand Russell made a distinction between a class as a whole and a class as 
many. For example, we can think of a navy as a whole or as many sailors, as he 
indicated.41 As I will argue, we can also think of “humanity” as one or many. 
More specifically, Tartaglia (and most other people I suspect) thinks of humanity 
as a whole - a perspective I will refer to as holism. We can also conceive of 
humanity as the many, individual human beings that make up the whole – a 
perspective I will refer to as individualism.   
Before exploring the question “What is humanity?” it will be helpful to start 
with a discussion of a group that is easier to understand – the New York Yankees 
(hereafter “Yankees”). If we imagine we are watching a Yankees baseball game, 
we see the individual players, bats, and ball. It is uncontroversial that these 
concrete objects exist. But does the Yankees, as a group, also exist?42 Some 
proponents of ontological individualism deny that groups exist.43 Thus, they will 
deny that the Yankees, as a group, won the World Series in 2009.   
Many philosophers believe in the reality of groups. Even if we assume that 
the Yankees, as a group, exist, there are two different ways of explaining their 
achievement of winning the World Series. Methodological holists will argue that 
this group achievement was more than the sum of the achievements by the 
individual players because of the synergistic effects of the players working 
together. In contrast, proponents of methodological individualism will maintain 
that this achievement was nothing more than the sum of the individual 
achievements.  
Individuals can have rights, be blameworthy or praiseworthy, and be bearers 
of meaning. Can groups do the same? There has been extensive analysis of 
whether groups can have rights and be blameworthy, but there has been very little 
discussion about whether groups can be praiseworthy and meaningful.    
Do human beings constitute a group? If so, what type of group is it? Katherine 
                                                     
41 Russell (1903), p. 68. Ritchie (2013, p. 258) makes the case that a group, like a class, can be 
thought of as one or many. 
42 For further discussion, see Ritchie (2013) .  
43 Other proponents of ontological individualism acknowledge that groups exist, but maintain that 
groups and other social phenomena are exhaustively determined by properties or facts about 
individuals.  
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Ritchie outlines various criteria for determining what qualifies as a “social 
group.”44 Some of these criteria include that a social group can be located in space 
and time and have different members at different times. Because other objects, 
such as trees, also meet most of the criteria she specifies, Ritchie adds the 
requirement that the members intended to form the group. In a later article, Ritchie 
distinguishes between “organized” and “unorganized” social groups. Whereas the 
members of organized social groups, such as committees, need to cooperate to 
achieve the goal(s) of the group, the members of unorganized social groups, such 
as racial and gender groups, “do not need to intend to cooperate or act in concord 
with other members of the group.”45   
One might try to argue that all human beings have shared intentions and, 
therefore, qualify as an “organized social group.” This argument, however, would 
be a stretch. Unlike the members of organized social groups, not all human beings 
have a shared goal. Indeed, some people have conflicting goals.  
It seems plausible that human beings constitute an “unorganized social group.” 
Another option would be to conceive of human beings in the same way as 
biologists - as a species. But this might not get us very far in understanding the 
ontology of humanity because it leads to another, unresolved question: “What is 
a species and how do you distinguish one species from another?”46 Because there 
is vigorous debate about the ontological status of social groups and species, more 
work will be needed to determine whether human beings make up a group and, if 
so, what type of group it is. I raise these questions about the ontology of humanity, 
and hope others will join me in exploring them, because addressing these 
questions is necessary for understanding whether it makes sense to think that 
humanity could be meaningful. In what follows, I will assume that human beings 
are an “unorganized social group” and that such a group can be a bearer of 
meaning.  
Tartaglia thinks of a meaning of life as a meaning that is possessed by 
humanity, as a whole.47 If we think of “humanity,” not in the traditional holistic 
way, but as the many individuals that comprise the group, it reveals a different 
way that humanity could become meaningful. As I will argue, when individuals 
accrue meaning in their lives, by, for example, making intellectual or moral 
                                                     
44 Ritchie (2013), pp. 258-260. 
45 Ritchie (2015), pp. 313-314.  
46 For further discussion about this question, see Ereshefsky (2016).  
47 Targalia (2016a), p. 54. 
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achievements, this also adds meaning to humanity. As more individual lives 
become meaningful, there is a corresponding increase in the meaning of human 
life. Irving Singer made a few comments suggesting that he also believed that 
humanity could become meaningful through the efforts of individual human 
beings. He writes: “To the extent that life becomes meaningful in this 
accumulative way, its total meaning is increased.”48 The two perspectives of how 
humanity could be meaningful are as follows.  
 
Meaning of Life – Holism: A meaning of life is a meaning possessed by 
humanity, as a group, rather than by individual human beings.   
 
Meaning of Life – Individualism: A meaning of life is a meaning that 
humanity accrues as individual human beings engage with intrinsically 
valuable goods. This meaning is equal to the sum of the meaning in the 
lives of individual human beings.  
 
There could be holistic or individualistic versions of supernaturalism 49  and 
naturalism. For example, with the traditional view of supernaturalistic holism (as 
I will call it), God assigns the same purpose(s) to everyone. In contrast, Jacob 
Affolter suggests that God could assign each person a unique purpose.50 He does 
not argue that these unique purposes need to be related. Affolter’s view 
exemplifies supernaturalistic individualism. 
In the next section, I will seek to support a naturalistic and individualistic 
account of meaning of life, which I will call “naturalistic individualism.” Before 
doing so, I will point out some problems that arise with Tartaglia’s version of 
supernaturalistic holism. According to Tartaglia, “if you ask about the meaning of 
life, the answer will apply to everybody . . . .”51 When thinking about whether 
humanity was created for a purpose, we must keep in mind that “humanity” is not 
something that exists independently of human beings. Rather, humanity is 
comprised of individual human beings. Furthermore, the members of humanity 
are not static, but change over time, as new human beings are born and existing 
human beings die. With this in mind, suppose that a transcendent being created 
                                                     
48 Singer (1996), p. 42. See also pp. 44-45.  
49 For more discussion about supernaturalism, see Metz (2013), pp. 77-118. 
50 Affolter (2007), p. 453. 
51 Tartaglia (2015), p. 93. See also (2016a), p. 7. 
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the universe and wanted to see if intelligent life could be created from matter. The 
transcendent being successfully created the first two human beings – a man and a 
woman. Let us also suppose that these two individuals were not created to “do 
something” and that the transcendent being was indifferent to whether they had 
children. These two individuals lived for 60 years and had many children who, in 
turn, had additional offspring. After 200,000 years, humanity consisted of seven 
billion people, let us suppose. To state it formally: 
 
At t1, humanity was comprised of two members who were created for a 
purpose by a transcendent being.  
 
At t200,000, humanity was comprised of seven billion members who were not  
created for a purpose by a transcendent being.  
 
Tartaglia claims that whether human life is meaningful will apply to “everybody,” 
but in the above scenario, where only the first two members of humanity were 
created for a purpose by a transcendent being, it is unclear that this is true. Is 
humanity, as a whole, meaningful or meaningless in this scenario? It would be 
helpful if Tartaglia would let us know the answer to this question.  
In the following different scenario, suppose that a transcendent being created 
all human beings to “do something.” Suppose also that this transcendent being 
made our role clear to us, but that only 20% of people contributed toward 
implementing the purpose. The remaining 80% of human beings disregarded the 
purpose and spent all their time watching television. In this scenario, where only 
20% of people contribute, is humanity meaningful or meaningless? If humanity is 
meaningless, what level of participation by human beings would be required for 
humanity to be meaningful? Would 51% of human beings have to contribute to 
the purpose or would the percentage have to be 80% or 100%? Where do you draw 
the line and how do you defend, in a non-arbitrary way, where it is drawn? 
At first, the holistic account might seem appealing because of its simplicity at 
conceiving of human life, as a whole, as either possessing or lacking meaning. 
However, as shown by the preceding thought experiment, this simplicity quickly 
disappears as we think more deeply about what humanity is and how human 
beings, with our freedom and diverse interests, would carry out an assigned 
purpose. Tartaglia might respond that the above situation would not happen 
because human beings would be unable to disengage from the purpose (in the 
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scenario he envisions). But if our actions are predetermined, or everyone is forced 
to implement this purpose, it then becomes difficult to see how this would confer 
meaning on humanity.  
 
5. Researching Meaning of Life from the Bottom-up 
 
In discussing “What is philosophy?” Tartaglia contends that philosophy was 
originally motivated by questions of ontology and enframement; “we wanted to 
know what exists and why it exists.”52 He uses the word “enframement” to mean 
being situated within a context of meaning. In recounting the history of philosophy, 
Tartaglia argues that to determine whether there is a meaning of life, “a natural 
place to start is with the ontological question of whether there are any gods to 
provide a wider framework within which human life exists.”53   
This “top-down” approach, as I will call it, to researching questions about 
meaning of life has proven to be unsuccessful. For thousands of years, there has 
been speculation and discussion about gods and transcendence, yet human beings 
have made little progress in understanding the questions about meaning of life. 
Instead of continuing the top-down approach to researching the topic of meaning 
of life, we would be better served with a new, bottom-up approach.   
From the perspective of naturalistic individualism, the source of life’s meaning 
is not a supernatural being, but the interaction between individual human beings 
and intrinsically valuable, natural goods. By explaining what gives meaning to the 
life of a person, the philosophical and psychological research that has been 
conducted during the last thirty years provides a good starting point for a bottom-
up approach to researching meaning of life. Besides continuing this research on 
“meaning in life,” an additional necessary step for a bottom-up approach would 
be to determine whether the meaning that we accrue in our individual lives can 
serve as a foundation for making humanity meaningful, as I hypothesize.   
With naturalistic individualism, the extent to which humanity is meaningful 
equals the sum of the meaning in the lives of individual human beings. For this 
proposed account to be plausible, (1) meaning must be measurable; (2) meaning 
must be comparable among individuals; (3) human beings must constitute a 
group; and (4) this type of group must be capable of being a bearer of meaning.  
If meaning cannot be measured, then of course it cannot be aggregated. If 
                                                     
52 Tartaglia (2016a), p. 71.  
53 Ibid., p. 71.  
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meaning is measurable, but not comparable among individuals, then it could be 
aggregated, but the aggregate number would be unintelligible - it would be like 
adding apples and oranges. Finally, if meaning is measurable and comparable, but 
human beings do not make up a group, or are a group but this group is not a bearer 
of meaning, then the aggregate number would not represent the extent to which 
humanity is meaningful. Rather, it would simply be the sum of the meaning in our 
individual lives. Similarly, if there are no “nations” in this world, but only persons, 
it would be inappropriate to conclude that the sum of the wealth of persons in a 
particular geographic area reflects the wealth of a given “nation.”  
There is debate about which metric(s) we should use to assess the quality of 
our lives. Recently, researchers have begun to measure “subjective well-being” in 
addition to, or sometimes instead of, happiness. For example, although the World 
Happiness Report contains happiness in the title, it is a report about “subjective 
well-being,” as the report acknowledges. The report compares the degree of 
subjective well-being by country.54 In this study, the primary question to measure 
well-being is as follows. Imagine a ladder with 10 possible steps, with the bottom 
step representing the worst possible life for you and the top step representing the 
best possible life for you. “On which step of the ladder would you say you 
personally feel you stand at this time?”55 
The data source for this “life ladder” question is the Gallup World Poll. Gallup 
conducts this poll in more than 160 countries that include 99% of the world’s adult 
population. They select a representative sample of about 1,000 individuals from 
each country so that the results will be generalizable to the various countries.  
Amitai Etzioni argues that happiness and subjective well-being are inferior 
measures because they fail to take into account whether people are living up to 
their moral responsibilities. 56  In response, Metz makes the case that 
meaningfulness should be included as one of the metrics for appraising a society 
because it is not reducible to happiness or morality.57 But is meaningfulness 
something that we can measure and compare?  
To reflect on the preceding question, it might be helpful to list the different 
aspects that are involved in measuring subjective well-being, as I will do in the 
                                                     
54 See Helliwell (2015), p. 26.  
55 A discussion of the survey methodology can be found in the “Statistical Appendix” at  
<http://worldhappiness.report/ed/2015/> or at <http://www.gallup.com/178667/gallup-world-poll-
work.aspx>. 
56 Etzioni (2016). 
57 Metz (2016b).  
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table below, and then to think about these aspects as they relate to meaningfulness. 
First, we can ask, “Who is being evaluated?” With the Gallup World Poll, those 
being evaluated include the respondents to the survey and each country. Although 
Gallup conducts the interviews, the respondents rate their own subjective well-
being. Thus, these are internal or self-evaluations of well-being, rather than an 
external evaluation of the participants in the study.58 If Gallup were to ask the 
question, “Is your life going well?” this question would have only two possible 
answers: “yes” and “no.” It would be a binary variable. Rather, their “life ladder” 
question reflects the assumption that there are degrees of well-being. Thus, they 
treat well-being as an ordinal variable.  
 
Aspects of Measuring Subjective Well-Being 
Who is Being Evaluated? Individual Respondents to the Survey and 
the Countries in Which They Reside 
Who Performs the 
Evaluation? 
Self-Evaluation 
Type of Measure Subjective 
Is the Measure Binary or 
Ordinal? 
“Life ladder” question is ordinal 
  
Measuring meaningfulness is more controversial than measuring happiness or 
subjective well-being. There is debate about what meaning is, whether it is 
objective or subjective, and whether meaning is something that is present or 
absent or whether there are degrees of meaningfulness. There is also debate about 
how meaningfulness should be measured, namely whether it should be measured 
internally or externally.  
Metz, with his “fundamentality theory,” hypothesizes that one’s life is more 
meaningful, the more that one orients one’s rationality toward fundamental 
conditions of human existence.59 Some critics of this theory, including Masahiro 
Morioka, deny that there are degrees of meaningfulness and that it is possible to 
make interpersonal comparisons of meaning. Morioka has proposed an internalist 
account of meaning in life. He argues that the question about meaning in life is 
often asked in the following way, “does my life like this have any meaning at 
                                                     
58 See Helliwell (2015, pp. 17-20) for discussion about why they measure well-being internally rather 
than externally.  
59 Metz (2013).  
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all?”60 He contends that this question has only two possible responses (“yes” and 
“no”) and can be answered only by the person who asks the question. 
Even if meaning is binary and not objective, it would still be possible to make 
some interpersonal comparisons of meaningfulness. For example, one could 
calculate the number and percent of people living in a country who self-report that 
their lives are meaningful. However, because these individuals might have 
different conceptions of “meaningfulness,” these results would be less useful, 
from a policymaking perspective, than they would be if meaning were objective.  
If we knew whether meaning was objective (as I believe) or subjective, it 
would help to determine how we should measure meaningfulness. For example, 
if meaning is purely subjective, then the person being evaluated would be in the 
best position to know whether his or her life is meaningful. Alternatively, if 
meaning is objective, then one could be mistaken about whether one’s life is 
meaningful. Consequently, this would lend support to those philosophers who 
think meaningfulness should be measured using mind-independent, external 
standards.  
Tartaglia argues that there are four different notions of “meaning” and that 
meaningfulness is culturally specific.61 Unless there is a way of resolving these 
disputes about the nature of “meaning,” this will pose a serious threat to the 
prospect of measuring meaningfulness. Because we are at an early stage of 
analyzing what it means to say that a person’s life is meaningful, I remain hopeful 
that we will be able to work through these issues.  
If it turns out that meaning is objective, measurable, and comparable among 
individuals, then it would be possible to aggregate this meaning and to have 
confidence that the aggregate number is intelligible. Moreover, if human beings 
constitute an “unorganized social group,” and this type of group can be a bearer 
of meaning, then the sum of the meaning in our individual lives would represent 
the extent to which humanity is meaningful.    
One way that critics will challenge these claims is by attempting to raise doubt 
that an “unorganized social group” could be meaningful. That human beings 
constitute an unorganized social group does not mean there is no cooperation 
among human beings. Rather, it only means that not all members of humanity 
have a shared goal. However, many human beings do have shared goals, such as 
the teams of scientists who are researching a cure for cancer. Let us compare two 
                                                     
60 Morioka (2015), p. 55. 
61 Tartaglia (2015), pp. 103-106. See also Tartaglia (2016a), p. 14.  
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scenarios. The first scenario reflects the current state of our lives. The second 
scenario reflects our current lives with the following changes: human beings have 
discovered how life originated, have attained an understanding of how 
consciousness arises in human beings, and have recently discovered a cure for all 
types of cancer. Even if human beings are an “unorganized social group,” it seems 
to make sense to say that humanity is more meaningful in the second scenario 
than in the first. 
I suspect that Tartaglia will be unconvinced that accruing meaning in our 
individual lives can provide a foundation for making humanity meaningful. He 
will likely maintain that humanity is meaningless no matter what we do in our 
lives. Tartaglia’s claim that humanity is meaningless is based on the hidden 
assumption that human beings make up a group and that this group had the 
potential to be meaningful (if it had been created for a purpose by a transcendent 
being). If human beings do not make up a group that has the potential to be 
meaningful, then claiming that “humanity” is “meaningful” or “meaningless” 
would be nonsensical. Furthermore, under these conditions, it would be irrational 
for anyone to worry that “humanity” is meaningless.   
Let us now return to discussing naturalistic individualism. I will conclude this 
section by responding to a potential, different criticism of this proposed account 
of meaning of life. One might argue that this account implies that we should 
maximize the meaning of human life. This account leads, a critic will argue, to the 
counterintuitive conclusion that we should create billions upon billions of future 
people, even if their lives would only have a tiny amount of meaning in them. 
Because the meaning of human life is an aggregation of the meaning in the lives 
of human beings, creating vast numbers of new human beings would make 
humanity much more meaningful than it currently is. However, this conclusion is 
repugnant because the lives of these new persons might only have a negligible 
amount of meaning in them.62  
The universe, as a context of meaning, unknowingly supports our desire to 
lead meaningful lives, but this support will collapse if we create too many people. 
                                                     
62 See Parfit (1984) for the original formulation of the “Repugnant Conclusion.” He begins by stating 
the “Impersonal Average Principle,” which is, “If other things are equal, the best outcome is the one in 
which people’s lives go, on average, best” (p. 386). He then considers a Hedonistic and a non-
Hedonistic version of this principle. He expresses the non-Hedonistic version in terms of maximizing 
“the quality of lives.” In contrast, I discuss maximizing the meaning in our lives. The concept of a 
“quality life” is more encompassing than that of a “meaningful life,” and takes into account a number 
of factors including the amount of meaning and happiness in that life.  
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Creating vast numbers of new people might make humanity more meaningful in 
the short run, but it would have counterproductive and devastating long-term 
consequences. It would deplete and overwhelm the biosphere and likely result in 
the extinction of humanity and many other forms of life. Thus, if we were to 
pursue the goal of maximizing the meaning of human life, it would need to be 
balanced against the goal of preserving the biosphere.  
There is an alternative, better way of making humanity more meaningful that 
does not involve creating vast numbers of future people. By supporting and 
encouraging existing human beings to engage with intrinsically valuable goods, it 
can help them to realize their potential and lead meaningful lives, which in turn 
will enhance the meaning of human life.    
 
6. Conclusion  
 
Because the topic of “meaning of life,” in recent years, has been 
overshadowed by discussion about “meaning in life,” I found it refreshing to read 
Tartaglia’s works. I disagree, however, with his top-down and narrow approach 
for researching the topic of meaning of life and with his conclusion that human 
life is meaningless. Like Tartaglia, I do not think that life was created for a purpose. 
However, lacking an assigned purpose would not necessarily render human life 
meaningless because there is at least one other way that human life could become 
meaningful.  
I have pointed out two conceptions of humanity, one that focuses on the group, 
as a whole, and one that focuses on the “many human beings” that comprise the 
group. By conceiving of humanity in the individualistic way, and combining this 
individualism with objective naturalism, it reveals a pathway by which humanity 
could become meaningful. It is through the efforts of individuals that a sports team, 
university, nation, or other group is successful. Similarly, it is through the efforts 
of individuals that humanity could become meaningful.  
Finally, I have responded to Tartaglia’s claim that the research on “meaning 
in life” is trivial by explaining how this research is related to understanding how 
humanity could become meaningful. This research is important not only for 
explaining what gives meaning to the life of a person, but for the larger reason of 
explaining what we, as individuals, can do to make humanity meaningful.  
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Reply to Brooke Alan Trisel  
James Tartaglia* 
 
Brooke Alan Trisel is an advocate of the ‘meaning in life’ research programme 
and his paper lays out, with admirable clarity and passion, exactly why he thinks 
it is important. Trisel is very unusual among these figures, however, for he neither 
conflates ‘meaning in life’ with ‘the meaning of life’, nor dismissively puts the 
latter to one side. Rather, he thinks that an account of meaning in life might 
provide an answer to the question of the meaning of life. He is not sure, however; 
he thinks it might, but that more work is needed to find out whether it actually 
can. The idea that it would provide the answer is simple enough: through 
individual people doing meaningful things (building up their meaning in life), the 
meaning aggregates, thereby making human life as a whole meaningful (providing 
us with the meaning of life). The problem is that he is not sure whether the 
meaning can aggregate in such a way as to answer the big question, because he is 
not sure that humanity can constitute a group; although he is sympathetic to the 
view that humanity counts as an ‘unorganized social group’. Nevertheless, despite 
these sympathies, he cautiously concedes that if ‘human beings do not make up a 
group that has the potential to be meaningful, then claiming that “humanity” is 
“meaningful” or “meaningless” would be nonsensical’ (p. 176). So there are only 
two viable answers to the question of the meaning of life, on Trisel’s view: either 
the question makes no sense (if humanity is not a group), or the meaning of life is 
the aggregate of the meanings of individual lives.  
Nihilism is a non-starter, on Trisel’s view, given the existence of social 
meaning. But what about the religious answer that life is provided with meaning 
by a transcendent context? Suppose there is such a context, and suppose also that 
humanity constitutes a group. In that case, we would have two competing answers 
to the question of the meaning of life. This suggests to me that Trisel has invented 
a new question. Here are some indicators of this. Firstly, on his view, the question 
may not make sense, depending on how work on the metaphysics of groups turns 
out. But it evidently does make some kind of sense, given that so many people 
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have asked it; even if we assume that philosophers will one day determine the 
definitive truth about groups, which I would not, the result of this would not be 
the abandonment of the question as senseless, but rather a reinterpretation of the 
question which captured its sense. Another indicator is that nihilism is not even 
possible on his view, given the manifest situation we all find ourselves in. And yet 
in full awareness of that situation, many sensible people have worried about, and 
even endorsed, nihilism. How can they have failed to notice that our actions have 
meaning for others and for ourselves? The indicator I began with is clearest, 
however, for suppose the transcendent meaning were revealed to us in some 
epistemically indisputable fashion: God simultaneously interrupts everybody’s 
consciousness to reveal a mind-blowing answer which makes perfect sense. I 
doubt anybody – Trisel included – would say: ‘No, that’s not the meaning of life! 
Analytic philosophy already answered that one. You’re answering a different 
question.’ What would that ‘different question’ be, exactly? 
What God would have to tell us is the reason there is a reality; a reality that 
includes both humans and God, of course. In light of this reason, he might have 
to tell us not only the meaning of human life, but of his own life too – if this had 
any bearing on the meaning of our lives, as it presumably would. As I stressed 
from the outset in Meaningless, any answer to the question of the meaning of life 
must address this existential issue. Otherwise, it would not be true to the intentions 
of this perfectly natural question, and so would not answer it. Nevertheless Trisel 
proceeds to claim that there can be a meaning of life within a physical universe 
that emerged, meaninglessly, from the Big Bang. He accepts that there is no 
meaningful reason for human life, of the kind that only a transcendent context 
could provide. But in that case, the only answer available to him, if he wants to 
stick with the question, is nihilism. Despite his best intentions, however, he does 
not stick with the question, but rather uses the meaning in life idea to invent a new 
one: the question of what aggregate of social meaning our lives collectively 
produce. Imagine announcing to the world: ‘the meaning of life is that our 
knowledge, loving relationships, etc., give us a collective score of X meaning-
points’; the world would respond, ‘that doesn’t tell us why we’re here … and 
what’s the point of doing all of that stuff anyway?’ 
This switch reveals Trisel’s real interest in ‘the meaning of life’, which like 
the rest of the meaning in life advocates, I think, is not metaphysics but rather 
normative ethics. It provides them with an evocative and hence powerful platform 
from which to theorise about how we ought to live our lives; just as religious 
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answers to the original question continue to provide that kind of platform. Since 
I think this muddies the waters, I would rather they restricted themselves to 
theorising directly, in their naturalistic fashion, about what we ought to do in order 
to live the good life; which is all I think they are really doing. There are also 
foundational theoretical flaws to the idea of attaching this label to normative 
theorising, as I argue in the book; much too harshly, I admit (see the introduction 
to this symposium). But the arguments are there and Trisel does not engage with 
any of them. Instead, he goes on the offensive by trying to show that I have my 
own foundational problems; a venerable tactic with a good track-record, of course. 
So let me turn to those arguments.   
The immediate problem I face is that the position Trisel addresses is not my 
own; if this were an issue of fine-grained interpretation then I would simply gloss 
over it. But he says, 
 
Tartaglia argues that humanity was not created for a purpose and, therefore, 
is meaningless. He assumes that humanity could not be meaningful unless 
we were created for a purpose. (p. 160; see also p. 162) 
 
I said that our having a purpose is just a ‘tantalizing possibility’ (PML, p. 2) which 
accounts for much of the human interest in the question, and that as such, ‘the 
only options capable of resolving the issue of its own terms are that reality exists 
for a reason (which either does or does not attribute purpose to human life), or 
that reality does not exist for a reason’ (PML, p. 3; italics added to the original). 
Trisel even quotes me saying that, ‘the meaning of our lives might consist in being 
valuable, rather than having the capacity for doing something valuable [i.e. rather 
than having the capacity to achieve some purpose]’ (p. 162 / PML, p. 2). So surely 
he must have known that my view is that life could be meaningful even if we have 
no purpose, and hence that I did not argue as he says I do. As his title says, human 
life could be unintended but meaningful; I agree.  
This threatens to make my task of responding less interesting than it might 
have been. Thus when Trisel says I use ‘the phrase “context of meaning” in an 
overly narrow way, to mean a context that has a purpose’ (p. 164), this is simply 
incorrect. Likewise, when he suggests that my transcendent context of meaning 
must really be God, since to give the universe a purpose it must be able to ‘think, 
plan, and have a goal(s)’ (p. 163). But rather than pedantically go through the 
paper in this fashion, let me skip to the main argument. 
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The argument is as follows. Suppose God created the physical universe, and 
then made Adam and Eve for the purpose of discovering whether he could make 
intelligent life from matter. There are now seven billion people because of this 
initial act, but God has no purpose for any of us; we are an epiphenomenon of his 
experiment. So, ‘Is humanity, as a whole, meaningful or meaningless in this 
scenario?’ (p. 171). Then in a variation, Trisel supposes that God makes humanity 
for a purpose, but only 20% of people pay heed to it. Would humanity then be 
meaningful? And if not, what percentage of triers would be required? 
The answer is that it depends on whether there is a transcendent context of 
meaning in which God and the physical universe exists, and if so, what its nature 
is. If there is one, then if that context attributes meaning to humanity as a whole, 
then humanity is meaningful. If that context attributes meaning to just one person, 
or perhaps just their finger, then that person, or just their finger, is meaningful. If 
that context does not attribute meaning to humanity as a whole, then either 
humanity as a whole, or just the people (or body-parts) it misses out, would be 
meaningless. But if there is no context of meaning, then we have a much simpler 
answer: humanity as a whole is meaningless. Now you might be inclined to object 
that the context could not make just one person meaningful, and especially not 
just one person’s finger, because their existence would be implicated with others: 
the meaning of their ancestors would be to give rise to the meaningful people, for 
instance. To react in this way, however, would demonstrate a ‘failure to grasp the 
enormity of a transcendent hypothesis of meaning’ (PML, p. 52), as I put it. For 
if the physical universe really does exist within a wider context of meaning, we 
really have no idea what is going on: the kind of reasoning employed in the 
objection, which works in the objective world, goes straight out of the window. 
That is why I describe such hypotheses as idle possibilities. My nihilism, by 
contrast, takes it for granted that our notions of a meaningful reality will not apply 
to the transcendent context; and if reality is not meaningful, then it is meaningless, 
just as objective thought suggests it is. 
Trisel’s objection takes it that I am thinking of God making people for a 
purpose, which would be a highly specific hypothesis about transcendent reality, 
of the kind our cultural history primes us for. Within these strictures, he supposes 
that God’s purpose for Adam and Eve would make their lives meaningful. But 
that would depend on whether God’s existence was meaningful; and if it was, 
whether the meaningful context that made him meaningful also made his purpose 
for Adam and Eve meaningful. But perhaps the idea is that God actually is the 
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transcendent context; he provides his own self-explanatory context, rather as for 
physicalists, the physical universe provides its own meaningless context. I think 
this is what Trisel has in mind. Well in that case, monistic pantheism would be 
true: God would be reality. What one of ‘his purposes’ could be, in that case, I 
really have no idea; but luckily my view that positive transcendent hypotheses of 
meaning are baseless exempts me from having to speculate. However, if his 
purposes are required to make us meaningful, then I myself would not say that 
humanity as a whole is meaningful unless we are not all covered; if one person is 
missed out then it is simply the vast majority of human life that is meaningful. 
But to be honest, had I not decided to play ball, I could have quite legitimately 
responded from the outset that Trisel’s questions are for the theologians. All I 
claim is that if reality is transcendent, then human life could be meaningful; the 
meaningful context could implicate everyone, so humanity, construed as either a 
group or a collection of individuals, could be meaningful. Questions about what 
to say if it does not implicate everyone, what bearing God’s purposes play, etc., 
are simply not for me; given that I do not think there is any such context. 
Another issue for the theologians that Trisel presents me with concerns 
whether a meaningful life would be ‘degrading’ and lacking in free will (pp. 165-
6). This is because I said that if we live in a meaningful context, then our actions 
would have their meaning bestowed by this context whether we liked it or not. 
But Trisel himself thinks there are intrinsically meaningful activities; he has not 
realised that this places him in exactly the same boat. If we enter into a loving 
relationship, on his view, this will be meaningful whether we like it or not. Does 
that make such relationships degrading, and does it follow that we cannot enter 
into them freely? These are not questions for me, but personally I do not feel 
degraded by my lack of choice over the objective interpretations that hold true of 
me, such as those concerning my age and eye-colour; if Trisel or the religious 
philosophers are right, then the meaning of all our actions would figure among 
these. If this worries him, then perhaps he should reconsider his commitment to 
moral objectivism. 
The distinction between holism and individualism about groups has no 
relevance to my position, because if there is no transcendent context of meaning, 
human life is meaningless however you construe it. Moreover, Trisel is mistaken 
in thinking that my holistic approach neglects the individualist question, because 
as I make plain in the book, if human life is meaningless, then every individual 
person’s life is too. He says that this top-down approach has made no progress (p. 
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172), but I deny this. This sounds to me like frustration at our inability to discover 
the meaning of life: only one answer is deemed acceptable, because of the false 
assumption that nihilism is bad. Trisel pigeon-holes me with the religious thinkers 
on this issue, but all I said is that they have the question right; unlike naturalists 
who transform it into something they can answer positively, because the influence 
of religion makes them think that nihilism is bad. He thinks I am ‘disappointed’ 
that we lack a purpose and that I ‘lament’ nihilism (p.166). But for what it is worth, 
he has me all wrong: I was actually quite excited when I first started taking 
nihilism seriously as a substantive metaphysical claim.  
At the end of his paper, we see the kind of issue that really concerns Trisel: 
issues such as population explosion and the effects this has on the environment. 
Extremely important, I entirely agree. He wants to use his views on meaning in 
life to address them, but as immediately becomes clear, this make matters worse. 
For if meaning in life is an objective commodity, it makes sense to maximise it by 
increasing the population; but Trisel, like me, does not want the environment to 
be ruined. So he argues that if there were too many people, life would be so bad 
that total meaning would decrease. He will never be able to do those sums, 
however. If he were to forget about meaning in life and argue directly for 
sustainable development, he would have one less problem to worry about. A 
related problem with objectivising meaning as a route to normative ethical 
theorising which I have highlighted (Tartaglia 2016), is that since various different 
senses of a ‘meaningful life’ have widespread currency, promoting this notion 
could exacerbate a phenomenon we are already witnessing, in which people try to 
make their life objectively meaningful by doing morally reprehensible, but 
nevertheless significant or subjectively engaging, things. If the meaning in life 
advocates were arguing against these other senses, then I would obviously not 
object; but it seems to me that they simply presuppose a moral component, and 
that the moral sense they want to promote over others is on the weakest theoretical 
ground if we are talking about something objective. I think that if meaning in life 
advocates want us to value knowledge, art and charity, then they should argue 
directly for why we should value these things, and give up on the meaning in life 
agenda, which encourages them to simply take these things for granted by starting 
with the intuition that, ‘obviously, these things add meaning to life’. 
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Transcendence  
J. J. Valberg* 
 
Abstract 
James Tartaglia in his book Philosophy in a Meaningless Life advances what he calls ‘The 
Transcendent Hypothesis’ as a solution to the problem of consciousness. The present paper examines 
T’s solution in light of his definition of ‘transcendence’, offers several criticisms of the solution, and 
briefly, indicates a conception of consciousness on which the problem does not arise. 
 
1.  
 
James Tartaglia’s Philosophy in a Meaningless Life is a book wide in scope 
and bristling with ideas. We shall mainly focus on just one, viz., his application 
of the concept of transcendence to the problem of consciousness. The problem, as 
he presents it, should be familiar to philosophers; his proposal for solving it, 
however, is novel (at least I have never encountered it before). 
The problem, very roughly, might be stated as follows: whereas the existence 
of consciousness (or experience) cannot be denied, it is not obvious what exactly 
consciousness is. 
Thus, as T explains, identifying it with something going on in the brain or 
anywhere else in the natural world (which T often refers to as ‘objective reality’) 
– a view to which many contemporary philosophers have subscribed – seems, at 
least in some respects, to clash with our everyday conception of consciousness, 
and in that sense to be what T calls a ‘revisionist’ view of the matter. Thus, e.g., 
things might be arranged so that you could catch a glimpse of what is going on in 
your brain right now. Does it seem right that the activity (in that pulpy, convoluted 
mass) of which you are, via a mirror, say, visually aware might be your 
consciousness? You can point to the activity. Can you point to your 
consciousness?   
But if it is not something going on in your brain, what else might your 
consciousness be? Traditionally, some philosophers have appealed to a view of 
reality as including not just what T calls objective reality (the natural world) but 
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a discrete, further reality, which is essentially spaceless and hence radically 
different from objective reality (the Cartesian soul). Yet this raises the awkward 
question of how, in that case, our consciousness might, as it certainly seems to, 
arise causally out of – and in turn may cause – events which belong to the 
physiological make-up of the human beings we are and thus are part of objective 
reality; not to speak of the fact that the idea of such a further reality seems foreign 
to any conception of reality which respects modern science. 
 
2. 
 
Such, then, is the problem of consciousness. We cannot deny the existence of 
consciousness or experience; yet there seems to be nothing which it might be. 
There have been, since Descartes, countless suggestions for solving the problem. 
T’s solution turns around the concept of transcendence. 
T’s solution, if I understand it correctly, is very simple. Consciousness, 
whatever exactly it is, is a kind of activity or state or event – that is, a kind of 
phenomenon – that occurs on the part of (let us suppose) a human subject. The 
problem, once again, is that consciousness cannot be identified with any 
phenomenon that is part either of objective reality or a supposed (spaceless) 
addendum to this reality; hence, while it is undeniable that there is such a thing as 
consciousness, there seems to be nothing that it might be. T’s solution (he calls it 
the ‘Transcendent Hypothesis’) is that, in trying to locate consciousness either, on 
the one hand, in objective reality or, on the other, in the Cartesian addendum to 
this, we overlook the further possibility that it might be part of what T describes 
as a ‘transcendent’ reality – which, he maintains, is where consciousness should 
be located (PML, p. 104). 
 
3. 
 
Of course, everything hangs on what is meant here by ‘transcendent reality’. 
What, e.g., is the difference between the reality that is objective and that which is 
transcendent? If we assume the former is that of which we are perceptually aware 
and which spreads out (endlessly) around us now in space and time, then what 
might the latter be? 
T distinguishes two senses of ‘transcendent’. On the first, one reality 
transcends another for the simple reason that it is a different reality (or perhaps 
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we should say, kind of reality) from the other. On this sense, however, the 
Cartesian addendum would ‘transcend’ the objective world. So far from solving 
the problem of consciousness, this is part of the picture which gives rise to the 
problem. 
On the second sense, the fact that one reality transcends another – this would 
be at least a necessary versus sufficient condition – entails that entities belonging 
to these realities, though spatio-temporal, have no spatial or temporal relation to 
each other. Thus, no matter how long and in what direction I travel away from the 
point I currently occupy, I could never get ‘closer to’ or ‘further from’ an entity 
that belongs to a transcendent reality (Valberg 2007).  
Now, although T does not explicitly characterize transcendence in this way, it 
seems to capture what he has in mind. Thus he says that the ‘only concrete model 
of transcendence we have ... [is one in which entities in the transcending reality] 
stand to the objective world as the objective world stands to [the world of] a 
dream’ (PML, p. 103). There are, in fact, aspects of T’s view of the dream/reality 
contrast to which I would take exception; but these do not affect our present 
discussion. Let us therefore agree to take this contrast as our model for 
understanding transcendence. 
According to T, the key to solving the problem of consciousness lies in what 
he calls the ‘Transcendent Hypothesis (TH)’. The TH says that, e.g., my present 
consciousness belongs neither to objective reality nor its Cartesian addendum, but 
to a transcendent reality: a reality that stands to the objective world (the reality I 
take to include both myself and the objects spreading out endlessly around me) in 
the way that, if this were a dream, the objects and phenomena belonging to the 
reality outside the dream would transcend the world that spreads out around me. 
The TH, if correct, seems to solve the problem of consciousness. But 
problems, or questions, arise. We shall mention three.  
     
4. 
 
If consciousness belongs neither to objective reality nor its Cartesian 
addendum, we are, as T maintains, required neither to accept the kind of 
revisionism that identifies consciousness with phenomena in the brain nor to 
grapple with the supposed conundrum of how consciousness and these 
phenomena might causally interact. Indeed, if consciousness belongs to a 
transcendent reality, there is – there can be – no question of any such identification 
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or interaction.  
But is it not a well-known fact, a commonplace, that what transpires in the 
brain affects how things are from within consciousness or experience – that, e.g., 
taking certain drugs (which act on the brain) may affect our perception of colour, 
that brain damage can radically alter the way objects appear?  
The point is not lost on T. But he thinks that such commonplace beliefs are 
the result of a mistake, viz., of our misinterpreting consciousness or experience, 
which is a transcendent reality, as ‘both part of the objective world and a 
subjective entity, in order to interpret it as indirect awareness of an objective world 
(PML, p. 112).’ I am not sure I understand this, or, indeed, why we should have 
the aim of interpreting consciousness as an indirect awareness etc. Or, if it is not 
meant to be an ‘aim’, why suppose that we place such a convoluted and (no doubt) 
misguided construction on things when all we seem to be doing is – in our habitual 
inductivist way – ascribing a causal connection on the basis of an observed 
succession of phenomena (e.g., taking drugs and an alteration in the way objects 
look to us)? Of course, such everyday inductive leaps may prove ill-founded; but 
it seems implausible to suppose they involve the kind of philosophical 
misinterpretation contemplated by T. 
     
5. 
 
Another difficulty is this. On T’s view, my present consciousness (call it ‘C’) 
belongs to a transcendent reality – but I misinterpret C (as being both part of 
objective reality and subjective.) The difficulty is that, in order for me to 
misinterpret C, that is, to take it to have properties it does (or could) not have, I 
would first have to single out C referentially. Yet if C belongs to a transcendent 
reality, this is not possible. The possibility of misinterpreting an entity E 
presupposes a kind of referential contact with E that is necessarily absent in the 
case where E is a transcendent entity. 
I can, unproblematically, refer to entities and phenomena in, say, my dream of 
last night. But then, although the world of which I am a part transcends the world 
of the dream, I have access in memory to the world of the dream. However, if this, 
right now, were a dream, I would not have access to the world that would 
presumably stand outside this. Do I have memories of it? Can I see or touch etc. 
entities in that transcendent reality? If this were a dream, the reality that 
transcends the dream would be, for me, nothing more than ‘something’ that exists 
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or is there – ‘something’ into which I might emerge.  
In that case, it is not clear how I might, in thought, single out for reference the 
entities – the objects and phenomena – that comprise the supposedly transcendent 
reality. On the dream hypothesis, there would be such a reality, but the entities by 
which it is comprised would be, for me, outside referential reach. They would not 
be entities about which I might form either a correct or an incorrect interpretation.  
     
6.  
 
The last problem we shall mention concerns the role of the dream hypothesis 
in T’s argument. I may toy with the dream hypothesis, but in fact I believe this is 
not a dream: the world around me is the real world, not a dream world. T, I take 
it, would assert the same with respect to his own case. However, his conception 
of a transcendent reality requires (I hope I have him right here) that this is a dream. 
Thus, as we noted earlier, he says our only model for understanding 
transcendence is one in which entities in the transcending reality stand to the 
objective world as the objective world stands to [the world of] a dream. So, if I 
am to take seriously the idea that my present consciousness belongs to a 
transcendent reality, I must assume that this is a dream. But, it seems, that is just 
what I cannot assume, since, once again, I believe this is reality. 
This has an awkward consequence. On T’s view, my consciousness is part of 
transcendent reality. If (as I believe) this is not a dream, there is no transcendent 
reality. And my consciousness? It seems that, on T’s view, not only that it is part 
neither of objective reality or its Cartesian addendum, but that there is no such 
thing as my consciousness.      
     
7.  
 
Yet I agree with T’s basic negative point that consciousness is part neither of 
(what he calls) objective reality or its Cartesian addendum. I also agree that it is 
therefore a mistake to conceive of consciousness as some kind of phenomenon 
(state or process or activity etc.) occurring in our heads or souls. The alternative, 
I suggest, involves not that consciousness is transcendent, but that it is, as I might 
put it, horizonal. 
The familiar debate in current philosophy about consciousness or experience 
assumes that it is something which occurs or goes on in us – that it is a 
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phenomenon – the main issue being whether it occurs in our brains (the more 
popular view) or in our souls (the view to be avoided). And there is no denying 
that we at least sometimes conceive of consciousness (experience) in this way. 
Thus, e.g., if you observe me looking at my hand, you might think that light rays 
reflected from my hand are striking my eyes and initiating a complex string of 
phenomena whose upshot is yet another phenomenon occurring in me, viz., my 
visual experience or consciousness of my hand. 
But suppose you adopt toward my consciousness the first-person perspective, 
and consider how things are for me in looking at my hand. I think: ‘Here is my 
hand, present within my consciousness (experience).’ In this case, it seems 
nonsense to regard the term ‘consciousness’ as referring to something that is going 
on in me, a phenomenon. (What would it be for my hand to be present in 
something going on in me?) Here, rather, ‘consciousness (experience)’ refers to 
that from within which my hand is present, not to a phenomenon but to a horizon.  
OK. I have developed this idea at length elsewhere. Suffice it to say, the two 
conceptions of consciousness – as a phenomenon and as a horizon – are radically 
different. As we said, it is the phenomenal conception that philosophers assume 
when they argue about whether consciousness can be identified with phenomena 
in the brain. In this debate, the horizonal conception of consciousness remains in 
the background. On the horizonal conception, consciousness (experience) is part 
neither of the brain or the soul; it is neither material nor ethereal. It is in a sense 
nothing, that is, nothing in itself: nothing apart from there being something given 
or present from within it.        
     
8.  
 
T, as we noted, claims that our conception of consciousness or experience in 
terms of states (and more generally, phenomena), is the result of a confusion. This 
seems to me right – although, as I said (Section 4), I do not understand T’s 
diagnosis of the confusion. 
As I see it, the confusion consists in running together our conception of 
consciousness as something which occurs in our heads, hence as a phenomenon 
of some kind, with that of the horizon from within which the world is present to 
us. On the horizonal conception, consciousness, so far from being a phenomenon, 
is in a real sense nothing: it is nothing apart from something being given from 
within it; nothing, that is, in itself. The confused amalgamation of these two ideas 
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issues in the problematic conception of something which is both a phenomenon 
and yet somehow less than that – a shadowy or ethereal phenomenon. 
There are, indeed, relevant phenomena on our part, viz., the events and 
processes, and so on, which occur in our brains and nervous systems. 
Consciousness does not consist of, but is caused by, such phenomena. Then what 
is consciousness – a further, shadowy phenomenon? Have we not omitted 
consciousness from our picture? 
What has been omitted is not a phenomenon but a fact. When, say, I look at 
my hand, various things happen in the world, including the part of the world (the 
human being) that I am: light waves reflect from my hand to my eyes, the optic 
nerve is stimulated, impulses are transmitted to my brain, and so on. The upshot 
is not a further perhaps shadowy phenomenon but a fact, viz., the fact that my 
hand is there, visually present from within my consciousness. 
Consciousness figures here not as something that occurs inside my head, 
hence as a phenomenon, but as the horizon within which the fact of presence 
holds. Suppose the fact in question were the fact, say, that a flash of lightning is 
present to me. The flash would be a phenomenon. However, the consciousness 
from within which the fact of the flash’s presence holds would not be another 
phenomenon. Would there be two phenomena – one outside my head (the flash) 
and the other inside my head (my consciousness of the flash)? There would be 
just one, the flash, the fact of whose presence holds from within the horizon of 
my consciousness.  
     
9.  
 
Of course, as we said, there are things going on inside my head, viz., the events 
(phenomena) in my brain which are – or so we may suppose – responsible not just 
for whatever facts of presence hold from within my consciousness but for the fact 
that there is such a thing as my consciousness from within such facts hold. Thus 
each of us knows that when this activity ceases (which one day it will), then that 
will be it: there will be just nothing.     
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Reply to J. J. Valberg  
James Tartaglia* 
 
Replying to a paper by J. J. Valberg is a very special milestone for me. When 
I was his student (door, left; bookcase, right; desk-JV-window, front), I frequently 
resisted what he was teaching me, only to consequently back down when he 
explained where I had gone wrong. The only thing he never got me to back down 
over was my advocacy of physicalism – and it turned out I was wrong about that 
too! Given this history, my current prospects do not look rosy. But this time I have 
an advantage: because Valberg has underestimated the degree to which his 
philosophy has influenced me. If he had realised how much I have internalised his 
teachings over the years – particularly from Dream, Death, and the Self (Valberg 
2007), but also from everything else he has published or shown me – then I might 
have been in trouble. As it is, I think I will be OK. Seeing my position as viewed 
through Valberg’s eyes, as this paper allows me to do, makes me highly suspicious 
of that position as a matter of instinct. But even with this heightened critical 
awareness, I am not seeing anything wrong with it; my exposition was inadequate, 
I have no doubt, but that is all I am seeing. 
Central to Valberg’s own position is his distinction between the phenomenal 
and horizonal conceptions of consciousness. As he explains in his paper, we think 
about consciousness with the phenomenal conception when we think of an 
experience as ‘some kind of phenomenon (state or process or activity etc.) 
occurring in our heads or souls’ (p. 191). Thus when I think about my current 
experience as a distinctive ‘something’, then I am thinking about consciousness 
phenomenally; as if it were a phenomenon in the world, which I could designate 
like any other phenomenon. I may go on to hold that this ‘something’ is produced 
by my brain; or can be identified with something in my brain; or is an element of 
immaterial reality that interacts with my brain; or is an illusionary intentional 
object; or is one of the building-blocks of a reality which physical descriptions 
cannot adequately characterise. But in all such cases, the difference pertains only 
to my metaphysical theory of the nature of what I am phenomenally conceiving. 
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Valberg holds, as do I, that this is the conception routinely presupposed in 
philosophical debates about consciousness. The various sides all conceive of 
consciousness in this way, and then proceed to argue about the nature of what they 
are likewise conceiving; whether it is physical, non-physical, or illusory. 
Valberg also holds, as do I (being his follower in this regard), that we have 
another, radically different conception of consciousness which ‘remains in the 
background’ of these debates (p. 192). This is the horizonal conception, according 
to which consciousness is that within which things appear to us: the horizon of 
subjective presentation. Thus we may distinguish between a tree and the presence 
of the tree within my consciousness; if I fall unconscious, the tree will still be 
there, but it will no longer be experientially present to me. Consciousness, on this 
conception, is the first-person horizon, or context, from within which certain facts 
hold, such as that the tree is present to me. It is not a phenomenon we can point 
to, but rather the horizon in which the phenomena we can point to are present. In 
itself, the horizon is nothing, but objects and events appear within it (as opposed 
to: simply exist). And when objects and events permanently cease to appear within 
somebody’s horizon, their conscious life is replaced by the nothingness of death. 
Valberg thinks that the problem of consciousness, along with the standard 
responses to that problem – dualism, physicalist reductionism, eliminativism, etc. 
– arise from a failure to recognise the distinction between the phenomenal and 
horizonal conceptions. As he puts it, ‘the confusion consists in running together 
our conception of consciousness as something which occurs in our heads, hence 
as a phenomenon of some kind, with that of the horizon from within which the 
world is present to us’ (p. 192). Essentially, we presuppose the phenomenal 
conception, but also think about consciousness from our own, first-personal 
perspective – thereby employing the horizonal conception without becoming 
aware of it – to form a conception of a phenomenon whose existence depends on 
the first-person perspective we take on it: a curious, subjective kind of 
phenomenon which must somehow be integrated with the objective world. We are 
thus landed with the problem of consciousness, and inspired to propose a 
metaphysical theory to deal with it. The error which causes this problem to arise, 
as Valberg sees it, consists in mistaking the presence of phenomena within the 
horizon of consciousness, with the presence of puzzling subjective phenomena. 
And this occurs through neglect of the horizonal conception: we fail to adequately 
think through what it means to think about consciousness from the first-personal 
perspective. 
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Now I internalised all of this many years ago; but since I was not sure what 
to do with it, it remained compartmentalised within my thinking , just like the 
ideas of other philosophers who I could see were onto something, although I was 
not quite sure what – in this particular case, I was sure it was something important, 
however. I have never doubted the distinction between the phenomenal and 
horizonal conceptions; not since I first grasped it. The question for me was where 
to take it. And the Transcendent Hypothesis was the answer I eventually came up 
with. From Valberg’s paper, it is clear that he thinks I have neglected the 
distinction, made the standard mistake he diagnoses of presupposing the 
phenomenal conception, and simply come up with a new theory about the nature 
of the ‘problematic phenomenon’. That is not how I see it. 
As I see it, the Transcendent Hypothesis is a development of Valberg’s 
thinking about consciousness, which has the distinction between the phenomenal 
and horizonal conceptions at its heart. I was not in a position to simply agree with 
Valberg about consciousness, because there are certain aspects of where he takes 
his reflection on the phenomenal / horizonal distinction which I have never been 
able to accept; and not wanting to be what Lester Young called a ‘repeater pencil’, 
I would have avoided the topic of consciousness if I had thought Valberg had it 
entirely right. It is Valberg’s direction of travel after the phenomenal / horizonal 
distinction is made central to reflection on the nature of mind – as I agree that it 
should be – which has always been the problem for me. Trying to avoid the 
elements of his account which I could not accept was crucial to working out my 
own account. There are three of these. 
 
(1) Impossibilities 
 
Valberg thinks that the horizon of consciousness is a nothingness which is 
caused by activity in the brain. Since something physical cannot cause that which 
is nothing at all (nothing apart from what appears within in), he thinks this 
compels us to accept an impossibility as actual. This, he thinks, is the natural 
resting place of philosophical inquiry in this area; and he sees wisdom in just 
accepting and learning to live with it. It is just one of a number of impossibilities 
which Valberg thinks ordinary reflection ultimately leads us to, and which 
philosophy can do nothing more than make explicit to us. I respect this position, 
but my natural and unsophisticated reaction to it – which I am unable to see 
anything wrong with – is that if something is impossible, then it cannot happen; 
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so there must be something wrong with the reasoning that leads you to believe 
that it does happen. I think the task of philosophy is to answer certain kinds of 
natural curiosity, not to distil, clarify and intensify them, thereafter leaving us to 
acquiesce in their perfected forms. 
  
(2) The Phenomenal Conception 
 
Valberg thinks, and I agree, that there is a widespread neglect of the horizonal 
conception. But it seems to me that he makes the opposite mistake of neglecting 
the phenomenal conception; if we have two ways of thinking about consciousness, 
then both should be integral to, and reconciled within, our final account. For 
although Valberg grants the legitimacy of the phenomenal conception, it has no 
real place in his account. It serves primarily to provide his diagnosis of where 
others go wrong, and within his own account, it strikes me as merely an 
awkwardness. For on the one hand, Valberg thinks that the phenomenal 
conception, since it applies to phenomena, can only apply to the sole repository 
of phenomena: the objective world. Thus in his definitive exposition, he says: 
‘The point is not (of course) to deny that there are states, events, processes, etc., 
that occur or go on “in us” (in our brains and nervous systems) when we think, 
perceive, feel, will, and so on. It is not, in other words, to deny the validity of the 
phenomenal conception of mind’ (Valberg 2007: 99). And in an earlier treatment, 
he is clear that, ‘Like most philosophers these days, I believe that the idea of there 
being a soul (a spiritual substance) in us, and hence the idea that there are soul-
related phenomena (spiritual phenomena) occurring in us, is a fiction. The only 
phenomena occurring in us are, roughly speaking, biological phenomena’ 
(Valberg 1992: 145). More conclusively still, he goes on to say that, ‘there are no 
experiential phenomena, only experiential facts’ (ibid.: 146); that is, facts of 
presence within an experiential horizon. And yet on the other hand, Valberg grants 
that some of the phenomena that are present to us in the horizon of consciousness 
are merely ‘internal objects’ which are exhausted by their presence; such as 
hallucinations. Since these objects do not have independent existence in space and 
time, they are not part of ‘the world’ (Valberg 2007: 48-9).  
Now in his paper, he says that, ‘there is no denying that we at least sometimes 
conceive of consciousness (experience) in this [phenomenal] way. Thus, e.g., if 
you observe me looking at my hand, you might think that light rays reflected from 
my hand are striking my eyes and initiating a complex string of phenomena whose 
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upshot is yet another phenomenon occurring in me, viz., my visual experience or 
consciousness of my hand’ (p. 192). However, although philosophers standardly 
conceive the upshot of the causal process to be ‘yet another phenomenon 
occurring in me, viz., my visual experience or consciousness of my hand’, Valberg 
thinks this is an erroneous conception, of course – because there are no 
experiential phenomena. The only phenomena which the phenomenal conception 
of consciousness can legitimately be applied to are physical ones in the brain, the 
causal upshot of which is a horizon of consciousness. If Valberg himself were to 
accept the existence of experiential phenomena, against his own diagnosis of error, 
then the problem of consciousness would obviously arise in exactly the same way 
for him.  
However, it seems to me that Valberg already has this problem: because of 
his acceptance of internal objects, such as hallucinations. A hallucinatory object 
is an experiential phenomenon, and experiential phenomena have no obvious 
resting place in the objective world: hence the standard problem of consciousness. 
To deny that they exist within the objective world, and claim that they are 
exhausted by their presence within a horizon, does not tell us what they are; if 
they are phenomena, then like all phenomena, they must have a nature, and if this 
nature is not physical … herein we see the old problem re-emerging. Moreover, it 
seems to me that even without this problem – even if there were no internal objects 
for Valberg to deal with – his restriction of the phenomenal conception to physical 
phenomena, such as brain processing, would not be a phenomenal conception of 
consciousness; not unless he were to advocate the physicalist doctrine that brain 
events are identical to experiential events, which, wisely, he never would. For 
these physical phenomena, on his view, are simply what cause consciousness. 
They are not conscious phenomena themselves. I conclude that the phenomenal 
conception has no stable resting place within Valberg’s account. He is right to 
think it is legitimate, just as I do; but in that case it must be integrated with the 
horizonal conception within a unified account of consciousness. 
  
(3) Direct Realism 
 
Valberg advocates a sophisticated form of direct realism; it is the only account 
I know of which, from an experiential perspective, makes proper sense of the title. 
For if the objects of the world appear within the horizon of consciousness, we are 
directly aware of them; there are no experiential phenomena to mediate our access. 
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I have often suspected that the aim of making sense of direct realism motivates 
much of Valberg’s thinking (although I could be wrong about this.) I do not think 
it is a well-motivated aim; I rather think, following Rorty, that it derives from a 
history of attempts to find an iron-clad refutation of external world scepticism of 
the kind which cannot be, and has no need of being, refuted. Something along 
these lines, as I see it, is provided at a significant juncture in Dream, Death, and 
the Self (Valberg 2007: 111); Valberg’s twist is not to attempt to refute scepticism 
per se, but rather disarm it by showing that it is compatible with direct realism. 
But then, why should we want to be direct realists in the first place? The 
mainstream of twentieth-century philosophy has presupposed that this is a 
laudable aim; but that is not a good reason in itself. Valberg offers a simple 
phenomenological observation; that when we attend – honestly – to our 
experience, then all we find is the world, not experience itself (Valberg 1992: 
Chapter 2). This is to be distinguished from the familiar ‘transparency’ intuition, 
because Valberg is employing the horizonal conception; experience is not a 
transparent phenomenon (ibid: 150-1). But nevertheless, whether in its 
phenomenal or horizonal guise, the whole idea strikes me as thoroughly dubious. 
I often find myself travelling home by train at night, sitting next to the window. 
When you look out of the window in this situation, you can see the landscape 
passing by, but also a myriad of reflections from the inside of the carriage. What 
you see can be quite a mess, which it takes some thought to make any worldly 
sense of; I find myself not really sure what I am looking at and typically give up 
trying after a while. Now is it really obvious, in such a situation, that ‘All we find 
is the world’ (ibid.: 22)? Not to me. It seems considerably more plausible that I 
find a conscious experience which is the causal upshot of all kinds of things in the 
world; this strikes me as the prima facie situation, once philosophical reflection 
has begun, but which we can nevertheless easily overlook when viewing 
conditions are optimal, such as when we stand in front of a tree in broad daylight. 
And as I point out in Meaningless, many of the most prominent philosophers 
before the twentieth century found this patently obvious. What changed, I think, 
is that once science came to dominate our intellectual aspirations, the obviousness 
of this philosophical subject-matter of mediating experience – one which seemed 
to resist incorporation into the objective world which science can describe – came 
to seem like something that needed to be dismantled. Direct realism became the 
goal, and the most natural way to fit this into traditional philosophical concerns 
was to use it to refute the sceptic. But if the phenomenal conception of 
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consciousness is legitimate, as Valberg and I both agree that it is, then it seems to 
me that what we are conceiving must be experiential phenomena which mediate 
our access to the objective world. The task, as I see it, is to find a way to coherently 
fit this phenomenal conception in with the horizonal conception. And that is what 
I was trying to do with the Transcendent Hypothesis. 
 
My leading thought when arriving at the Transcendent Hypothesis – using 
Valberg’s manner of thinking about dream scepticism, but in light of my three 
sources of dissatisfaction with his final position, as detailed above – was that if 
this were a dream (me sitting at my desk; you reading these words in whatever 
your current situation is), then the dream objects I am experiencing must have 
some kind of reality or nature behind them. Since I take the phenomenal 
conception to be legitimate, the natural explanation of this is that my experiences 
of the dream objects are something real. Now in light of the horizonal conception, 
the reality possessed by the experiences could only be found in a context 
transcendent to the dream; one in which I am asleep in the objective world and 
dreaming all of this up (i.e. dreaming the situation in which I am typing at my 
desk). A model is thereby suggested of consciousness placing us within a horizon 
in which we find a world to be present (the dream world, in this case), with the 
reality of consciousness existing in a context which transcends the horizon (the 
objective world, in this case). Assuming that this is how consciousness always 
works, and that dream experience is not metaphysically special, I then formed the 
Transcendent Hypothesis, according to which the same happens in waking life. 
According to this theory, the reality of waking consciousness is transcendent: it 
transcends the horizon in which we find the objective world. (I have missed out 
various complicating factors for clarity of exposition, but they are all there in the 
book.) 
This account fully integrates the horizonal and phenomenal conceptions. The 
central insight to the horizonal conception, as I see it, is that is that consciousness 
places us within a horizon, with a world presented inside it, and the reality of the 
presentation outside it. But since I also take the phenomenal conception seriously, 
I think the presentations of an objective world which take place within our 
ordinary, waking horizon (as well as presentations of things that evidently do not 
belong to that world, such as hallucinations) are something: subjective 
experiences. Since these subjective experiences are found within the horizon of 
consciousness, then according to the Transcendent Hypothesis, their reality must 
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transcend that horizon. But since this is also true of the objective world which 
these subjective experiences indirectly inform us of, the reality of the objective 
world must also be found in a transcendent context; in the sense that it is the nature 
of transcendent reality which ensures the effectiveness of our interpretation of 
conscious experience in terms an objective world. So the reality of everything 
must be transcendent, to cut a long story short. We live in a transcendent reality 
which we make sense of with an ultimately incoherent mixture of subjective and 
objective thinking. 
On my view, nothing in the objective world causes or causally affects 
consciousness, so unlike Valberg, I am not required to accept impossibilities as 
facts. The objective world and horizon of consciousness are not an ontologically 
divided being and nothingness, as I see it, but rather two elements of the same 
representational package: a package we use to make the best sense we can of a 
reality whose true nature will always radically transcend human understanding. 
Objective conditions do seem to cause subjective, experiential ones, of course, but 
this is because we must represent subjective experiences as occupants of the 
objective world in order to apply our causal understanding to them, and thereby 
predict their comings and goings. Our representational package commits us to 
causally integrating experience with the objective world, but also provides the 
philosophical resources to see that this cannot really be what is going on; that we 
must be misrepresenting the transcendent reality, in order to think of it as different 
people having different outlooks on the same objective world. The 
representational package cannot be accurate as a whole, in the sense that it cannot 
capture the nature of the transcendent reality; which, in the final count, is all there 
is. But it is a package that works, such that outside of philosophy, we can say that 
the anaesthetic caused the pain to stop without any qualms whatsoever.  
You might sum up the difference between my account and Valberg’s as 
follows. On his account, we must recognise consciousness for the nothingness it 
is, and thereby learn to accept the impossible fact that nothingness is causally 
integrated with the objective world. On my account, we must recognise 
consciousness as a transcendent reality which we misrepresent in terms of 
subjective experiences, horizons and an objective world, and thereby learn to 
accept that its causal integration with the objective world is merely apparent. I do 
not think these two answers are so utterly dissimilar. On the contrary, I think the 
Transcendent Hypothesis is a Valbergian conception of consciousness, which 
makes some changes to the original in order to answer the question of what 
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consciousness is. (Valberg thinks this question is misconceived and I do not.) It 
seems to me a natural extension of Valberg’s account. 
With this in mind, let us turn to Valberg’s three objections to my theory of 
consciousness. They are all directed to an account according to which conscious 
experiences are phenomena that belong to a transcendent reality. Well, I do think 
that we conceive of conscious experiences as phenomena (because I accept the 
legitimacy of the phenomenal conception), and I also think that what we are 
conceiving of has transcendent reality. But here is the crucial point: I think 
everything that exists has transcendent reality. Valberg, I suspect, is thinking of 
the transcendent reality as another world; but I am thinking of it as our world. On 
my view, reality is transcendent; and there is only one reality. Since the 
independent nature of our world is transcendent, it is not something we can 
substantively describe. But we can and do substantively describe the one and only 
reality by misrepresenting it as experiential phenomena in causal dialogue with 
an objective world. We do not thereby capture its independent nature, but our 
descriptions work for all purposes apart from this metaphysical one. 
Valberg’s first objection is that it is implausible to hold that our commonplace 
beliefs about experiences causally interacting with objective conditions ‘are the 
result of a mistake’ (p. 190), namely that of misinterpreting transcendent 
conscious experiences. He asks, ‘why we should have the aim of interpreting 
consciousness as an indirect awareness etc. Or, if it not meant to be an “aim”, why 
suppose that we place such a convoluted and (no doubt) misguided construction 
on things when all we seem to be doing is – in our habitual inductivist way – 
ascribing a causal connection on the basis of an observed succession of 
phenomena (e.g., taking drugs and an alteration in the way objects look to us)?’ 
(p. 190). 
The first thing to say is that there is only any prospect of a mistake being 
involved if you are doing metaphysics. In all other walks of life, we will of course 
continue to talk about objective conditions causing and being caused by 
experiences. But if we want a metaphysical interpretation of what is going on, 
then mine will say that this involves misrepresentation; those offered by 
metaphysical realists who believe in causal transactions between objective 
conditions and experiences, will say the representation is accurate. Both are fully 
in accord with the manifest situation, namely that there seem to be such causal 
interactions (note that Valberg says ‘seem’ in this context too) – and non-
metaphysical talk can and will ignore these subtleties.  
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But then, why do I place this particular ‘construction’ on things? Because I 
take the phenomenal conception to be legitimate; unless you are an eliminativist, 
I cannot see how you can avoid this. As I made clear earlier when discussing 
Valberg’s treatment of the phenomenal conception, I do not think that even he has 
found any alternative; if brain states are the only things the phenomenal 
conception can apply to, as he has argued, then I think he actually is an 
eliminativist (in the phenomenal sense only). But if the phenomenal conception is 
legitimate – if experiences are among the phenomena we refer to – then since they 
cannot belong to the objective world, I cannot see how they actually can be in 
causal dialogue with the objective world. So given that we certainly do conceive 
of them as such, this must be a misrepresentation. Moreover, if experiences are 
phenomena, then since experiences perceptually inform us about the world, the 
natural thing to say – and what you will say, I think, so long as you are not 
determined to be a direct realist, for motivations I find highly dubious – is that 
this perceptual access is indirect. 
Valberg’s second objection is that, ‘in order for me to misinterpret C, that is, 
to take it to have properties it does (or could) not have, I would first have to single 
out C referentially. Yet if C belongs to a transcendent reality, this is not possible’ 
(p. 190). He goes on to say that, ‘If this were a dream, the reality that transcends 
the dream would be, for me, nothing more than “something” that exists or is there 
– “something” into which I might emerge. In that case, it is not clear how I might, 
in thought, single out for reference the entities – the objects and phenomena – that 
comprise the supposedly transcendent reality. They would not be entities about 
which I might form either a correct or an incorrect interpretation’ (pp. 190-1).  
My answer to this is simple: Valberg is right and so the theory he is criticising 
is wrong. But it is not my theory. He is thinking of individual experiences as things 
which belong to a transcendent reality, rather than objective reality; he is thinking 
of transcendent reality as another world. On my view, transcendent reality, 
conceived as such, is indeed ‘nothing more than “something” that exists or is there 
– “something” into which I might emerge’ (although I could only emerge into it 
if it is not the final context, given the horizonal structure of consciousness). We 
cannot pick out individual objects and events that carve transcendent reality at the 
joints, and certainly not when we refer to experiences, whose nature can be seen 
to be illusory within the horizon that contains the objective world. Nevertheless 
we can conceive of it in a manner which is not in accordance with its independent 
nature; we can conceive of transcendent reality as imminent reality. And this is 
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what we do with objective thought, and the shadow concepts we borrow from it 
in order to conceive of individual experiences. Our objective conception of reality, 
which gives us our conception of representation vs. misrepresentation (PML, 
Chapter 7), plus the phenomenal conception of experience, is what facilitates 
reference. Reference is thereby made to transcendent reality – because there is 
nothing else to refer to – but metaphysical reflection reveals that despite the utility 
to us of the referential distinctions we make in this way, they cannot be sensitive 
to the independent nature of this reality in the straightforward manner which 
metaphysical realism about the objective world supposes. Thus metaphysics must 
turn its back on objective thought when it comes to describe this independent 
nature, leaving it with a mere ‘something’. 
Reading between the lines, I get the distinct impression that Valberg thinks it 
is puzzling (to put it mildly) and rather odd (to go a little further), that I say there 
is a transcendent reality. Well here is a really straightforward way of looking at it. 
Whenever you want to say what reality really, truly is, you always have to point 
blindly outside the horizon to a mere ‘“something” into which I might emerge’, 
as Valberg puts it. That is why I say that reality is transcendent: it is transcendent 
to (outside of) the horizon. The objective world, by contrast, is within the horizon; 
it is within a representation of the true reality. Point inside and you get our 
representation; point outside and you get what we are representing. Since what 
we are representing is outside, we say that reality is transcendent. That sounds 
like a sensible enough position to me. 
Valberg’s third criticism (p. 191) is premised on the view that I think this (the 
here and now in which I am typing these words and take myself to be wide awake) 
is a dream; Valberg thinks this because he thinks believing that reality is 
transcendent, is equivalent to believing that waking life is a dream. Based on this 
premise, he says that out anyone who believes this is not a dream (i.e. normal / 
sane people), cannot accept my position that consciousness is transcendent 
without absurdly denying the existence of their own consciousness. The reason is 
that if they accept that consciousness is transcendent, while denying that there is 
a transcendent reality (as there cannot be if this is not a dream, according to 
Valberg’s reasoning), then they must deny the existence of all consciousness, 
including their own.  
This seems both right and unsurprising. If somebody thinks there is no 
transcendent reality, then they would hardly be attracted to the position that 
consciousness is transcendent; unless of course they had eliminativist ambitions.  
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But I think there is a transcendent reality (because I think reality is transcendent) 
and I do not have eliminativist ambitions. So the real question is surely: does 
believing that there is a transcendent reality, as I do, commit you to the view that 
this is a dream? Or we might just ask: do I think this is a dream?  
Well, there are eminent philosophers around who take the idea that this is a 
computer simulation designed by aliens very seriously. And there would be a 
certain panache involved in embracing the claim that this is a dream; of the kind 
currently in-vogue, as eliminative materialists try to subvert the anti-physicalist 
meme of zombies by proudly proclaiming: ‘I am a zombie’ (e.g. Garfield 2016: 
75). However I am afraid that I am not saying anything so radical and exciting, so 
no: I do not think this is a dream. I do not think I have ever seriously entertained 
the thought that this might really be a dream; not in the sense of not already being 
sure at the moment the issue arises, and consequently having to decide one way 
or the other. Moreover, I am certain that the position that this is a dream is not 
entailed by my theory. For if this is a dream, then the world which transcends it is 
the objective one. But according to my theory, the world that transcends what I 
call ‘waking life’ (the kind I am now engaged in), is not the objective world, but 
rather (in the final context) the independently existing reality, i.e. transcendent 
reality. Hence according to my theory, this is not a dream; the implication is 
squarely built into it. 
In the process of making this final objection, Valberg says that, ‘If (as I 
believe) this is not a dream, there is no transcendent reality’ (p. 191). But why 
not? Valberg thinks that from the perspective of a dream there is a transcendent 
reality; his whole philosophy is built around this idea. From the perspective of a 
dream, the transcendent reality is the objective world in which you are asleep in 
bed, dreaming. He thinks that the horizon of the dream can be displaced by the 
wider horizon of waking life. But given that we are conscious both in a dream and 
in waking life, and so must apply the horizonal conception of consciousness in 
both cases, why should the same not apply to the consciousness of waking life? 
Surely, once more, there must be a transcendent reality: the reality which is 
transcendent from the perspective of waking life. (Transcendence is a relative 
notion.) Otherwise, from the point of view of the horizonal conception, what is 
supposed to be ontologically grounding our waking consciousness? You could say 
‘nothing’: because consciousness is a nothingness. But in the dream case this was 
not Valberg’s answer. The answer was to be found in the objective world: 
somebody was dreaming and the physical reality of this caused their dream 
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experience. Well, it cannot be a matter of causation when we are talking about a 
reality that transcends the objective world. And once you get this far, you have 
more or less arrived at my Transcendent Hypothesis. I think I have followed 
Valberg’s principles through consistently, given that I wanted to go somewhere 
different with them. 
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‘Life is Meaningless.’ Compared to What? 
Damian Veal* 
 
Abstract 
James Tartaglia argues that the question of the meaning of life, when properly construed, is ‘the 
keystone of philosophy,’ that which ‘locks its traditional preoccupations in place’ and ‘allows them 
to bear weight in an intellectual culture dominated by science.’ He also argues that we ought to 
reject the question’s premise and conclude that ‘life is meaningless.’ This paper critically examines 
what Tartaglia calls ‘the real question of the meaning of life’ and its implications. It concludes that 
Tartaglia provides no good reasons for maintaining that his version of the question is not, in the 
words of his imaginary interlocutor, ‘a philosophical dead-end,’ but that there is a broader sense of 
the question that might indeed qualify as a fundamental wellspring of philosophical inquiry.  
 
Introduction 
James Tartaglia’s Philosophy in a Meaningless Life: A System of Nihilism, 
Consciousness and Reality is a work of rare philosophical ambition.1 Deeming 
the ‘big ideas’ and ‘sweeping visions’ of the great systematic metaphysicians of 
the past to be both more interesting and more ‘philosophical’ than the modest, 
piecemeal efforts of his contemporaries, Tartaglia has self-consciously set out to 
emulate the former. Mercifully lacking the overweening grandiosity of some of 
those past greats who seem to have inspired him, however, Tartaglia is modest 
enough to admit that he ‘may well not have succeeded.’2 Also happily absent is 
the kind of tortuous, circumlocutory prose for which some of those same 
luminaries are notorious: Tartaglia’s book is elegantly written and clearly argued 
throughout. And for those who may fear that, in purporting to offer a 
‘system’—‘A System of Nihilism, Consciousness and Reality,’ no less—the 
book might test the limits of both their patience and their shelving capacity, it 
should be noted that its soaring ambition is by no means reflected in its bulk, 
weighing in as it does at a svelte two-hundred pages.  
Given the audacious scope of Tartaglia’s book, comprising rich discussions 
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1 Tartaglia (2016). 
2 Ibid., p. ix. 
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and provocative claims about everything from the nature of philosophy and the 
meaning of life to the problems of consciousness, time, and universals—and, far 
more audaciously still, claiming to have provided the keys to solving all of these 
problems in a mere two-hundred pages—Tartaglia leaves himself unusually 
wide open to criticism. But if a fair test of the worth of a work of philosophy is 
not how much consensus it generates—something that rarely ever happens in 
philosophy anyway—but rather how much rich philosophical debate it provokes, 
I expect Philosophy in a Meaningless Life will prove itself worthy indeed. 
Regarding my own contribution to the anticipated debates, I expect the present 
paper to be only my opening salvo. Given the theme of the present 
symposium—namely, ‘Nihilism and the Meaning of Life’—I limit myself here 
to addressing Tartaglia’s principal claims regarding these two issues.  
 
1. Theme and Outline of the Paper 
 
That the human species has no ‘overall meaning’ or ‘purpose,’ that it does 
not owe its existence to some ‘transcendent’ being ‘beyond the physical 
universe,’ is not a claim that is likely to raise many eyebrows, much less hackles, 
in contemporary academia. From the point of view of modern science, informed 
by the findings of cosmology, geology and evolutionary biology, to ask what the 
human species is for, to ask what its meaning or purpose might be, is every bit 
as absurd as asking after the ‘meaning’ of electricity or the ‘purpose’ of a planet. 
What are penguins for? What is the overall meaning of hippopotamuses? What 
was the point of dinosaurs? If the question of the ‘overall meaning’ of the human 
species strikes you as any less preposterous than these questions about penguins, 
hippos and dinosaurs, then—from the point of view of modern science, at 
least—you have a whole lot of catching up to do. 
It is because academics are rationally obliged to take our best established 
knowledge of the world seriously that few are nowadays inclined to regard such 
questions as good or even meaningful ones. While it makes sense to talk about 
the meaning of a sentence or a gesture, about the purpose of an artefact or an 
action, and about the ‘overall meaning’ of a fable or narrative, we have long 
since known that biological species are not the sorts of things that could have 
‘overall meanings’ or purposes.3 While we can understand, in psychological and 
                                                     
3 For accessible yet sophisticated introductions to the issues see, e.g., Kitcher (1982), Dawkins (1991), 
and Dennett (1995). 
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evolutionary terms, why human beings might have a natural tendency to suppose 
there must be some inscrutable ‘meaning’ to their existence—just as we can 
explain their natural tendency to assume purpose, design, intention and meaning 
lurking behind natural disasters, personal misfortunes, and the appearance of 
rainbows or comets4—no one who is even moderately well-acquainted with the 
findings of the past two centuries of science may take such assumptions as their 
own; not, at any rate, with a clear intellectual conscience.  
It is for reasons such as these, I take it, that those few philosophers who 
have waded into the murky and mercurial waters of the question of ‘the meaning 
of life’ in recent decades, while not neglecting to discuss and critically evaluate 
traditional theistic approaches to the question, have also not restricted 
themselves to such approaches. This strikes me as both eminently reasonable and 
just what one would expect. Given the prevalence of theistic and otherwise 
supernaturalist beliefs throughout world history and across human societies, one 
would not expect philosophers to neglect them entirely. By the same token, 
however, one would also not expect them to adopt the assumptions of such 
metaphysics as their own—even if a small number of them may be attracted to 
the question in the first place precisely because they do share some such 
assumptions. After all, if theistic or supernaturalist assumptions were to delimit 
the parameters of the inquiry, such that the only permissible construal of the 
question of life’s meaning, or of the conditions of a meaningful life, would have 
to invoke some divine purpose or supernatural, meaning-bestowing context, this 
would very obviously rule out any and all possible naturalist approaches to 
meaning, significance and value a priori. Since we do not ordinarily permit the 
parameters of our intellectual inquiries to be dictated by the default assumptions 
of medieval scholasticism—not, at any rate, those of us who conduct our 
inquiries outside the cloistered confines of seminaries and theology 
departments—why would we do so here?  
Now, although these remarks ought to be uncontroversial—after all, there 
are no approaches being ruled out a priori here—it turns out that not all 
philosophers agree that this is a reasonable way to proceed. More specifically, as 
those who have read this journal’s recent symposium on Thaddeus Metz’s book 
Meaning in Life: An Analytic Study5 will be aware, James Tartaglia is one 
                                                     
4 See, e.g., Gergely & Csibra (2003), Guthrie (1993); Kelemen (1999, 2004), Kelemen & DiYanni 
(2005), Kelemen & Rosset (2009), McCauley (2000, 2011), Pyysiainen (2009), and Tremlin (2010).  
5 Metz (2013). For the complete symposium see Morioka (2015).  
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philosopher who is not happy about it at all; indeed, he seems to be positively 
fuming about it. What Tartaglia is most incensed about, it seems, is that what he 
calls a ‘new paradigm’ within analytic philosophy, a paradigm ostensibly 
devoted to exploring the question of ‘the meaning of life,’ entirely neglects what 
he calls the traditional question of the meaning of life.6 And the traditional 
question of life’s meaning, Tartaglia insists, is not only the sole real question, 
the only obviously and legitimately philosophical question of life’s meaning; it 
is also nothing less than the fundamental question of philosophy.  
In what follows I critically explore Tartaglia’s arguments for these claims as 
presented in Philosophy in a Meaningless Life. In section 2 I introduce what 
Tartaglia calls ‘the real question of the meaning of life’ and indicate some of the 
reasons for his exasperation with the ‘new paradigm’ approach. In section 3 I 
address Tartaglia’s claim that there is only one ‘obvious philosophical question 
in the area’ before clarifying just what this ‘real’ question of the meaning of life 
boils down to. In section 4 I evaluate Tartaglia’s reasons for claiming that this 
question is not only ‘as serious as your life’ but also ‘the keystone of philosophy.’ 
In other words, why does he think it matters so much? Having failed to arrive at 
a satisfactory answer to this question in section 4, I return to it in section 5 and 
suggest that an adequate answer must take into account the principal 
metaphysical thesis Tartaglia presents in the second half of the book—namely, 
what he calls his ‘Transcendent Hypothesis.’ In the conclusion I suggest that, 
although Tartaglia’s ‘real’ question of the meaning of life ought to be abandoned, 
there is yet a broader sense of the question that might indeed qualify as one of 
the fundamental wellsprings of philosophical inquiry.  
 
2. The ‘Real’ Question of the Meaning of Life 
 
In order to get a handle on what Tartaglia calls the ‘real’ question of the 
meaning of life, one need only reflect on the fact that he would regard the 
opening two paragraphs of section 1 above as an outright denigration of this 
question.7 Indeed, in view of all he has said on this issue—not only in the book 
presently under discussion, but also in several recently published papers devoted 
to the same topic8—it is safe to say that he would regard these paragraphs as the 
                                                     
6 Tartaglia (2015). 
7 Tartaglia (2015), p. 92; (2015a).  
8 Tartaglia (2015a, 2016a, 2016b).  
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very epitome of what he characterises as a pernicious ‘anti-philosophical 
cultural trend,’ a ‘conspicuous tragicomic’ element of which has been ‘the 
phenomenon of philosophers turning against philosophy.’ According to Tartaglia 
this prima facie ‘absurd agenda’ has been ‘a dominant theme within the 
profession since the 19th century,’ with the most influential versions of it 
attempting to ‘make philosophy more like science.’9 
What Tartaglia takes to be the ‘real’ question of the meaning of life, then, is 
precisely the question I have suggested most academics would nowadays regard 
as being based upon obsolete, prescientific assumptions: namely, the question of 
whether or not the human species has an ‘overall purpose’ or ‘overall meaning.’ 
Thus, in his unsparingly critical review of Metz’s Meaning in Life: An Analytic 
Approach, Tartaglia suggests that the book goes awry right from the start by 
addressing itself to the wrong issue. While one might think that what Metz’s 
book ought to be about should be a matter for Metz to decide, Tartaglia’s 
implicit assumption seems to be that the book ought not to have been published 
at all—not if it has any pretensions to be a genuine work of philosophy, at any 
rate.10 Seizing upon a passage from Metz’s Introduction in which he clarifies 
the scope of the book, Tartaglia suggests that the very fact that it does not 
address itself to the question of whether the human species has a meaning 
already demonstrates that ‘something has gone wrong.’ This is because, 
according to Tartaglia, to ask the question of the meaning of life just is to ask 
‘whether the human species has a meaning.’11 Metz’s book, on the other hand, 
since it sets out from the assumption that what ‘[m]ost people, or at least 
philosophers, interested in topics readily placed under the rubric of “the meaning 
of life” ultimately want to know [is] what, if anything, would confer meaning on 
their own lives and the lives of those people for whom they care,’12 thereby 
disqualifies itself as a genuine work of philosophy from the outset. 
Were it the case that in rebuking other approaches as ‘not really 
philosophical,’ Tartaglia were simply expressing the kind of haughty disdain that 
Continental and analytic philosophers sometimes display towards one another, 
this would hardly merit comment. However, while I do think it’s possible to 
detect a tone of proprietorial superciliousness in the way Tartaglia discusses the 
                                                     
9 Tartaglia 2016, pp. 1, 185 n. 3. 
10 Metz explicitly notes this implication of Tartaglia’s critique in his reply (Metz 2015, p. 230).  
11 Tartaglia (2015), p. 94. 
12 Metz (2013), p. 3; Tartaglia (2015), p. 95; Metz (2015), p. 230. 
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work of other philosophers—something most audible when, for example, he 
suggests that those who take a different approach to the question of life’s 
meaning than his own do so ‘because they are very confused’13—such an 
attitude should also be understood in the context of the principal 
metaphilosophical thesis of Tartaglia’s book. For according to Philosophy in a 
Meaningless Life, the question of the meaning of life—understood as the 
question of whether there might be an ‘overall meaning’ to human existence—is 
the philosophical question par excellence. Indeed, according to Tartaglia it is 
nothing less than the original, paradigmatic philosophical question; the question 
in which all of philosophy’s perennial problems are rooted; which unifies all of 
its disparate concerns; and which motivates people to take an interest in it in the 
first place. As such, Tartaglia argues, philosophers should openly embrace the 
question as their core subject matter and special areas of expertise.14  
Should philosophers overcome their misguided sense of embarrassment over 
this question and reclaim it for philosophy, suggests Tartaglia, it would have 
many salutary consequences: it would reinvigorate philosophy by explicitly 
reconnecting it with its roots in matters of natural human concern; it would 
make sense of and justify the fact that there is a discipline called philosophy at 
all, by clarifying ‘what it is all about’; it would illuminate the history of 
philosophy and clarify what unites its diverse concerns by revealing the 
underlying connection between its theoretical and practical branches; it would 
help to restore philosophy’s self-confidence in an age dominated by aggressive 
scientism; it would provide a clear line of demarcation between science and 
philosophy, so that philosophy can thrive in peace, and science, in gaining 
clarity about its own proper remit, can learn to ‘mind its own business’;15 and it 
would restore philosophy’s unique cultural voice by showing that science is not 
the only legitimate mode of discourse about the nature of reality—philosophy, 
he suspects, can more than hold its own on this score.16  
Not least among the startling implications of Tartaglia’s thesis here is that, 
contrary to what one would expect, it is not contemporary philosophers who 
                                                     
13 Tartaglia (2015), p. 4. 
14 Tartaglia (2016), chapter 3 passim and Tartaglia (2016a).  
15 Tartaglia (2016), p. 76. 
16 Although Tartaglia writes ‘at least’ rather than ‘more than’ (ibid., p. 11), it becomes clear later in the 
book that he thinks scientists not only cannot but should not try to address questions regarding ‘the 
nature of reality,’ for this is the special domain of expertise of the philosopher qua a priori 
metaphysician (see chapter 8 especially).  
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best understand the true nature of philosophy, but rather those members of the 
general public who, while they may know nothing whatsoever about what such 
philosophers spend their lives thinking, talking and writing about, at least 
understand something that these philosophers themselves appear not to: namely, 
that the core subject matter of philosophy—that which defines it as 
philosophy—is nothing other than the meaning of life. 
Were Tartaglia right about this it would be a surprising states of affairs 
indeed. Could it really be the case that people who may have never read a work 
of philosophy, and who might not be able to name more than a few famous 
philosophers (and almost certainly none who are still alive), might nevertheless 
understand the nature and motivating concerns of philosophy better than 
philosophers themselves? Could it be the case that philosophers, of all people, 
are so thoroughly bereft of self-knowledge that they have no real understanding 
of what it is they devote their lives to, or why they are doing it, whereas people 
who are barely acquainted with it nonetheless understand perfectly well ‘what 
it’s all about’?17  
Whatever one might think about this prima facie implausible suggestion, it 
at least helps to make sense of what it is that so infuriates Tartaglia about the 
‘new paradigm’ approach to the question of the meaning of life. For while these 
philosophers typically underline the notorious obscurity, vagueness, ambiguity 
and elusiveness of the expression at the outset—usually as a prelude to getting 
clear about the variety of ways it can be, has been, and might legitimately be 
construed—Tartaglia regards all such attempts at conceptual disambiguation and 
clarification as both gratuitous and disingenuous in view of what he regards as 
one blindingly obvious fact: namely, that the meaning of the expression ‘the 
meaning of life’ is already clear to everyone. Those who might be inclined to 
dispute this by pointing out that the expression appears to admit of a wide 
variety of different, often incompatible or at best overlapping usages, and that 
the variety of ways it has in fact been construed bears witness to this, are 
accused by Tartaglia of deliberate obfuscation, of muddying perfectly 
transparent waters, and of perpetuating a ruinous neglect of the only ‘real’ or 
‘true’ meaning of the question—the meaning that, according to Tartaglia, it has 
always had, and which it must retain if philosophy is to rediscover its true 
identity and purpose.  
                                                     
17 Tartaglia (2016a). 
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Thus, although Tartaglia describes himself as an analytic philosopher, he has 
very little patience with the suggestion that the phrase ‘the meaning of life’ is 
one that requires any conceptual analysis at all—beyond, that is, a few quick 
reminders about how the expression is supposedly used in everyday life.18 
While he starts with the fact that the question has been dismissed, denigrated 
and ridiculed because of its ‘supposedly hopeless obscurity,’ he suggests that the 
ridicule is only a defence mechanism—laughter, he says, ‘always works well 
when dealing with something that has touched a nerve.’19 As for the claim that 
the meaning of the question is obscure, vague, ambiguous and so on, Tartaglia 
seems to think this amounts to some kind of subterfuge. Thus when Brooke Alan 
Trisel remarks, in a recent article for this journal, that the expression ‘meaning 
of life’ is ‘one of the best known, but most obscure phrases in the English 
language’; when Richard Taylor writes that ‘[t]he question of whether life has 
any meaning is difficult to interpret,’ adding that the more we concentrate on it 
‘the more it seems to elude’ us and ‘evaporate as an intelligible question’; when 
Julian Baggini writes that the question is ‘vague, general and unclear… not so 
much a single question as a placeholder for a whole set of questions’; and when 
Timothy Mawson writes that ‘when one asks “What is the meaning of life?,” 
one asks an ambiguous question, or—perhaps better—one asks an assemblage 
of largely overlapping, but significantly different, questions at once’; in all these 
cases, along with dozens more that could be cited, Tartaglia would suspect the 
authors of either disingenuousness or wilful obscurantism (or both); that is, of 
pretending not to understand the meaning of a question the intention of which 
ought to be entirely obvious to everyone—and to philosophers above all.20 To 
the ridiculers and the head scratchers respectively, then, Tartaglia’s response is 
as follows: ‘the question is as serious as your life and its intention is anything 
but obscure.’21 
In the following three sections I will critically assess two questions that arise 
                                                     
18 Tartaglia identifies himself as an analytic philosopher in the first paragraph of the Preface (p. ix). As 
readers of the book will discover, this is not the only concept he seems to think requires no real 
conceptual analysis or elucidation: the same goes for all the book’s central concepts, including 
meaning, consciousness, experience, objectivity, reality, and transcendence.  
19 Tartaglia (2016), p. 1. 
20 Trisel (2016), p. 4; Taylor (1967/2000), p. 167; Baggini (2005), p. 2; Mawson (2010), p. 20. One is 
reminded of Berkeley’s famous remark about philosophers kicking up dust and then complaining they 
can’t see. As noted above, Tartaglia also has another, even less charitable suggestion: such 
philosophers are just ‘very confused’ (2015a, p. 4).  
21 Tartaglia (2016), p. 1. 
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from this claim. First, what, according to Tartaglia, is the precise import of the 
‘real’ question of the meaning of life, and what reasons does he offer in support 
of his claim that this is ‘anything but obscure’? Second, why does he claim that 
the question is ‘as serious as your life’? I will address the first question in 
section 3 before tackling the second in sections 4 and 5.  
 
3. Clarifying the Meaning of the Question 
 
So far all we know is that Tartaglia’s ‘real’ question of the meaning of life is 
equivalent to the question of whether there is an ‘overall meaning’ or purpose 
for which the human species exists. What, however, does that mean? Well, it 
turns out that Tartaglia has in mind something very specific indeed: life, we are 
told, could only be meaningful if there were a wider context of meaning within 
which it takes place. Now, when Tartaglia says ‘wider’ he doesn’t just mean 
wider; he means a whole lot wider; in fact, he tells us, only something which 
transcends the entire physical universe could do the job. This is because things 
can only have a meaning if they are placed in a ‘wider context of meaning,’ and 
the physical universe is not a context of meaning; rather, it is a meaningless 
context. It follows, then, that for our lives to have any meaning or purpose at all, 
‘there would have to be a wider context of meaning beyond the physical 
universe, on which the existence of the physical universe depended,’ ‘a context 
of meaning that transcended the spatiotemporal world’ and which ‘would 
provide reasons for the existence of the physical universe.’22 For Tartaglia, then, 
what he calls the ‘real’ question of the meaning of life,23 the only ‘obvious 
philosophical question in the area,’ 24  is that which asks whether such a 
‘transcendent context of meaning’ exists. The necessary and sufficient condition 
for a meaningful life—in the absence of which everyone’s life would be 
meaningless—thus turns out to be not only a cosmic one, but an extra-cosmic, 
supernatural, or (as Tartaglia prefers to say) ‘transcendent’ one. 
Needless to say, these are all hugely contentious claims, and not ones to 
which anyone is likely to assent unless they are backed up by exceptionally 
strong arguments. So what is supposed to rationally motivate them, and what 
reasons does Tartaglia offer in justification of them? The first question—namely, 
                                                     
22 Ibid., p. 50. 
23 Tartaglia (2015a). 
24 Tartaglia (2016), p. 2. 
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what motivates Tartaglia to insist, so doggedly and dogmatically, that this 
specific form of the question is its only legitimate sense, the ‘only obvious 
philosophical question in the area’—I find somewhat baffling, and will return to 
in sections 4 and 5.25 Regarding the first question—that of the arguments 
Tartaglia employs to support the claim—I will explore this in the following three 
subsections. In doing so, we will gain clarity about what it is that Tartaglia’s 
‘real’ question of the meaning of life amounts to.  
 
3.1 The Meaning of ‘the Meaning of …’  
 
First, though he says such analysis ought not to be necessary—it is not as if 
there is ‘an enigma in need of deciphering,’ he writes26—Tartaglia does appeal 
to a brief elucidation of the meaning of the terms. Thus he insists that the 
question of the meaning of life must be sharply differentiated from meaning in 
life. He illustrates this with the analogy of a film. When we ask about meaning 
in a film, he claims, we are talking about such things as ‘what is motivating the 
characters, their personalities, trials and tribulations etc.’ When we ask after the 
meaning of the film, on the other hand, we are asking about its significance in a 
wider social or historical setting. Thus we might say that the meaning of an early 
Western, for example, is that it ‘reveals the negative stereotypes in early 20th 
century America towards Native Americans, and also perhaps the new-found 
confidence of a country creating an idealised version of its history.’ It is this sort 
of thing we are asking about, suggests Tartaglia, when we ask about ‘the 
meaning of the film.’ From this he concludes as follows: 
 
Thus meaning in concerns the contextual meaning created by a 
phenomenon (such as a film, novel, sport or musical composition), while 
meaning of concerns the meaning of the phenomenon in a wider context 
(a society, most typically).27  
 
                                                     
25 Tartaglia might object to the accusation of dogmatism, but in view of the fact that he insists upon 
the undeniable obviousness of the claim, even accusing those who disagree with it of being 
anti-philosophical, quite literally on page 1 of the book, the charge is hardly a baseless one. 
26 Tartaglia (2015), p. 96; cf. Tartaglia (2016): ‘The question did not drop from the sky as an enigma 
to be deciphered, but is rather a natural question which we know human beings have been asking since 
at least the beginning of civilization and were probably asking long before that’ (p. 2).  
27 Tartaglia (2015), pp. 92, 93. 
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Is this plausible? When people ask about the meaning of a film, novel, play, 
song, poem, fable, allegory, parable, riddle and so on, are they asking about its 
significance in a wider social or historical setting? Fortunately, we do not need 
to engage in any contentious ordinary language analysis or ‘x-phi’ (experimental 
philosophy) research on this question. Instead, we can simply enter phrases such 
as ‘the meaning of the film’ and ‘the meaning of the song’ into an internet search 
engine and see what it comes up with. While I will leave this an exercise for the 
reader rather than citing examples of what turned up when I did such searches,28 
I think it will be clear enough that what people typically want to know when 
they ask such questions is not what its social or historical significance might be. 
Rather, what they seem to be seeking is something like an explanation or 
interpretation, the kind of explanation that would make sense of the film, song, 
poem, play or whatever it happens to be.29 This becomes even clearer, I think, if 
we ask about the overall meaning of something, which is what Tartaglia says the 
question of the meaning of life amounts to. For as noted earlier, while it makes 
dubious sense at best to ask about the overall meaning of a biological species, 
people do ask about the overall meaning of narratives. Indeed, I would suggest 
that it is precisely contexts in which people are asking about the meaning of a 
film, story, play, myth, saga, allegory, fable, parable and the like that talk of 
‘overall meaning’ seems most at home. That such an interpretation might also 
shed light on what people often mean when they talk about ‘the meaning of 
life’—that is, roughly, that they are seeking something like a global narrative, 
worldview or explanatory framework within which to make overall sense of 
their lives—is a possibility that I have no space to examine here, but I return to 
it briefly at the end of the paper.30 
 
3.2 A Single Question or Many? 
 
As noted above, philosophers who have written about the question ‘What is 
the meaning of life?’ typically address what I called the ‘murky and mercurial’ 
                                                     
28 I will only add that it helps include the titles of well-known films, songs, stories etc.—and that the 
website <moviemeanings.com> seems like a good place to go if you want to read interpretations of 
popular films.  
29 This is not to suggest that such requests for explanation or interpretation might not sometimes 
require some socio-historical contextualisation, of course, but my point is that this is not what people 
typically want to be told about when they ask, for example, ‘what is the meaning of this movie?’  
30 For an intriguing proposal along these lines see Seachris (2009). For some interesting discussion of 
the implications vis-à-vis naturalism see Trisel (2016) and the literature cited therein. 
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nature of the question at the beginning. No doubt some of the ambiguity and 
indeterminateness of the question concerns the term ‘life,’ for it is not clear 
whether the question is asking about the meaning of human life as a whole, the 
meaning of people’s individual lives, or both. According to Metz, for example, 
as we saw above, what people who ask the question typically want to know is 
‘what would confer meaning on their own lives and the lives of those people for 
whom they care.’31 For Tartaglia, on the other hand, as well as many of those 
who approach the question from a theistic perspective, the question is primarily 
about the purpose or overall meaning of human life in general, an answer to 
which would also provide the meaning of people’s individual lives. Nevertheless, 
in spite of this difference, it is at least agreed that the ‘life’ that the question 
addresses is human life rather than the life of lives of bacteria, barnacles, bison 
or baboons. It therefore does not seem to be the case that it is any real obscurity 
about what the term ‘life’ refers to that is the principal source of the question’s 
ambiguity.  
What is generally acknowledged to be the obscurity, vagueness, ambiguity 
and indeterminacy of the question, then, primarily concerns the notoriously 
slippery meaning of the term ‘meaning’ itself. Yet although Tartaglia admits that 
‘there are undeniably many different senses of the word “meaning,”’ so that ‘the 
question clearly has plenty of scope for obscurity,’ he claims that ‘this is 
irrelevant, because there is only one obvious philosophical question in the area, 
to which senses like “value,” “significance” and “purpose” are easily related.’32 
The problem with this suggestion is that the terms ‘value,’ ‘significance’ and 
‘purpose’ are obviously not synonymous or interchangeable. Indeed, it is 
precisely because they are not typically used synonymously that what Tartaglia 
says about ‘meaning’ here—namely, that ‘there are undeniably many different 
senses of the word’—carries over to the question, ‘What is the meaning of life?’ 
Thus when Joshua Seachris writes, in the General Introduction to a recent 
anthology entitled Exploring the Meaning of Life: An Anthology and Guide, that 
the question is ‘undeniably characterized by significant vagueness,’ and that 
‘one cannot plausibly deny that this vagueness makes the question difficult to 
understand,’ he is simply reporting the conclusion arrived at by the vast majority 
of philosophers who have examined the question.33 Of course, it is always open 
                                                     
31 Metz (2013), p. 3. 
32 Tartaglia (2016), p. 2. 
33 Seachris (2012), p. 3. 
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to someone to stipulate the specific way they are going to interpret the question, 
or to argue for the way they think it ought to be understood. However, this is 
obviously very different from claiming, as does Tartaglia, that the meaning of 
the question is ‘anything but obscure’ and that the only reason it might seem 
obscure is that ‘the form it has acquired has potential to mislead’—a potential 
which some philosophers ‘have willingly latched onto,’ either because they are 
part of an ‘anti-philosophical cultural trend,’ because they are afraid that they 
might be seen to be taking a religious question seriously,34 or because they want 
to change the subject entirely so that they can ‘engage in secular moralising’ and 
become ‘atheist preachers.’35 Thus when Tartaglia says that he emphasises ‘the 
impersonal question of why human beings exist… simply because it is what the 
question of the meaning of life concerns,’ adding that he regards this as ‘a 
statement of the obvious, despite the fact that professional philosophy went to 
considerable lengths during the last century to make it seem otherwise,’36 it 
seems to me that it may be Tartaglia himself rather than those philosophers who 
have been the targets of his criticism who is being disingenuous.  
In order to see that the expressions ‘meaning of x,’ ‘value of x’ and ‘purpose 
of x’ are not synonymous or intersubstitutable, in most contexts at least, one 
need only call to mind typical instances in which they are used. Indeed, are there 
any situations in which one uses the word ‘meaning’ where ‘value’ or ‘purpose’ 
would have done just as well, or in which, although one says ‘meaning’ it is 
obviously implied that what one intends is ‘value’ or ‘purpose’? Though one 
may be able to think of some such situations, the fact that they do not readily 
spring to mind suggests that it is certainly not what one typically means when 
one talks about the ‘meaning of’ something. Thus, when, in everyday situations, 
someone asks ‘What is the meaning of this?,’ it would be exceptionally 
                                                     
34 This is a curious imputation, yet one that Tartaglia reiterates throughout the book. More curious still, 
he seems to think that something like this is the principal motivation for naturalism and physicalism. 
Thus the only reason anyone thinks ‘science in anything like the form we understand it’ could resolve 
the problem of the nature of consciousness is that, having ‘grasped that it will not fit into a scientific 
world-view, most philosophers become frightened.’ This is because ‘if you believe reality outruns the 
physical, then you seem to have strayed into the realms of religion: you have opened up the possibility 
that there is a meaning of life’ (Tartaglia 2016, p. 10). Tartaglia never really attempts to substantiate 
such bald assertions, and they seem to be based upon little more than amateur psychologising. Yet he 
depends on them for a whole lot of heavy-lifting, not only in terms of how he characterises the history 
of philosophy, and the dialectical dynamics of philosophical debate (see, e.g., pp. 178–181), but also in 
his accounts of what he takes to be the motivational sources of science, philosophy, and religion 
(passim).  
35 Ibid. pp. 1, 4–5, 10–11, 12ff. and passim. Tartaglia (2015a), pp. 3–4.  
36 Tartaglia (2016), p. 3. 
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tendentious to suggest that what they usually mean to ask is ‘What is the value 
of this?’ or ‘What is the purpose of this?’ Moreover, as we have seen above, 
Tartaglia argues that when we ask after the meaning of something we are talking 
about ‘the meaning of the phenomenon in a wider context.’ But, to stick to his 
own example, even if we were to agree that there might be contexts in which, 
when someone asks ‘what is the meaning of this film?,’ what they want to know 
about is its wider social or historical significance, we would obviously not 
thereby be asking what its value or purpose is. Indeed, regardless of who is right 
about what people typically mean when they ask about the meaning of a movie, 
play, poem, fable, song and so on—that is, whether they mean to ask about its 
social or historical significance (as Tartaglia maintains) or rather about how it 
ought to be interpreted (as I have suggested)—in neither case would they be 
asking about its value or its purpose.  
In response to such objections Tartaglia might claim that, although it is 
obviously true that the terms not always used synonymously or interchangeably, 
they nonetheless are so used whenever one asks the question—the real question, 
that is—of the meaning of life. The problem with this response is that, if this 
were so, it ought to be obvious that the following three questions are all asking 
the same thing: ‘What is the value of the human species?’ ‘What is the purpose 
of the human species?’ ‘What is the significance of the human species?’ What a 
sentence means, of course, typically depends upon the intention of the speaker, 
the context of usage, the other sentences to which it is inferentially connected, 
and so on. But without running through a list of possible interpretations of these 
questions, or examples of how they might be used in different situations, I think 
it ought to be clear enough that, on the face of it at least, they do not all appear 
to be asking the same thing. 
It is starting to look as though Tartaglia’s one true question, the ‘real’ 
question of the meaning of life, is not a single question after all, but rather—as 
many of those Tartaglia has rebuked for failing to understand (or else feigning 
not to understand) its only ‘obvious’ meaning have argued—a disjunctive one, 
which breaks down upon analysis into a series of partially overlapping yet 
distinct questions sharing at best a certain family resemblance. 37  Indeed, 
Timothy Mawson has argued—quite persuasively in my opinion—that it is 
precisely because the question is equivocal, ambiguous and multiply 
                                                     
37 See, e.g., Baggini (2005), Hepburn (1965), Mawson (2010), and Metz (2013). 
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interpretable in this way, that people who ask it tend to find any single answer to 
it unsatisfactory.38 Whether or not that is so, I think enough has been said to 
make it clear that, contrary to what Tartaglia maintains, there is no one obvious, 
clear, univocal or universal meaning to the expression ‘the meaning of life.’39 
What still remains to be done is to clarify the specific sense in which Tartaglia 
intends the question to be understood. This I will do in the next subsection, 
before going on to ask, in section 4, why he thinks it matters so much.  
 
3.3 Whose Meaning? 
 
Although, as we have seen, there is no single, univocal meaning or 
interpretation of the question of the meaning of life, there is nevertheless one 
perspective from which it would make sense to think of the value, purpose and 
significance of human beings as synonymous. In order to see this, let us recall 
Tartaglia’s characterisation of the meaning of the question as he sees it: 
 
[T]he question is as serious as your life and its intention is anything but 
obscure; though the form it has acquired has potential to mislead, which 
some have willingly latched onto. For asking ‘what is the meaning of life?’ 
leads immediately to a question everyone understands, namely ‘why do 
human beings exist?’ These questions are distinct because the former 
presupposes there is a reason we exist, in order to consequently ask what 
‘meaning’—in the sense of value—this reason provides to human life.40  
 
According to Tartaglia, then, the question ‘What is the meaning of life?’ is 
equivalent to asking ‘What is the reason we exist?,’ where it assumed that, if 
there is such a reason, this would make our lives meaningful in the sense of 
being valuable. By parity of logic, then, if there is no such value-conferring 
reason for our existence, our lives would be meaningless, in the sense of being 
valueless or worthless. By way of further clarification, Tartaglia provides the 
following, more succinct formulation: 
 
                                                     
38 Mawson (2010).  
39 Even less do I think it is an ahistorical question, in the sense of being a question that people have 
always asked, though Tartaglia claims it is, largely on the basis of a rather tendentious interpretation of 
the epic of Gilgamesh (Tartaglia 2016, pp. 61–3). 
40 Tartaglia (2016), p. 1. 
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The question boils down to: what is the value of human life which 
accounts for us being here? Or less carefully but more naturally: what are 
we here for?41 
 
The first, supposedly more careful way of putting it, seems a little opaque. 
Unless we assume something along the lines of John Leslie’s ‘axiarchism,’42 
how could a ‘value’ account for the existence of the human species? In light of 
what precedes it, however, I think it is clear that what Tartaglia means to say 
here—the correct ‘careful’ formulation of the question—would be this: ‘What is 
the value-conferring reason why the human species exists?’  
But this still leaves us with the question of why the reason something exists 
should be supposed to confer a value upon it. Clearly, when Tartaglia talks here 
about the reason something exists, he is not talking about what causes it to exist 
in the sense that, for example, we might say such-and-such atmospheric 
conditions cause clouds or hurricanes to form. What he seems to mean, rather, is 
that the reason something exists would confer a value on it in the sense that it 
would be valuable to whoever it was that designed or created it. That this is 
what Tartaglia has in mind is strongly suggested by the example he uses to 
illustrate it: computers have a meaning or value, he says, in the sense that ‘they 
accomplish tasks for us, and that is why we made them.’43 But if this is what 
Tartaglia means, and if (as he also stipulates) only something that transcends the 
physical universe, and upon which it depends, could provide life with meaning, 
then what his question boils down to is simply this: ‘Why did God create us?’  
I think this clearly is what Tartaglia means by the question, and indeed it is 
only when thus construed that it makes sense to think of the purpose, value and 
significance of something as synonymous expressions. It bears emphasis, 
however, that this would be the purpose, value and significance that we have for 
whoever or whatever ‘created’ us. Only in a highly derivative sense would it be 
our own meaning, purpose, significance or value. For the three questions 
mentioned—about the value, significance and purpose of the human species— 
only look like the same question from the point of view of God.  
So it appears that what Tartaglia insists is the only ‘real’ question of the 
                                                     
41 Ibid., p. 2. 
42 See, e.g., Leslie (1970). 
43 Tartaglia (2016), p. 2. 
 
 224
meaning of life is nothing other than the theological question, ‘For what reason 
did God create human beings?,’ where it is assumed that this reason would 
confer ‘overall meaning’—that is, value, significance and purpose—upon our 
lives, both collectively and individually. Such an interpretation is further 
supported by the fact that he says that the very form of the question, ‘“what is 
the meaning of life?”’ presupposes there is such a context, since it asks what 
meaning our lives are thus endowed with; endowed with by God, would be the 
standard presupposition.’44  
So now we understand the sense in which Tartaglia thinks that the question 
is ‘anything but obscure’—or rather, we now know how he thinks what he calls 
the ‘real’ question ought to be interpreted. What we still do not know, however, 
is why he insists that this is the only ‘real’ question, the only truly philosophical 
sense of the question, and why he tells us that this question is ‘as serious as your 
life.’ I will examine some possible answers to these questions in what follows. 
  
4. Why This Question? Why Does It Matter? 
 
Were Tartaglia a theist we could make immediate sense of his doctrinaire 
insistence upon the particular form of the question that he does. Yet as we 
already know, from the very title of the book if nothing else, Tartaglia does not 
think life has any meaning: life is meaningless—this is what Tartaglia calls 
‘nihilism.’ Why then does he maintain, so adamantly and uncompromisingly, 
that this theological (or crypto-theological) question is the only genuinely 
philosophical meaning the question can have? More than that, why would he 
contend that this is the philosophical question par excellence, the question that 
defines philosophy’s subject matter, and which philosophers should openly 
‘reclaim’ as the very core of their discipline and their principal, motivating 
concern? What motivates him to regard this question as ‘the keystone of 
philosophy,’ the question that ‘locks the rest of its traditional preoccupations in 
place,’ that without which those preoccupations ‘fall apart and fragment, losing 
the form that makes them credible’?45 Could Tartaglia’s proposed answer to the 
question provide some essential clues here? 
                                                     
44 Tartaglia (2015), p. 93; cf. p. 95: ‘any philosopher who thinks God endows our lives with meaning 
is talking about the traditional question.’ In Tartaglia (2016), p. 13, he also makes it clear that 
whenever God is invoked in these debates it’s a sure sign that ‘the traditional question’ is at stake.  
45 Tartaglia (2016), p. 7. 
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4.1 Rejecting the Premise of the Question  
 
It is important to note that the account I have given above somewhat 
underplays an essential qualification that Tartaglia makes right at the outset. 
Having clarified the sense in which he thinks the question ‘What is the meaning 
of life?’ amounts to asking ‘Why do human beings exist?,’ where this 
presupposes that there is such a reason and that this reason would confer 
‘meaning’ in the sense of ‘value’ upon human life, he writes: 
 
But before you can begin to ask this philosophically, you must first ask 
whether there is any reason we are here at all; which is why the question 
‘what is the meaning of life?’ leaves space for ‘there isn’t one’ as an 
appropriate response.46  
 
Similarly, in his article on Metz for the present journal, he writes: 
 
The form of the question ‘what is the meaning of life?’ presupposes there 
is such a context, since it asks what meaning our lives are thus endowed 
with; endowed with by God, would be the standard presupposition. But as 
with all questions of this form, it leaves room for us to reject its 
presupposition by appropriately answering that there is no meaning of 
life.47 
 
Why rejecting the presupposition of a theological question should transform it 
into a ‘philosophical’ question Tartaglia does not say, but rejecting the 
presupposition of the question is indeed what he does. This is not to say that he 
critically examines this presupposition, however, in the sense of calling into 
question the assumption that only a value-conferring reason why the human 
species exists, or a ‘transcendent context of meaning’ beyond the physical 
universe, could make human life meaningful. He does not ask, in other words, 
whether or not it is a good question. Nor does he ask whether such a 
‘transcendent context’ could provide life with meaning.48 Rather, as we have 
                                                     
46 Tartaglia (2016), p. 1 (emphasis in original).  
47 Tartaglia (2015), p. 93. 
48 In sections 4.3 and 4.4 I will present reasons for thinking that the answer to this question is 
negative.  
 226
seen, he insists that this is the only legitimate philosophical sense of the question. 
Nor does Tartaglia critically examine any arguments theists have presented for 
thinking there might be such a transcendent reason or context. Indeed, although 
he argues that philosophers ought to embrace the question of the meaning of life, 
in the sense outlined above, as their essential motivating concern, he shows no 
interest whatsoever in any position that does not reject the presupposition of the 
question from the outset. The only answer to the question that he calls ‘the 
keystone of philosophy’ that seems of any interest to him is the purely negative 
one: there is no value-conferring reason why the human species exist. From this 
Tartaglia infers that life is meaningless, and this is supposed to entail that the life 
of each and every person who has ever lived, or who is alive today, or who will 
ever live, is also meaningless—that is, without value, purpose, or significance. 
This is what Tartaglia calls ‘the truth of nihilism,’ and he regards it as 
philosophy’s greatest discovery, the unassailable proof of its ability to make 
substantial epistemic progress.49  
While all of this is clear enough, it only makes the issue of why Tartaglia 
thinks this question is such a profound and philosophically significant one all the 
more baffling. For we have now learnt that the question which he insists is the 
fundamental motivating concern of philosophy, that which unifies its various 
branches, and that upon which he pins his hopes for rescuing philosophy from 
cultural oblivion, is one whose core presupposition he rejects from the outset. I 
will return to the issue of why he rejects this presupposition shortly. First, 
however, let us briefly examine what he thinks the consequences of rejecting 
this presupposition ought to be.  
 
4.2 The Consequences of Nihilism: ‘Just act ordinary’ 
 
Since Tartaglia maintains that what he calls ‘the real question of the 
meaning of life’ is a question of profound significance, a matter of natural and 
ultimate human concern, and the fundamental question at the root of all 
philosophy and religion, one might suppose that he would also hold that it ought 
to be a matter of profound human concern if it turned out that the question itself 
is based upon a false presupposition—if it turned out, that is, as he argues is the 
case, that life simply has no meaning, value or purpose. 
                                                     
49 Tartaglia (2016), pp. 74–8 especially.  
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But here things get more puzzling still. For Tartaglia tells us throughout the 
book that it just doesn’t matter that life has no meaning. Realising ‘the truth of 
nihilism’—that is, that human life is meaningless and worthless—should not be 
‘expected to change our behaviour in any way,’ nor ‘to change how we feel 
about ourselves.’50 For nihilism, being ‘just a neutral fact,’51 is wholly ‘lacking 
in practical consequences,’ and therefore ‘realizing the truth of nihilism’ should 
‘be of no relevance within life.’52 Contrary to those who fear that widespread 
belief that life is meaningless might be a matter of social and moral concern, 
Tartaglia asserts that ‘there is no reason this belief should affect us practically at 
all, unless we were previously under the false impression that life has a 
meaning.’53  
As for the view that belief in nihilism might ‘threaten our commitments’ in 
any way, Tartaglia claims ‘there is nothing to it.’ After all, ‘just because our 
goals are not imposed from on high, and we realise this,’ he writes, ‘it does not 
follow that we cannot commit to them.’54 Nor should realising the truth of 
nihilism, and thus embracing the meaninglessness of our existence, in any way 
affect which activities we choose to prioritise in life. Nihilism ‘can have no 
bearing on such a decision, since its assessment of our activities as ultimately 
pointless is undiscriminating and uniform.’ Nor should acknowledgement of the 
meaninglessness of our lives make the things we choose to do with our lives 
absurd in any way. For if some activities ‘do occasionally strike us as absurd,’ 
he writes, ‘this can only be in comparison to others,’ since ‘there is nothing 
outside of life’ that could make all of our activities seem absurd.55  
It is something of a puzzle that Tartaglia does not think that what goes for 
                                                     
50 Ibid., p. 41 
51 Ibid., p. ix.  
52 Ibid., p. 42. 
53 Ibid., p. 44.  
54 Ibid., p. 175. Such comments (compare that just quoted about ‘being under the false impression that 
life has a meaning’) make it quite clear that Tartaglia’s book is not addressed to religious people. He 
certainly presents no arguments against theistic beliefs, and I hardly think many people of religious 
faith are likely to be persuaded by his implicit suggestion that they should realise there is no god and 
that their lives have no overall meaning, value or purpose when they are bored (pp. 25–34), or if they 
simply ‘retreat to a physical perspective, and think of human life as consisting in bodies moving 
around and making noises’ (p. 25; cf. p. 85). That Tartaglia takes atheism for granted in this way 
means that he fails to think through the veritable ‘total world revolution’ that universal acceptance of 
‘the truth of nihilism’ would involve, and blinds him to the possibility that a great many conflicts 
around the world today, not to mention the global resurgence of religious fundamentalism, might have 
their roots in resistance to and fear of precisely what he calls ‘nihilism.’ Were he aware of this, at least, 
I doubt he would treat the issue of the consequences of nihilism with the insouciance that he does.  
55 Ibid., p. 42. 
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absurdity also goes for meaninglessness, for the cases seem entirely analogous. 
That is to say, if some of our activities sometimes strike us as meaningless, this 
can only be in comparison with others that we do we find meaningful. Thus if 
there is nothing outside our lives in comparison with which it makes sense to say 
our lives are absurd, for the very same reason there is nothing outside our lives 
in comparison with which it makes sense to say they are meaningless either.56 
Oddly, Tartaglia makes a similar point when he takes issue with Thomas Nagel’s 
suggestion that when we ‘step back’ from our lives and regard them sub specie 
aeternitatis, our lives seem unimportant. In response Tartaglia says that the 
assumption ‘that only a meaning of life can bestow importance seems both 
unmotivated and entirely expendable.’ ‘It seems,’ he adds, ‘like a leftover 
religious dogma.’57 But if this goes for the importance of life, why does 
Tartaglia not draw the same conclusion with regard to the meaning of life? Why, 
in other words, does he conclude from the fact that there is no supernatural or 
transcendent ‘context of meaning’ that our lives are meaningless? Is this not 
why Nietzsche called nihilism a ‘pathological transitional stage’ in which, 
because faith is lost in a divine guarantor for truth, meaning and value, ‘the 
tremendous generalization’ is made, ‘the inference that there is no meaning at 
all’?58  
At any rate, Tartaglia is clear: nihilism ought to have no consequences for 
our lives. To quote from the opening sentence of the book, the fact that our lives 
are meaningless is ‘just a neutral fact.’ It is neither good nor bad, and people 
who worry about it, or about the consequences which might follow from belief 
in it, are simply misguided. For even those who do believe in God-given 
meaning, value and purpose—which would include the world’s 2.2 billion 
Christians, 1.6 billion Muslims, 1 billion Hindus, and so on—Tartaglia suggests 
that all they have to lose is a ‘false belief,’ along with whatever ‘illusory 
motivations’ that belief might have provided.59 For these reasons, he maintains, 
                                                     
56 Thus, to adapt a retort sometimes attributed to Voltaire, the best response to the statement that ‘life 
is meaningless’ might be: ‘Compared to what?’ Tartaglia responds to a similar objection in the fourth 
section of his second chapter (and even cites the retort just mentioned, albeit in response to the remark 
that ‘Life’s a funny thing,’ from a 1950s Robert Wise film, in which the line attributed to Voltaire is 
delivered by Susan Hayward’s character, p. 53), but his response essentially boils down to reiterating 
the idea that human life is meaningless because this meaning is not ‘constitutive of what it is to be a 
human being,’ since there is ‘no wider context of meaning’ (p. 55), and it is precisely these claims that 
I find most puzzling (as discussed in the next subsection, 4.3).  
57 Tartaglia (2016), p. 46.  
58 Nietzsche (1883–1888/1968), p. 14 (emphasis in German original).  
59 Tartaglia (2016), p. 42. With respect to this claim, see n. 54 above.  
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no ‘coping strategies’ are needed: ‘As you were!,’ seems to be Tartaglia’s 
considered advice; or, to quote from Chapter 2, tellingly entitled ‘A Survey of 
Misguided Coping Strategies,’ he writes: 
 
As to the question of what we should do upon realizing the truth of 
nihilism, then, there may be more than a little relevance in Lin-Chi’s 
advice to ‘Just act ordinary, without trying to do anything particular. 
Move your bowels, piss, get dressed, eat your rice, and if you get tired, 
then lie down.’60 
 
With this we seem to be further than ever from understanding why Tartaglia 
deems this question to be such a profoundly important one. For if the question is 
simply based upon a false presupposition, and rejecting it has no consequences 
for our lives, how could it be the ultimate natural concern for human beings? 
How could such an inconsequential question be the ultimate wellspring of 
philosophy and religion? Why would it be ‘as serious as your life’? None of this 
is clear at this point. And things are about to get stranger still.  
 
4.3 An Isolated Philosophical Concern 
 
When someone says they think their life is meaningless or worthless, or 
judges someone else to be living a meaningless or worthless life, we usually take 
them to be making a social or moral judgement regarding the value of that life. 
Indeed, it is often implied that human lives that are meaningless, worthless, 
aimless and pointless are lives that are not worth living.61 Yet it turns out that, 
although Tartaglia maintains that life is meaningless, and although he does think 
this entails that each and every human life is meaningless, valueless, worthless 
and insignificant,62 this does not amount to an evaluation of anything—not, at 
least, in any sense one might readily recognise. He writes as follows:  
 
                                                     
60 Ibid., p. 44. Further sagely advice from a venerable Zen master is quoted in an accompanying note: 
‘In this world we eat, we shit, we sleep and we wake up—and after all that all we have to do is die’ (p. 
190 n. 3).  
61 As indeed Tartaglia concedes when he writes that ‘worthless things are bad, and unless we can 
reform them, we generally want to either ignore or get rid of them’ (ibid., p. 171). 
62 This follows, of course, simply in virtue of the fact that ‘meaning’ is here being treated as 
synonymous with purpose, value and significance.  
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To say that life is meaningless is to say that it is valueless or worthless; 
but only in the sense that value is not essential to what it is. It is not to say 
that we are worthless in the socially contextual sense that would amount 
to a condemnation. For although our nature is not intrinsically valuable, 
we value many things, including ourselves. We might not have done so, so 
this value is not essential to what we are, or to the other things we value. 
But our capacity to think about and value anything has made us 
contingently valuable. The philosophical realisation that value does not 
flow inevitably from our nature—a nature which makes value possible— 
has practically no prospect of reversing this valuation; life is simply too 
compelling for a philosophical view about the nature of reality to have 
that kind of effect.63  
 
It will be worth pausing to unpack the implications of this, especially with 
regard to the words I have italicised. For what Tartaglia seems to be saying is 
that if the value of something is not an intrinsic property of that thing—that is, if 
its value is not something that belongs to the nature of that thing in itself or as 
such, regardless of its relations to anything else in the world—then it is without 
value, literally worthless. The trouble with this is that it is exceptionally difficult 
to understand what it is supposed to mean, or to think of any examples of 
anything that could possibly satisfy such a definition of ‘being valuable.’ We 
usually take the value of something to depend upon it being valued by or 
valuable for someone. Something is valuable not per se but rather in virtue of 
being valuable to an individual, group, society, or perhaps humans in general.64 
Yet Tartaglia’s implicit strictures regarding intrinsic value suggest that anything 
that depends for its value upon anything other than its own ‘intrinsic nature’ is 
not really valuable at all. For if we were talking about the value of something to 
or for someone, even if there were complete unanimity about this value, that 
would not count as an intrinsic value; that is, its value would not be something 
that belongs to its nature as the very thing that it is; its value would not ‘flow 
inevitably’ from its ‘intrinsic nature.’ Such value would thus not be real value, 
                                                     
63 Ibid., p. 6; italics added. See also p. 171 where he claims that ‘the judgement that life is socially 
worthless is an evaluation whereas the judgement that life is meaningless is not.’ Note that he says this 
even though he is clear that, for him, for life to be meaningless just is for it to be worthless; for as he 
says on the first page of the book, ‘it is “meaning”—in the sense of value’ (p. 1) that is at stake. 
64 I think there is also a perfectly good sense in which things might be said to be valuable to other 
animal species as well, though it is not a crucial point here.  
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intrinsic value, Tartaglia seems to suggest, but rather only value in some 
metaphysically second-class, low grade, nickle-plated sense—namely, a 
‘socially contextual sense.’65  
There has of course been a long tradition of philosophers, stretching back to 
Plato at least, who have debated the question of ‘intrinsic value’ in the context of 
ethics, where the idea of something valuable ‘in itself,’ ‘for its own sake,’ ‘in its 
own right’ or ‘as an end in itself’ is typically contrasted with that which is 
‘instrumentally valuable,’ or valuable for the sake of something else, or as a 
means for someone else. For Kant, for example, it is rational beings or persons, 
understood as ends-in-themselves, that are the bearers of ultimate, intrinsic or 
‘final’ value. All such discussions, however, have traditionally concerned what is 
intrinsically good or valuable for human beings or in human society.66 Once 
such talk is taken out of the sphere of ethics altogether, however, as Tartaglia has 
done here, I have serious doubts about whether anything intelligible is being 
said at all.67 For what does intrinsic value even mean in this case? If, as I have 
suggested above, it means a property an object would have independently of 
everything else that exists—or even whether anything else exists—I am at a loss 
to imagine what could be valuable in that sense. In fact, to employ one of the 
favourite conceits of contemporary analytic metaphysics, I find that I’m unable 
to conceive of any such thing in any possible world.  
Of course, it may be that I simply lack the powers of rational intuition that 
many proponents of contemporary analytic metaphysics seem to believe they 
possess: the power, that is, to consult their ‘modal intuitions’ in order to discover 
what is and is not possible ‘across all possible worlds.’ But if we restrict 
ourselves to conversing among the mortals for the moment, it seems to me that 
if anything has ‘intrinsic’ value or value ‘in itself,’ ‘for its own sake,’ ‘as such,’ 
‘in its own right,’ or however else one might put it—that is, if we can make 
sense of such a notion at all—I think most people would say that life on earth, 
and perhaps human life in particular, is the very best candidate we have. Yet 
                                                     
65 When going through a draft of this paper it dawned on me that I’d unwittingly plagiarised Mark 
Twain’s Letters from the Earth, wherein Satan, in his first letter from earth, describes man ‘at his very 
very best’ as ‘a sort of low grade nickel-plated angel’ (Twain 1909/1962, p. 7). It works a whole lot 
better in its original context, but I decided to leave it in, if only to have an excuse for bringing Twain’s 
scathingly brilliant and hilarious but much neglected satire to the reader’s attention.  
66 The only reason I say ‘traditionally’ is that more recently such discussions have also been extended 
to environmental ethics and animal welfare. For a helpful overview see Zimmerman (2015). 
67 Tartaglia makes it clear throughout the book that he does not think the issue ought to have any 
bearing upon ethics or morality whatsoever.  
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notice that this is precisely what Tartaglia is telling us cannot have any ‘intrinsic 
value’ or ‘intrinsic worth,’ since this worth is supposedly ‘not essential to what it 
is’ and ‘does not flow inevitably from our nature.’ But if that is the case, perhaps 
Tartaglia could provide some examples of what sort of thing does or even could 
have ‘intrinsic,’ ‘essential’ or ‘necessary’ value in this sense?  
A further problem with Tartaglia’s appeal to ‘intrinsic value’ here is that it 
would seem to violate his own stipulations regarding the necessary conditions 
for something to count as meaningful or valuable in the first place. For, as we 
have seen above, Tartaglia makes it clear on the first page of his Introduction 
that the ‘real’ question of the meaning of life concerns what would confer 
‘“meaning”—in the sense of value’ upon human life. We also saw that he 
defines meaning relationally. That is to say, Tartaglia holds that for something to 
have meaning (‘in the sense of value’), there must be a ‘wider context of 
meaning’ within which it would be meaningful or valuable. But if meaning and 
value necessarily depend upon there being such a wider context—which is 
something Tartaglia insists upon throughout the book—it is hard to see how he 
can coherently claim that human life is worthless on the grounds that it is not 
intrinsically valuable, in the sense that this value is not ‘essential to what we are’ 
and does not ‘flow inevitably’ from our intrinsic nature.68  
Given that Tartaglia very clearly believes that, if we had been created for a 
reason by a transcendent deity, then our lives would be intrinsically meaningful 
and valuable, the only sense I can make of all this is that he thinks ‘intrinsic 
value’—real meaning, value and purpose—would have to be divinely bestowed 
value. Yet even if one could coherently maintain that intrinsic value could be 
both wholly non-relational—in the sense that it would have to be an essential 
property of a thing in itself, regardless of the existence of anything else—and at 
the same time essentially relational—in the sense of necessarily depending upon 
a wider context of meaning—there are still further problems. For one, why 
would someone who rejects theism or creationism outright, and who finds no 
reason whatsoever to take it seriously, insist upon such metaphysically inflated, 
theological notions of meaning, value, purpose and significance in the first 
place? If Nagel’s suggestion that our lives can seem trivial when viewed sub 
specie aeternitatis ‘seems like a leftover religious dogma,’ what are we to make 
                                                     
68 I am grateful to Thaddaeus Metz for suggesting that I might make this point more explicit, as well 
as for sending me a recent paper of his own in which he argues against a relational account of meaning 
quite similar to that of Tartaglia (see Metz 2015a). 
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of Tartaglia’s conclusion that life is ‘meaningless’ and ‘worthless’ on account of 
the fact that we have no divinely conferred ‘intrinsic’ meaning and value?69 
Moreover, even if we had been created by a supernatural deity, why would 
that make our lives intrinsically valuable? Is Tartaglia suggesting that, had we 
been created by Odin or Yahweh or Allah or Zeus, our value would ‘flow 
inevitably from our nature’ and our lives would have intrinsic meaning? If so, to 
return to Tartaglia’s example, does that mean that computers, since they have a 
meaning or value because ‘they accomplish tasks for us, and that is why we 
made them’ also have an intrinsic value that ‘flows inevitably’ from their nature? 
After all, they do seem to have their value and function ‘built-in’ and ‘externally 
determined’: serving our needs is ‘what they are here for.’70 So are we to 
conclude that computers, shovels, lawn mowers and tooth picks have ‘intrinsic 
value’ whereas human life does not? And yet Tartaglia also suggests that, since it 
is not metaphysically necessary that we value the things that we do (for we 
‘might not have done so’), the things that we value do not have intrinsic value, 
for they do not have that value in virtue of being the things that they are. So are 
we to infer from this that, for something to have intrinsic value, it would not 
only have to have been created by a supernatural deity, but that it would also 
have to be metaphysically necessary that this deity value it, and could not have 
done otherwise?71 
However Tartaglia might go about responding to such objections, we have 
seen that his thesis that ‘life is meaningless’ amounts to saying that our lives are 
meaningless, valueless, worthless and insignificant, but only in the sense that we 
have no metaphysically ‘intrinsic,’ ‘necessary,’ ‘essential’ or ‘constitutive’ 
meaning, value, worth or significance. What this means is that our value ‘is not 
essential to what we are’; that it ‘does not flow inevitably from our nature,’ and 
is not ‘constitutive of what it is to be a human being,’ since there is ‘no wider 
context of meaning’—that is, no supernatural context of meaning beyond the 
physical universe—that could confer such ‘intrinsic’ meaning or value upon us. 
                                                     
69 Tartaglia (2016), p. 46. Cf. Nietzsche: ‘Radical nihilism is the conviction of an absolute untenability 
of existence when it comes to the highest values one recognizes; plus the realization that we lack the 
least right to posit a beyond or an in-itself of things that might be “divine” or morality incarnate’ 
(1883–1888/1968, p. 9; emphasis in German original). 
70 Tartaglia (2016), p. 22. 
71 I am here leaving aside the question of why such deities would not need to have their meaning, 
value and purpose conferred upon them by a wider context also—that is, why Tartaglia’s stipulation 
that something can only have meaning if there is a wider context of meaning does not open up an 
infinite regress—but I raise it briefly in section 4.4 below. 
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All of this presumably also explains why, although Tartaglia calls all this ‘just a 
neutral fact,’ he also suggests that it is no ordinary fact, such as ‘the fact that life 
evolved on Earth.’ It is, rather, what he calls a ‘philosophical fact.’72 But what 
on earth, we might well wonder, is one of those? Do we have any more of them? 
If so, what are they, and why are they not more widely known? Is there an 
encyclopaedia where the complete collection of such putative facts might be 
consulted? If not, why not? And how are such facts established? In the present 
case, for example, what kinds of evidence are drawn upon, and what kinds of 
arguments are employed, in order to establish the special ‘philosophical’ fact 
that life is meaningless?  
Disappointingly, perhaps, Tartaglia’s reason for rejecting the possibility that 
‘life might have a meaning,’ far from involving any special powers of 
intellectual intuition or rational insight into what holds necessarily across all 
possible worlds, comes down to the rather more banal admission that, ‘like 
many others I can see no good reason to think it does.’73 Moreover, unlike Metz, 
for example, who devotes the largest section of his book (comprising no less 
than four chapters) to critically assessing ‘supernaturalist’ approaches to the 
question of life’s meaning, Tartaglia does not bother addressing them at all. In 
view of the fact that Tartaglia reprimands Metz for neglecting the issue of 
whether or not humanity might have been created by a supernatural being, this is 
a peculiar state of affairs indeed.74 For if what Tartaglia calls ‘the traditional 
question’ is nothing other than the question of what meaning God endowed our 
lives with,75 and if this is the question Tartaglia exhorts philosophers to publicly 
embrace as their special area of expertise, one might think he would have some 
interest in those who have sought to answer it rather than just reject its premises 
from the outset. For even if, as he says, he cannot think of any reasons to 
suppose it to be true, one might think Tartaglia would at least engage with some 
of the reasons that have been offered, throughout the past two millennia, for 
thinking it might be. For if there is literally no good reason to suppose that any 
such reason can be found, and if those who think they have found such reasons 
                                                     
72 Ibid., p. 5 
73 Ibid., p. 6. 
74 Tartaglia acknowledges that Metz devotes ‘a large proportion’ of his book to ‘the traditional 
question’ (2015, p. 95), but this only gets him into more trouble with Tartaglia. Given what Metz had 
said about the book’s scope in his Introduction (see section 2 above), he is further chastised because he 
‘does not even stick to his guns’ (2016a, p. 298). Metz, it seems, as ‘the main culprit’ among the 
‘New-Paradigmers’ (ibid. 287–8), is damned if he does, damned if he doesn’t.  
75 Tartaglia (2015), p. 93.  
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are not even worth engaging with, why would we conclude that our lives are 
meaningless, valueless, worthless and insignificant, simply because this 
rationally unmotivated possibility fails to hold? 
It is starting to look like the question of whether life has a meaning in 
Tartaglia’s sense of these words—namely, the question of whether the human 
species has an overall meaning or purpose—is not very interesting at all; not 
even for Tartaglia. After all, if there are literally no good reasons for supposing it 
to be true, and the fact that it is not true has no implications for our lives—if it 
should not ‘be expected to change our behaviour in any way,’ nor to ‘change 
how we feel about ourselves’—then why all the fanfare about the question in the 
first place? Why is it supposed to be ‘a profound question; a deeply 
philosophical one’; a question that is ‘as serious as your life’?76 
At the end of his first chapter Tartaglia argues that the entire issue of 
whether there is an overall meaning or purpose to life ought not to be thought 
relevant to ethics or morality in any way, and that the rejection of such meaning 
or purpose should be treated as ‘an isolated concern; one relevant to a specific 
philosophical question.’77 We have yet to see, however, why it should be of any 
philosophical (rather than theological) concern either. Moreover, if the 
meaninglessness of life has absolutely no implications for morality or ethics, 
what becomes of Tartaglia’s thesis that the question of the meaning of life is ‘the 
keystone of philosophy,’ that which unites its theoretical and practical branches, 
and that without which it splinters into disparate, unconnected fragments? 
Before turning to this question I will briefly take up Tartaglia’s most explicit 
suggestion as to why ‘the truth of nihilism’ should matter to us after all.  
 
4.4. Are Our Lives Meaningless?  
 
Suppose we go along with Tartaglia and allow that to say that something is 
meaningless, valueless, worthless and insignificant in philosophy or in 
metaphysics is something completely different to what we would mean by those 
words in any other area of human discourse. Why would such an abstruse, 
metaphysical, ‘neutral fact’ regarding so-called ‘intrinsic meaning’ or ‘intrinsic 
value’ be of any interest to anyone?78 Why would it be a matter of profound 
                                                     
76 Tartaglia (2016), pp. 3, 39, 1. 
77 Ibid., p. 39. 
78 Given what Tartaglia seems to mean by this (see section 4.3), it would be a matter of concern to 
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philosophical and existential importance? In the Introduction to the book 
Tartaglia anticipates a similar response. He imagines a reader saying that, 
although she agrees that life has no ‘overall meaning,’ this doesn’t seem very 
interesting to her—it is, after all, what she had always assumed anyway. This 
imaginary interlocutor continues:  
 
But then, once you’ve pointed that out, there isn’t really anything more to 
say, is there? Life is meaningless, and that’s it. It doesn’t lead anywhere 
interesting, as you’ve effectively conceded yourself: it doesn’t show that 
life is terrible … or that anything goes … or anything like that. So it’s a 
philosophical dead-end. It’s boring. 
  
Tartaglia responds as follows:  
 
But nihilism is not just any old fact: it entails that everybody’s life is 
meaningless, and hence that your life is too. This must strike you as more 
significant for the way you think about the world than the vast majority of 
philosophical ideas you have come across, if not all of them; if it is not 
like that for you as it is for me, then perhaps I should start taking 
solipsism seriously. It is a thought which resonates throughout the 
understanding whenever you genuinely think about it, transfiguring 
everything while changing nothing.79  
 
Tartaglia thus invites each of his readers to reflect on the significance of the fact 
that their own lives are meaningless. Here I will briefly outline my own response. 
Though I can only speak for myself, the reason this ‘philosophical fact’ does not 
strike me as significant is that, as we have seen above, what Tartaglia means by 
this is the following four things: (1) that there is no ‘overall meaning’ to human 
life; (2) that the human species was not created for a reason by a god or 
                                                                                                                                                                     
many religious people, of course. For this reason it is all the more peculiar that Tartaglia does nothing 
to try to persuade such people that what he calls ‘nihilism’ might be true (cf. n. 54 above).  
79 Ibid., p. 7. This is only the first part of Tartaglia’s response. In the second part he claims that, far 
from it being the case that the question of the meaning of life in his sense ‘doesn’t lead anywhere 
interesting,’ there is a sense in which ‘it leads everywhere in philosophy.’ It is in this context that he 
writes that the question of the meaning of life ‘is the keystone of philosophy’ which ‘locks the rest of 
its traditional preoccupations in place.’ Although I touch upon these claims in the next section, a 
proper examination of his arguments for them fall well outside the scope of this paper. 
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pantheon; (3) that there is no ‘transcendent context of meaning’ beyond the 
physical universe; and (4) that human life does not have any ‘intrinsic,’ 
‘essential’ or ‘metaphysically necessary’ value or purpose. Let me briefly 
address these in order. 
Regarding (1), the idea that there is no ‘overall meaning’ to human life, that 
the human species has no ‘meaning’ or ‘purpose,’ does not strike me as 
significant in the least. In fact it just strikes me as confused. As noted in section 
1 above, biological species are not the sorts of things that could have meanings 
or purposes, any more than a planet could (and no, it doesn’t strike me as 
philosophically deep or significant that Venus has no ‘overall meaning’ either). 
Regarding (2), the reason I do not find that significant is simply that I have 
never in my life supposed that we might have been created by a god—not even a 
whole team of them. Regarding (3), likewise, I have never entertained the idea 
that there might be a ‘transcendent context of meaning’ existing somehow 
‘beyond the physical universe.’ Indeed, I am not at all sure I know what it means, 
much less have any idea how we might find out about such a thing even if it did 
exist. Moreover, even if I were to agree, for the sake of argument, that 
something can only be made meaningful by a ‘wider context of meaning,’ and 
that my life could only be meaningful if the physical universe had a meaning 
somehow bestowed upon it by a supernatural being or ‘transcendent context,’ it 
seems obvious that this would open up an infinite regress in which nothing 
could be meaningful anyway, as a matter of plain logic. For even if God had a 
reason for creating the physical universe, if the only thing that can make a life 
meaningful is a wider context of meaning, then God’s life too would need to 
belong to such a wider context, and so on to infinity. If, on the other hand, God 
does not need any such wider context, then neither do we, and there was never 
any need to start speculating about a mysterious supernatural or ‘transcendent’ 
context in the first place. And as for (4), the reason that my putative lack of 
‘intrinsic,’ ‘essential’ or ‘metaphysically necessary’ value doesn’t strike me as 
significant is that, as I have argued at length in section 4.3, I do not think 
Tartaglia has provided a sufficiently coherent account of such value for it to 
make any impact upon me whatsoever.80 
                                                     
80 Regarding Tartaglia’s final point, in the paragraph quoted above, that the thought that one’s life is 
meaningless ‘resonates throughout the understanding whenever you genuinely think about it, 
transfiguring everything while changing nothing,’ while I admit the possibility that I may not have 
what it takes to ‘genuinely think about it,’ I can only report that I have tried to think about it—quite 
genuinely—and yet, for better or worse, have experienced no such resonance or transfiguration.  
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4.5 The Keystone of Philosophy? 
 
Although I am not persuaded by Tartaglia’s reasons for suggesting that I 
ought to regard the ‘intrinsic’ meaninglessness of my life as a deeply significant 
‘philosophical fact,’ I am not suggesting that he should start taking solipsism 
seriously. Perhaps, after all, it’s just me, and most people would immediately 
understand the deep significance of all this. Perhaps Tartaglia’s distinction 
between intrinsic and necessary meaning and value, on the one hand, and social 
and moral meaning and value on the other, is intuitively obvious to most 
people—in which case perhaps I’m the one who should consider taking 
solipsism seriously.  
However, this doesn’t seem to be what Tartaglia is suggesting either, for he 
goes on to say that metaphysical meaninglessness and worthlessness and social 
or moral meaninglessness and worthlessness are ‘endlessly conflated in our 
culture.’81 Given Tartaglia’s earlier insistence upon the obviousness of the true 
meaning of the question, this is surprising indeed. For if it’s the case that the two 
questions are ‘endlessly conflated in our culture,’ then people evidently do not 
take the meaning of the question to be obvious in the way that Tartaglia 
suggests; nor can philosophers be blamed for having deliberately obfuscated the 
issue. Moreover, it follows that it is not just ‘new paradigm’ analytic 
philosophers who are ‘very confused’ about the meaning of the question.82 
Rather, if the issues are ‘endlessly conflated in our culture,’ if follows that the 
confusion is endemic to ‘our culture.’83  
It is for this sort of reason, I take it, that Tartaglia thinks philosophers—not 
the confused ones, obviously, but the ‘real’ ones, i.e. those ‘good guys’ who see 
the distinction between these issues as clearly and distinctly as does 
Tartaglia84—ought to regain their self-confidence and reassert their voices in the 
                                                     
81 Ibid., p. 3. 
82 Since Tartaglia thinks post-Nietzschean philosophers were ‘obsessed’ with the ‘real’ question, yet 
made the issue of ‘social meaning’ their ‘principal concern’ (2015, p. 91, 98), it follows that they too 
must have been ‘very confused.’ Moreover, since Tartaglia rejects ‘the dubious assumption that there 
is a distinctive concept of social meaningfulness that merits specifically philosophical investigation,’ it 
follows that they weren’t doing genuine philosophy either (2016a, p. 297; italics in original).  
83 Tartaglia doesn’t say what ‘our culture’ includes, so it could be that he thinks this confusion is only 
a malady of (say) ‘Western’ culture, and that in some cultures people are rarely if ever guilty of this 
egregious conflation. If that is the case, however, he doesn’t tell us which cultures those might be. 
84  Tartaglia introduces ‘the good guys’—that is, ‘those philosophers who recognise the clear 
distinction between the question of the meaning of life and issues about social meaning’—at the end of 
an Appendix to his Introduction (2016, pp. 18–19). Based on this discussion it would seem that there is 
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cultural conversation of mankind. And indeed, if humanity is to survive for 
another few millennia, he suggests, ‘we need a lot more philosophical clarity on 
these matters.’85 Such clear-sighted philosophers are needed so that people do 
not go around conflating intrinsic, necessary, metaphysical meaning, value, 
purpose and significance with the philosophically uninteresting, extrinsic, 
contingent, humdrum variety—that is, with what just about everyone else would 
take these words to mean. (One wonders what other vital services such 
philosophers might have in store for us befuddled folk.) And yet, apart from any 
misgivings we might have about metaphysicians bearing gifts of dubious value 
(to use the latter term in its standard ‘social’ sense rather than Tartaglia’s 
‘philosophical’ sense), if the putative confusion is as widespread as Tartaglia 
suggests, it’s hard to see why he ever insisted that the correctness of his 
interpretation of the question was ‘a statement of the obvious,’ and berated so 
many other philosophers for having failed to realise this, in the first place. 
In response, Tartaglia might concede the point that it is people in general (at 
least within ‘our culture’) and not just ‘new paradigm’ analytic philosophers 
who are ‘very confused’ about what he takes to be the obvious meaning of the 
question. Indeed, given that people from all walks of life seem to think that 
things like ‘happiness’ and ‘love’ count as appropriate answers to the question,86 
and given that he says the issues are ‘endlessly conflated in our culture,’ I do not 
see how he can reasonably deny it. (So much, then, for his arguments about how 
we typically use the terms, which, even if he can fend off the criticisms offered 
in section 3 above, turn out to be redundant anyway.) In conceding this, however, 
he might say that his point all along was not that there was only one possible 
interpretation of the question, but rather that there is only one real philosophical 
                                                                                                                                                                     
(or was) only one really good guy, apart from Tartaglia himself: namely, the late Milton Munitz. 
However, in view of the fact that in his book on this issue Munitz himself dismissed the question of 
the meaning of life in Tartaglia’s sense as a pseudo-problem—‘a mirage and wholly gratuitous’ 
(Munitz 1993, p. 109)—it looks as though Tartaglia himself may be the only really good guy.  
85 See the end of the next footnote for the source of this quotation. 
86 To see the sorts of answers people think it appropriate to give to the question ‘What is the Meaning 
of Life?’ there is a website called ‘Excellence Reporter’ <excellencereporter.com> comprising more 
than 700 such answers from people of various walks of life (e.g., writers, artists, architects, monks, 
scientists, mystics, teachers, etc.). Having read a few dozen of them I can report that I came across not 
a single one in which the question was taken in anything like the sense Tartaglia claims to be obvious. 
The first five answers (it is listed alphabetically by surname) are as follows: ‘knowing and being our 
deepest being’; ‘leaving more behind than you take away’; ‘to do great things that make yourself and 
others happy,’ ‘loving my wife and partner, loving my family and friends, loving the work that I do’; 
and ‘to find the best version of me every day.’ A recent addition is ‘The Meaning and the 
Meaninglessness of Life,’ by one James Tartaglia, from which I took the footnote 85 quotation. 
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interpretation of the question. After all, in the very first paragraph of the book he 
notes that the question of the meaning of life has picked up a ‘bad reputation’ 
because ‘there are pathological connotations to obsessing over it.’ This is 
because worrying about the meaning of life is relatively common among people 
suffering from depression and other psychological problems. Philosophers, 
however, should not fear being stigmatised, suggests Tartaglia, since there is 
nevertheless a legitimate philosophical version of the question untainted by any 
such pathological associations—namely: ‘What is the human species for?’ (or, 
more colloquially, ‘What are we here for?’).87 Likewise, in the third paragraph 
of the book he does not state that there is only one obvious question regarding 
the meaning of life, but rather that ‘there is only one obvious philosophical 
question’ regarding it—and shouldn’t philosophers, at least, be able to tell the 
difference between a properly philosophical question about intrinsic or essential 
meaning and value, on the one hand, and a wholly unphilosophical one about 
mere personal, social and moral meaning and value on the other?88  
But apart from the implicit suggestion that the questions people suffering 
from depression might seek answers to are beneath the concerns of 
philosophy—a suggestion that is simply staggering in light of the fact that 
Tartaglia claims that people who are bored are able to divine the true answer to 
the ultimate question of philosophy and religion simply in virtue of having been 
left to twiddle their thumbs89—it is obviously the case that one will only agree 
with this if one already agrees with Tartaglia that philosophy is ‘all about’ the 
question of the meaning of life in his narrow, crypto-theological sense. But since 
Tartaglia is the only philosopher, to the very best of my knowledge, who has 
                                                     
87 Tartaglia (2016), pp. 1–2; cf. Tartaglia (2016a), p. 300. 
88 Tartaglia (2016), p. 2 (italics added). 
89 Ibid., pp. 25–34. Tartaglia argues that boredom has profound philosophical significance because it 
is not a mere mood or emotion but rather something more like what Heidegger called a 
Grundstimmung (see, e.g., Heidegger 1929–30/1995): that is, a fundamental ‘attunement’ that is 
revelatory of ‘the human condition as a whole,’ allowing us ‘to see things more objectively and grasp 
truths that would otherwise remain hidden’ (pp. 26, 28). What is ‘most significant about boredom from 
a philosophical perspective,’ writes Tartaglia, ‘is that it naturally orientates us to the truth of nihilism’; 
that is, that it ‘attunes’ us to the true answer to the fundamental question of both philosophy and 
religion—that ‘life is meaningless.’ Should such a philosophical attunement tip over into a mere mood 
such as depression, on the other hand, Tartaglia seems to suggest, asking about the meaning of life 
thereby loses its deep philosophical significance and becomes a shallow, unphilosophical question 
with ‘pathological connotations’ (pp. 3, 1). Thus a person who feels her life is meaningless is 
implicitly asking the merely ‘social,’ wholly unphilosophical question, ‘How can I get some more 
meaning in my life?,’ to which an appropriate response would be to advise her to get a new hobby or 
join an internet dating agency (p. 3). Tartaglia takes these points to be obvious, and ‘[u]nlike other 
philosophers,’ he writes in this connection, ‘I do not scorn the obvious’ (p. 3).  
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ever characterised philosophy in these terms, and he is well aware that the vast 
majority of philosophers would disagree with him, all his talk about this being 
‘the only obvious philosophical question in the area,’ and his scathing rebukes of 
other philosophers for failing to see (or else scorning) ‘the obvious’—all of this 
boils down to little more than Tartaglia feeling disgruntled over the fact that 
people do not share his highly idiosyncratic conception of philosophy.90 But 
then since making the case for the credibility of this conception of philosophy is 
the principal argumentative burden of Tartaglia’s book, he ought not to have 
assumed it to be obvious at the outset. Rather, he should have expected to have 
to argue for it, and only expect it to become ‘obvious’ to people, if at all, to the 
extent that his arguments succeed in convincing them. The same goes for his 
accusation, cited earlier, that those who find the question of the meaning of life 
‘obscure, uninteresting or just plain unanswerable’ are purveyors of an 
‘anti-philosophical cultural trend,’ and that those who attempt ‘to make 
philosophy more like science’ are eo ipso part of an ‘absurd agenda’ of 
‘philosophers turning against philosophy’—in which case, of course, Descartes, 
Locke, Hume and Kant would count not so much as the fathers of modern 
philosophy as the fathers of modern anti-philosophy.91 
 
4.6 The Meaning of Life: A Cheap Possibility  
 
Since Tartaglia’s appeal to obviousness does not work, then, his case for 
claiming that what he calls the ‘real’ question of life’s meaning is the only 
genuinely philosophical one must hinge on the story he has to tell about the 
history of philosophy. His historical thesis, in a nutshell, is that philosophy got 
underway when the question of the meaning of human life was first connected to 
the concept of ‘transcendence.’ 92  It was the prospect that if reality is 
transcendent there might be ‘a wider context of meaning,’ and thus that nihilism 
might not be true, that ‘provided the original impetus to philosophical inquiry.’93 
Philosophy thus ‘begins in, and remains rooted in,’ what he calls the ‘two 
                                                     
90 To get an idea of just how idiosyncratic it is, consider his claims that (all?) ‘[p]hilosophical 
problems arise from attempts to make sense of the world with the concepts of transcendence, and such 
attempts are its proper aim,’ and that the history of philosophy has been a perennial debate between 
two factions, ‘with one side reminding us of the fact of transcendence only to take it in the wrong 
direction, and the other side trying to deny it’ (ibid., pp. 178, 180).  
91 I explore this point in some detail in another paper currently in progress.  
92 Ibid., p. 73 and chapter 3 passim; Tartaglia (2016a). 
93 Tartaglia tells the same story about the origins of religion (2016, e.g., pp. 55, 70, 74, 78).  
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prototypical concerns’ of the meaning of life and transcendence, and ‘once the 
connection between them is understood, we have more than enough unity to 
speak of a distinctive subject-matter of philosophy.’94 In short, Tartaglia’s 
principal metaphilosophical thesis is that ‘concerns about transcendence and the 
meaning of life’ together ‘provide the unifying core to the subject-matter of 
philosophy’ and provide it with its ‘distinctive subject-matter.’95 
Apart from the fact that the few historical examples Tartaglia briefly 
discusses do not really support his case,96 one might have thought that, if these 
two questions really did form the original impetus and raison d'être of 
traditional philosophical inquiry, historians of philosophy might have taken note 
of this.97 But even if we were to accept that the history of philosophy has been 
in some sense ‘all about’ the question of the meaning of life in Tartaglia’s 
crypto-theological sense, the trouble is that it follows from other things he says 
that the entire history of philosophy must have been motivated by a literally 
irrational, ill-motivated, ‘cheap’ possibility: namely, the possibility that there is 
a connection between the question of the meaning of life and the question of 
transcendence. For just as he often says he can think of literally ‘no reason’ to 
think there might be a transcendent context of meaning, so he also says, with 
regard to the possibility of a connection between transcendence and meaning, 
that ‘there is no reason to link the two, since there is no reason a transcendent 
context should be a context of meaning.’ Although the idea that reality might 
have some ‘overall purpose’ is not ‘conceptually ruled out,’ he writes, ‘we have 
no good reason to believe in it either’:  
 
For even if the physical universe does exist within a transcendent context, 
there is no reason this should be a context of meaning, or one in which 
human life has an overall purpose. All this is possible, but possibility is 
cheap.98  
                                                     
94 Ibid., pp. 69–70. 
95 Ibid., pp. 73, 76.  
96 I cannot substantiate this claim here, but attempt to do so in a paper currently in preparation. 
97 Tartaglia does not cite any accounts of the history of philosophy to support his case in the book. 
However, in a more recent article, by way of pre-empting the objection that ‘philosophy has typically 
not shown much interest in the meaning of life,’ he cites Julian Young’s The Death of God and the 
Meaning of Life (2003). That Young’s book might not entirely support Tartaglia’s case, however, is 
suggested by the statement in its opening paragraph that ‘[f]or most of our Western history we have 
not talked about the meaning of life’ (p. 1).  
98 Tartaglia (2016), p. 52 (italics in original). 
 243
 
In light of all that Tartaglia has to say about how philosophy got underway once 
the question of the meaning of life was connected to the question of 
transcendence, and how the connection between the two ‘provides the unifying 
core to the subject matter of philosophy’ and so on, this is quite a bewildering 
conclusion for him to have embraced. And yet in the final chapter of the book he 
goes further, letting us know just how cheap he thinks this possibility really is. 
For here we find him arguing that although it is possible there could be a 
connection between the question of the meaning of life and transcendence—the 
two questions which, again, he has been telling us all along together comprise 
the ‘unifying core’ of philosophy—this is only an idle or empty conceptual 
possibility on a par with the possibility ‘that Heidegger’s death was faked and 
that he lives on as the world’s oldest man; but nobody with any sense would feel 
the need to rule that out. Possibility, as I said before, is cheap.’99 
So, at the end of the book we find Tartaglia ridiculing and trivialising the 
question which, at the start of the book, he told us was the most profound and 
important question a human being can ask; a question that he had told us is ‘as 
serious as your life’; the ‘keystone of philosophy,’ no less; the question that 
‘locks the rest of its traditional preoccupations in place’ and without which those 
preoccupations ‘fall apart and fragment, losing the form that makes them 
credible.’100  
It would seem to follow, then, that the entire history of philosophy and 
religion—and science, too, inasmuch as it lacked self-consciousness about its 
proper role and was thus guided by a ‘confused quest’101—has been based upon 
little more than a rationally unmotivated, idle, cheap conceptual possibility. And 
yet Tartaglia implores philosophers to embrace and ‘reclaim’ this same cheap 
possibility as their own, to officially acknowledge it as the original impetus and 
unifying core of their discipline, in order to restore philosophy’s 
self-consciousness and self-confidence, and to re-establish its cultural voice.102 
To steal a line from Tartaglia’s review of Metz’s book: could it be that 
‘something has gone wrong’? 
 
                                                     
99 Ibid., p. 171 (italics in original). 
100 Ibid., p. 7. 
101 Ibid., p. 174 and chapter 8 passim. 
102 Tartaglia (2016a). 
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5. Why this Question, Again?  
  
So why is it, finally, that Tartaglia insists upon the absolute centrality of this 
question—a question that, as we have seen above, turns out to be not only 
crypto-theological and scientifically obsolete, but also based upon a possibility 
that even Tartaglia himself regards as rationally unmotivated, idle, and ‘cheap’? 
Why would he go to such lengths to argue that the question of the ‘overall 
meaning’ of human life—understood in the narrow and specific sense of whether 
there might be a ‘transcendent context of meaning’ beyond the physical 
universe—is ‘the keystone of philosophy’? Why would he claim that this 
question has always been the essential, defining question of philosophy, and that 
it should remain so today, when he himself rejects the question’s core premise? 
Why does he insist upon the crucial significance of this question for 
philosophy’s future when he thinks the answer to it is so obvious, so trivial, so 
anodyne, and so lacking in consequences that he can simply take it for granted 
that the reader will agree? Why does he implore philosophers to explicitly 
embrace this question as their own when he thinks it has long since been 
definitively resolved, and has no interest in the arguments of those who accept 
its basic premise? And finally, why does he assert that our lives are ‘meaningless’ 
and ‘worthless’ simply because there is no reason to believe in an extra-cosmic, 
supernatural purpose for the universe’s existence? A fully satisfying answer to 
these questions would take us far beyond the scope of this paper. However, a 
few things can be said that will help to make ‘overall sense’ of it.  
We have seen above that Tartaglia would like to revitalise or reinvigorate 
philosophy, and help it to ‘regain its own distinctive cultural voice,’ by returning 
it to what he regards as its roots—that is, to the natural sources of human interest 
from which it originated, and which continue to draw people to it today. We 
have also seen that he thinks that this natural source of human interest is best 
encapsulated by the question, ‘What is the meaning of life?,’ where this is 
understood to be equivalent to asking ‘What are we here for?’ or ‘Why do 
human beings exist’? It is because analytic philosophers over the past century or 
so have ignored, dismissed and even denigrated this question that Tartaglia 
regards them as part of a ‘tragicomic’ and ‘absurd agenda’ of ‘philosophers 
turning against philosophy,’ this itself being part of what he sees as a wider 
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‘anti-philosophical cultural trend.’103 Such philosophers typically dismiss or 
disparage the question because it is supposedly ‘obscure, uninteresting, or just 
plain unanswerable,’ but Tartaglia suspects that the intellectual dominance of 
science, combined with deeper psychological anxieties regarding religion and 
nihilism, are what really lie behind this absurd and tragicomic spectacle.104 But 
in distancing themselves from the question of the meaning of life, argues 
Tartaglia, philosophers have distanced themselves not from religion, but from 
the essential motivating impetus and core subject matter of philosophy itself.105  
To make matters worse, even those philosophers who have addressed the 
question of the meaning of life over the past century have entirely missed the 
point of the question as properly understood. Instead of addressing the real 
question of the meaning of human life, the question that Tartaglia thinks human 
beings ‘have been asking since at least the beginning of civilisation’—that is, 
the ‘deep, natural and ancient question’ of why the human species exists—they 
have addressed an entirely different question, one that is ‘a relatively recent 
cultural product,’ and which wholly lacks the philosophical depth, scope and 
significance of the original. In short, such philosophers have substituted for the 
venerable question of why the human species exists a question that is not a 
genuinely philosophical question at all: namely, the question of meaning in life, 
or social meaning.106 Such philosophers think that, by ignoring the traditional 
question of the meaning of life in favour of a wholly distinct set of issues about 
the conditions of a meaningful life in a social or moral sense, they are bringing 
philosophy closer to the supposedly more intellectually reputable concerns of 
science. But Tartaglia thinks this is a fatal mistake. For in trying to align 
philosophy with what he regards as the wholly incommensurable concerns 
proper to science, rather than the original motivating concerns he thinks 
philosophy shares with religion, Tartaglia argues that such philosophers are only 
helping to drive philosophy itself ever further into cultural oblivion.  
Should philosophers follow Tartaglia’s lead in explicitly embracing the 
question of the meaning of life as the defining core of their discipline, on the 
other hand, they would be able to carve out an autonomous space for 
philosophical inquiry entirely unbeholden to the misguided metaphysical 
                                                     
103 Tartaglia (2016), p. 1. 
104 Ibid., pp. 4–5. 
105 Ibid., e.g., p. 11: ‘In backing away from a meaning of life, then, philosophers have inadvertently 
been backing away not from religion but from philosophy.’ 
106 Tartaglia (2015); (2015a); (2016), chapter 1 passim; (2016a). 
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pretensions of the natural sciences. This would not only make it clear, to both 
philosophers and others, ‘what philosophy is all about,’ and provide a clear line 
of demarcation between the concerns of philosophy and those of science; it 
would also provide philosophy with the kind of self-consciousness and 
self-confidence it so sorely lacks, thereby enabling it to ‘reclaim its centre,’ 
‘regain its own distinctive cultural voice,’ and ‘bear weight in an intellectual 
culture dominated by science.’107  
This much explains why Tartaglia thinks the question of the meaning of life 
is so important, why he seems so annoyed with much of contemporary 
philosophy, and with what he calls the ‘new paradigm’ approach to the question 
of life’s meaning in particular. But why does Tartaglia insist that the question of 
the meaning of life must be understood in connection with what he calls 
‘transcendence,’ such that for our lives to be meaningful ‘there would have to be 
a wider context of meaning beyond the physical universe, on which the 
existence of the physical universe depended’? For Tartaglia is putting it very 
mildly indeed when he says that this ‘might be thought an overly strong 
requirement,’108 and I have been suggesting throughout this paper that he has 
provided nothing in the way of a cogent argument for why the question must be 
restricted in this way. To say that our lives are meaningless because there is no 
such ‘transcendent context of meaning’ is gratuitous hyperbole at best. Moreover, 
we have seen above that even Tartaglia himself regards the possibility of such a 
context to be a cheap, idle and rationally unmotivated one. So let us ask, one 
more time: why does he insist upon this question? 
In order to provide an adequate answer to our question, I think, there is a 
piece of the puzzle that still needs to be added. For Philosophy in a Meaningless 
Life comprises not only a metaphilosophical thesis about the nature of 
philosophy, but also a metaphysical thesis about the nature of reality itself.109 
Though I have only been able to explore some aspects of the former thesis in 
this paper, I suspect it is because he wants to forge a connection between these 
two theses that he insists upon formulating the question of the meaning of life in 
the way that he does. For, in a nutshell, Tartaglia argues that there is a wider 
                                                     
107 Ibid., pp. 11, 9, 7. 
108 Ibid., p. 49. 
109 Roughly speaking, the first three chapters are devoted to the metaphilosophical thesis indicated by 
the main title of the book, the next four to the metaphysical one indicated by the subtitle of the book, 
with the two being brought together in the final chapter, where Tartaglia makes a case for what he 
thinks the future of philosophy ought to look like in light of the conclusions of the previous chapters. 
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context of existence beyond the physical universe after all, and that this wider 
context of existence, upon which the existence of the physical universe depends, 
is nothing other than consciousness.110 And to cut a long story short, Tartaglia 
thinks he has found a way to utilise his metaphysical thesis about the 
transcendence of consciousness to secure an autonomous space for a priori 
philosophical inquiry and to fortify it against the unwanted incursions of natural 
science. For within this sheltered space Tartaglia imagines that philosophers 
might be able to keep consciousness to themselves, to cup their palms around 
the flame of human essence, as it were, and press on with the fundamental task 
of philosophy—that of ‘tending the space of transcendence.’111 Moreover, since 
the physical universe that is the proper concern of science has no independent 
existence but rather depends upon consciousness, it is these philosophers of 
transcendence who get to have the ultimate say about the true nature of reality.112 
Scientists, on the other hand—as well as philosophical naturalists who 
misguidedly take the physical universe as the final context of existence—should 
be persuaded to leave such questions well alone; for not only do they have no 
expertise in metaphysics, and so make a botched job of it when they try, but 
since they are guided by a ‘confused quest’ for ultimate meaning that does not 
exist, they may well end up doing something with disastrous consequences.113  
                                                     
110 Ibid., p. 105. This is a slight oversimplification in that Tartaglia also maintains that consciousness 
itself belongs to a final context of reality-in-itself. Whether Tartaglia’s premises entitle him to infer 
that there is any transcendent reality apart from consciousness is not a matter I can take up here, but it 
seems the only reason he introduces it is that he thinks it exculpates him from the charge of idealism. 
111 On the task of philosophy as that of ‘tending the space of transcendence’ see p. 83 and chapter 8 
passim. I owe the palm-cupping metaphor to Collins (2001), p. 279. 
112 Even if, at Tartaglia also maintains, all they can ever hope to accurately say about it is ‘that it is 
transcendent’ (see, e.g., pp. 117–120, and p. 163). 
113 Ibid., p. 174. One such disastrous consequence—besides the possibility that scientists might 
recreate the conditions of the Big Bang, discover the elixir of life, or inadvertently invite alien 
civilisations to invade—would be that they might ‘reverse engineer consciousness’ (ibid.). That 
Tartaglia thinks this is a real possibility might lead one to question whether he really believes his own 
story about the extra-physical, transcendent nature of consciousness. For if science could reverse 
engineer consciousness, in the sense of actually building creatures whose behaviour would be 
indistinguishable from that of conscious human beings, how can he maintain that science can never 
explain consciousness in physical terms? Here I suspect Tartaglia would play the ‘zombie card,’ and 
claim that it would be metaphysically impossible for such merely physical beings to have real 
consciousness, no matter how indistinguishable they might be from really conscious beings like 
ourselves. That philosophers allow their intuitions about what ‘the merely physical’ is capable of do so 
much of their metaphysical heavy-lifting, and have little more to offer than blatantly circular and 
question-begging arguments in their defence (‘Imagine you knew everything there is to know about 
the physical world, but…’ or ‘Imagine the physical world remains unchanged, but…’), has long 
baffled me—even if, as I argue in work in progress, such intuitions are perfectly ‘natural,’ and can be 
explained in terms of the auto-epistemic limitations of our neurocognitive architecture (inter alia).  
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An extra bonus from Tartaglia’s point of view is that, when it comes to the 
ultimate nature of reality, religious and ‘spiritual’ people turn out to have latched 
onto a profound insight—for there really is a ‘transcendent context of existence,’ 
as they had assumed all along. All they were wrong about was their assumption 
that this context is also a context of meaning.114 However, since philosophy is 
all about transcendence, it follows that religious and spiritual people ‘evidence 
more philosophical acumen’ than naturalists and scientists who think they have 
good reasons for ruling out such a supernatural ‘beyond.’115 For when it comes 
to the ultimate nature of reality, while religious and spiritual people have been at 
least half right—after all, they knew all along that real reality was something 
that transcends the physical universe—naturalists and (atheist) scientists, in 
taking the physical universe to be all that there is, are altogether wrong. For as 
we discover when we arrive at Tartaglia’s ‘Transcendent Hypothesis,’ the entire 
physical universe turns out to be something that only exists within a ‘context of 
existence’ that is created by consciousness.116  
Thus the reason that Tartaglia insists upon the specific form of the question 
of life’s meaning that he does, I would suggest, is not because it makes best 
sense of the history of Western philosophy (which it doesn’t), nor that it explains 
the origins of the various kinds of religious beliefs people have held throughout 
history (which it does even less). Rather, it is because he thinks he has found a 
solution to the problem of consciousness, and hopes that his solution, since it 
places consciousness beyond the physical universe altogether, might also 
provide the answer to the ultimate question of both philosophy and religion. In 
particular, he thinks it explains why people all over the world, and throughout 
human history, have supposed there must be more to the world than physical 
reality; why they have always supposed that ‘true reality’ must be transcendent 
in some sense, existing beyond the physical world. And the reason it explains 
this, he thinks, is that it demonstrates that they were right.  
Unfortunately for Tartaglia’s overall thesis, however, the links he manages 
to forge between the problem of the meaning of life, on the one hand, and the 
problem of consciousness on the other—even with a whole lot of skilful 
                                                     
114 Ibid., p. 183.  
115 Ibid., p. 191 n. 19. He does add a parenthetical ‘ceteris paribus’ lest he be taken to be crediting 
Deepak Chopra or Rick Warren with greater ‘philosophical acumen’ than Bertrand Russell or W.V.O. 
Quine. (Though, come to think of it, it may well be that he would so credit them.)  
116 Sometimes Tartaglia says that the physical universe ‘exists within consciousness’ (p. 105), at 
others that it exists ‘within a context created by consciousness’ (p. 178).  
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gerrymandering—are quite tenuous. When one gets to the chapters on 
consciousness and transcendence, it at least becomes clear why he had insisted 
upon formulating the question of the meaning of life in the idiosyncratic terms 
of the possibility that there might be a ‘transcendent context of meaning’ beyond 
the physical universe. For Tartaglia’s ‘problem of consciousness’ is a matter of 
how consciousness can belong to the physical world, and since he cannot 
understand how it could belong to it, he concludes that it doesn’t belong there at 
all. Rather, it transcends the physical world. And yet since the physical world 
presents itself within consciousness, and since consciousness cannot possibly 
exist within the world that it presents, it follows that the physical world itself 
must exist in some sense within consciousness. To believe that consciousness 
depends upon the brain within the world it presents in waking life, argues 
Tartaglia, would be as absurd as to suppose that it belongs to the brain within the 
world it presents in a dream. The sense in which the physical world exists within 
consciousness, then, is the same as the sense in which the world of a dream 
exists within consciousness: it is a ‘context of existence’ which consciousness 
creates. Consciousness itself, on the other hand, belongs to a transcendent 
context of existence that is not created by consciousness, but is rather the final, 
ultimate context of reality-in-itself. So, if people have always believed in a 
reality that transcends the physical world, and if the ultimate, founding question 
of both philosophy and religion is the question of the meaning of life, where this 
is understood in terms of the possibility that there might be a transcendent 
context of reality that would provide a reason for the existence of the universe, 
and thereby also a meaning to human existence, could it be that Tartaglia has 
solved the ultimate problem of both philosophy and religion—the most profound 
question of natural human concern?117 
Well, I expect this at least clarifies how the two issues are supposed to be 
connected, and I suggest that this goes a long way towards explaining why 
Tartaglia insists upon the form of the question of the meaning of life that he does. 
For any such metaphysically audacious hypotheses as these, of course, the 
hazards are myriad and the hurdles gargantuan. Indeed, the puzzles to which 
Tartaglia’s proposed solution to the problem of consciousness gives rise make 
the problem itself look altogether simple by comparison. To restrict myself here 
to the issue of how Tartaglia attempts to forge the aforementioned connections, 
                                                     
117 On all this see chapters 4 and 5 especially. 
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we can already discern several loose threads that might unravel the fabric of the 
would-be system. For although Tartaglia claims that the question of 
consciousness is motivated by the question of transcendence, he does not in fact 
formulate the question in these terms at all. Rather, what he calls ‘transcendence’ 
is his answer to the problem of consciousness, a problem which he formulates 
on quite other grounds: namely, as mentioned above, in terms of the question of 
how consciousness could ‘belong to’ the physical world.118 Similarly, although 
he claims that his ‘Transcendent Hypothesis’ denies that there is a ‘transcendent 
context of meaning,’ and, in thus revealing the truth of nihilism, ‘reveals that 
one important source of psychological need for meaning is a straightforward 
mistake,’119 the hypothesis in question, to the extent that it is not simply 
orthogonal to these issues, would seem rather to favour the idea that there is a 
transcendent context of meaning. For if it were indeed the case, as Tartaglia’s 
hypothesis would have it, that our consciousness creates the physical world, it is 
hard to see how this could fail to make our lives meaningful—for it would seem 
to make us gods, and each human mind a kind of demiurge. Moreover, since 
Tartaglia endorses Einstein’s view that without consciousness the entire universe 
would be ‘nothing but a pile of dirt,’120 it seems he is committed to saying that 
consciousness is not only the ‘transcendent context’ within which the universe 
exists, but also the transcendent source of all meaning and value. Why then, we 
might wonder, is consciousness itself not a ‘transcendent context of meaning’?121 
And to these two problems one could easily add dozens of others no less serious; 
some considerably more so.122 
                                                     
118 Ibid., pp. 83ff.  
119 Ibid., pp. 170, 171. 
120 As reported by Feigl (1967), p. 138; cited by Tartaglia (2016), p. 85. Feigl tells us that the German 
word Einstein actually used was more ‘uncouth’ than the English word ‘dirt.’  
121 Far from recognising any such implication, Tartaglia’s official position is that realising that the 
physical universe depends upon and exists within our own minds does not and cannot even ‘put human 
life in a new perspective’ (see, e.g., pp. 170, 172). Rather, he thinks that realising that the physical 
universe is ‘not an independent being’ but rather ‘exists within a context created by consciousness’ 
ought to lead to ‘a relative quietism on ontological issues’ (p. 178). He also denies that his position 
amounts to any kind of idealism, but in view of his claims that the physical universe ‘exists within 
consciousness’ (p. 105), that the ‘world of physical things, like electrons, tables, and planets’ is only a 
‘representational posit’ (pp. 165–6), and that consciousness ‘is not dependent on the brain’ (p. 113), I 
do not find his denials altogether convincing. 
122 I intend to address some of these problems, especially with regard to Tartaglia’s proposed solution 
to the problem of consciousness, elsewhere. It may be worth adding here that a deeper reason why 
Tartaglia links the problems of consciousness and the meaning of life may be that he apparently thinks 
both nihilism and the transcendence of consciousness become obvious if we simply reflect upon what 
a wholly physical reality would be like. Thus he says that the ‘quickest and easiest way’ to see the truth 
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6. Conclusion 
 
It is often said that in philosophy it is more important to ask the right 
questions than to arrive at the right answers, and though I have found much to 
take issue with regarding to Tartaglia’s way of construing the question of the 
meaning of life, I do think he has raised important metaphilosophical issues that 
philosophers all too rarely address. Indeed, I even think there is something to the 
suggestion that philosophy has its origins in questions regarding ‘the meaning of 
life’—at least if that is construed in a suitably broad sense. For many 
philosophical questions are indeed deeply rooted in natural sources of human 
curiosity about the world, and about the place of human beings within it. It is 
also true that human beings have always tried to make sense of things by placing 
their lives within a larger context, narrative, worldview or explanatory 
framework. Thus, if we allow that in searching for the ‘overall meaning’ of life 
people might be seeking to place their lives, and by extension human life as a 
whole, within a broader context or explanatory framework—a framework within 
which to make sense of the world as a whole, and of their own place within 
it—then I think Tartaglia is quite right: the question of the meaning of human 
life, in this maximally broad sense, is indeed a matter of profound human 
concern, wonder and curiosity. Throughout human history such overarching 
explanatory frameworks have taken a wide variety of different forms. From the 
fabulous mythological narratives of our prehistoric ancestors through the simple 
anthropomorphic cosmologies of the world religions to the breathtakingly 
sophisticated ‘theories of everything’ of contemporary theoretical physics and 
cosmology, the human urge for global or all-embracing explanation and 
understanding is undeniable. Also undeniable is that many of philosophy’s 
perennial problems have their roots in this drive to make maximal sense of the 
world. Indeed, it is this aspiration for all-encompassing explanation and 
understanding that is so well captured by Wilfrid Sellars’s characterisation of the 
aim of philosophy as that of understanding ‘how things in the broadest possible 
                                                                                                                                                                     
of nihilism is ‘to retreat to a physical perspective, and think of human life as consisting in bodies 
moving around and making noises’ (p. 25). As it turns out, this is also essentially the same route 
whereby he arrives at the conclusion that consciousness cannot ‘belong to the physical world’ (see pp. 
83–85 especially). It would therefore appear that both Tartaglia’s nihilism and his ‘Transcendent 
Hypothesis’ rest upon his conviction that the physical universe is a zombie universe, in the sense 
popularised by David Chalmers. That this conviction is supported by little more than a hopelessly 
impoverished conception of ‘the physical’ is a claim I defend at length in work currently in progress.  
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sense of the term hang together in the broadest possible sense of the term’—a 
characterisation of philosophy that I have long favoured.123 
Where I disagree with Tartaglia is that I see no reason to tether this natural 
human curiosity and drive for explanation to any particular question about a 
value-conferring reason for our existence, much less to any supposed natural 
yearning for a ‘transcendent context of meaning’ beyond the physical universe, 
one that might ward off the threat of nihilism and provide human life with value 
and purpose. Even as a hypothesis about the origins of Western philosophy, this 
does not withstand serious scrutiny, and it is even less credible with regard to the 
origins of the world’s religions. Moreover, if we interpret the question of ‘the 
meaning of life’ in the broader sense I have sketched above—that is, in terms of 
the search for an all-inclusive context, narrative, worldview, or explanatory 
framework within which to ‘make sense of things’ in the broadest possible sense 
of these terms—we could avoid several problems with which Tartaglia’s 
interpretation of the question would seem to be hampered. First, we would 
respect the original linguistic form of the question, and use the expression 
‘meaning of x’ in the way that I have suggested it is most commonly used, 
without having to substitute ‘value,’ ‘purpose’ or ‘significance’ in its place, as if 
these were all synonymous. This would have the added advantage that overall 
meaning would not be confused, as is the case with Tartaglia’s construal of the 
question, with distinct concerns regarding value.124 Second, the question would 
not only be asking (inter alia) about our origins (‘Why are we here?’), but also 
about our fate (‘Where are we heading?’), both in terms of our individual lives 
and the human species itself. These are questions that surely have always been 
central to the human quest for meaning, yet ones that Tartaglia’s formulation of 
the question would appear to sideline—and even, at times, trivialise.125 Third, 
                                                     
123 Sellars (1963), p. 1.  
124 Though Tartaglia claims that the conflation of social meaning and value with intrinsic meaning 
and value is a ‘straightforward mistake,’ he also says, as we have seen, that life is worthless and admits 
that ‘worthless things are bad, and unless we can reform them, we generally want to either ignore or 
get rid of them’ (2016, p. 171). On my alternative construal of the question, however, there would be 
no need to insist upon a dubiously coherent metaphysical distinction between ‘intrinsic value’ and 
‘social value,’ one that is ‘endlessly conflated in our culture’ and which people would need to take 
courses in Tartaglian metaphysics to understand, since life’s ‘overall meaning’ would not be 
synonymous with its value in any sense of the word. 
125 Although Tartaglia does talk about death in the context of his discussion of time in chapter 6, in the 
earlier chapters where he formulates his ‘real’ question of the meaning of life, it scarcely figures. 
Unlike boredom, which Tartaglia tells us is a profound philosophical significance to the question of 
the meaning of life, he tells us in a note to his Introduction that ‘fear of death’—which one might think 
even more relevant to the question—‘does not impress me: “whaddya gonna do?,” as Tony Soprano 
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there would be no reason to restrict the range of possible answers to the question 
to those that make a rationally and empirically unmotivated appeal to a 
supernatural being beyond the physical universe, thereby leaving us with a stark 
and unappealing choice between either theism or nihilism. Rather, we would see 
that the physical universe itself is a context within which we can make sense of 
our lives—where we have come from, where we might be heading, and where 
we ought to be heading—based upon genuine (albeit defeasible) knowledge 
rather than the divisive dogmas of irrationally held belief (or ‘faith’). And finally, 
we would also have no reason to say that human life is ‘meaningless’ and 
‘worthless’ on the dubiously coherent, crypto-theological grounds that we have 
no ‘intrinsic value,’ where this would mean something like ‘divinely bestowed’ 
or ‘God-given’ value.  
Of course, it could be that Tartaglia simply likes the sound of the idea that 
everybody’s life is meaningless and worthless, just as he tells us that he 
describes himself as a nihilist because ‘I like the sound of it.’126 However, given 
that more than 800,000 people end their own lives every year (which works out 
as about one suicide every 40 seconds), and that one of the most frequently cited 
reasons they do so is that they feel their lives are meaningless and worthless, 
Tartaglia might want to think twice about the wisdom of being seen to lend 
intellectual legitimacy and academic respectability to this sentiment. Tartaglia 
would qualify this, of course, as he does in his book, by saying that this is no 
sense an evaluation, and that he is talking about metaphysically necessary, 
essential and intrinsic value, not mere ‘social value,’ or value in any ‘socially 
contextual sense.’127 But even if Tartaglia can show that this distinction is 
coherent and important, if he wants people to construe the question of the 
meaning of life in the way he does, on the grounds that this is supposedly what 
the words mean, or how they are typically used—that is, if he still wants to 
maintain this in the teeth of the many objections raised above—then he ought 
also to take into account what the words meaningless and worthless mean, and 
how they are typically used. For however much he might go on to qualify his 
message that people’s lives are meaningless and worthless with talk of the 
supposedly irreducible difference between ‘intrinsic’ value, on the one hand, and 
                                                                                                                                                                     
would say’ (p. 185 n. 11).  
126 Ibid., p. 7. Apart from his day job as a professional philosopher, Tartaglia is also an exceptionally 
talented jazz musician. However, I would urge him not to allow his aesthetic tastes (i.e., what he ‘likes 
the sound of’) to guide his metaphysical commitments.  
127 Ibid., e.g., pp. 6, 56, 171, and the discussion in section 4.3 above. 
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‘social’ value on the other, from the point of view of ordinary language this is 
simply irrelevant. For from the point of view of how these words are used in all 
domains of life (beyond, perhaps, a few scattered philosophy seminar rooms), to 
say that a person’s life is ‘meaningless’ and ‘worthless’ simply is to condemn 
their lives—it is to condemn them as not worth living.128 And if philosophy is to 
‘regain its own distinctive voice,’ I hardly think that this is the message it ought 
to be conveying as the culmination of more than two and a half millennia of 
philosophical wisdom—even if Tartaglia does regard it as philosophy’s greatest 
triumph.129  
In response to this last point, Tartaglia might argue, as he does in the book, 
that even if widespread belief that life is meaningless and worthless were to have 
ruinous social, moral or psychological consequences, nihilism can hardly be 
held to blame. After all, nihilism is ‘just a neutral fact,’ and regardless of what 
the consequences might turn out to be if everyone came to realise the truth, it is 
no less true for all that. For it is still a fact, and a profoundly significant one to 
boot.130 But nihilism, in Tartaglia’s sense, is not a ‘fact’ at all, not even a 
‘philosophical fact.’ To say that human life, including the lives of each and every 
individual human being, is meaningless and worthless because there is no 
supernatural ‘context of meaning’ is gratuitous hyperbole at best. It no more 
follows from the fact that there is no divinely preordained ‘meaning of life’ that 
life is meaningless than it follows from the fact that there is no divinely 
preordained morality that there can be no morality at all. To declare that life is 
meaningless and worthless on these grounds is nothing other than what 
Nietzsche called a ‘pathological inference’ from loss of belief in an ideal 
‘transcendent’ world existing somehow ‘beyond the physical universe,’ a belief 
which entails devaluation of this world as ‘merely physical.’131 This is the sort 
of ‘ideal world’ that today’s so-called ‘religious martyrs’ or ‘suicide bombers’ 
are hoping to escape to when they trigger their ‘sacred explosions’ in crowded 
public places. But then if this life is truly meaningless, worthless and 
insignificant; if ‘the life of this world,’ as the Qur’an has it, ‘is nothing but a 
fleeting vanity,’ ‘a sport and a pastime,’ ‘a show and an empty boast,’ and if 
                                                     
128 Again, Tartaglia readily concedes this when he says that ‘worthless things are bad, and unless we 
can reform them, we generally want to either ignore or get rid of them’ (ibid., p. 171). 
129 Ibid., e.g., pp. 74–76.  
130 Ibid., p. 44. 
131 Nietzsche (1883–1888/1968), pp. 9, 11, 14, 35 and passim. 
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eternal paradise awaits the martyr in the hereafter, who can blame them?132 
Given this, and the suicide rates mentioned above, would it really be such a 
good idea for philosophers to publicly embrace ‘the question of the meaning of 
life’ as their special domain of expertise, and then, having had their 
self-confidence and distinctive cultural voice restored, declare that life is indeed 
‘meaningless,’ ‘worthless’ and ‘insignificant’? 
Nihilism, then, understood as the ‘philosophical fact’ that all human life is 
meaningless, worthless, aimless and insignificant is not a ‘useful label’ for ‘an 
important philosophical position,’ as Tartaglia would have it. It is, rather, as his 
imaginary interlocutor puts it, ‘a philosophical dead-end.’ Indeed, even this may 
be giving it too much credit. For just as Tartaglia says that questions regarding 
‘social meaning’ and the meaningfulness of people’s individual lives ‘do not 
strike me as terribly philosophical,’ so do I fail to find much that is of 
philosophical (rather than theological) significance in his ‘real’ question of the 
meaning of life.133 For if philosophy aims to understand ‘how things in the 
broadest possible sense of the term hang together in the broadest possible sense 
of the term,’ the broadest possible context we have, and ever will have, is that of 
the physical universe. 134 And contrary to Tartaglia’s claim that only a 
supernatural or ‘transcendent’ context could bestow ‘overall meaning’ upon 
human life, it seems to me that placing our lives in the context of human history, 
human history in the context of the evolution of life on earth, and life on earth in 
the context of cosmological evolution, can provide considerable meaning to our 
lives, both individually and collectively. For we thereby come to understand our 
real origins, and our intimate biological kinship with all living things on earth.135 
                                                     
132 See, e.g., Qur’an 2: 86, 190–3, 212, 216; 3: 167–9, 195–8; 4: 74, 95; 6: 32, 70; 7: 51; 9: 38–9, 73, 
81, 85–9, 111; 10: 7–8; 11: 15–6; 13: 26; 14: 3; 16: 107–9; 17: 18–9; 22: 58–60; 29: 64; 40: 39; 42: 36; 
47: 36; 57: 20; 76: 27; 79: 38–39. Such lines as those quoted here are a frequent refrain in the Qur’an, 
which is clear that only unbelievers rejoice in this life (and that they will suffer eternal torture for it in 
hellfire). I have quoted here from Dawood’s translation (1990): see, e.g., pp. 58, 283, 359, 382–3.  
133 Tartaglia (2016), pp. 7, 4.  
134 I say this notwithstanding the fact that Tartaglia takes himself to have established, in the space of 
eight short paragraphs of a priori reasoning, that consciousness transcends the physical universe (ibid., 
pp. 83–85). Regarding the definite article here (‘the physical universe’) I do not mean to rule out 
‘multiverse’ hypotheses in contemporary cosmology, nor Everettian interpretations of quantum 
mechanics. Rather, I am using the term ‘universe’ in its maximally inclusive sense, such that if it turns 
out that what we now call ‘the universe’ is only one among many, these too would count as part of ‘the 
universe’ in the relevant sense. As for my contention that we never will have a broader context than the 
physical universe within which to make sense of things, this should be taken as a hypothesis or 
prediction strongly supported by enumerative induction over the history of science (cf. Melnyk 2003, 
pp. 256ff). 
135 On the truly surprising extent of this kinship see, e.g., Carroll (2005).  
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We also come to learn that we are, in a sense, ‘special’ after all. We are special 
in that the Earth is very far from being a typical part of space, or even a typical 
sort of planet. Rather, it is an extraordinarily rich and multifarious planet, upon 
which that most curious of all things—life itself—has evolved and proliferated. 
For whether one regards life as a blessing or a curse, a gift for which to be 
thankful or a condition to be endured, there can be little doubting its remarkable 
scarcity in the universe at large.136 And we human beings, though only one 
among many species of animal life, are also special—not least in that we have 
evolved the ability to collaboratively develop, refine and expand our knowledge, 
and to provide empirically supported answers to questions about the universe as 
a whole, and our place within it. Whether one prefers to think of this in terms of 
‘the universe coming to know itself through man,’ or in less metaphysically 
inflated terms, it is quite capable of providing ‘overall meaning’ to our lives.  
We also come to learn, of course, that we are finite—that, to quote Bertrand 
Russell, ‘no fire, no heroism, no intensity of thought and feeling, can preserve 
an individual life beyond the grave’—but that this too can make our lives more 
rather than less meaningful. For we thereby come to realise that this life is the 
only one we have, or ever will have, and that there is no other life with respect 
to which it even makes sense to say that this one is ‘meaningless’ or ‘worthless.’ 
We come to learn likewise that we humans are but one among countless millions 
of biological species, and that we too, like so many before us, will ultimately be 
faced with annihilation—‘that all the labours of the ages, all the devotion, all the 
inspiration, all the noonday brightness of human genius, are destined to 
extinction…’ Indeed, in view of the many existential threats or ‘global 
catastrophic risks’ already looming on the horizon—many of them, of course, 
anthropogenic in origin—it seems increasingly likely that we will be forced to 
confront this possibility sooner rather than later; if not in the present century, at 
least a whole lot sooner than Russell’s ‘vast death of the solar system.’137 But 
just as we can do things to try to ward off an early death, and to extend our 
individual lives, so too can we face up to the threats that face our species, and 
the many species with which we still share the planet, and arrive at rational, 
scientifically informed decisions about how best to respond to them.  
                                                     
136 Regarding the distribution of planets in space this is unassailable (cf. Deutsch 2011, pp. 42ff.). 
Regarding the probable distribution of complex life on other planets it also remains the default 
position in astrobiology and evolutionary biology (see, e.g., Davies 2010 and Lane 2015). For a robust 
and philosophically sophisticated challenge to the conventional wisdom see Ćirković (2012).  
137 Russell (1917), p. 41. See, e.g., Bostrom & Ćirković (2008) and Bostrom (2013). 
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Such a naturalistic perspective on the meaning of life is unlikely to provide 
the kind of comfort that many people desire, or else have learnt to take for 
granted; the kind of comfort an infant might feel in knowing that a benevolent 
parent is watching out for them and will protect them come what may. And for 
those who think of the meaning of life as a kind of story—and this includes the 
vast majority of human beings who have ever lived—the ending may provide 
little solace or consolation of the kind that religions have traditionally provided. 
But the meaning of life we are talking about here is, at the end of the day, the 
only kind worth having; for it is the kind that is based upon genuine knowledge 
rather than myth, superstition, or wishful fantasy. 138  And notwithstanding 
Tartaglia’s intuitions and arguments to the contrary, the physical universe not 
only provides a fathomlessly rich and endlessly fascinating context within which 
to make sense of our lives, but—as I intend to argue in future publications—it 
also readily accommodates human consciousness.139 
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Reply to Damian Veal  
James Tartaglia* 
 
Damian Veal’s paper has a clear overall narrative: it takes the form of an 
investigation into why I ask the question of the meaning of life, despite the fact 
that I do not think there is one, and why I insist upon (Veal’s context) or argue 
(the book’s context, I maintain) that this question is central to philosophical 
inquiry. This is presented as a mystery, the solution to which requires a 
painstaking assemblage of all the clues. In the penultimate section, entitled, ‘Why 
this Question, again?’, Veal announces the result of his investigation. Here is what 
he says: 
 
In order to provide an adequate answer to our question, I think, there is a 
piece of the puzzle that still needs to be added. For Philosophy in a 
Meaningless Life comprises not only a metaphilosophical thesis about the 
nature of philosophy, but also a metaphysical thesis about the nature of 
reality itself. Though I have only been able to explore some aspects of the 
former thesis in this paper, I suspect it is because he wants to forge a 
connection between these two theses that he insists upon formulating the 
question of the meaning of life in the way that he does. For, in a nutshell, 
Tartaglia argues that there is a wider context of existence beyond the 
physical universe after all, and that this wider context of existence, upon 
which the existence of the physical universe depends, is nothing other than 
consciousness. And to cut a long story short, Tartaglia thinks he has found 
a way to utilise his metaphysical thesis about the transcendence of 
consciousness to secure an autonomous space for a priori philosophical 
inquiry and to fortify it against the unwanted incursions of natural science. 
(pp. 246-7) 
 
This is the culmination of his narrative. Afterwards, there is no time for him to 
say where I went wrong (I engaged in a ‘whole lot of skilful gerrymandering’ (pp. 
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248-9)), and so he instead proceeds to allow his criticisms to become quite 
extreme, thankfully only for a short while, before finally providing his own, 
positive take on the question of the meaning of life; a question hitherto disparaged 
at every step. Veal’s main investigation was successful, however, because I did 
indeed write a book which connects the question of the meaning of life with a 
thesis about consciousness and the nature of philosophy. The final chapter is 
called ‘Nihilism, Transcendence and Philosophy’; ‘Nihilism’ is my answer to the 
meaning of life question, and ‘Transcendence’ pertains to my accounts of 
consciousness and the nature of philosophy. But I did not save this connection for 
the last chapter. Rather I said exactly what I was going to do in the introduction, 
and then proceeded to argue for my position throughout the book. So I can only 
conclude that the investigative narrative of Veal’s paper is really just a dramatic 
device, employed to allow him to hold the whole of my book up the incredulous, 
disapproving stares which he seems to imagine whenever he quotes me; which is 
a lot. 
Still, I think I can see his underlying concern. Veal thinks the question of the 
meaning of life is ambiguous and can be interpreted in many different ways. He 
thinks I have chosen a particular interpretation simply because it ties in with my 
account of consciousness; and that this is not a good reason for side-lining 
alternative interpretations. I, for my part, think that my interpretation is 
independently plausible. I take it to be the most natural interpretation of the 
question, whatever metaphysical commitments you might hold, and find aversion 
to this interpretation a reasonable cause for suspicion. If I were a physicalist, I 
would still interpret the question this way, look for a wider context than human 
society from which the existence and value of human life could be explained, find 
none, and conclude both that nihilism is true and that the question arose because 
people suspected that there was a transcendent context capable of delivering a 
positive answer to the question. My conclusion would still have been that this 
interpretation of the question has been avoided because nihilism has mistakenly 
been thought of as a negative evaluation, due to theological assumptions. As it is, 
however, my account of consciousness leads me to believe that reality does in fact 
transcend our physical conception of it. So seeing this connection between the 
question of the meaning of life and consciousness, these accounts became 
mutually reinforcing. The connection does not motivate my interpretation of the 
question; rather it provides a better explanation of why that interpretation has been 
avoided, and one which is revealing about the nature of philosophy. 
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Although the passage I quoted above does capture the broad aims of my book, 
it nevertheless contains two important misrepresentations of my position; so given 
that I have now quoted it, I shall point out what they are. The first is where Veal 
says, ‘this wider context of existence, upon which the existence of the physical 
universe depends, is nothing other than consciousness’. I explicitly deny this; I 
say that it depends on the final context, which cannot be a context of 
consciousness. Veal knows this, because he immediately adds a footnote saying 
that this is a ‘slight oversimplification’ (p. 247; his emphasis); but that he has no 
time to explain why my position ultimately collapses into the one he presents. The 
second misrepresentation is when Veal says that I want to, ‘utilise [my] 
metaphysical thesis about the transcendence of consciousness to secure an 
autonomous space for a priori philosophical inquiry and to fortify it against the 
unwanted incursions of natural science’. This is misleading, because although I 
think the recognition of transcendence goes a long way towards revealing the 
relatively autonomous space in which philosophical inquiry takes place, Veal is 
suggesting that I am trying to insulate philosophy because I am afraid natural 
science can do a better job on the same tasks. Rather, I argue against the 
philosophy of physicalism because I think science and philosophy have very 
different tasks. The only ‘unwanted incursions’ in question are from scientists who 
engage with philosophical questions while simultaneously disparaging 
philosophy. 
Veal begins his paper by telling us that anyone who knows some science 
knows that a biological species is not the kind of thing which could have an overall 
meaning. Since humans are a biological species, then, the question of the meaning 
of life, as I present it, is nonsensical; an alternative conclusion, which Veal 
overlooks, would be that nihilism is necessarily true. There are two reasons why 
neither of these options can be right. The first is that just because science has a 
way of talking about our lives according to which the question of overall meaning 
does not naturally arise, it does not follow that it cannot arise; for scientific 
discourse occurs in the wider context of life. In talking about water scientifically, 
issues about taste may never arise, but we are still talking about something for 
which such issues do arise; as can be seen from the fact that, given how well 
known this example has become, people can talk about ‘the taste of this H2O’ and 
be readily understood. The second reason is that if the question really were 
nonsensical, then it would be impossible for reality to be such that either a positive 
or negative answer to it was true. Nihilism may be false, just as positive accounts, 
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according to which human life exists within a context of meaning, may be false; 
but we have no reason to think that these positions are necessarily false, simply in 
virtue of the concepts involved, unless an argument can be provided to show that 
formulating them involves a contradiction.   
If Veal had an argument of this kind, to support his claim that, ‘we have long 
since known that biological species are not the sorts of things that could have 
“overall meanings” or purposes’ (p. 209), then the rest of the paper would have 
been unnecessary. Instead, he soon backtracks to the claim that it makes ‘dubious 
sense at best to ask about the overall meaning of a biological species’ (p. 218). He 
is not sure whether it makes sense, then, but proceeding on the assumption that it 
does, he asks why I made sense of it the way I did. He thinks I should have 
followed the consensus of saying that the question is very obscure, as ‘a prelude 
to getting clear about the variety of ways it can be, has been, and might 
legitimately be construed’ (p. 214). He thinks that unlike other philosophers, I 
neglect the project of conceptual analysis (p. 215). 
I provided an analysis of the question according to which it has two 
components; an existential component concerning the reason we exist, and an 
evaluative component about that reason. I argued that if nihilism is true, it cannot 
be an evaluative fact. I then proceeded to distinguish four different senses of social 
meaning / meaning in life, showing how two of these senses have been the focus 
of recent debates, and that a failure to distinguish them both from each other, and 
from the sense in which life itself might have a meaning, has led philosophers to 
argue at cross-purposes and draw conclusions about the meaning of life from 
premises about social meaning. I argued that there are also two senses of seeming 
meaningfulness, namely as manifest but defeasible conscious presentation and as 
judgement, and that inattention to this distinction undermines the most popular 
approach to social meaning in the debate, namely the combined subjective-
objective account. All of this transpires in the introduction, which Veal quotes 
more than any other part of the book – but you would never guess from his paper. 
In the book, I claim that the reason the question ‘what is the meaning of life?’ 
has acquired the iconic status it has within our culture, is that it is a natural 
question which people have always asked and probably always will. This is a 
disconcerting question to ask for those without religious faith, given the negative 
connotations of nihilism (which I reject); and so I make the case that since recent 
philosophy has wanted to align itself with science, philosophers have tried to 
reinterpret the question in terms of social meaning. Through a combination of 
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these factors and others, two ideas have acquired currency both inside and outside 
philosophy, namely that the question is obscure and that it can be answered with 
an account of social meaning. As a naturalist / physicalist, Veal objects to me 
saying things like this. I should not have made such claims without firm empirical 
evidence, and it was arrogant of me to suggest that I have seen something others 
have overlooked. From the comfort of my armchair, as he thinks of it, I alighted 
on this particular interpretation of the question of the meaning of life, and ran with 
it because it allowed me to make a connection to consciousness, which I saw as 
the best defence old-fashioned metaphysics still has against the encroachments of 
science into its traditional territory.  
As I see it, however, I was simply trying to do some original philosophical 
thinking. If you agree with the consensus on a topic, then that option is not open 
to you; but the consensus I discovered when I looked into what philosophers were 
currently saying about the meaning of life did not seem right to me. So I thought 
about it and said what did seem right to me, trying to make my case as 
convincingly as I could, and trying to connect what I now thought about this topic, 
with other issues I had been thinking about for years. One thing that struck me 
was that neither the question of the nature of philosophy nor the question of the 
meaning of life had received much attention in recent philosophy; which seemed 
odd. However, I knew that there had been considerable and sustained opposition 
to physicalist accounts of consciousness, so I was not alone there, at least. I came 
to the conclusion that it was physicalism that had relegated the question of the 
nature of philosophy to the side-lines, and thereby inspired a misinterpretation of 
the question of the meaning of life.  
When I defended this position, it was not in order to assert what I consider 
plausible as superior to what everyone else considers plausible. It was in the hope 
that others would find what I had to say plausible, or at least some aspects of it. 
That is how philosophical debate works. If I had agreed with the consensus, there 
would have been nothing new for me to say; and if I did not, then I should have 
said so – as indeed I did. The hope was that people who came across these ideas, 
might think things like: ‘Yes, maybe nihilism isn’t so bad after all’; ‘Yes, maybe 
the meaning of life is an interesting philosophical question, and not just something 
for religious people’; ‘Yes, maybe questions about the meaning of life and 
meaning in life are distinct, and maybe there is a legitimate secular answer to the 
former’; ‘Yes, maybe the question of the nature of philosophy has received some 
suspiciously murky answers, and maybe this has something to do with the 
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influence of physicalism’; ‘Yes, you can have a clean conscience about science 
while rejecting physicalism; perhaps we’re not in the same business after all.’ 
There were bound to be some ‘no’ answers too, of course, and when you encounter 
them, you look into the reasoning. That is how philosophical debate works; there 
is nothing remotely unusual about my book in this respect. 
To show that people do not typically have my question in mind when they talk 
about the meaning of life, Veal turns to an example I gave in a paper (Tartaglia 
2015), where I distinguished the meaning in a film, from the meaning of a film 
within a wider context than that set up by the film itself. Veal dismisses the need 
for ordinary language analysis or experimental philosophy to assess my example, 
and instead relies upon an internet search (p. 218); note how his criticisms of my 
methodology go by the wayside as soon as he wants to make a claim. What he 
finds is that when people ask about the meaning of a film, they are looking for an 
explanation or interpretation of the film. Perhaps so, but then they are evidently 
not distinguishing between the meaning in and of the film. My point was that such 
a distinction can be made. It makes perfect sense to ask about the meaning of a 
film in a wider social context, rather than about the meaning within the film, and 
if you did want to make that distinction, it is clear which idiom would be more 
appropriate; if you wanted to talk about the meaning in a film in a wider social 
context, this would suggest that you did not want to talk about the film as a whole, 
but rather something specific within it. I was trying to show that a similar 
distinction can be made between meaning in life and the meaning of life; and that 
if you make the in / of distinction, then it is quite clear which would be more 
appropriate to the social meaning question, and which to the traditional question. 
Thaddeus Metz now seems to accept this (Metz 2015). Veal takes the example 
more seriously than I ever would, however, because on the basis of his discovery 
about films, he decides that what people are really looking for when they ask about 
the meaning of life is a ‘a global narrative, worldview or explanatory framework 
within which to make overall sense of their lives’ (p. 218); an idea he returns to at 
the end of his paper, by which point his worries about biological species, and 
respect for diversity of opinion about the nature of the question, are apparently all 
behind him. 
Next Veal begins to criticise me at length for – according to him – saying that 
‘meaning’, ‘value’, ‘significance’ and ‘purpose’ are synonymous. He begins by 
quoting me: 
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there is only one obvious philosophical question in the area, to which senses 
like “value,” “significance” and “purpose” are easily related. (p. 219 / PML, 
p. 2) 
 
The reader will note that I said: ‘are easily related’. The view I proceeded to 
explain, without any explicit or implicit claims about synonymy, is that given the 
existential import of the question, we are looking for a reason why we exist; and 
given the evaluative component, the question presupposes that this reason will 
make our lives valuable or significant in some way – the term ‘significant’ is more 
conducive to a non-moral interpretation than ‘valuable’, although they can be used 
synonymously in this context. I also said that a great part of our interest in the 
question is provided by the prospect that the reason we exist gives life a purpose. 
Later, Veal says that what my interpretation of the question really ‘boils down to 
is simply this: “Why did God create us?”’ (p. 223). But knowing why God created 
us would simply push the question back a stage to the question of why God exists, 
and of what value there was to his fulfilling his intentions by creating us; I 
discussed this in the book. 
With the apparently wilful misreadings now stacking up fast, Veal goes on to 
ask why ‘rejecting the presupposition of a theological question should transform 
it into a “philosophical” question’ (p. 225). What Veal has in mind is my claim 
that if you neglect the existential component of the question, then it is transformed 
into either a theological question about which particular meaning God invested in 
life, or a question about social meaning. I did not say that the question is 
theological, however, but rather that if you presuppose that its evaluative 
component must receive a certain kind of religious answer, and focus only on 
specifying the exact nature of the answer, then your concern with it is purely 
theological. It is always going to be a philosophical question – a paradigmatically 
philosophical one, in fact – but those with religious or physicalist convictions tend 
to neglect its existential component, and hence consider only its evaluative 
component, because they think they already know the answer to the existential 
component: typically, that God created reality, for the religious; or that science 
explains why there is a reality – or that the question does not make sense – for the 
physicalists. I think both sides are wrong about this, but nevertheless, within their 
religious or physicalist frameworks, they are asking a philosophical question; they 
just think that only one part of it needs to be addressed.  
The reason I reject any theological presupposition to the question is, rather 
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obviously, that I think nihilism is true. Veal thinks this creates huge tensions, to 
put it mildly, with my placing the question at the centre of my account of 
philosophy. This line of criticism steadily builds in intensity until Veal finally says 
that, 
 
It would seem to follow, then, that the entire history of philosophy and 
religion—and science, too, inasmuch as it lacked self-consciousness about 
its proper role and was thus guided by a ‘confused quest’ —has been based 
upon little more than a rationally unmotivated, idle, cheap conceptual 
possibility. (p. 243) 
   
The main points that arise along the way, and which are supposed to establish this 
conclusion, are: firstly, that it is ridiculous to argue that the question unifies 
philosophy when I reject its ‘core presupposition’ (p. 226); secondly, that my 
rejection of the claim that life is absurd is incompatible with claiming that the 
question of the meaning of life is legitimate (p. 228); thirdly, that the notion of 
intrinsic value required to provide a positive answer to the question is incoherent 
(pp. 230-2); fourthly, that I do not provide a good reason to reject positive answers 
to the question (p. 234); and fifthly, that my conception of a wider context of 
meaning is incoherent (pp. 232-7).  
The answer to the first critical point is that I think the question of the meaning 
of life directs us to the concept of transcendence, which we need to make 
metaphysical sense of the world. That I did not ask the question in a theological 
context has nothing to do with this, because as I tried to show, there are reasons 
to believe that reality is transcendent, whether or not you think the transcendent 
context is meaningful. I reject a certain kind of answer to the question, of the kind 
which has traditionally been presupposed, but not the question itself. 
The second objection is good; the section on absurdity in my book does not 
answer it explicitly – although I did address a similar argument by Metz (PML, p. 
191). In the section in question, I argue that life is not absurd; it only seems that 
way if we compare life to the religious meaning which we find it not to have. But 
if we are not to evaluate life according to this absent transcendent meaning, why 
claim that life is meaningless? Why use a measure of meaning that we reject in 
order to claim that life is meaningless? The answer is that if we do not think there 
is transcendent meaning, then we have no reason to evaluate life as absurd in light 
of its absence; but we may still think that reality is transcendent, as I argue that it 
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is. If reality is transcendent, and hence a transcendent reality provides the final 
context in which life exists, the question arises of whether that context provides 
our lives with meaning; a question that is firmly embedded in our history, but is a 
natural enough one to ask in any case. I think that the transcendence of reality 
does not provide us with a good reason to think it is meaningful; and this explains 
why I do not think we should use a transcendent measure of meaning to provide 
the basis for a judgement that life is absurd.    
The third point is only partly a question for me, because, like Veal, I think 
there is only relational value. Many think there is intrinsic value, however, such 
as Metz (2013: 92-3). Veal goes too far when he claims that intrinsic value is 
impossible: ‘I find that I’m unable to conceive of any such thing in any possible 
world’, he says (p. 231). This must have made learning about the history of 
philosophy difficult; Plato’s theory of forms, for instance, which Veal apparently 
thinks was an exclusively ethical theory with a relativistic commitment. If we trust 
Veal’s conceivability intuitions, however, then the notion of intrinsic value must 
be contradictory, in which case either the question of the meaning of life 
necessarily has a negative answer; or else Veal might revert to his original position, 
with a little more substance this time, by claiming that the question is incoherent 
given that it embodies a contradictory notion of meaning. But there is nothing 
contradictory here. If Veal cannot imagine intrinsic meaning, this is only because 
he presupposes a physical conception of reality, and thinks that a physical 
characterisation of a thing would contradict a characterisation of that same thing 
as intrinsically valuable. I am inclined to agree about the latter, but many, such as 
Metz, would not. But in any case, if reality is transcendent, as I think it is, then 
there is no question of our conception of something which is valuable according 
to its own nature, conflicting with our conception of fundamental reality, because 
we have no positive conception of fundamental reality for it to conflict with. 
The fourth point is accurate enough. I do not provide any new arguments for 
thinking that life is meaningless; I do not have any. As any reader of the book 
should quickly ascertain, that is not my focus. My focus is on reconfiguring 
nihilism and showing that it answers a legitimate question; my focus is on 
understanding ‘philosophy in a meaningless life’. My own convictions about 
nihilism have been formed on the basis of objective thought, reflection on the 
nature of the framework, and suspicion of the various arguments for the existence 
of God. Nevertheless, my various positions on framework engagement, the fact 
of existence, the nature of philosophy, consciousness, and so on, do provide plenty 
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of reinforcement to those already inclined to believe that there is no meaning of 
life; while trying to assuage the natural worry that holding that reality is 
transcendent must conflict with this belief.   
The beginning of the fifth objection is worth quoting: 
 
But if meaning and value necessarily depend upon there being such a wider 
context—which is something Tartaglia insists upon throughout the book—
it is hard to see how he can coherently claim that human life is worthless 
on the grounds that it is not intrinsically valuable, …. (p. 232) 
 
(I shall, for now, withhold comment on the substitution of ‘worthless’ for 
‘meaningless’.) As Veal says, I think things only have a meaning within a wider 
context; in the case of our activities, this is the context provided by our social 
framework. But then, what is supposed to be anything less than fully coherent 
about claiming that if human life itself does not fit into a wider context of meaning, 
then it is meaningless? If the existence of life in the final context is intrinsically 
meaningful, then there is a meaning of life. But then life would be part of the final 
context, and hence would indeed exist within a wider context of existence. Not in 
the sense in which an action exists within the framework – a sense reflecting the 
fact that the framework is obviously not the final context – but rather in a sense 
more akin to that in which a tree fits into the physical universe. Essentially, the 
sense that human life exists in the final context, as everything that exists must. 
What is meant by ‘within a wider context of existence’ must be different 
depending on whether or not we are talking about the final context. My reasoning 
here is echoed by Veal: 
 
For even if God had a reason for creating the physical universe, if the only 
thing that can make a life meaningful is a wider context of meaning, then 
God’s life too would need to belong to such a wider context, and so on to 
infinity. If, on the other hand, God does not need any such wider context, 
then neither do we, …. (p. 237) 
 
All that could stop the regress is intrinsic meaning. So if God’s life were 
intrinsically meaningful in the final context, it would belong to a wider context 
only in the sense of being part of what that context amounts to; not in the sense 
that would defer us to something else that exists in order to account for its meaning 
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– because brute, meaningful existence would have been reached. Of course, I do 
not think there is any such existence, which is why I do not think there is a 
meaning of life. But it is a perfectly coherent idea of what could make life 
meaningful, and the only one I have either come across or can think of; it is what 
God, human beings, or anything else, would require in order to have a meaningful 
life. 
None of these five points remotely support Veal’s conclusion, with which I 
began this part of the discussion, about my supposed position on the entire history 
of philosophy, religion and science. And that just about brings us to the 
culmination of Veal’s narrative, where he reveals the plot of my book. But before 
I turn to what he says afterwards, I shall comment on his passing accusation that 
I misinterpreted Milton Munitz (p. 239); because Veal thinks this leaves me all 
alone, thereby highlighting how thoroughly idiosyncratic my position is. When I 
discovered Munitz’s work, I focused on the better-known Boundless Existence, 
but I did make one reference to his later Does Life Have A Meaning?, saying that 
in this book, ‘Munitz sometimes expresses his message about social meaning in 
an unnecessarily ambiguous manner’ (PML, p. 187). Further down the page from 
the quotation Veal provides, thinking he has found Munitz rejecting the traditional 
question, Munitz turns to ‘Boundless Existence’, or as I would say, transcendent 
reality, and says that ‘since Boundless Existence is Nothing, Emptiness, then in 
this respect life has no meaning either’ (Munitz 1993, p. 109). As I was saying, 
Munitz could have made his ‘yes and no’ answer a lot clearer (ibid., p. 113). 
After the culmination of Veal’s paper, there are three extraordinary pages (pp. 
253-5), in which he says that my book could foreseeably provoke both suicide 
and terrorism, and hence is deeply irresponsible. The reasoning, as regards the 
former, is that one of the most frequently cited reasons for suicide is the feeling 
that your life is ‘meaningless and worthless’ (p. 253). The reasoning, as regards 
the latter, is that terrorists who accept a particular, fundamentalist reading of their 
sacred texts, of the kind which Veal strongly suggests that he endorses as correct 
(pp. 254-5), think that mortal life is meaningless / worthless, but that transcendent 
reality is paradise. Since Veal thinks, or at least says, that I take essentially the 
same view – which requires him to disregard pretty much everything about the 
book, including the first sentence of the preface, even – then since Veal also thinks 
this fundamentalist reading encourages the killing of unbelievers, he accuses my 
position of helping to justify terrorist suicide attacks. Given the fundamentalist 
reading, which Veal strongly suggests that he endorses, he is prepared to ask: ‘who 
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can blame them?’ (p. 255). 
It is now high time to comment on the meaningless / worthless issue. The 
word ‘worthless’ appears thirty-six times in Veal’s paper. It appears nine times in 
my book: twice in a discussion on page 6, once in a quotation from Robert Nozick 
on page 18, and six times in a discussion on page 171. In both of the discussions, 
the point I argue for – and it is abundantly clear that the only reason I use the word 
‘worthless’ is to make this point – is that the metaphysical sense in which I am 
saying that life is meaningless, is not the social sense in which we might condemn 
life as worthless. This is what I say the first time: 
 
If life has a meaning, then, this could be bad. But nihilism cannot be. To 
say that life is meaningless is to say that it is valueless or worthless; but 
only in the sense that value is not essential to what it is. It is not to say that 
we are worthless in the socially contextual sense that would amount to a 
condemnation. (PML, p. 6) 
 
And this is what I say the second time: 
 
The straightforward mistake at the root of all elaborate attempts to escape 
from nihilism is an equation of ‘meaningless’ with ‘socially worthless’. It 
is perfectly reasonable that people should want to avoid condemning life as 
worthless in this sense, of course; worthless things are bad, and unless we 
can reform them, we generally want to either ignore or get rid of them. 
Arguably mosquitoes are worthless. If human life were worthless, then 
extreme, unrestricted misanthropy and so-called antinatalism – the view 
that being born is bad and that the extinction of the human race would be 
good – would not be absurd. And if we did take this kind of view seriously, 
the solution to our predicament would be obvious, just as Epicurus saw: it 
would be to solve Camus’s ‘one truly serious philosophical problem’ with 
suicide. Thankfully (if rather conveniently) the advocates of these views 
usually manage to persuade themselves that this is not the solution. 
However, the judgement that life is socially worthless is an evaluation 
whereas the judgement that life is meaningless is not. (p. 171) 
 
The reader can now see all of my eight uses of the word ‘worthless’. There is no 
trace of an argument in Veal’s paper to the effect that the above reasoning fails, 
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and hence that, in discussing my position, ‘worthless’ is a valid substitution for 
‘meaningless’. So in light of this, it does not strike me as reasonable academic 
practice to continually make this substitution, or else place ‘meaningless’ and 
‘worthless’ alongside each other as if I considered them synonymous. 
Now in the first quotation above, I said, ‘To say that life is meaningless is to 
say that it is valueless or worthless’; and immediately qualified this by saying that 
I do not mean in ‘the socially contextual sense that would amount to a 
condemnation’. In the metaphysical sense, life is indeed worthless; and loveless; 
and hateless, etc., because the final context of reality is not a context of meaning. 
No evaluative concepts can apply to our existence if there is no meaning of life; 
and when we do sometimes, outside of metaphysics, apply them to life as a whole, 
I think we almost inevitably say something either vacuous or false (PML, p. 53, 
56). The reason I alighted upon worthlessness in particular to make my point, is 
because I think the false view that nihilism is negatively evaluative results from 
confusing it with a social condemnation. As I say in the second passage, ‘The 
straightforward mistake at the root of all elaborate attempts to escape from 
nihilism is an equation of “meaningless” with “socially worthless”’. One of the 
main aims of my book was to diagnose the error of making this equation. Veal 
may still make it, but if there is anyone who it should not be attributed to, then 
that person is surely me. And yet this is what Veal does: again and again and again. 
There is a mention of suicide in the second passage. Here, as the passage 
makes quite clear, I had in mind misanthropic views, such as those of 
Schopenhauer, Cioran, and David Benatar, according to which human life is 
provided with a negative evaluation, and it is claimed that it would be better if we 
did not exist. My point was that if life could correctly be evaluated as worthless, 
which is an idea I consider completely absurd, then suicide would indeed seem 
like a sensible solution. I mentioned this kind of position because it shows the 
most extreme conclusion you could reach from mistakenly thinking of nihilism as 
a negative evaluation; a mistake I set out to diagnose, thereby undermining such 
positions, to the extent that they use nihilism as a motivation. Ray Brassier 
commented on Veal’s paper for him. Brassier wrote a book defending nihilism 
and opened his book with a quotation from Thomas Ligotti, who uses nihilism to 
utterly condemn human life. The other commentator was Metz. Metz thinks of 
nihilism as a negative evaluation; if a person lives a meaningless life, then this is 
certainly very bad, on his view, even if it does not follow that their life is socially 
worthless. So if there were anything to Veal’s extreme criticisms of my position, 
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I think Brassier and Metz would have a lot more to worry about than me. 
So let me start with the ‘lending encouragement to suicide’ idea. I wrote a 
book in which I argued that nihilism is not an evaluation, and in which I attacked 
the view that the question of the meaning of life concerns social meaning of a 
meritorious kind that can be measured and compared, such that one person might 
be praised for living a meaningful life, and another condemned for living a 
comparatively meaningless one. If somebody was worried by the thought that 
their life was meaningless, and could not be persuaded out of it, then I should have 
thought that this is exactly the kind of thing they would want to hear. For I am 
saying that there is no intellectual substance to the idea that their particular life 
has failed to reach the level of meaningfulness of other people’s, and hence is 
worthy of condemnation; and that in the only substantive sense in which life is 
meaningless, the same is true of everybody. Moreover, it is not bad that life is 
meaningless in this more weighty sense: to think that it is, is to make an 
intellectual error.  
Now for the ‘lending encouragement to terrorism’ idea. I wrote a book arguing 
that transcendent reality is meaningless and cannot be a context of consciousness; 
that all value and meaning resides within the mortal lives we find within the 
context of consciousness. If the terrorist is persuaded by that, then they have a 
decisive reason to call off their suicide attack, because they will no longer believe 
that it will take them to paradise; they will no longer believe there is a paradise, 
and will instead believe that they will never find any value except in mortal life, 
which is the only kind there is. 
Once more, let me try to find the underlying concern; for there must surely be 
one, even in these extreme cases. As Veal is aware, I think philosophy has become 
far too insular, and can counteract this by reconnecting with issues that matter to 
people, such as the meaning of life. His worry is that this is dangerous territory. 
People end their lives because they feel them to be meaningless, and the notion of 
transcendence persuades others to condemn this life as meaningless and to attack 
those who place value in it. On the most charitable interpretation I can muster, 
Veal realises that I am not promoting such notions, but worries that my views 
would be open to misinterpretation within the public domain; and that any attempt 
to revive interest in issues such as nihilism and transcendence is consequently 
irresponsible. In his view, such issues are best left alone; not only are they patent 
nonsense, as any respectable naturalist realises, but they are also dangerous in the 
wrong hands. 
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It seems to me, however, that these issues are already firmly in the public 
domain, and that it is the duty of academic philosophy to try to give rational 
direction to their discussion. If there are good reasons to think that nihilism is not 
an evaluative condemnation, as I think there are, then it must be a good thing to 
argue this, given the harm that the negative evaluation idea can have. Simply 
avoiding the topic is not going to help, not only because the view that nihilism is 
a negative evaluation is firmly embedded in many minds, as Veal’s examples show, 
but also because some philosophers continue to reinforce this view. Providing 
support to the religious view that reality is transcendent has its dangers, of course, 
but so does the naturalist dismissal of such views. For if the meaning of life is 
interpreted as a question of social meaning, not only does nihilism remain a 
negative evaluation, but the issue arises of how to draw a principled distinction 
between making your life socially meaningful in a moral, or at least non-immoral 
way, and making it socially meaningful in any way whatsoever; desire to achieve 
fame at any cost strikes me as evidently on the rise in our world, and a very 
worrying social trend. If defenders of a social conception of the meaning of life, 
as they think of it, continue to insist that the notion they have in mind precludes 
immoral action, and if defenders of the traditional conception continue to insist 
either that there is no transcendent context, or that there is one but that it cannot, 
or does not, usurp the value we find in life, then we are all on the right side. If we 
can find arguments to support these stances, we will potentially be doing some 
good. Saying nothing is not the answer from a social, pragmatic stance, because 
there are others on the wrong side; arguing against such views will not help their 
efforts. And from a more purely philosophical point of view, if the issues are 
legitimate, then philosophers should discuss them, so long as they do so 
responsibly. 
Veal finishes the paper with a naturalistic sketch of a theory of the meaning 
of life, as he thinks of it. He thinks that by, ‘placing our lives in the context of 
human history, human history in the context of the evolution of life on earth, and 
life on earth in the context of cosmological evolution, [we] can provide 
considerable meaning to our lives, both individually and collectively’ (p. 255). He 
says that we are special, both for our physical unusualness, and the fact that this 
has allowed us to acquire extensive knowledge about the universe; and that this is 
‘quite capable of providing “overall meaning” to our lives’ (p. 256). He goes on 
to say that our lives are made more meaningful when we reject the idea of an 
afterlife, and realise that our mortal lives are the only ones we will ever have (p. 
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256). 
This is the only part of the paper, except for the incongruous introduction, 
where my work is not being targeted; so my judgement that Veal seems to work 
best in this positive vein should perhaps be taken with a pinch of salt. However, 
if he does want to pursue this project, I think he would be well-advised to drop 
the phrase ‘the meaning of life’; given his deep suspicions about it, and the fact 
that the picture he has in mind would not address that issue. For it would not 
answer the existential component; this cannot be done within an exclusively 
naturalistic framework. Although some people might find that reflecting on their 
place with the natural world allows them to attribute a certain kind of value to 
human life as a whole, such value does not explain why human life exists. We are 
not here because we are physically unusual, if indeed we are. We are not here 
because we value the physical processes that produced us, if indeed we do; they 
certainly do not value us. Others who do not make the physicalist’s confusion of 
naturalistic knowledge with metaphysics might say, rather more naturally, that our 
capacity for love, for instance, attributes a certain kind of value to human life as 
a whole; but, ceteris paribus, this would be equally tangential to the question.  
Veal has simply looked for a question he can ask within an exclusively 
naturalistic framework; one which shadows in form the question of the meaning 
of life. But since it will not address the philosophical concerns behind that 
question, this simply muddies the waters. Perhaps this is what he wants to do; but 
if his concerns really are constructive, and if he is consistent, then I do not think 
it makes sense for him to allow a discredited theological agenda, as he sees it, to 
dictate his project. Nevertheless, I am perfectly open to the idea that naturalists 
may be able to say something plausible about our ‘specialness’, if that is 
something people desire. And maybe it could be argued that our lives acquire 
more social meaning when we no longer believe in a transcendent context of 
meaning; although I am sure religious believers would disagree, so this is one for 
them and the naturalists to discuss. Personally, I am very suspicious of such 
judgements, as I made plain in my book. 
Finally, a word on Veal’s title: ‘“Life is Meaningless.” Compared to What?’ I 
cannot see that it has much to do with the paper, but nevertheless, here is the 
answer I gave (at this point in the book, I was discussing the more specific 
hypothesis that life has a purpose): 
 
Life has no overall purpose compared to what? Compared to games, to how 
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things seem in the framework, and to how things might be if there is a wider 
context of meaning. We cannot give our lives this kind of purpose, but we 
do not need to anyway, because we have more localized and transitory 
purposes to occupy ourselves with. (PML, p. 56) 
 
This answer refers back to my reflections upon our typical absorption in the 
framework; reflections which bring nihilism into view. Veal pays no attention to 
any of this and so nihilism never comes into view for him. This is fine, since no 
one needs to engage in this kind of reflection if it does not interest them; that said, 
Veal was writing a critique of my book and he chose a title which suggested he 
would. Nevertheless, in light of his positive views, you would expect him to be 
sympathetic to at least the final sentence.  
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Abstract 
  Taking inspiration from James Tartaglia’s Philosophy in a Meaningless Life, I suggest a way out of 
the present dialectical stalemate in analytic philosophy of free will and moral responsibility. The key 
concept employed in my proposal is transcendence, i.e., our remarkable ability to self-relativize by 
stepping back from the social framework understanding which determines our systems of value. 
Analytic philosophers who favor one of the standard, determinate and mutually exclusive positions 
in the free-will debate have marginalized this aspect of transcendence in human life. For if one 
conceives human life as essentially involving the movement of transcendence, then one can discern 
an element of self-deception in the analytic philosophers’ self-images of themselves as defenders of 
the one true theory, as cast within a fixed framework of language and thought. One of the central 
suggestions of this essay is that analytic philosophers – including myself – should abandon such a 
self-image, because when we philosophize, we are always already engaged in an endless effort of 
self-reflection, self-criticism and self-revision. I argue, in addition, that it is loyalty to the untenable 
self-image which forces the philosophical debate on free will and moral responsibility into a vicious 
deadlock. As such, my essay is an attempt to philosophically investigate the topic of free will 
without succumbing to the self-image of ‘Seeker of The Unique and Definitive Truth’. 
 
Preface 
 
A lesson which we can learn from James Tartaglia’s recently published book 
(Tartaglia 2016) is that to search for a straightforward answer to the question 
“What is the meaning of life?” is not among the tasks of philosophy. The reason 
why I stress this is because, in the present Anglophone philosophical literature, 
several prominent authors (e.g., Wolf 2010, Metz 2014) engage themselves in 
answering that question by proposing a determinate view about which factor or 
condition makes a person’s life meaningful. Tartaglia’s discourse developed in 
that book would, I suggest, fundamentally explicate why those philosophers’ 
approach to the issue of life’s meaning is on a wrong track. The problem is not 
that they do not give the right answer to the question, but that they care about a 
wrongfully oriented question. What is important here is therefore to reconsider 
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what we should ask, or more basically what we should aim at, when we 
philosophically talk about the meaning of life. 
Why, however, is this so? I.e., for what reason should we say that a direct 
approach to the simple question about life’s meaning is not an appropriate way 
to consider the issue in question? It might be roughly explained as follows. 
One of Tartaglia’s important suggestions is, as I understand it, that 
philosophy is an activity practiced through, and throughout, each of our lives. 
Or, in other words, each of us is involved in philosophy as her or his life goes 
on. Therefore, “philosophy, like life, needs no end” (Tartaglia 2016: 181). What 
we should grasp here is that there is a sense of the word in which we can say one 
keeps engaging oneself in ‘philosophy’ insofar as one’s life continues. We, in 
fact, continuously re-examine what we believe to be true and revise it, insofar as 
we live. If we call such an endlessly self-revising aspect of our life by the name 
‘philosophy’, it cannot be the case that some philosophical problem or another 
will be solved once and for all. 
Any determinate dogma such as, e.g., “The meaning of a person’s life 
consists in making the world better” thus does not belong to philosophy in this 
sense, because any supposed answer to what life’s meaning is should be 
reconsidered sooner or later, insofar as we live. Any activity of philosophy (in 
that sense) does not contain any moments properly described as ‘solutions’, 
‘proofs’, ‘rejections’ and so on. What philosophy really involves is rather, e.g., a 
never-ending effort to deepen our own understanding of our world and 
ourselves. The attempt to find a conclusive statement that the meaning of life is 
such-and-such, therefore, would not be any part of philosophy in that significant 
sense. 
Tartaglia explains such a conception of philosophy, i.e., philosophy as 
self-renewal as it were, in terms of ‘transcendence’. Human beings, he suggests, 
can transcend their world and themselves, and thereby continuously turn their 
understanding of reality into a new one. This transcending aspect of human life 
is a fundamental basis for one’s being able to engage oneself in philosophy as 
self-renewal. Many contemporary philosophers of the analytic tradition, 
unconsciously or not, tend to disregard such dialektische Bewegung of 
transcendence in human life, because they favor a statement that could be 
uniquely interpreted through a determinate model. This is possibly an 
unfortunate effect of logico-positivist partiality in the tradition of analytic 
philosophy. We, however, transcend our world and ourselves. Any philosophical 
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inquiry, if it intends to conceive human life as a whole, should not ignore our 
transcending essence. 
What I am going to do in this paper is to take over Tartaglia’s discourse 
about transcendence and enlarge it in a certain direction. One of my central 
suggestions is that the dialectical deadlock in the on-going controversy about 
free will and moral responsibility in analytic philosophy is caused by the 
participants neglecting that remarkable feature of transcendence in human life. 
“Are we free or not?” is also a question for which a straightforward answer 
should not naïvely be sought, as I will explain. We should rather transcend such 
a dichotomous framework of inquiry around ‘free’ or ‘unfree’ to jump into an 
arena where we could cooperate with each other to deepen our understanding of 
freedom. My concluding remark will be that we should accept a sort of 
contradictory view, or, more accurately, we should take a perspective, or 
Horizont, from which we can suppose that human beings are free in a significant 
sense; and at the same time significantly unfree as well. 
Someone might wonder why this conclusion is important. As a minimal 
reply to such doubt, I note here that, not only to solve a problem within a given 
framework, but also to deepen our understanding of the whole issue in question, 
can qualify as a fruit of philosophical work (I would suggest that Tartaglia’s 
contribution to philosophy consists not in solving a certain traditional problem 
but in creating a novel discourse in terms of which we can say a number of new 
things about our nature of engaging ourselves in philosophy). What I aim at in 
this paper is also not the solution of a certain problem but a deepening of our 
understanding of human existence. The analytic philosophers of free will and 
moral responsibility, at least in the last decades, tend to simply ask whether or 
not we are free and, as a result, remain in a stalemate where the pro-freedom and 
anti-freedom camps have nothing to say to each other. So, I will try to develop a 
‘narrative’ which would help us to take a detour away from, or find a way out of, 
that fruitless dead-end. 
The argument of this paper runs as follows. To begin with, I introduce the 
status quo of the free-will debate and explain how it falls into a stalemate 
(Section 1). Next, I present some of Tartaglia’s central suggestions in his book 
(Section 2), because they enable us to understand what is fundamentally 
responsible for the vicious stalemate in question. I will argue that it is 
“marginalization” of the concern about transcendence in the recent trend of 
analytic philosophy that makes the free-will debate unproductive (Sections 3 and 
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4). 
 
1. 
 
The participants in the on-going controversy about free will are roughly 
divided into three camps, i.e., libertarians, compatibilists, and free will skeptics, 
as you would already know. These positions are defined in relation to the 
metaphysical thesis of determinism, as you again already know. If a person 
believes that the truth of determinism is compatible with the existence of human 
freedom, then she is a compatibilist, and if not, then an incompatibilist. Among 
the incompatibilists, there are two subgroups, i.e., libertarians who deny 
determinism but affirm the existence of free will, and free will skeptics who 
accept determinism and the non-existence of freedom. The compatibilists are 
naturally protagonists of freedom of will, because their arguing for the 
compatibility of determinism and human freedom pragmatically implies their 
commitment to the existence of free will. 
In most cases, a participant in the present free will debate would be 
categorized as an advocate of one of those three views: libertarianism, 
compatibilism, or free will skepticism. To randomly enumerate prominent 
figures: Robert Kane, Timothy O’Connor and Carl Ginet are libertarians; Harry 
Frankfurt, John Martin Fischer and Susan Wolf are compatibilists; and Galen 
Strawson, Derk Pereboom and Bruce Waller are free will skeptics. What each of 
them wishes to do in the debate is, most simply speaking, to find an argument 
which concludes that his or her position is right, or that a position which she or 
he does not accept is wrong. As the debate proceeds, more and more articulated 
arguments are proposed. We will learn a number of ‘fine’ conceptual distinctions 
as we follow their works. 
What I am going to argue in this section is that this framework of inquiry 
leads the debaters, sooner or later, to a stalemate of the vicious kind. Such a 
phenomenon is, I suggest, symptomtic of Richard Double’s experience. 
 
Several years ago at a meeting of the American Philosophical Association 
a very prominent incompatibilist commented on a paper delivered by a 
younger, less prominent, but very sharp compatibilist. The exchange 
between the two lasted the entire hour, and toward the end it became clear 
that neither speaker could understand at all why the other held the position 
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that he did: one spoke, the other just shook his head in disbelief. (Double 
1991: 5) 
 
I think that it is not simply contingent that these two philosophers from different 
camps finally ‘swear’ at each other. Such a quarrel sometimes happens in the 
free will debate because of the framework of inquiry, as explained in the 
following. 
Libertarianism, compatibilism, and free will skepticism are, in reality, 
defined as mutually exclusive. If, therefore, you presuppose that what 
philosophy of free will seeks would be an answer to the question of which of 
those positions is true, then your choosing of one of them inevitably entails your 
abandoning the other two. When, e.g., a compatibilist argues, in some way, that 
human freedom is realizable even under the truth of determinism, any 
incompatibilist should suggest that there must be something wrong with the 
argument in question, because the core of her position implies the negation of 
any compatibilist reconciliation between determinism and free will. 
The opposition between those camps is deeper than this, however. E.g., an 
incompatibilist could not be persuaded to convert to compatibilism insofar as 
she is an incompatibilist. For the effort of persuasion would make sense only if 
two opposing sides talk to each other about an issue of which at least one side 
can partly make a concession to the other. If, therefore, two positions with 
directly conflicting core ideas compete with each other by asking which of these 
ideas is right, then they reach, sooner or later, a place where both sides have 
nothing more to say than, e.g., “Our idea is intuitively correct” or “I can’t 
understand how you could accommodate such a view.” The free will debate thus 
very often ends in a kind of impasse where all the debaters can do is just repeat: 
“I cannot believe you are right.” (The same thing holds in many fields of 
analytic philosophy, e.g., the philosophy of mind debate among type-A 
physicalism, type-B physicalism and dualism. So, if my argument in this paper 
is right, it would be applicable to further areas.) 
I shall introduce an example which very typically represents the lack of 
mutual understanding in the free will debate.  
Derk Pereboom, a prominent free will skeptic as I mentioned above, 
suggests in his book that “if all of our behavior was ‘in the cards’ before we 
were born, […] then we cannot legitimately be blamed for our wrongdoing” 
(Pereboom 2001: 6). This is an expression of the core idea of incompatibilism, 
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and I suggest that all of us can sympathize with it to some degree. We have, in 
fact, many ways to construct discourses in which the idea in question would be 
understandable: “if our behavior was predetermined, we would contribute 
nothing to it,” “if all of our behavior was in the cards before we were born, 
someone who – or something which – had dealt the cards would be the true 
author of our behavior,” et cetera. John Martin Fischer, an eminent compatibilist 
as I mentioned above, however, opposes this idea in a very unsympathetic 
mood: 
 
Our behavior’s “being in the cards” is obviously metaphor. Pereboom 
means by this that conditions prior to our births “inevitably result in our 
behavior by a deterministic causal process.” If the problematic notion of 
inevitability simply implies the notion of entailment, then Pereboom’s 
claim just comes down to the unargued-for assumption that causal 
determination in the actual sequence rules out responsibility. Again, this is 
dialectically unhelpful. If “inevitability” also implies some sort of actual 
sequence compulsion, this is question-begging within the dialectic 
context. Why exactly is it the case that one’s behavior’s being “in the 
cards,” in the relevant sense, involves problematic compulsion and thus 
directly rules out moral responsibility? (Fischer 2002: 201) 
 
We should remark that what Fischer says in this quotation is, in short, that he 
cannot interpret Pereboom as saying something right about the matter at hand. 
Fischer just shrugs his shoulders and shakes his head. Certainly, it is natural, or 
even obligatory, for Fischer as a compatibilist to oppose the incompatibilist idea. 
But, I suggest that there is something wrong with the compatibilist’s directly 
refuting stance in considering incompatibilist ideas (the same thing can be said 
about any incompatibilist’s simple refusal of compatibilist intuitions). 
My suggestion here is not that the philosophers have to avoid any kind of 
conflict about their core views on a relevant issue. I rather admit that, insofar as 
philosophy is a serious project in our life, i.e., it faces ‘hard’ problems about our 
world and ourselves which are essentially different from any matter of mere 
taste, it is inevitable for our philosophical views to collide against each other. I 
suppose, in addition, that a philosophical opposition of the ‘legitimate’ type, if 
any exist, possibly reaches the extreme where two rivals will never be 
reconciled with each other, even if that opposition is very fruitful in the sense 
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that it will produce many novel narratives in the relevant field. Thus, not every 
opposition ought to be prevented, but what type of opposition holds does matter, 
and it is the unproductive type of conflict that should be avoided, as I shall argue 
in this section. 
What I will criticize is, in a word, a presupposition of the free will debate as 
a whole, consciously or unconsciously held by the participants concerning the 
orientation of inquiry. I would like, in other words, to criticize the debaters’ 
understanding of what philosophy of free will aims at. Except for several 
remarkable non-standard authors1, all the participants of the free will debate 
presuppose that a certain view on free will is ‘objectively’ correct and that what 
they ought to seek is the ‘true’ theory of human freedom. They suppose, in 
consequence, that at most one of libertarianism, compatibilism, and free will 
skepticism, is true – and hence two of them must be false. The assumption that 
there is one objectively true conception of free will thus orients the debaters 
toward a simple battle in which the only thing each camp should do is to defend 
itself and attack the others. 
What, however, if we human beings are free in that we can ‘transcend’ a 
fixed orientation of inquiry? Or, what if we are free in that we can ‘destruct’ a 
given framework of intellectual activities and ‘construct’ a new way of discourse 
which would enable us to engage ourselves in investigation in a radically 
different way? And, what if our deeper freedom consists in such a transcending 
creation? Then, we cannot but doubt the legitimacy of the ‘naïve’ research 
project in seeking one true theory of free will. I will come back to this point 
later. 
What I am arguing is that the ‘triadic’ competition of libertarianism, 
compatibilism, and free will skepticism ends by falling into a vicious deadlock. I 
present another example. In the final paragraph of his paper, focused on 
clarification of his conception of agent causation, Randolph Clarke tentatively 
identifies the reason why many of us would reject compatibilism (and 
non-agent-causal libertarianism) by saying that, 
 
we find unsatisfactory any view of free will that allows that everything 
                                                     
1 Honderich 1993/2002, Double 1991, 1996, Smilansky 2000, and Sommers 2012 suppose that what 
philosophy of free will should aim at is not to find a straightforward answer to the question of whether 
or not we are free but to consider, e.g., the following question about life: With what idea of freedom 
should we live? I would like to consider a genealogy of such non-standard thinkers elsewhere. 
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that causally brings about an agent’s action is itself causally brought about 
by something in the distant past. Certainly any freedom of will that we 
enjoy on such a view, if not a complete fraud, is a pale imitation of 
freedom that is characterized by an agent-causal account. (Clarke 1993: 
298) 
 
The compatibilists immediately contend that they, and a number of us, would 
not find that view unsatisfactory! I stress again that all of us could sympathize 
with their claim to some degree, as well as Clarke’s. We have, in fact, many 
ways to construct discourses in which the compatibilist idea would be 
understandable: “some significant concept of freedom must be compatible with 
the truth of determinism, because, on the one hand, we cannot but distinguish 
‘free’ persons from ‘unfree’ insofar as we ordinarily differentiate normal adults 
from children, mere animals, or adults with ‘abnormal’ conditions, and, on the 
other hand, the distinction of ‘free’ and ‘unfree’ in this sense must be realizable 
even in a strict causal connection of events since it is undeniable that we human 
beings are a part of the causally connected totality of nature, in which human 
behavior should be regarded as an effect of the combination of past events.” But, 
if the debaters presuppose that at most one side among the compatibilists and 
Clarke have it right, then all that each side can finally do is just spit out, “I have 
no idea why you think so.” 
I repeatedly suggest that such lack of mutual understanding is problematic. I 
realize, however, that my suggestion would be somehow difficult to accept, or 
even hard to understand, for people who have an analytic interest in scrutinizing 
the technically detailed arguments developed in the recent literature. I should 
add further that the traditional ‘triadic’ framework of the free will debate is not 
completely fruitless, because it has produced many illuminating conceptual 
distinctions, such as the difference between the ‘leeway’ and ‘source’ types of 
freedom.2 To touch upon my personal history, I learned very many things by 
reading texts written by prominent authors including Pereboom, Fischer and 
Clarke. In what sense, then, can I criticize the recent research interest of 
philosophy of free will? 
My criticism would be, I dare to say, a kind of hope, i.e., hope that 
                                                     
2 The ‘leeway’ type of freedom is defined by so-called alternative possibilities, while the ‘source’ type 
is characterized by origination, not necessarily by alternatives. This distinction added an important 
twist to the recent debate. 
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philosophy of free will would be further developed if the traditional framework 
can be overcome, or aufgehoben in the Hegelian sense. More concretely, I 
expect that, if we stop asking which of libertarianism, compatibilism, and free 
will skepticism is objectively true, then we will thereby keep away from the 
recent unproductive stalemate and be in a position to better say something which 
enables us to understand the matter in a novel and deeper way.  
While this paper might be interpreted as an anti-analytic-philosophy 
manifesto, I have no intention to say that the tendency to subtlety and rigidity 
found in the contemporary Anglophone literature is harmful. Insofar as all the 
philosophers are essentially critics of sloppy discourses (no philosopher as such 
intends to be an obscurantist!), it would be reasonable for them to pursue a 
‘rigid’ way of argumentation. It is, however, important for us to realize that there 
is “something it is easy to forget when we are engaged in philosophy, especially 
in our cool, contemporary style,” as Peter Strawson says (Strawson 1962: 77). 
We would, e.g., easily forget the transcending nature of our thinking, if we 
engaged ourselves in an analytic project to construct a logically consistent 
discourse about a given subject matter. More concretely, e.g., our familiarity 
with logical considerations developed throughout the history of analytic 
philosophy would urge us to scorn respect for the transcending movement of 
human thinking. There is, however, something true about a contradictory 
statement like “we are fundamentally free, and at the same time fundamentally 
unfree,” and the concept of transcendence would enable us to make sense of this 
statement in a significant way, which will be explained in Sections 3 and 4. In 
the next section, I will introduce, or re-construct in my own way, what Tartaglia 
says about the transcendent aspect of human thinking. 
   
2. 
 
Tartaglia, in the book in question, engages himself in philosophy in the 
dimension of transcendence, as it were. He does not construct his position in a 
fixed framework, but continuously ‘deconstructs’ the frameworks in which 
contemporary philosophy is performed. His argumentation could therefore be 
classed as non-standard, or even strange, because the mainstream of 
contemporary philosophy in the English-speaking world, i.e., analytic 
philosophy, tends to neglect or disrespect such a transcending movement of the 
human intellectual ability, as I suggested in the preface of this paper. Tartaglia 
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touches on the reason why analytic philosophy systematically ignores the 
phenomenon of transcendence, when he says 
 
[…] concerns about transcendence and the meaning of life have been 
marginalized over the course of the history of philosophy, especially in 
twentieth-century analytic philosophy’s drive to naturalism and the 
emulation of scientific or mathematical inquiry […]. (Tartaglia 2016: 73) 
 
What we should note is that, according to Tartaglia, analytic philosophy’s 
assimilation of philosophical inquiry to the scientific, brought about the 
twentieth-century marginalization of concerns about transcendence. We should 
remark, in addition, that there is suggested to be some connection between 
transcendence and life’s meaning in the quotation. What is transcendence, then, 
and what relationship does it have with the meaning of life? 
Tartaglia, in that book, introduces the concept of transcendence in the 
context of a consideration of the issue about the meaning of life, as explained in 
the following paragraphs.  
We ordinarily live with confidence in the meaningfulness of our daily 
practice, because “the social framework we live within, which has been building 
up over the course of history, makes it seem that our lives have an overall point” 
(Tartaglia 2016: 22). In fact, our social framework brings with it many devices 
such as commercial advertisements, school education, books, and much else, 
which ‘implant’ and reinforce the belief in the meaning of our present activities 
and thereby prevent us from reconsidering whether our life has an ultimate 
meaning at all. We affirm, e.g., the meaningfulness of study in school by saying 
that, if a person does not study well in school, she or he will not earn much in 
the future; and none of us would ever doubt the truth of this in daily life. In this 
sense, we are ordinarily ‘immersed’ in our social framework, just as much as 
non-human animals who are more or less inevitably immersed in their biological 
frameworks (Tartaglia 2016: 24). 
We human beings, however, are not always immersed in the daily 
framework. We can “step back from our framework,” objectify it, and locate it in 
a larger context (Tartaglia 2016: 24). We can, e.g., see our everyday practice 
from the perspective of the physical universe and thereby find that our moral 
behavior, or social activity in general, is just a part of the complex totality of the 
‘law-abiding’ movements of physical matter. This ability to step back from a 
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given framework Tartaglia calls ‘transcendence’, which he interestingly 
supposes to be “a by-product of the freedom we evolved in the transition from 
the structures of a biological to a more malleable social framework” (Tartaglia 
2016: 24). 
By exercise of this ability of transcendence, we realize that what our social 
framework supposes to be the absolute values in our life, e.g., pleasure, wealth, 
commercial success, industrial development, and so on, are ‘worthless’ things in 
a higher or deeper context. If, e.g., we ascend to the perspective of physical 
nature, then we find that, objectively, there is no axiological difference between 
socially presumed good and bad actions, because both are fundamentally just 
complex sums of value-free movements of micro-physical matter. Every 
normative feature of the world vanishes from the physical perspective. 
Transcendence thus brings about nihilism, i.e., the view that there is no absolute 
value which would ascribe an overall point to our life. There is something true 
about nihilism, and we know it. For, if we step back from the social framework, 
which would ordinarily give some seemingly ultimate point to our daily 
activities, we realize that social matters are just a sort of illusion, and nothing 
matters at a deeper, more fundamental level. The physical universe, in short, is 
indifferent to what happens in our world. Our life in it therefore lacks an overall 
point. 
While many philosophers wish to reject nihilism, Tartaglia rather affirms it, 
partly because that view, he suggests, reflects the truth of our world which our 
ability of transcendence unveils. He adds that, contrary to naïve expectation, 
realizing the truth of nihilism has no grave consequences in our practical life. He 
says that, as a matter of fact, 
 
trying to make money, change the world for the better, become famous, 
find love or just stay out of prison, all remain just as compelling as they 
ever were in light of nihilism, except to the extent that they were thought 
to contribute to an overall purpose to life […]. (Tartaglia 2016: 43) 
 
Even after we find that there is no ultimate goal in our life, we cannot but live in 
our daily social framework. Relative goals like wealth or development, 
therefore, continue to be things we should pursue in our life. What changes, 
then, when we realize the truth of nihilism? Tartaglia says that all we should do 
is “re-engage with the [social] framework” (Tartaglia 2016: 43). We should, in 
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other words, engage ourselves in the same things as before, but now we would 
do so without the illusion that these social activities have an absolute value. 
Nihilism, in short, wakes us up, but does not necessarily imply despair or 
hopelessness. 
Many who regard nihilism as a source of ruination, nevertheless, would seek 
a firm ground on which we hit the ultimate framework, and which no one could 
transcend. Tartaglia himself, however, transcends this common frame of 
thinking, which uncritically supposes that nihilism ruins us. So, his philosophy 
does not begin with the assumption that there may possibly be a firm ground 
which would give us some overall meaning, but rather with the fact that we 
continuously transcend, i.e., objectify and relativize, our given frameworks. I 
will explain this point in the following. How Tartaglia’s focus on transcendence 
determines his conception of philosophy will thereby be clarified. 
The intellectual activity he calls ‘philosophy’ is not a purely ontological 
description of the world within a given framework. It could, should and even 
must in some cases, transcend that fixed framework to ask, “In what respect 
does this kind of ontological description matter?” Even in the midst of an 
exciting inquiry, indeed, we can always, and should sometimes, step back from 
an ‘absorbed’ perspective and ask about the meaning of the inquiry to which we 
are presently devoted. If philosophy is an attempt to understand our world and 
ourselves as a whole, then it should not overlook this transcending feature of our 
movement of thought. In this sense, it is reasonable for Tartaglia to qualify 
‘philosophy’ as involving reflective consideration on the meaning of the issues it 
engages itself with (Tartaglia 2016: 69-70). 
To organize these points, I introduce Tartaglia’s term of ‘enframement’. He 
says that, generally, 
 
if we want to understand the meaning of a particular practice, we do so by 
framing it within the wider context of social life […]. (Tartaglia 2016: 70) 
 
Suppose that, e.g., a student asks, “Why should I study at all?” In order to 
answer, we have to find a comparatively broad framework which locates, within 
it, the practice of study as a means to another end. E.g., when we reply, “If you 
don’t study well, you won’t earn much in the future,” we thereby appeal to the 
framework which determines money as an absolute value, the meaningfulness of 
which is stipulated to be undoubted under the context in question. Needless to 
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say, we can also transcend the latter framework and ask “Why is money 
relevant?” To answer this, we need a broader framework still. 
To understand the meaning of a practice is, therefore, to realize a framework 
in which the practice in question is determined as meaningful. Tartaglia thus 
calls a question of this type, i.e., a question about the meaning of a practice and 
its background framework, “a question of enframement” (Tartaglia 2016: 70). 
Another type of philosophical question, i.e., an ‘objective’ inquiry into the 
fundamental elements of the world, is traditionally called ‘ontology.’ The 
terminology of ‘enframement’ and ‘ontology’ enable us to catch the point of 
Tartaglia’s conception of philosophy. What he suggests is, in short, that our 
philosophical investigation should not only consist of ontology but also 
enframement, even though the interest of the latter kind is marginalized in the 
trend of analytic philosophy, as I already mentioned. 
It is arguable, in fact, that philosophy is originally a sort of two-wheeled 
vehicle for conceiving our existence. E.g., for Plato, a philosopher’s ontological 
knowledge of the transcendent world, or especially the knowledge of the Idea of 
Goodness, would guide our life by telling us what our practice fundamentally 
aims at, as Tartaglia illustrates (Tartaglia 2016: 72). I would like to add 
Spinoza’s Ethics as another example, where the fundamental meaning of our 
intellectual activity is found to be an exercise of our human rational essence as 
determined by God’s eternal nature. Ontology and enframement are thus “tightly 
interwoven” (Tartaglia 2016: 72). Answering the question of the enframement of 
an ontological inquiry would justify the whole philosophical project at a deeper 
level. In this sense, in virtue of the two-wheeled-ness of its concern, philosophy 
would proceed on the right track. If a philosopher, conversely, lost her interest in 
‘transcendent’ explanation and justification of the meaning of her first-order 
ontological research, then her investigation would fail to do all that it could do. 
This would be a significant fault, Tartaglia supposes. I will argue that his 
judgment is relevantly right, through consideration of the free will debate. 
Several chapters, i.e., chapter 4-7, of Tartaglia’s book consider the problems 
of consciousness, time and universals in the light of his ‘two-wheeled’ 
philosophy, although I would like to omit the details. He explicates, throughout 
those chapters, that “experience does not belong to the objective world” 
(Tartaglia 2016: 176). This means that any objective description of reality could 
not exhaust everything there is. Something would always remain, which 
transcends our objectification. Tartaglia calls this supposition the “transcendent 
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hypothesis”, which I take to be another expression of the fact that we 
continuously transcend our given frameworks.  
This ‘hypothesis’ explains why, e.g., the materialist reduction of 
consciousness in philosophy of mind would be unsatisfactory, because such an 
attempt would only succeed in making a clear analysis of the conscious 
phenomenon in the physicalist framework at the price of overlooking, or even 
denying, the dimension of human experiential transcendence. On reflection, 
however, we cannot but realize that we could transcend such a ‘material’ 
framework to conceive an ‘idealistic’ aspect of the phenomenon in question, as 
Kant did. The materialists’ success, in short, carries with it a significant cost. A 
dualist conception of consciousness, on the other hand, would absurdly try to 
objectify the transcendent dimension, without adequate understanding of the 
hypothesis in question. The most important point here is to realize that there is a 
genuinely transcendent feature of human thought and experience. We should, 
therefore, abandon the ambition to describe everything in front of our objective 
eyes. Both the materialists and dualists are caught by ‘a philosophically bad 
obsession’, insofar as they aim to objectify all the essential aspects of the 
conscious phenomenon. 
Repeatedly, the materialists deny transcendence, while the dualists objectify 
it. Generally speaking, it is the dialectic of these two approaches, i.e., negation 
of transcendence and objectification of it, that makes progress in philosophy 
(although, in most cases, the debaters do not explicitly realize that we human 
beings are an essentially transcending existence). This is one of the central 
suggestions developed in the final chapter of Tartaglia’s book. He says that, 
 
[p]hilosophy proceeds as a perennial debate between these two factions, 
with one side reminding us of the fact of transcendence only to take it in 
the wrong direction, and the other side trying to deny it. Thus the first 
provide alternative articulations of transcendent being to that provided by 
objective thought – typically achieved by treating our shadow concepts of 
experience as accurate representation – with this then producing a clash 
with commitments which the other side consider obligatory, such as 
physicalism, positivism or common sense. (Tartaglia 2016: 180) 
 
In addition, 
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the debate goes on and shows no sign of abating, as various approaches to 
affirming or denying transcendence are developed from generation to 
generation; taking in new discoveries and reflecting new interests. This 
constitutes progress in philosophy; a progress which reflects life in that it 
has no prospect of completion. (Tartaglia 2016: 181) 
 
We now reach the point where we can make sense of what I mentioned at the 
beginning of this paper. I said that philosophy is an activity practiced through, 
and throughout, each of our lives. This is because, as Tartaglia suggests, 
philosophical progress consists in deepening our understanding of the world and 
ourselves through continuous exercise of the human ‘privilege’, i.e., our 
transcending nature. When we engage ourselves in a ‘first-order’ philosophical 
inquiry, there are always open possibilities in which we might transcend its 
framework. True, we would plausibly have some ‘natural’ limitation on the 
range of humanly possible transcendence. But, we do not know where the 
boundary is. For us, therefore, philosophical progress has no end. 
To sum up, our transcending nature, which even philosophers sometimes 
ignore or disrespect, makes our practice of philosophy never-ending. Finding a 
definitive answer to a question would, therefore, not be any genuine part of our 
philosophical journey. This point applies also to philosophy of free will. A 
straightforward answer to the naïve question “Are we free or not?” is not a thing 
that philosophers of free will ought to pursue. What should we aim at, then, in 
philosophy of free will? I would like to answer this in the remaining sections. 
 
3. 
 
The compatibilists typically suggest that human freedom is conceivable in 
the framework of physicalism or naturalism. For them, our freedom of will 
would be an immanent phenomenon within the system of mechanistic nature, as 
it were. Some libertarians oppose them by suggesting that proper free will must 
be ‘thicker’ than it. They therefore assume that there are transcending dynamics, 
or “agent causation”, in the objective reality. Another type of libertarian, by 
contrast, equates human freedom just with a kind of indeterministic event and 
suggests that some type of naturalism, insofar as it accommodates 
indeterminism, would be compatible with the existence of freedom of the 
libertarian sort. Most free will skeptics suppose that our genuine freedom is of 
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the ‘thick’ type, and argue that free will in this sense is not realizable in the 
objective world. 
This status quo of the free will debate can be analyzed from a different 
perspective in terms of the terms ‘transcendence’, ‘objectification’ and 
‘negation’. If the fundamental kind of human freedom consists in the movement 
of transcendence of our thinking and experience (as I believe), then, e.g., the 
‘agent-causal’ libertarians are guilty of objectifying such transcendent dynamism 
within their this-worldly causal connections. For dynamics of transcendence 
would essentially evade the net of our objectification, or Vor-sich-stellen. On the 
other hand, the typical compatibilists and naturalistic libertarians attempt to 
conceive human freedom in the framework of physical events and thereby 
overlook, or in some cases negate, the phenomenon of transcendence. The free 
will skeptics should be blamed for the same reason, because they would in most 
cases be devoted just to exposing the non-existence of free will in the objective 
world, and therefore have no respect for the ‘transcendent’ existence of our 
freedom. 
We should remark that almost all the participants in the contemporary 
free-will debate ignore, or fail to rightly conceive, or even consciously deny, the 
possibility of human transcendence. They begin their consideration with the 
supposition that there is a fixed objective reality, and never consider whether or 
not we could step back from that given framework and relativize it, as explained 
in the following manner. 
The pro-freedom debaters would, in fact, just seek what they define as 
human freedom in their particular, ‘prejudiced’ conception of the world. Robert 
Kane, an eminent libertarian, e.g., starts his investigation by accepting a 
naturalistic worldview and analyzes our free choices in terms of indeterministic 
informational-processing of “the two crossing neural networks” in our brain, i.e., 
so-called “parallel processing” (Kane 1999: 312), without critically reflecting 
whether his conception of the world could be transcended or not. What is 
problematic about his stance is, I would suggest, that his concern is exclusively 
focused on locating or constructing something he would call “freedom” within 
his presupposed framework. So, we would find in the process of his thinking, no 
moment of fundamental reflection on the necessity of his particular orientation, 
i.e., of pursuing freedom in the event-causal world. In brief, Kane is, in other 
words, immersed in his presupposed framework and never re-examines it. He, as 
a result of this, fails to turn his eyes on the genuine dimension of human 
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freedom, i.e., ‘transcendent’ liberation from the given framework of thinking 
and living (similar things happen in the work of, e.g., Chisholm and Pereboom, 
to whom I refer in the following).  
As another illustration, Roderick Chisholm, an equally eminent but 
non-naturalistic libertarian, suggests that “the motion of the hand was caused by 
the motion of certain muscles,” and “the motion of the muscles was caused by 
certain events that took place within the brain,” but “some event, and 
presumably one of those that took place within the brain, was caused by the 
agent and not by any other event” (Chisholm 1964: 31). He here objectifies 
human freedom of a ‘transcendent’ kind, i.e., agent causation, within the 
sublunary causal connection, without asking at all whether our genuine freedom 
is transcendent over, or immanent in, the objective reality. If there is something 
absurd about his move, it is explained by Thomas Nagel’s comment that 
Chisholm would “try to force autonomy into the objective causal order” (Nagel 
1986: 115). I.e., if our genuine autonomy belongs not to the objective, or 
objectified, order, but rather to our transcendent objectification of the order in 
question, then any attempt at forcing autonomy into something objectified 
should be judged ‘absurd’; because it is meant to objectify something 
unobjectifiable. 
The anti-freedom debaters could also, in most cases, be blamed for failing to 
rightly capture the genuine dimension of human freedom, for they just aim at 
showing the non-existence of freedom of will within the physical world. They 
would not consider the freedom in our transcending dynamism, i.e., 
transcendental liberation as it were, which would enable us to step back from a 
given framework. Pereboom, e.g., argues that, given our knowledge of natural 
science, agent-causal libertarianism is implausible. He says, 
 
it may turn out that some human neural structures differ significantly from 
anything else in nature we understand, and that they serve to ground agent 
causation. This approach may be the best one for libertarians to pursue. 
But at this point we have no evidence that it will turn out to be correct. 
(Pereboom 2007: 114) 
 
True, we can agree that we have no evidence for the prospect that physics, 
physiology, or neuroscience will discover the existence of agent causation, even 
in the remote future. But, we should remark at the same time, that Pereboom 
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would uncritically accept that human freedom should be found, if possible, 
somewhere in the objective worldview described by natural science. What is 
problematic here is, briefly, that the dimension of human transcendence remains 
completely out of his sight. 
Kane, Chisholm, Pereboom, and most of the other debaters, suppose that 
there exists an objective reality, but never take into consideration our 
transcendence of objectification. It is, however, this ‘naïve’ realism, i.e., the 
supposition that there is one fixed reality, that I would suggest is the root, or at 
least one of the essential roots, of the dialectic deadlock in the recent debate as 
introduced in Section 1. For, if there were one fixed reality, independent of our 
objectification and conceptualization, then there would have to be one true 
answer to the question “Are we free or not?” Adequate observation of this 
reality would tell us the Truth of human freedom. Realism uncritically 
presupposed in the free-will debate thus entails the ‘harmful’ supposition that the 
free-will question has one determinate answer.3 
Why is this harmful, however? It is because, if it is assumed that there is this 
one Reality, then the difference between the core suggestions of libertarianism, 
compatibilism and free will skepticism would turn into an opposition or conflict 
concerning who knows the Truth. What each participant in the debate aims at 
would be, in consequence, to show that only her or his view is true. She or he 
would therefore try to find faults in the other camp’s position, but not to 
understand the good aspects of it. Thus, one speaks and the others just shake 
their heads in disbelief, as Double said. As a result of this, we have dialectical 
deadlock. How can we transcend this ‘suffocating’ situation? 
My answer to this question is that we should keep in mind, and continuously 
reflect on, our transcending nature. Realizing the dimension of human 
transcendence, indeed, enables us to truly say that philosophical progress 
consists in deepening our understanding of the world and ourselves through the 
continuous exercise of transcendence, as I developed in Section 2 by following 
Tartaglia. Our philosophical dialogue, thus, essentially has no end and therefore 
never falls into a deadlock. 
Transcendence would, generally speaking, enable us to keep away from a 
fixed framework of thinking and thereby make sense of a certain ‘inconsistent’ 
view in a ‘rational’ way. It would, e.g., tell us that there is something true, and 
                                                     
3 Only a few exceptional philosophers, some of whom are referred to in footnote 1 of this paper, avoid 
the naïve realism of the contemporary free-will debate. 
297 
 
something false, on both sides of the pro-freedom and anti-freedom camps. We 
would therefore have no need to answer which of libertarianism, compatibilism 
and free will skepticism is True. We should rather, e.g., consider in what sense 
each of those views are true and false. I will explain these points in the next, 
final section. The discourse developed in the following is intended as an exercise 
in transcending the dead ends of the debate. Though possibly presumptuous, this 
entails positing a novel dimension for talking about human freedom. I begin my 
argument by objectifying the framework of the debate in a somewhat novel way. 
 
4. 
 
The problem of free will, as transcendent reflection reveals it, can be 
formulated as a conflict between two types of perspective, which would make us 
see the world and ourselves in completely different ways. From one perspective, 
i.e., the ‘daily’ perspective as it were, we see human behavior as action and say 
that, e.g., Mr. A was driven by jealousy and shot Mr. B. Note that, from this 
perspective, we conceive Mr. A’s behavior of shooting as his action. And, insofar 
as we do so, we regard it as a freely chosen and responsible act.  
From the other perspective, i.e., the scientific perspective, however, we see 
human behavior as an event or mere happening and say, e.g., that Mr. A’s brain 
state was such-and-such, the neural firing of such-and-such pattern occurred, 
and then the muscle contraction of such-and-such pattern occurred, with the 
result that the position of the trigger changed, and so forth. We now conceive 
Mr. A’s behavior not as his action (since, from the latter perspective, Mr. A is not 
an agent at all but just a complex sum of physical matter, and therefore Mr. A’s 
behavior is just a combination of physical movements). We rather see it as 
purely ‘impersonal’ event and, insofar as we do so, we regard it as non-free and 
non-responsible.4 
The existence of two types of perspective, and therefore two ways to 
describe the world, leads to the following questions. From which of those 
perspectives should we see human behavior? In which way should we describe 
it? Suppose that a person, say Ms. C, chooses to take the scientific perspective 
and says that Mr. A’s behavior is just an event and so he is not responsible for 
Mr. B’s death. She must be right in some sense, because there is, in fact, a 
                                                     
4 I would define “free will” here by a volitional factor in virtue of which a human being is qualified as 
an agent. Freedom in this sense would have no essential relationship with alternative possibilities. 
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perspective from which to see the world in that way. True, there is another 
perspective, i.e., the daily perspective, to see the world as involving agency. But, 
it can be supposed that Ms. C knows it and yet chooses the ‘impersonal’ one. 
Given this supposition, telling Ms. C that there is another viewpoint would not 
change her idea. Her view that Mr. A’s behavior, or more generally, human 
behavior in general, is not free would thus carry with it some legitimacy.  
Is it the case, however, that each of two ways to describe the world is true in 
its own terms? Should we admit here a kind of relativism which suggests that it 
would be a waste of time to pursue some fruitful dialogue between these two 
ways of discourse? Can we, in the present context, do something more than 
telling Ms. C that there is another viewpoint, in order to argue for our agency 
and freedom?  
My answer, which I am going to explain, is that we can. Certainly, this would 
not imply the ability to convert Ms. C to the pro-freedom school. But, it would 
add a dialectical depth to the present situation, as it were. 
Let me rephrase our question, to begin with. The existence of two ways to 
describe the world brings about the question “Which should we choose?” as 
explained above. Which, then, should we choose between an action narrative 
and an event narrative, as it were? Should we see the world as the space of 
happening and say that our behavior is not free? Or, should we see the world as 
involving agency and ascribe freedom and responsibility to some of our 
behavior?  
I argue that choosing one way to see the world and to describe it, in response 
to this question, is also an action. Selection is an action. It is, in other words, not 
just anything happening in the space of events but rather something an agent 
does. When trying to choose an answer to the question of “Which should we 
choose?” therefore, we are already inside the space of action. We then 
pragmatically presuppose that we are agents and can choose our own lives. 
Even if a person takes the scientific perspective and describes human 
behavior as an event or happening, as Ms. C did about Mr. A’s behavior, that 
person’s act of describing nevertheless figures among human actions. More 
fundamentally, insofar as we are “homines narrantes,” i.e., story-telling human 
beings, we always live within the space of actions. As a result of this, to say 
“Everything is mere event, so there is no action at all” would be inevitably 
absurd in an important sense, for a person’s saying so implies putting out of 
view the fact that she or he says so (this is an action!). 
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The same thing applies to freedom. Should we describe human behavior as 
freely chosen? Or, should we view it as a matter of happening? Choosing one 
among these ways of discourse cannot but be an exercise of freedom. Generally 
speaking, when we choose something, we are already inside the space of 
freedom, as it were, for otherwise we would not be genuine subjects of the 
choice. As a result of this, to say “we are just composites of micro-physical 
movements, so there are no free agents who are truly subjects of behavior” 
would again be absurd. A person’s saying that, in fact, implies the so-called 
‘self-destructive’ negation of his or her own freely choosing to say so.5 
It turns out therefore that we can save the space of actions and freedom at 
the ultimate level. In fact, at the very time when we ask “Are we free agents or 
mere composites of events?” we find ourselves in the space of freedom. Our 
asking something is also among human actions. Our question “Are we free?” 
should, therefore, be affirmatively answered at the very time of its being 
questioned. The existence of human freedom is thus saved at the fundamental 
level. 
This is what I would like to say when I reply to a person like Ms. C, who 
says, “Our behavior is never free.” What I intend by saying so, however, is not 
that Mr. A’s behavior of shooting must be a free action. Rather, I intend to 
remark that, independently of what Ms. C says about the behavior in question, 
we anyway cannot say, e.g., “There is no free action at all,” unless we would fall 
into absurdity. I would suggest further that, if someone asserts that everything 
just happens in accordance with the laws of nature, then her or his statement 
would be self-destructive in an important sense. If, in fact, such a statement were 
true, then her or his assertion would be a mere happening, and therefore it would 
not be any action which could sensibly be ascribed accountability. Likewise, her 
or his saying so would be the same sort of noise. I would thus suggest that the 
‘assertion’ in question has an absurd implication like “Treat this claim just as a 
natural phenomenon, like noise!” 
Certainly, in response to these suggestions, someone might continue to say, 
e.g., “It is exactly the case: I admit that what my assertion implies, and 
everything, including this claim, is just a happening.” I should say here that I 
have nothing to say in reply to him or her. What I have said in the last paragraph, 
however, would justify this resignation. We would have no duty to reply to his 
                                                     
5 This is so, at least insofar as ‘freedom’ here is understood as a factor in virtue of which a human 
being is qualified as an agent, as remarked in the last note. 
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or her voice if it was just a mere noise as he or she ‘suggests’. 
To sum up, we cannot live outside the space of actions and freedom, insofar 
as we are homines narrantes or res cogitantes (since thinking is also an action in 
a broad sense). In this sense, nobody can consistently suggest that there is no 
free action. So, there must be something true about the pro-freedom camp in the 
free-will debate. The point can be explained or enlarged in terms of the concept 
of transcendence. Even if we try to talk about everything as mere happening, 
there remains some residue which keeps its bearing over our event narrative. 
I.e., our fundamental freedom, as exercised in our talking, will not be captured 
as something unfree, as objectified in the event narrative. In this sense, our 
freedom of the ‘deepest’ kind is transcendent and therefore it does not belong to 
the objective causal order; and this is what Tartaglia’s transcendent hypothesis 
says about conscious experience. 
We have thus dis-covered that the space of free actions is never closed so 
long as we live. We should remark, however, that a truth sometimes covers up 
another truth. The truth found in the last paragraphs, i.e., the truth that we cannot 
view everything as mere happening, would, in fact, conceal the antipodal truth 
that human behavior must be just an event. This truth, I will argue, we cannot 
express in a straightforward way. In fact, as I already explained, if we say that 
all of our behavior is mere happening, then we immediately fall into absurdity. 
This is one of the main reasons why free will skepticism, which suggests that we 
have no freedom of will, sounds inconsistent. There is, however, something true 
about the radical denial of human freedom, as I will explain in the following. 
Why should we believe that human beings are unfree? It is because we are 
not, e.g., infinite gods, i.e., exercisers of absolute freedom, but rather just finite 
individuals that belong to the natural world. True, there is a good sense in which 
it can be said that human beings participate of ‘divine’ ability. E.g., 
understanding the meaning of something is a sort of ‘divine’ art, insofar as mere 
animals could not do it. Transcendence, in short, makes us divine to some 
degree. Nonetheless, we are also just parts of the system of nature. Our behavior 
should therefore be one of the events in the global system of causal connection. 
A human being is a part of nature. It cannot be, therefore, a subject of 
independent autonomy. If the word ‘substance’ is a word applied only to 
something independently autonomous, there is no human substance in the world. 
Human beings, metaphorically speaking, are parts of the flow of a big river. Our 
behavior must be mere happening at least in this fundamental sense.  
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Nonetheless, as stressed earlier, the fundamental eventhood of human 
behavior is hard to talk about. This is so, even if it is obvious that our behavior 
cannot but be an event as a part of the order of nature, because, to repeat the 
reason, saying that there is no action would imply absurdity. Our question is thus 
the following: How can we consistently talk about the fundamental eventhood of 
our behavior? Or, in other words, what should we say in order to understand 
why we, who already found that human behavior is necessarily free at the 
ultimate level, can admit that our behavior is fundamentally unfree? How can 
we understand this contradiction? 
My central suggestion is that the fundamental eventhood of our behavior 
cannot be endorsed by us in any direct, or straightforward, way. Its endorsement 
rather requires some medium. If you reflect on the history of thought, you would 
realize that many profound thinkers reached endorsement of the fundamental 
eventhood of our behavior through various paths of mediation (in a more or less 
Hegelian sense). Medieval philosophers or theologians, e.g., contemplated God 
and found His freedom in divine decision to be of the ideal kind. For them, only 
God is truly qualified as free. Human decisions, on the contrary, are just free in a 
very limited, ‘incomplete’ way. Our freedom to make them is a mere shadow of 
the Idea of Divine Freedom, so to speak. Human beings are not masters of their 
own action, but their behavior is a result of God’s choice. In this sense, our 
behavior is not what we do, but something properly called “happening” as a 
remote effect of causa prima. 
Contemplation of the divine perfection, nonetheless, is not demanded as a 
necessary condition for recognizing the eventhood of our behavior. What is 
required would rather be realization of our own finite nature. And, in order to be 
aware of our finitude, it would be necessary to transcend our own sphere and 
relativize it through mediation with something beyond us. Here is the reason 
why the eventhood in question cannot be conceived in a ‘direct’ way. 
Endorsement of it would require self-transcendence, and relativization through 
mediation with something beyond us would open a perspective on which we 
could conceive ourselves as unfree. 
I suggest that scientific reflection on the world also would tell us of the 
limitation of our mastery, as theological contemplation informs us of our 
imperfection of agency. If we view ourselves, e.g., from a physical point of 
view, we conceive human behavior, not as a process of self-determination and 
self-control, but rather as a consequence of some universal laws. From such a 
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scientific perspective, human beings could not renew the world by their action, 
but rather they would just be subjected to the universal laws which govern the 
world. More precisely, the scientific point of view would pull human beings 
back into the dimension in which the distinctions of master/slave, 
free/constraint, and so on, would no longer make sense, because there is no 
room for action within the space of events opened by the ‘cool’ perspective in 
question. 
Let me summarize. When we talk about something, we live within the space 
of action, as I stressed above (since to talk is an action). The space of actions is, 
therefore, the ultimate field of human life in which we continuously find 
ourselves. We human beings, however, are not necessarily immersed in this 
space. We can transcend it, while we are still always within it. We can, in fact, 
step back from our own absolute perspective and relativize it through mediation 
with something beyond us (e.g., God and natural law). We would, in this way, 
find that our behavior is just mere happening of which we have no ultimate 
control. There must be therefore something true about the anti-freedom camps in 
the free-will debate. 
We should remark that, insofar as the pro-freedom and anti-freedom camps 
both suggest something true, the philosophers of free will ought not to seek a 
straightforward answer to the question of “Are we free or not?” The right track 
would be, I suggest, to keep away from this naïve question.  
Someone might be afraid, however, that there would remain nothing for us 
to do in philosophy of free will if we stopped asking whether or not we are free. 
I would suggest that there remain many things. We can, e.g., try to make explicit 
under what framework of thought we engage ourselves in in our first-order 
practice of philosophy, as Tartaglia did in his book and I did in this paper. Our 
transcending nature would leave us many things to do in order to deepen our 
understanding of the world and ourselves. In this sense, I said above that 
philosophy is an activity practiced through, and throughout, each of our lives. 
Concretely speaking, each of the three main camps in the free-will debate, 
libertarianism, compatibilism, and free will skepticism, must have its 
unconsidered framework of investigation. To explicate what it is might be, I 
suggest, one of the things we should be attempting to do. This attempt might, as 
I hope it will, break the dialectical dead end we now face in philosophy of free 
will. 
I will finish my paper with a brief critical comment on one of Tartaglia’s 
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suggestions in his book. I completely sympathize with his conception of 
philosophy as an activity practiced through, and throughout, each of our lives, if 
I correctly understand him. I would therefore argue that Tartaglia could affirm 
life’s meaning in a deepened sense as it were, because he should find some 
‘meaning’ in our engagement in such perennial philosophical conversation. True, 
he is right in suggesting that any social meaning could be transcended and 
therefore it should not be a final aim which would give our life an overall point. 
I remark that his suggestion of this point is very significant because it would 
make us realize the transcendent dimension of our thinking about meaning. 
However, I would note that Tartaglia unnecessarily emphasizes the 
meaninglessness of our life to an excessive degree, because his discourse seems 
at least to me to imply that there is a deeper dimension of meaning of life than 
the ordinary, social one. Tartaglia says, e.g., 
 
[t]here would still be plenty of philosophy to do, of course, because there 
are many routes to transcendence to explore; some of which have 
doubtless yet to be discovered. And there is endless potential for 
investigating the nature and scope of our misrepresentation of 
transcendent being […]. The task could not end, because every new 
generation needs to make philosophical ideas their own. (Tartaglia 2016: 
181) 
 
I would argue that, if such a philosophical journey is worth making, then a life 
including it would be meaningful in some sense. I can agree with Tartaglia that, 
insofar as any social meaning could be relativized, our life could not be 
‘meaningful’ in the sense that some social framework would supply it with an 
overall purpose. I should admit that our life cannot but be like a drifting ship 
with no destination. I would nevertheless argue that, insofar as, e.g., “every new 
generation needs to make philosophical ideas their own,” such activities should 
have some meaning in another sense, though what this sense would be, I 
suggest, is among the hard questions appearing in our perennial philosophical 
journey. Deepening our understanding of life’s meaning that we cannot but 
admit at some level would belong to the intellectual activity authentically called 
the ‘philosophy of meaning of life’. 
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Reply to Sho Yamaguchi 
James Tartaglia* 
 
I know exactly what Sho Yamaguchi means about certain debates in 
philosophy, where the lines of opposition are so trenchantly drawn, and the 
incredulity each side shows to the other is so intense and completely intransigent, 
that the spectacle of it seems, frankly, bizarre. Something, common sense dictates, 
must surely be wrong. One such exchange, which struck me hard when I was a 
student, took place between Daniel Dennett and John Searle (printed in Searle 
1997, thereby allowing Searle to have the last word … or was it rather Dennett, 
by not considering the correspondence worthy of appearing in a publication under 
his name?) Dennett and Searle are probably the two most eminent philosophers 
of mind in the world today. But on the face of it – in the sense, that is, of what we 
would naturally conclude from equivalent evidence within any other area of life 
– each thinks the other a fool. In this exchange, Searle basically says that denying 
the existence of conscious experiences, such as pains, is the most stupid thing any 
philosopher could ever say; and that Dennett says it. While Dennett basically says 
that relying on outdated intuitions, while ignoring all the scientific evidence which 
shows that these intuitions are mistaken is … the most stupid thing any 
philosopher could ever do; and that Searle does it. What is a student, who finds 
the views of both philosophers interesting, supposed to make of such a spectacle?  
Imagine taking your car to a garage, where one mechanic informs you that the 
problem is obviously with the gearbox; no question about it. Then another 
mechanic strides up, with a look of disbelief on his face, and tells you that it is 
obviously nothing to do with the gearbox: the problem is with the carburettor. 
They then both proceed to go at each other’s throats. And just to add to the 
absurdity, suppose you later discover that these are the two most eminent car 
mechanics in the world! Surely one of them must simply be wrong. That was my 
immediate reaction when I encountered the Dennett / Searle exchange, and 
realised that its contours were to be found across philosophy’s debates; albeit 
rarely so sharply defined. I remember telling my supervisor that I thought the 
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problem was time and patience: they were giving up too easily. It seemed to me 
that whenever philosophical debates reached a crux of apparent irreconcilability, 
the participants became frustrated and quit, thereby leaving us onlookers none the 
wiser. So just lock Dennett and Searle in a room, I said, with lots of pieces of 
paper so they can map out their various steps, and refuse to let them out until they 
reach agreement; a psychologist could run tests to make sure they were not faking 
it. Then, assuming they deserve their reputations, we would have the answer. I 
gave up on this idea long ago. I think only one of them would ever leave the room 
(my guess: Searle). It was a naïve conception of philosophy; albeit one which 
remains popular among those who would formalise, and even computerise, all 
philosophical debates. Something must be wrong when these debacles occur, and 
not just someone. 
Yamaguchi has an account of what is going wrong, and I find it highly 
gratifying that it takes inspiration from my book. The idea which captured his 
imagination is that of stepping back from the framework of daily life, in which 
our purposes are presupposed, to consider them in a broader perspective from 
which nihilism can come into view. Yamaguchi then connected this, quite rightly, 
with my concern throughout the book to reconnect the traditional problems of 
philosophy with matters of natural human interest. Philosophy has become insular 
in the shadow of scientistic culture. Add to this the fact that its traditional 
problems have exceedingly long histories, and the result has been the isolation of 
philosophical problems from the natural human interest that sparked them off in 
the first place, leaving them of interest to professionals only. Too often, nobody 
much remembers why their topic was ever supposed to be interesting, and nobody 
much cares so long as writing about it allows them to publish. When philosophers 
address these issues in their ‘research papers’ – which is the misnomer scientistic 
culture has landed our discipline with – I get the distinct impression that the 
question of why they are doing so is rarely at the forefront of their minds. They 
usually find the topic of personal interest, I think; although I have heard more than 
one successful philosopher tell me that they do not find their specialist topic 
interesting – it originally secured their professional niche, so they had to continue 
writing about it to maintain their reputation and publication output. Too often, the 
aim when writing a paper you intend to submit to a journal (and I have been there), 
is to prove you know what you are talking about, make a point that has not been 
made before – within the options provided by the recent literature – and thereby 
secure yourself a publication: in order to build your career as a philosopher. 
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Saying something that might be of interest to people generally, rather than simply 
to people who might cite your paper within their own paper, is too rarely on the 
agenda. 
This blinkered approach works fine in many areas of life. I tend to prefer the 
work of artists who do not much care what the public wants to see or hear, but 
rather look to what their peers are doing, and try to come up with something as 
good or better. This produces good art, and the public tends to latch onto good art; 
and even if they do not, it does not devalue the artist’s endeavour. But I do not 
think such an approach is conducive to good philosophy, even though it does 
regularly appear through the cracks; moreover the public will never latch onto it; 
and I think it does indeed tend to devalue the endeavour – since ways of 
philosophically understanding the world, rooted in the history of how humans 
have thought about these matters, and directed to our current concerns, are not 
thereby produced. What is produced is a myriad of different jigsaw pieces, most 
of which do not connect; some subsets of the pieces do, of course, but the task of 
putting them together has become peripheral to the main task of producing more 
and more pieces. All you need do is find flaws in recently produced pieces, and 
Hey Presto: you have produced a new piece. Piece-production has eclipsed 
puzzling within the closed doors of today’s academy. 
In light of this situation, combined with my concerns about the decline in the 
cultural status of philosophy – which scientistic culture is trying to capitalise upon 
with all its might – I advocated stepping back from the professional framework of 
‘what the players in the debate are saying at the moment,’ to the much wider 
framework of life. I advocated thinking about why anyone ever cared about the 
topic in question, why anyone might still care about it, and why you, the 
philosopher, do. Yamaguchi says that, ‘This ability to step back from a given 
framework Tartaglia calls “transcendence”’ (pp. 288-9). Well, what I 
predominantly mean by ‘transcendence’ in Meaningless relates to my view that 
consciousness provides a context from within which we conceptualise the world, 
but that reality itself is ‘transcendent’, in the sense that its nature transcends such 
conceptualisations; except for the minimally contentful ones we use to 
metaphysically point to it. Nevertheless, I am all for creative readings of my work, 
and we certainly do ‘transcend’ frameworks in thought when we look to a wider 
framework from within which the goals that previously absorbed us to the 
exclusion of all else now take on a new significance. Metaphysics is the ultimate 
transcendence, in this sense. So Yamaguchi’s terminology is fine by me. 
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Yamaguchi goes on – again in a manner I thoroughly approve of – to connect 
this view that philosophy needs to transcend its insular concerns to consider them 
within the sphere of a wider framework, with my distinction between ontology 
and enframement. Thus philosophy can benefit from framing its interest in 
ontological matters, such as the nature of consciousness or time, within a context 
which reveals the wider interest of the matter. As he puts it, ‘Answering the 
question of enframement of an ontological inquiry would justify the whole 
philosophical project at a deeper level’, and he memorably characterises this 
approach as ‘two-wheeled’ (p. 291).  
He connects this ‘two-wheeled’ approach with discussions, in Chapters 3 and 
8, where I say that the diversity of opinions to be found in philosophy only seems 
like a weakness if we make an inappropriate comparison to the kind of consensus 
that can be found in science or mathematics. For when we grasp what philosophy 
is really up to, we should not be expecting definitive, final answers. If everyone 
agreed with The Book of Philosophical Answers, there would no longer be any 
philosophy in the world, just a list of dead facts (or rather, a list of what these 
unrealistically unphilosophical people regarded as facts). Similarly, if all painters 
tried to mimic the style of Chagall as closely as possible, then the art of painting 
would be pretty much dead – completely dead if they simply reproduced his 
originals. And if everyone agreed about the causes of World War I, then that topic 
would no longer be a live one for historians. Connecting all these ideas up in his 
own original way, then, Yamaguchi reaches the view that by continually 
transcending philosophical debates – to frame them within a wider context 
determined by the concerns of the day which the philosopher finds his- or herself 
living among – philosophy becomes a never-ending practice. ‘Finding a definitive 
answer to a question would, therefore, not be any genuine part of our 
philosophical journey.’ (p. 293) 
I have sympathy for this position, but I think it goes a little too far. All I would 
say, and did say in Meaningless, is that it seems exceptionally unlikely, in light of 
the history and nature of philosophy, that we will ever find definitive answers to 
the traditional problems of philosophy which everyone can agree on; after all, 
there is disagreement in philosophy even over matters such as the Law of Non-
Contradiction. However I also do not think this is something to worry about. In 
philosophy, we cannot simply work within the confines of objective thought, 
which sets up strict criteria for accurate representation, since the status of the 
world objective thought describes is itself a paradigmatically philosophical issue. 
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The history of philosophy provides us with a variety of competing 
representational systems with which to attempt to describe reality in this wider 
context, via investigation of the various phenomena which resist incorporation 
into objective thought and thereby indicate the presence of a wider context. In 
such an endeavour, objective thought cannot settle matters on its own; even the 
physicalist who wants it to, will still have to portray the objective world as the 
final context, thereby stepping outside of objective thought and into philosophy. 
Moreover, given the variety of competing representational systems that have been 
developed – none of which are required by objective thought, otherwise the 
problems they seek to address would never have arisen – there are no universally 
accepted definitions from which a definitive answer might be derived a priori. As 
such, continuing disagreement is practically inevitable. But this is no bad thing, 
because it prevents objective thought from closing in on itself, and thereby keeps 
the world philosophical.  
I would not say that a definitive answer would ‘not be any genuine part of our 
philosophical journey’, then, only that we should not see lack of consensus as a 
problem, but rather a facet of philosophy. We have to look for definitive answers, 
and I think it would be great if there could be consensus around an answer which 
affirmed, in some essential way, the transcendent nature of our reality. I would 
love for everyone to agree on that, primarily because the world would thereby 
become a more philosophical place again; intransigent oppositions would still 
proliferate, of course, but the prospect we currently face of objective thought 
closing in on itself would have become a distant memory – a laughable one, I 
should have thought, were everyone to come to agree on this, as a new kind of 
background common sense. If I find solutions I am happy with, then I do not see 
anything wrong with promoting them as the answers which should be accepted as 
definitive. Anything else would seem rather wishy-washy. For although I think 
philosophy has an affinity with art, in that it has developed a variety of schools of 
representation, and aesthetic and emotional effects belong within its remit, it must 
always be a representational ‘art’. The idea of a purely abstract philosophy makes 
no sense to me. If there is a transcendent context of meaning, then I am wrong 
about nihilism, and that is that; regardless of whether there is any way I could ever 
possibly know this. You might be wrong in philosophy – but you cannot really be 
wrong in art. You are extremely unlikely to be right if you think you are better 
than Picasso; but your paintings will not be wrong. 
Yamaguchi’s position is rather stronger than mine, then, in that he thinks the 
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idea of a definitive answer is a mistake to be shunned; whereas I, mindful of the 
quotation from Kołakowski with which I opened Chapter 8 (PML, p. 169), think 
that such an answer has to be your aim when you enter into metaphysical inquiry. 
Yamaguchi has extended my views in his own direction, which is a good thing; it 
is what you should always try to do with philosophical ideas, if you can. This is 
not to deny, of course, that there remains a very close affinity. After all, even 
though I would be glad if some position on the transcendence of reality were to 
become definitive, I would still expect it to be continually ‘transcended’, in 
Yamaguchi’s sense, in the hands of each new creative philosopher. And I am 
always looking for opportunities to ‘transcend’ my own positions with new 
resonances. However, it is the extra strength of his position, according to which 
we should not even be seeking a definitive answer, and thereby should not be 
arguing that others have it wrong, which provides his solution to the puzzle of 
intransigence with which I opened this reply. I stand by my conviction that 
something must be wrong when philosophy can produce spectacular standoffs like 
the one between Searle and Dennett. So let us see how Yamaguchi’s solution fares 
in explaining what it is. 
Yamaguchi illustrates his solution against the backdrop of the free will debate. 
I shall be rather cagey as regards the content of this debate, because in the sequel 
to Meaningless which I am currently working on, free will is one of the traditional 
topics I will address, along with personal identity and truth; just as in the original 
I addressed consciousness, time and universals. Since I have yet to get into the 
fine detail of my account of freedom, however, I want to avoid saying something 
I might later regret. So I shall leave free will as an example, and focus on the 
metaphilosophy. 
He gets to the crux of the matter in the following passage: 
 
if there were one fixed reality, independent of our objectification and 
conceptualization, then there would have to be one true answer to the 
question “Are we free or not?” Adequate observation of this reality would 
tell us the Truth of human freedom. Realism uncritically presupposed in the 
free-will debate thus entails the ‘harmful’ supposition that the free-will 
question has one determinate answer.  
Why is this harmful, however? It is because, if it is assumed that there 
is this one Reality, then the difference between the core suggestions of 
libertarianism, compatibilism and free will skepticism would turn into an 
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opposition or conflict concerning who knows the Truth. What each 
participant in the debate aims at would be, in consequence, to show that 
only her or his view is true. She or he would therefore try to find faults in 
the other camp’s position, but not to understand the good aspects of it. Thus, 
one speaks and the others just shake their heads in disbelief, …. (p. 296). 
 
The solution, then, is to reject the assumption that there is one, fixed and 
determinate reality from which we are trying to discover the answer as to whether 
we are free or not. Reality is transcendent so will not yield such answers. Rather, 
we make philosophical progress through the deepening of understanding we 
achieve by looking for the truth in all the three main positions in the debate: 
compatibilism, libertarianism and free will scepticism. We look for the ‘good 
aspects’ of each, and thereby avoid the kind of standoff that arises when we 
assume that one must be wholly right and the other two wholly wrong. We 
transcend the terms of the debate, frame it within the context of our personal 
journey of philosophical discovery, and see what we can take from all sides. 
I find this an appealing vision, and following it through would indeed seem 
to avoid any potential for unproductive impasses, of the kind which can place our 
discipline in a most unattractive light. However, once we get into the detail of 
what Yamaguchi thinks he can take from the various sides of the debate, doubts 
start forming in my mind. From the side that affirm freedom (the compatibilists 
and libertarians), Yamaguchi takes the following insight. Whenever we take a 
stance on the free will issue, he thinks, whether by looking at our actions as 
physical, causally determined events, and hence not as freely chosen and self-
determined, or else when we look at our actions as actions, as we do within the 
framework of daily life, and hence as freely chosen actions originating in our 
decisions to work towards certain goals, then whichever way we decide to look at 
it, we are deciding, choosing, acting. ‘Selection is an action’, as he puts it (p. 298). 
In my terms, we might say that philosophy, like any of our other activities, takes 
place in the framework, even though it sometimes requires us to disengage from 
the framework in thought. 
The action of transcending our framework of actions in order to see them as 
causally determined movements partially undermines the free will sceptic’s 
position, in Yamaguchi’s view, thereby rendering it ‘absurd’ (p. 299). For then the 
sceptic is saying, as a freely-chosen action, meant to be interpreted as such (they 
want us to choose to embrace their position rather than any other) that the sound 
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passing the barrier of their teeth is just ‘mere noise’ (p. 300). They are asserting 
that they are not making an assertion. If we take them at their word, we have no 
position to respond to; but the very fact of taking them at their word gives us all 
the reason we need to reject their position.  
However, this only partially undermines their view, for Yamaguchi also thinks 
there is a sound insight to be taken from free will scepticism. For we can indeed 
transcend our ordinary framework in which action and purpose is presupposed, in 
order to view ourselves from the wider perspective of the physical universe. As 
he puts it, ‘We can, in fact, step back from our own absolute perspective and 
relativize it through mediation with something beyond us (e.g., God and natural 
law). We would, in this way, find that our behavior is just mere happening of 
which we have no ultimate control’ (p. 302). We thereby show recognition of our 
finitude by relativizing our lives within the framework, to something larger. So 
both the free will and anti-free will sides of the debate are onto something, and by 
recognising our ability to transcend our situation in thought, we can take the good 
aspects of both in order to weave them into our own personal philosophical 
journeys, without feeling the need to stand our ground on one side or the other. 
The transcending ability shows we are free; what we discover when we exercise 
it in a certain way shows that we are not. 
I find this account original, well-motivated and interesting; but as I said before, 
I have my doubts. Firstly, it seems to me that Yamaguchi is siding with the 
compatibilist, although officially he is not supposed to be taking sides. For if, as 
he says, ‘human behavior is necessarily free at the ultimate level’ (p. 301), given 
our transcending ability and the fact that exercising it always places our utterances 
in the space of reason and action, and yet he does not seek to deny the legitimacy 
of conceiving these same utterances as simply physical movements, then it seems 
to me that the free will sceptic must simply be wrong to think that free will is an 
illusion. It appears illusionary when we take up a certain stance towards the world, 
but at the ‘ultimate level’, it is always there, being exercised in the background. 
So free will and determinism are compatible. Moreover, the third side of the 
debate, libertarianism, receives very little concession within Yamaguchi’s account. 
It is right about the reality of free will; but then so is compatibilism, which does 
not make the mistake of thinking free will is incompatible with determinism – a 
mistake which places libertarianism on the misguided track of trying to insert a 
special kind of agent causation into the physical world. So it seems to me that 
Yamaguchi is saying that compatibilism is right, but that nevertheless there is 
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something right about free will scepticism (which the compatibilist recognises) 
and something right about libertarianism (which the compatibilist also recognises). 
This is somewhat conciliatory; but then, compatibilism, by its very nature, is a 
conciliatory position. He will still be faced with free will sceptics saying, ‘no, 
there is no free will at all’, and libertarians saying, ‘no, our physical perspective 
on the universe does not reveal any truth to free will scepticism’. 
And secondly, I have my doubts about the potency of Yamaguchi’s central 
argument against the free will sceptic, namely that our ability to transcend the 
framework and take up a purely physical perspective undermines their position. 
For they can simply say that Yamaguchi’s ‘mere noise’ is a causal determinant of 
yet more ‘mere noise’: one person emits sounds, these sounds are processed in the 
brain of another, causing them to respond with yet more sounds, bodily 
movements, etc. They can say that although we naturally interpret these sounds 
as intentional speech acts, that is not what they really are, and the interpretation 
we place on them is simply another part of the causal network. Hence there is only 
really sound and movement, and the act of transcending the framework in thought 
is yet more of the same. I am not saying I agree with this, but nevertheless I think 
this is what they would say; and nothing in Yamaguchi’s account undermines it. 
I very much like the aim of Yamaguchi’s account, then, namely that of 
steering our discipline towards a more tolerant, self-reflective and productive 
future, and I think he is working along the right lines (naturally enough, perhaps). 
I am just not sure he is quite there yet; but I look forward to his future development 
of these ideas. So what do I myself think was going on in the clash of the titans 
between Searle and Dennett? Essentially, what I said in Meaningless about the 
general root of philosophical standoffs on the transcendence-denying side.  
Both Searle and Dennett think that consciousness needs to be incorporated 
into the scientific world-view of objective thought, but they have different tactics 
for pursuing this doomed and damaging project. Searle thinks the scientific world-
view must be expanded to include subjective properties, while Dennett thinks the 
scientific world-view requires us to reject subjective properties. Philosophy-
scepticism is more deeply ingrained in Dennett, which is why he hates Searle’s 
philosophical intuitions so much, but both are motivated by science-worship; the 
only reason Searle is happy with his philosophical intuitions is that he thinks a 
metaphysic dictated by science can incorporate them by simply saying that brain 
states causes subjective properties. Searle is more realistic, because when 
philosophers like Dennett are not breathing down scientists’ necks, they are 
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perfectly happy to say which of the brain states they are investigating cause which 
states of consciousness; it is the natural thing to say when you are not doing 
philosophy. The philosophical pyrotechnics Dennett engages in so as to make 
consciousness disappear are hardly likely to be embraced outside of philosophy. 
And yet Dennett has a better grasp of the philosophical situation, because 
consciousness does indeed need to be exiled to the realms of pure illusion if the 
metaphysics of physicalism is true. 
The reason they find it so hard to stomach each other’s positions is that in 
their minds, the scientific respectability of philosophy is at stake. The only future 
for philosophy, they both think, is one in which it walks hand-in-hand with science. 
As leaders of their profession, this raises the stakes considerably. Searle thinks 
that Dennett’s denial of something as blatantly obvious as conscious experience 
will lead his discipline into disrepute and ultimate ruin; science is currently 
finding out more than ever before about consciousness, and if philosophy is seen 
to be denying its existence, it will be ridiculed and isolated. Dennett, on the other 
hand, thinks that Searle is making claims without scientific evidence, and that 
philosophy only has a future if it learns to track scientific discoveries at every turn, 
never deviating too far from them; common sense and philosophical reasoning 
must no longer seek to supplement, and can certainly never be allowed to conflict 
with, the hard evidence of the sciences; otherwise, once more, the discipline will 
fall into disrepute. Both have closed their minds to the notion of transcendence, 
and hence an absolutely central component of the history of their discipline, from 
which its future will unfold. Eradicate scientism and reassert philosophy’s own 
identity, and their worries disappear in a puff of smoke. Philosophy will never 
have a future hanging onto the coattails of science. When its conflicting voices try 
to help science out, the result is the opposite of that intended; if philosophers were 
not so keen to get involved, I expect there would be a lot less philosophy-
scepticism in popular science books. 
Without the influence of scientism, I think they could probably see some good 
in each other’s positions. At the very least, such intemperate exchanges would be 
less likely, because much less would be at stake: within a self-confident discipline 
eager to assert its independence, all that would be at stake is how best to 
philosophically describe consciousness, and although they would still reject each 
other’s starting points, they might still find some useful insights transpiring 
further down the line; Dennett’s reflections on the inaccuracy of introspective 
judgements, for instance, or Searle’s account of the intentional structure of mind. 
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I have no doubt that standoffs would still occur, but if each side made more effort 
to understand the reasoning behind the other’s curious starting point, so that it 
came to seem a little less curious; and if they no longer saw the starting point as a 
reason not to look further down the line to find out whether it issues in something 
that could profitably be incorporated into their own understanding; then these 
standoffs might be a little more productive. This might sound rich coming from 
me, given the polemical character of the appendix to the introduction to 
Meaningless. But: I did make considerable effort to understand the starting point 
of the meaning in life debate; the direction it heads thereafter falls outside of my 
interests in that book; I am still learning; and philosophy is not where it needs to 
be yet. 
Yamaguchi ends his paper with the criticism that, ‘Tartaglia unnecessarily 
emphasizes the meaninglessness of our life to an excessive degree, because his 
discourse seems at least to me to imply that there is a deeper dimension of 
meaning of life than the ordinary, social one’ (p. 303). Well, I would have needed 
a different title if I had not, and besides, I think nihilism is a very big deal: it 
provides a legitimate secular answer to an unjustifiably maligned philosophical 
question which has deep personal resonance for us all. His reasoning is that, ‘there 
is a deeper dimension of meaning of life than the ordinary, social one,’ and that 
this is provided by undertaking a philosophical journey, which might include 
‘Deepening our understanding of life’s meaning’ (p. 303). This just strikes me as 
social meaning; which is no bad thing. Social meaning makes life worth living, 
and if philosophy is your particular thing, it can provide plenty of the good kind. 
Writing this reply gave me a buzz, and I hope it will do something similar for 
Yamaguchi and others. I see no good reason to try to elevate our buzzes over those 
of others, and I see no plausible way of doing so either. If philosophy is good, then 
others will latch on; always have, always will. 
 
 
References 
 
Searle, J. (1997) The Mystery of Consciousness, London: Granta. 
 
 
 
Information about the Authors 
 
 
Adam Balmer   
Ph.D. student, Keele University. 
Philip Goff 
Associate Professor, Central European University. 
Ronald A. Kuipers 
Associate Professor, Philosophy of Religion, and Director of the Centre for 
Philosophy, Religion, and Social Ethics (CPRSE), the Institute for Christian 
Studies. 
Tracy Llanera 
Postdoctoral Research Fellow (Fall 2017) – Humility & Conviction in Public Life, 
University of Connecticut Humanities Institute. 
Alan Malachowski 
Research Associate, Centre for Applied Ethics, Stellenbosch University. 
Bjørn Torgrim Ramberg 
Professor of Philosophy, Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature (CSMN), 
University of Oslo. 
James Tartaglia 
Senior Lecturer in Philosophy, Keele University. 
Brooke Alan Trisel 
Independent scholar. 
J. J. Valberg 
University College London, retired. 
Damian Veal 
Independent Researcher. 
Sho Yamaguchi 
Part‐time lecturer, Kyoto University. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISBN 978‐4‐9908668‐2‐2 
Journal of Philosophy of Life 
